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342 N.C. 184

463 S.E.2d 228

Echols v. Zarn, Inc.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Decided November 3, 1995

Supreme Court of North Carolina · decided 1995-11-03

Relies on Woodson v. Rowland · Pleasant v. Johnson · Mickles v. Duke Power Co.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1995-11-03

How this case has been cited

Cited by 15 later decisions — most recently December 2012

13 state decisions

70199520002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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*185 PER CURIAM.

¶1 With respect to plaintiffs first assignment of error as to whether she may maintain this action for damages against her co-employee, Edith Barnett, pursuant to the holding in Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 325 S.E.2d 244 (1985), we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

¶2 With respect to plaintiffs second assignment of error as to whether she may maintain this action against her employer, Zarn, Inc., pursuant to the holding in Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991), we also affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. However, as we did in Mickles v. Duke Power Company, 342 N.C. 103, 463 S.E.2d 206 (1995), we disavow the language of the Court of Appeals in Echols v. Zarn, Inc., 116 N.C. App. 364, 378, 448 S.E.2d 289, 297 (1994), suggesting that the Restatement (Second) of Torts illustrates misconduct which satisfies Woods cm’s “substantial certainty” test. Restatement (Second) of Torts provides as follows:

A throws a bomb into B’s office for the purpose of killing B. A knows that C, B’s stenographer, is in the office. A has no desire to injure C, but knows that his act is substantially certain to do so. C is injured by the explosion. A is subject to liability to C for an intentional tort.

¶3 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A illus. 1 (1965).

¶4 As we stated in Mickles,

[according to well-known principles of tort liability, one who intentionally engages in conduct knowing that particular results are substantially certain to follow also intends those results for purposes of tort liability. See Woodson, 329 N.C. at 341, 407 S.E.2d at 229. In the above example, A is actually certain his act will injure or kill C. A successful claim under the Woodson exception does not require such actual certainty.

¶5 Mickles, 342 N.C. at 110, 463 S.E.2d at 211.

¶6 AFFIRMED.

Justice ORR did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
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