Williams v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 federal appellate · 90 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 96 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““.[T]he Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say, the term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police. This focus reflects the fact that the Miranda safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of protection against coercive police practices, without regard to objective proof of the underlying intent of the police. A practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to interrogation. But, since the police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of the police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Drury v. State · Fenner v. State

2. ““[a] finding by the trial judge that a particular piece of evidence is relevant, however, does not mean that evidence is automatically admissible. Even relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Hunt v. State, 321 Md. 387, 425 , 583 A.2d 218, 236 (1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 835 , 112 S.Ct. 117 , 116 L.Ed.2d 86 (1991); 5 Lynn McLain, Maryland Evidence § 403.1, at 297 (1987). As with the trial court’s relevancy determination, a decision to admit relevant evidence over an objection that the evidence is unfairly prejudicial will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Hunt, 321 Md. at 425 , 583 A.2d at 236 .””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Snyder v. State · Fenner v. State

3. “[t]hese were routine procedures that the officers could hardly be expected to anticipate would prompt an incriminating statement.... These comments simply advised Williams that police had evidence they believed established Williams’s guilt in a double homicide, and as a result he was being charged with murder. We cannot conclude that the trial judge erred in finding that these innocuous comments were not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating responses from Williams.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 186 Md. App. 498 - Smith v. State · 140 Md. App. 520 - White v. State