250 July 30, 2025 No. 675
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of W. V.,
a Youth.
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent,
v.
W. V.,
Appellant.
Douglas County Circuit Court
16JU03787; A175342
Ann Marie Simmons, Judge.
Submitted January 30, 2023.
G. Aron Perez-Selsky and Michael J. Wallace filed the
brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Patricia G. Rincon, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Powers, Judge, and
Hellman, Judge.
HELLMAN, J.
Reversed and remanded.
Powers, J., dissenting.
Cite as 342 Or App 250 (2025) 251
HELLMAN, J.
Youth appeals a judgment that ordered him to
report as a sex offender.1 In his sole assignment of error,
youth argues that the juvenile court erred when it denied
his motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. In youth’s view,
the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to hold his sex offender
reporting hearing eight months after it entered an order
terminating jurisdiction.
This is the first time we have been presented with
a case that requires us to determine how ORS 163A.030(12),
ORS 163A.030(1)(b)(A), and ORS 419C.005(4) work together.
As we more fully explain below, ORS 163A.030(12) permits
the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction for purposes of a sex
offender reporting hearing, even if jurisdiction has otherwise been terminated under ORS 419C.005(4)(c) (the provision at issue in youth’s case). However, ORS 163A.030(1)(b)(A)
requires the juvenile court to make a good cause determination before holding a sex offender reporting hearing outside
of the statutory six-month period. Because neither the parties
nor the juvenile court had the benefit of our determination of
how the statutes work together, and because the court did not
make a good cause determination before holding the hearing,
we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
In 2016, youth was committed to OYA custody
based on his admission that he committed an act which, if
committed by an adult, would have been a felony sex offense
(attempt to commit sexual abuse in the first degree). At the
time, youth was 17 years old. The commitment order was
for a period “not to exceed five years” and would “not extend
beyond the date [on] which the youth becomes 25 years of
age.” On September 12, 2018, the state moved to terminate
jurisdiction because youth was convicted in adult court in
Colorado for “attempting to influence a public servant and
1
Although the caption of the order uses the phrase “sex offender registration,” the text of the order correctly refers to the statutory requirement for a
juvenile as one of “reporting.” ORS 163A.030(1)(a). Accordingly, we use the terms
“reporting” or “to report” in this opinion. However, as we previously recognized,
“to report” and “reporting” are often used interchangeably with “to register”
and “registration.” See State v. A. L. M., 305 Or App 389, 395 n 5,
469 P3d 244,
rev den,
367 Or 218 (2020) (noting the discrepancy in the terminology and concluding that the difference does not affect the legal analysis).
252 State v. W. V.
resisting arrest.” The juvenile court terminated jurisdiction
on September 13, 2018.
Almost eight months later, on May 1, 2019, youth’s
probation officer filed a notice seeking a sex offender reporting
hearing in youth’s case. Youth filed a motion to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction, arguing that the juvenile court lost jurisdiction over him on September 13, 2018, and could no longer hold
a sex offender reporting hearing. Youth acknowledged ORS
163A.030(12), which states, “Notwithstanding ORS 419C.005
(4)(c), (d) and (e), the juvenile court retains jurisdiction over a
person for purposes of this section.” However, youth argued
that that provision allowed the retention of jurisdiction only
if the sex offender reporting hearing was already in progress.
In support of his argument, youth relied on ORS 163A.030(1)
(b)(A), which provides that a sex offender reporting hearing
“must be held … [d]uring the six-month period before the
termination of juvenile court jurisdiction over the person[.]”
The juvenile court denied youth’s motion to dismiss. The juvenile court held that ORS 163A.030(12) controlled and that it therefore retained jurisdiction to hold a
sex offender reporting hearing. The juvenile court ordered
youth to report as a sex offender. This appeal followed.
The question presented in this case involves
how to harmonize seemingly inconsistent statutes: ORS
163A.030(12), ORS 163A.030(1)(b)(A), and ORS 419C.005(4).
Questions of statutory construction are “questions of law
that we review for legal error.” State ex rel Rosenblum v.
Living Essentials, LLC, 371 Or 23, 33,
529 P3d 939 (2023).
“We resolve those questions by seeking to give effect to the
intent of the legislature as demonstrated by the text, context, and any helpful legislative history.”
Id. In so doing,
we interpret statutes to “give effect to all” provisions. ORS
174.010; see also State v. Clemente-Perez,
357 Or 745, 755,
359 P3d 232 (2015) (in conducting a statutory analysis we
“assume that the legislature did not intend any portion
of its enactments to be meaningless surplusage”); State v.
Cloutier,
351 Or 68, 98,
261 P3d 1234 (2011) (observing that
“an interpretation that renders a statutory provision meaningless should give us pause, both as a matter of respect
for a coordinate branch of government that took the trouble
Cite as
342 Or App 250 (2025) 253
to enact the provision into law and as a matter of complying with the interpretive principle that, if possible, we give
a statute with multiple parts a construction that ‘will give
effect to all’ of those parts”).
Ultimately, our opinion turns on our interpretation
of the “good cause” provision in ORS 163A.030(1)(b)(A). But
to understand why that statute provides the answer in this
case, it is necessary to understand the overall statutory
framework that applies in juvenile sex offender reporting
hearings.
We start with ORS 419C.005(1). That provision, contained within Oregon’s chapter for juvenile delinquency, sets
forth ways that a juvenile court obtains jurisdiction over a
youth. ORS 419C.005(4) provides that jurisdiction continues
until one of the statutorily listed events occurs, including
paragraph (c) (the provision applicable in this case), when
“[t]he court enters an order terminating jurisdiction.” Thus,
under ORS 419C.005(4)(c), the juvenile court’s jurisdiction
over youth ended on September 13, 2018, when the juvenile
court entered an order terminating jurisdiction.
But for individuals in youth’s situation, the straightforward and logical statement in ORS 419.005(4)(c) is not the
end of the jurisdictional story. ORS 163A.030(12), a provision
in the youth sex offender reporting framework, complicates
the analysis. ORS 163A.030(12) states, “Notwithstanding
ORS 419.005(4)(c), (d), and (e), the juvenile court retains
jurisdiction over a person for purposes of this section.” So,
despite having entered an order terminating jurisdiction,
the juvenile court did not, in fact, completely terminate
jurisdiction over youth. Instead, under ORS 163A.030(12),
the juvenile court retained jurisdiction for the specific purpose of holding a sex offender reporting hearing.
Once again, that straightforward text is not the end
of the story because ORS 163A.030(1), which sets forth the
legal framework for holding the sex offender reporting hearing, also applies in this situation. The relevant portion of
that statute provides:
“(1)(a) Except as provided in subsection (6) of this section, the juvenile court shall hold a hearing on the issue of
254 State v. W. V.
reporting as a sex offender by a person who has been found
to be within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under ORS
419C.005 … for having committed an act that if committed by an adult would constitute a felony sex crime if:
“(A) The person was adjudicated on or after August
12, 2015
“…
“(b) Unless the court continues the hearing described
in this section for good cause, the hearing must be held:
“(A) During the six-month period before the termination of juvenile court jurisdiction over the person.”
The statute first sets forth a requirement for the
juvenile court to hold a sex offender reporting hearing for
a youth who was within its jurisdiction. ORS 163A.030(1)
(a). The statute also requires that the reporting hearing
“must be held … [d]uring the six-month period before the
termination of juvenile court jurisdiction over the person[.]”2
ORS 163A.030(1)(b)(A). The use of the word “must” indicates
a mandatory requirement. See Umatilla County v. Dept. of
Energy, 372 Or 194, 212,
547 P3d 804 (2024) (recognizing
that “must” is “a word denoting an obligation or a command”).
With that background explanation, the complexity
in this case becomes evident. At the time the state sought
youth’s reporting hearing, the juvenile court had jurisdiction under ORS 163A.030(12) to hold a reporting hearing.
However, if it held that hearing, the juvenile court would
violate the statutory requirement to hold the reporting
hearing “[d]uring the six-month period before the termination of juvenile court jurisdiction over” youth as required
by ORS 163A.030(1)(b)(A), because the juvenile court had
terminated jurisdiction over youth eight months earlier.
To resolve the apparent inconsistencies between
those statutes, we employ our well-established method of
statutory interpretation, which requires that we consider
the text and context of the statutes to determine the intent
of the legislature. State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 170-72, 206
2
Because the statute specifically references jurisdiction under ORS 419C.005,
the statutory requirement to hold a hearing contemplates that juvenile court jurisdiction could terminate from any one of the four listed bases in ORS 419C.005.
Cite as 342 Or App 250 (2025)
255
P3d 1042 (2009). Our task when faced with seemingly incompatible statutes is to determine whether there is a way to
interpret them in a manner that “give[s] effect to all.” ORS
174.010. Here, we readily conclude that that is possible. As
we explain below, the answer is found in the exception to the
requirement that the court hold a reporting hearing within
the six-month window “before the termination of juvenile
court jurisdiction.” ORS 163A.030(1)(b)(A). The exception
authorizes the juvenile court to deviate from that timeline
if it “continues the hearing” upon a finding of “good cause.”
Id. Thus, the way to harmonize ORS 163A.030(1)(b)(A), ORS
163A.030(12), and ORS 419C.005 is to conclude that that
“good cause” exception applies to all reporting hearings,
even those that did not start within the statutorily mandated six-month window prior to termination of jurisdiction.
We start with the text of ORS 163A.030(12), which
establishes that the juvenile court retains jurisdiction over
a youth for purposes of conducting a reporting hearing. ORS
163A.030(12) does not set forth a new and separate process
for the court to follow if the reporting hearing will be held
after jurisdiction is otherwise terminated. Instead, it permits the juvenile court to “retain[ ] jurisdiction over a person for purposes of this section,” which indicates that the
legislature intended juvenile courts to follow the remainder
of ORS 163A.030 in conducting reporting hearings that are
held under subsection (12). That includes the requirement
to make a finding of “good cause” prior to continuing a hearing that is held outside of the statutorily required six-month
window prior to the termination of jurisdiction.
The text of ORS 163A.030(1)(b), specifically the
word “continues,” confirms that the “good cause” exception
applies to all reporting hearings—including those that have
never been initiated. Because the legislature did not provide
a definition for this commonly used word, we start with the
common definition of the term. See State v. Murray, 340 Or
599, 604,
136 P3d 10 (2006) (“Absent a special definition, we
ordinarily would resort to dictionary definitions, assuming
that the legislature meant to use a word of common usage
in its ordinary sense.”); State v. Jones,
298 Or App 264, 266-
67,
445 P3d 358, rev den,
365 Or 658 (2019) (explaining that,
256 State v. W. V.
when a statute does not define a term of common usage, “we
assume that the legislature intended them to have their
plain, ordinary meanings”). “Continue” can mean “to carry
onward or extend: keep up or maintain … add to or draw
out in length, duration, or development.” Webster’s Third
New Int’l Dictionary 493 (unabridged ed 2002). In the legal
context, it can mean “to keep on the court calendar: subject
to further consideration : postpone by a continuance—used
of a legal proceeding.”
Id.
The dissent would hold that the good cause requirement applies only to hearings that started, but did not finish, within the six months prior to the termination of jurisdiction. 3 The dissent reaches that determination, in large
part, on its disagreement with our interpretation of the term
“continues;” arguing that we “stretch[ ]” its meaning. 342 Or
App at 266 (Powers, J., dissenting). We disagree.
When referring to a legal proceeding, “continue”
is commonly used both to extend the time for something
that has already started and to extend the time for the
proceeding to start in the first instance. For example, parties seek a “continuance” of a trial that has not yet started,
and the court can “continue” a hearing that was set, but
not yet started, until the next day. See, e.g., Black’s Law
Dictionary 321 (6th ed 1990) (defining “continuance” as “[t]he
adjournment or postponement of a session, hearing, trial,
or other proceeding to a subsequent day or time; usually
on the request or motion of one of the parties”). The text of
ORS 163A.030, then, authorizes the court to hold a reporting hearing, whether or not it started within the six-month
period, so long as the court makes a finding of “good cause.”
Our statutory interpretation framework also allows
us to consider any helpful legislative history. Gaines, 346
Or at 171-72. Here, the legislative history surrounding
3
Apart from the fact that that interpretation fails to give effect to all provisions in the statute, it rewards the state for failing to even try to comply with the
statute. Under the dissent’s interpretation, the state would be subject to a greater
burden if it started the hearing “during the six-month period before the termination of juvenile court jurisdiction,” but was forced to seek a continuance, than
it would if it never started the hearing and failed to make any effort to comply
with the statute in the first place. Such an incentive structure is contrary to the
legislative priority on the timing of the reporting hearing.
Cite as 342 Or App 250 (2025) 257
the enactment of the current youth sex offender reporting
scheme supports our interpretation of ORS 163A.030(1)(b)
(A). Previously, youths were ordered to report by default
at the time of disposition and needed to seek a hearing to
obtain relief from reporting. See generally ORS 181.809 -
181.826 (2013), amended by Or Laws 2015, ch 820. The legislature changed that practice and set the hearing as the
default, with youths having the burden to show that reporting was not required. See ORS 163A.030(7)(b) (“The person
who is the subject of the hearing has the burden of proving
by clear and convincing evidence that the person is rehabilitated and does not pose a threat to the safety of the public.”).
The result of that change put new burdens on the
state as the party seeking to require reporting. The state
must now initiate the reporting hearing and must do so
within a specific window of time. ORS 163A.030 sets forth
a clear path for supervising agencies to follow to meet
those burdens and thereby allow the juvenile court to fulfill its statutory duty to “hold a hearing on the issue” of
whether a youth is required to report as a sex offender. ORS
163A.030(1)(a). The “county or state agency responsible for
supervising” the youth “shall notify” both the youth and the
juvenile court “when the agency determines that termination of jurisdiction is likely to occur within six months.” ORS
163A.030(2)(a). Once the juvenile court receives that notice,
it shall set “an initial hearing date” and provide notice of
such to the parties. ORS 163A.030(3)(b), (c). In the context of
the state bearing the burden to move forward on the hearing, it is consistent that the state would also be the party
that would have to establish the statutory exception to allow
the hearing to proceed outside of the statutorily required
time frame. Thus, requiring the state to show “good cause”
for any hearing that occurs outside the six-month period
before the termination of jurisdiction comports with both
the explicit terms of the statute and with the allocation of
burdens in the statute.4
4
Indeed, in this case it was the state that asked the court to terminate jurisdiction, without first seeking to require youth to report as a sex offender. And it
was the state that waited eight months after jurisdiction had terminated to seek
a sex offender reporting hearing.
258 State v. W. V.
In sum, reading ORS 419C.005(4)(c) to deprive a
juvenile court of jurisdiction to hold a reporting hearing if it
does not start within the six-month time frame prior the termination of jurisdiction, as youth asserts, fails to give full
effect to ORS 163A.030(12), which anticipates that the court
retains jurisdiction to hold a hearing, and demonstrates the
legislative priority placed on the hearing itself. At the same
time, reading ORS 163A.030(12), as the state proposes and
as the dissent would hold, to allow the state to initiate sex
offender reporting proceedings at any time, without making any further showing, fails to give effect to the mandatory language in ORS 163A.030(1)(b)(A), which requires the
hearing to be held within the six months prior to the termination of jurisdiction, unless the court finds “good cause” to
“continue[ ] the hearing.” Such an interpretation also undermines the legislative intent to hold the hearing within six
months prior to termination of jurisdiction because there
are important reasons for the timing of that hearing.
Thus, whether the juvenile court has jurisdiction—
either under ORS 419C.005 or ORS 163A.030(12)—is only
the first step to determine whether a juvenile court can hold
a reporting hearing. Even if a juvenile court has jurisdiction
to hold the hearing, the juvenile court must still make a
finding of “good cause” to permit the hearing to go forward if
it does not take place within the six-month period before the
termination of jurisdiction. ORS 163A.030(1)(b)(A). Because
there was no finding of good cause here, we remand to the
juvenile court to make that finding.5
Reversed and remanded.
5
We recognize that the record includes an exchange between the juvenile
court and youth’s counsel in which youth’s counsel stated that she waived “timelines” if the juvenile court ruled against her position that the juvenile court lacked
jurisdiction to hold a hearing. That waiver does not affect our statutory interpretation analysis here because we “have an independent duty to correctly interpret
any statute that comes before us, regardless of the arguments and interpretations offered by the parties.” Strasser v. State of Oregon, 368 Or 238, 260,
489
P3d 1025 (2021). Moreover, the record is not clear as to what “timelines” youth’s
counsel was waiving, given that her argument regarding the juvenile court’s lack
of jurisdiction relied in part on the failure to hold the reporting hearing within
the six months prior to the termination of jurisdiction. A valid waiver must be
clear and unequivocal, and this one was not. We thus do not view the “timelines”
waiver as preventing a remand for a good cause determination, now that we have
provided the correct interpretation of ORS 163A.030(1)(b)(A).
Cite as
342 Or App 250 (2025) 259
POWERS, J., dissenting.
A cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to
“pursue the intention of the legislature if possible.” ORS
174.020(1)(a); see also State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72,
206 P3d 1042 (2009) (setting out the familiar methodology of
examining the statutory text, in context, along with any legislative history that is helpful). Because the majority opinion stretches the good-cause provision of ORS 163A.030(1)(b)
beyond what I see the legislature intended the statutory
framework to provide, I respectfully dissent. In my view,
even if the hearing required by ORS 163A.030(1) is not
commenced before delinquency jurisdiction is otherwise
terminated—which is what happened in this case—ORS
163A.030(12) provides that the juvenile court retains jurisdiction for purposes of determining whether an adjudicated
youth must report as a sex offender. Further, because the
plain text of the framework provides that the good-cause
provision of ORS 163A.030(1)(b) applies only if a juvenile
court has started and “continues” a hearing, I cannot join
the majority opinion.
This separate opinion begins with a brief overview
of the somewhat odd factual circumstances that give rise
to the statutory interpretation question posed by this case.
I then set out in detail the applicable provisions of ORS
163A.030 and provide a brief explanation of how that framework operates in the normal course of juvenile delinquency
proceedings before turning to how it should have worked
given the circumstances of this case. Finally, I conclude with
brief comments on where the majority opinion’s analysis
strays beyond the text, context, and legislative history of
the framework.
THE FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES GIVING RISE TO
THE STATUTORY INTERPRETATION QUESTION
The juvenile court adjudicated youth for conduct
that, if committed by an adult, would constitute a felony
sex crime—viz., attempted first-degree sexual abuse. The
court placed him in the legal custody of the Oregon Youth
Authority (OYA), but youth absconded after being paroled.
The state moved to terminate jurisdiction after learning
260 State v. W. V.
that youth was incarcerated in Colorado after being convicted of a (non-sexual) crime in adult court in Colorado. The
state’s motion to terminate jurisdiction was accompanied by
an affidavit providing that, while youth was in OYA’s custody, he had been terminated from a community-residential program, then placed in a youth correctional facility
where he made “steady progress.” When he was paroled to
Buckman House in Portland to transition to independent
living, he struggled and, ultimately, absconded from supervision. A warrant was issued for his arrest, and the state
subsequently learned that he was detained in Colorado. The
court granted the state’s motion and terminated jurisdiction
in September 2018, without holding a hearing on whether
youth must report as a sex offender.
Almost eight months after the juvenile court terminated delinquency jurisdiction over youth, the state filed
a request for the court to hold a hearing for sex offender
reporting, which the court eventually held approximately
six months later after there was an objection to the initial
hearing date.1 Youth moved to dismiss the state’s request for
a hearing, arguing that the request was untimely and that
the court lacked jurisdiction. Ultimately, the court entered
an order requiring youth to report as a sex offender.
THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR SEX OFFENDER
REPORTING FOR ADJUDICATED YOUTH
Because youth and the state offer intricate and
intertwined statutory construction arguments concerning
the framework for sex offender reporting for adjudicated
youth, I set it out in some detail. ORS 163A.030 provides, in
part:
“(1)(a) Except as provided in subsection (6) of this section, [concerning waiver of the hearing or failure to appear]
the juvenile court shall hold a hearing on the issue of reporting as a sex offender by a person who has been found to
be within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under ORS
1
Although the state’s request used a form that asked for a hearing for sex
offender “registration” (capitalization omitted), I follow the majority opinion’s use
of the term “reporting” to avoid confusion with the sex offender framework for
adult offenders. See State v. A. L. M., 305 Or App 389, 395 n 5,
469 P3d 244,
rev den,
367 Or 218 (2020) (noting the discrepancy in the terminology and concluding that the difference does not affect the legal analysis).
Cite as
342 Or App 250 (2025) 261
419C.005 … for having committed an act that if committed by an adult would constitute a felony sex crime [if the
person’s adjudication falls within applicable dates].
“(b) Unless the court continues the hearing described
in this section for good cause, the hearing must be held:
“(A) During the six-month period before the termination of juvenile court jurisdiction over the person[.]
“…
“(2)(a) The county or state agency responsible for
supervising the person shall notify the person and the
juvenile court when the agency determines that termination of jurisdiction is likely to occur within six months.
“…
“(3) Upon receipt of the notice described in subsection
(2) of this section, the court shall:
“…
“(b) Set an initial hearing date; and
“(c) Notify the parties and the juvenile department
… of the hearing at least 60 days before the hearing date.
“…
“(7) At the hearing described in subsection (1) of
this section:
“…
“(b) The person who is the subject of the hearing
has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence
that the person is rehabilitated and does not pose a threat
to the safety of the public. If the court finds that the person
has not met the burden of proof, the court shall enter an
order requiring the person to report as a sex offender under
ORS 163A.025.
“(8) In determining whether the person has met the
burden of proof, the juvenile court may consider but need
not be limited to considering:
“…
“(12) Notwithstanding ORS 419C.005(4)(c), (d)
and (e), the juvenile court retains jurisdiction over a person
for purposes of this section.”
262 State v. W. V.
The plain text of the framework provides that,
under ORS 163A.030(1)(a), the juvenile court “shall hold a
hearing” on the reporting requirement for specified youth.
ORS 163A.030(1)(b) sets out the timing requirements, and
subsections (2) and (3) set out related notice requirements.
ORS 163A.030(7) allocates the burden of proof to the person
who is the subject of the hearing and mandates that, if the
court is not persuaded, it shall order the person to report.
ORS 163A.030(8) provides a nonexclusive list of criteria that
the court may consider when determining whether the burden of proof has been met. Finally—and important to this
case—ORS 163A.030(12) provides that, even if the court’s
jurisdiction has otherwise ended in one of the ways specified
in ORS 419C.005(4)(c), (d), or (e), “the juvenile court retains
jurisdiction over a person for purposes of this section.” A further examination of that subsection yields additional clues
about the legislature’s intent regarding the jurisdictional
provision of the statutory framework.
ORS 419C.005(4) encapsulates five ways that the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction could be terminated.2 ORS
163A.030(12) encompasses only three of those ways—meaning that the juvenile court does not retain jurisdiction for
purposes of ORS 163A.030 if its jurisdiction is terminated
in either of the other two ways. More specifically, paragraphs (a) and (b) of ORS 419C.005(4) are the termination
provisions that are not included. ORS 419C.005(4)(a) and
2
ORS 419C.005 provides, in part:
“(4) The court’s jurisdiction over a person under this section or ORS
419C.067 continues until one of the following occurs:
“(a) The court dismisses a petition filed under this chapter or waives the
case under ORS 419C.340. If jurisdiction is based on a previous adjudication,
then dismissal or waiver of a later case does not terminate jurisdiction under
the previous case unless the court so orders.
“(b) The court transfers jurisdiction of the case as provided in ORS
419C.053, 419C.056 and 419C.059.
“(c) The court enters an order terminating jurisdiction.
“(d) The person becomes 25 years of age.
“(e) The court places the person under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric
Security Review Board as provided in ORS 419C.529. If the court also has
jurisdiction over the person based on a previous adjudication under this
chapter or ORS chapter 419B, placing a person under the jurisdiction of the
board in a later case does not terminate wardship under the previous case
unless the court so orders.”
Cite as 342 Or App 250 (2025) 263
(b) are provisions in which the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court ends because (a) it dismisses the petition or waives
the youth into criminal or municipal court, or (b) jurisdiction is transferred to another circuit court for one of several
reasons not applicable in this case.3 That is, the statutory
framework shows that the legislature considered the ways
that a juvenile court’s jurisdiction might otherwise end, and
it provided for retained jurisdiction except when jurisdiction
ended because another court took over the case or the petition was dismissed. In each of those instances, the original
juvenile court would no longer need to conduct the hearing
or no longer be the appropriate court to conduct it.
Conversely—and important to this case—ORS
163A.030(12) specifically provides that the juvenile court
retains jurisdiction over a person “for purposes of this
section” (that is, for purposes of determining reporting)
if the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction after entering an order terminating jurisdiction as provided by ORS
419C.005(4)(c); the person becomes 25 years of age as provided by ORS 419C.005(4)(d); or the court places the person
under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review
Board as provided by ORS 419C.005(4)(e). If any of those
three circumstances is present, then ORS 163A.030(12) provides that the juvenile court retains jurisdiction to hold the
hearing required by ORS 163A.030.
As described above, the juvenile court in this case
terminated jurisdiction as provided by ORS 419C.005(4)
(c). Thus, that understanding of the framework supports
the conclusion that the legislature intended to require the
hearing to occur even if the hearing occurs after the court
has terminated jurisdiction, and that it expressly provided
for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction for that purpose
when it is the most appropriate court in which to hold the
hearing. See State v. K. L. F., 301 Or App 666, 667,
456 P3d
376 (2020) (summarily concluding in a per curiam decision
that the appropriate disposition was to remand the case so
that the juvenile court could hold a hearing to give the youth
3
ORS 419C.053 and ORS 419C.056 both involve transferring a proceeding to
the juvenile court of a county where the youth resides, and ORS 419C.056 allows
one juvenile court to authorize another juvenile court in a different county to
facilitate the disposition of the case under specified circumstances.
264 State v. W. V.
an opportunity to meet the statutory burden to prove that
the youth rehabilitated even though the court already terminated delinquency jurisdiction).
Examining other context of the statutory framework
provides additional reasons to conclude that the legislature
intended that the juvenile court retain jurisdiction even if
the timing requirements for the hearing were not met.
First, the legislature expressly articulated the
purpose of the statutory framework for sex offender reporting. ORS 163A.045(1) explains that “[t]he purpose of ORS
163A.005 to 163A.235 is to assist law enforcement agencies
in preventing future sex offenses.” The framework itself
further shows that the legislature also wanted to balance
concerns about the capacity of juvenile offenders to reform
and to have individualized determinations before imposing
reporting requirements. For example, ORS 163A.030 does
not automatically require sex offender reporting as it does
for adult offenders; rather, each individual is entitled to a
hearing before a juvenile court can impose that requirement. Compare ORS 163A.010 (reporting for adult offenders), with ORS 163A.030 (reporting for adjudicated youth).
The enactment history, which is also part of the context,
reveals that the legislature changed the juvenile reporting
requirement from an automatic requirement imposed at the
time of disposition to the current version, where the decision
is whether or not to impose the reporting requirement, and
that decision takes place near the end of the court’s jurisdiction over the youth, which can take into account if a youth
has completed treatment and other programs. See generally
ORS 181.809 - 181.826 (2013), amended by Or Laws 2015,
ch 820. Further, the process for adjudicated youths allows
an opportunity for the youths to establish that they are
rehabilitated and no longer pose a threat to public safety.
That difference in treatment for juveniles—that the reporting requirement no longer be automatic and that it should
be determined later in the life of the case so that the juvenile court would have more information about the youth’s
prospects for reoffending—is balanced against the burden
of persuasion on the youth and the state policy that the purpose of the framework is to prevent future sexual offenses.
Cite as 342 Or App 250 (2025) 265
The legislative history also shows that the legislature initially considered a bill that would have been oriented
toward a view that youth who completed treatment would be
unlikely to reoffend. See State v. A. R. H., 371 Or 82, 99-100,
530 P3d 897 (2023) (discussing the legislative history of ORS
163A.030). Ultimately, however, the legislature enacted a
compromise bill, in which reforms that included individualized decisions about reporting and moving the time for
those decisions to the end of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction
were balanced against concerns about recidivism and public
safety. See
id. (describing compromise based on the Oregon
District Attorneys Association’s objections to the bill, which
“led to negotiations with the bill’s proponents[;] … the parties reached a compromise that was reflected in proposed
amendments that the legislature later enacted”). In describing the legislative history, the Supreme Court explained:
“Th[e] negotiated amendments changed the standard
of proof from a preponderance of the evidence to clear and
convincing evidence, shifted the burden of proof from the
state to the youth, and added the 18 enumerated factors
that the juvenile court ‘may consider but need not be limited to considering.’ ORS 163A.030(8). … In short, the legislature approved a compromise bill that did not provide a
presumption in favor of relief for a youth—whether or not
that youth had completed sex offender treatment—despite
being presented with a substantial body of research that
indicated that such a youth is unlikely to reoffend.”
Id. at 100.
In sum, I would conclude that the text, context,
and legislative history of ORS 163A.030 support construing the jurisdictional provision in ORS 163A.030(12) as
extending—for purposes of the entire statutory section—
the juvenile court’s jurisdiction even if the hearing that
ORS 163A.030(1)(a) requires was not held within the time
requirements imposed by paragraph (b) of that subsection.
THE DIFFICULTY THAT I HAVE WITH THE
MAJORITY OPINION’S ANALYSIS
Turning to the majority opinion’s analysis, I respectfully disagree that the good-cause determination under
ORS 163A.030(1)(b) is applicable under the circumstances
266 State v. W. V.
of this case. In my view, the majority opinion incorrectly
sees a potential inconsistency where there is none. ORS
163A.030(1)(b) and ORS 163A.030(12) are not at odds with
each other because they address two separate issues. As
described above, paragraph (1)(b) sets out the procedural
timing requirement when the court still has delinquency
jurisdiction, whereas subsection (12) provides the court with
limited jurisdiction after delinquency jurisdiction has otherwise ended. Those two subsections should not be conflated.
Further, in erroneously concluding that the subsections are incompatible, the majority opinion stretches the
meaning of “continue” to a hearing process that had not even
started, let alone been requested. A court can setover or continue a hearing that has been scheduled or that has begun
and not finished, but in no sense of the ordinary meaning
of “continue” should the good-cause provision apply in this
case given that the state did not request a hearing until well
after delinquency jurisdiction had ended. We need not—and
should not—refashion the framework by adding in a good-cause requirement where the legislature did not explicitly
provide for one.
To be sure, the statutory framework in ORS
163A.030 for adjudicated youth provides that, within six
months before the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is likely to
be terminated, the juvenile court is required to hold a hearing about whether the youth should be required to report as
a sex offender. The juvenile court may continue that hearing
for good cause, even if that takes the hearing past the date
that jurisdiction is otherwise terminated. That is, under a
proper view of the framework, the good-cause determination in ORS 163A.030(1)(b) comes into play when a hearing
process has begun before delinquency jurisdiction has been
terminated.
Under the circumstances presented here, even if
the hearing is not commenced or continued before jurisdiction is otherwise terminated, ORS 163A.030(12) provides
that the juvenile court retains jurisdiction for purposes of
“this section,” which means all of ORS 163A.030. The timing provision in ORS 163A.030(1)(b) is not jurisdictional and
Cite as 342 Or App 250 (2025) 267
does not create an exception to the jurisdictional provision.4
Accordingly, because I would affirm the juvenile court’s
order without a remand, I respectfully dissent.
4
I would also reject youth’s arguments on appeal. First, construing the timing provisions as depriving the juvenile court of its jurisdiction over youths who
would otherwise be required to prove that they were rehabilitated and no longer posed a threat to public safety to avoid imposition of sex-offender-reporting
requirements would be inconsistent with the legislative intent to require the
juvenile court to individually determine whether a particular youth is required
to report. It would also be inconsistent with the express legislative purpose for
the reporting requirement, viz., “to assist law enforcement agencies in preventing future sex offenses.” Considering the burden of proof and the entire statutory framework, I would not conclude that the legislature intended for youths to
receive a windfall of avoiding sex-offender-reporting requirements altogether for
any of the possible reasons that the juvenile court might fail to hold the hearing
within the required time.
Second, there may be other ways of enforcing the specified timing provisions
such as a mandamus proceeding (if a youth otherwise meets the legal requirements) that would not involve precluding the juvenile court from ever holding
the required hearing. To be sure, there may be limits on how long after juvenile
court jurisdiction was terminated that the reporting hearing could be held. I
need not delve into those issues, however, because they have not been raised in
this case. Suffice it to say that, construing the framework as I have above, I have
not foreclosed the possibility that there are legal consequences for failing to hold
the hearing at the specified time or that the juvenile court’s authority to hold the
hearing “whenever” (as youth argues) may have other limits that are not raised
in this case.
