No. 657 July 23, 2025 119
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CARL WESLEY SANDBERG,
Defendant-Appellant.
Marion County Circuit Court
19CR59298; A182558
Jennifer K. Gardiner, Judge.
Submitted June 24, 2025.
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Emily P. Seltzer, Deputy Public Defender,
Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant. Carl Wesley Sandberg filed the supplemental brief
pro se.
Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Michael A. Casper, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and
Jacquot, Judge.
KAMINS, J.
Affirmed.
120 State v. Sandberg
KAMINS, J.
Defendant appeals his convictions for arson in
the first degree and aggravated animal abuse in the first
degree, after he set a fire to a home. He assigns seven counseled assignments of error. In his first two assignments of
error, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his
motion of acquittal (MJOA) on the arson charge and the
aggravated animal abuse charge. In assignments of error
three through seven, defendant challenges restitution for
property damages as a result of defendant’s fires. We also
reject defendant’s two supplemental assignments of error.
We therefore affirm.
In his first assignment of error, defendant contends
that the trial court erred in denying his MJOA on the arson
charge. He does not dispute that a fire was intentionally
set; instead, he argues that the evidence did not permit a
reasonable inference that he started the fire, because the
state relied on “entirely circumstantial” evidence. See ORS
164.325 (requiring that a defendant intentionally start a
fire to be convicted of arson in the first degree). We review
“the denial of a [MJOA] to determine whether, viewing the
facts and all reasonable inferences that maybe drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the state, a rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Powe, 314 Or
App 726, 728-29,
497 P3d 793 (2021).
The evidence, though circumstantial, supports the
reasonable inference that defendant started the fire.
Security cameras outside of a burglarized, burnt residence
captured defendant’s truck at the time of the fire. Defendant
was also in possession of stolen items from that residence.
A fire investigator concluded that the fire was intentionally
set because two independent fires occurred in the house and
those fires were not near any heat source or electrical wires.
From that evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to
the state, a factfinder could reasonably infer that defendant
intentionally started the fire. See State v. Fasai, 333 Or App
724, 727,
553 P3d 566 (2024) (explaining that circumstantial
evidence supported the defendant’s forgery conviction where
the record contained evidence that “the victim’s checks were
Nonprecedential Memo Op:
342 Or App 119 (2025) 121
blank when they were stolen, that [the] defendant had the
checks in his possession, and that they were completed when
[the] defendant provided” those checks to an acquaintance).
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in
denying defendant’s MJOA.
In his second assignment of error, defendant contends that the state failed to prove that he “maliciously”
killed a dog that died in the fire. ORS 167.322(3)(a) (2013),
amended by Or Laws 2024, ch 41, § 2 (defining “[m]aliciously”
as “intentionally acting with depravity of mind and reckless
and wanton disregard of life”). However, that argument is
unpreserved. At trial, defendant moved for an MJOA, contending that the “level of proof is not high enough to submit” the arson and animal abuse “issues” to the jury based
entirely on the theory that defendant was not responsible for
starting the fire. He never argued that he did not act “maliciously.” Accordingly, defendant’s argument challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence as to the mental state is unpreserved. See State v. Mendoza-Lopez, 291 Or App 292, 294-95,
419 P3d 761 (2018) (explaining that preservation “is required
to advance goals such as ensuring that the positions of the
parties are presented clearly to the initial tribunal,” “which
aids the trial court in making a decision and the appellate
court in reviewing it” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Defendant does not request plain error review, and we will
not undertake that analysis unless we are explicitly asked
to do so. State v. McIntire,
328 Or App 328, 335,
537 P3d
608 (2023), rev den,
327 Or 26 (2024). Accordingly, we reject
defendant’s second assignment of error.
In assignments of error three through seven, defendant challenges restitution for property damage resulting
from the fires. Restitution “is to be awarded when a defendant has been convicted of a crime that results in economic
damages to the victim and the state has presented evidence
of those damages.” State v. Kamaunu, 341 Or App 257, 260,
___ P3d___ (2025) (internal quotation marks omitted). We
“review the trial court’s imposition of restitution for legal
error, remaining mindful that we are bound by the trial
court’s findings, including reasonable inferences, if they are
supported by any evidence in the record.” State v. Pool, 338
122 State v. Sandberg
Or App 19, 20,
565 P3d 73 (2025) (internal citation marks
omitted).
Assignments of error three through six pertain to
the imposition of restitution to four different insurance companies. Defendant contends that the restitution amounts
owed to the insurance companies were unreasonable. See
ORS 31.705(2)(a) (explaining that recoverable economic damages mean “objectively verifiable monetary losses including
but not limited to … reasonable and necessarily incurred
costs due to loss of use of property and reasonable costs
incurred for repair or for replacement of damaged property,
whichever is less”). However, those restitution amounts were
supported by the evidentiary record. Each insurance company put forth invoices or records that contained an itemized breakdown of repair costs. Such evidence is presumed
reasonable. See ORS 137.106(1)(c) (explaining that “[a]t a
restitution hearing, economic damages will be presumed
reasonable if the damages are documented in the form of a
record, bill, estimate or invoice from a business”). Defendant
did not rebut that presumption. Thus, the trial court did not
err in imposing restitution to the insurance companies.
In his seventh assignment of error, defendant challenges the imposition of $250,000 in restitution amount to a
church. He contends that the church was not entitled to, or
that he rebutted, the presumption under ORS 137.106(1)(c)
that the amount was reasonable. However, the state submitted a profit and loss statement and an email from a church
employee, who testified at the hearing as to the expenses
that were not reimbursed by insurance, to support the
church’s restitution amount. The trial court’s determination
was thus supported by evidence in the record. Cf. Pool, 338
Or App at 24 (concluding that the imposition of a restitution
amount to replace a surfboard “was unsubstantiated by the
record—as evinced by the court’s own statement that ‘[i]t’s
unclear … how much the repair would cost to repair the
stab wounds in the board’ ”). Accordingly, we reject defendant’s seventh assignment of error.
Defendant also advances two supplemental assignments of error. First, he contends that an officer “gave false
testimony while testifying about his training” because,
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 342 Or App 119 (2025) 123
according to defendant, the officer testified that he did not
receive arson training even though the officer took one course
at the International Association of Arson Investigators.
However, assuming that would be a basis for relief, the record
does not support that assertion. Second, defendant contends
that the state committed a Brady violation by disposing of
fire debris. The trial court considered that argument below
and rejected it, concluding that the debris was not “material” or “potentially useful” because the debris undisputedly
could not be used as evidence to demonstrate how the fire
was started. That conclusion is supported by the record, and
therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err. Cf.
Tiner v. Premo,
284 Or App 59, 79,
391 P3d 816, rev den,
361
Or 886 (2017) (explaining that the prosecution committed a
Brady violation because it withheld impeachment evidence
that was material to central issues at trial).
Affirmed.
