No. 693 July 30, 2025 335
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
STEPHEN LEE BROWN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Jamie MILLER,
Superintendent,
Snake River Correctional Institution,
Defendant-Respondent.
Malheur County Circuit Court
24CV31243; A185242
Lung S. Hung, Judge.
Submitted June 9, 2025.
Jedediah Peterson and Equal Justice Law filed the brief
for appellant.
Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Jona J. Maukonen, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Pagán,
Judge.
AOYAGI, P. J.
Affirmed.
336 Brown v. Miller
AOYAGI, P. J.
Petitioner appeals a judgment denying his motion
for court-appointed counsel and dismissing his pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In his sole assignment of
error, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion
by denying his request for court-appointed counsel. For the
following reasons, we affirm.
ORS 34.355 provides discretionary and implicit
authority for trial courts to appoint counsel for indigent
petitioners in habeas cases. Steltz v. Cain, 325 Or App 560,
562,
529 P3d 284 (2023). It is a matter of discretion whether
to appoint counsel “because neither the Oregon Constitution
nor the United States Constitution guarantees counsel in
habeas cases, which are at their core, civil proceedings.”
Id.
“The consequence of the discretionary authority provided
to the habeas court is that we, as an appellate court, will
not disturb the lower court’s ruling on a motion to appoint
counsel if that decision is within the spectrum of legally permissible rulings on the matter.”
Id. In this case, petitioner
contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to explain the reason for declining to appoint counsel.
See State v. Mayfield,
302 Or 631, 645,
733 P2d 438 (1987)
(describing ways that a court may err in exercising discretion, including by failing to make a record reflecting the
exercise of discretion).
We are unpersuaded. Habeas relief is available
only in specific and limited circumstances. Penrod/Brown v.
Cupp, 283 Or 21, 28,
581 P2d 934 (1978). Here, the petition
itself demonstrated that habeas relief was unavailable to
petitioner because, as the trial court explained, the alleged
constitutional violations occurred months in the past and
were “no longer pending,” rendering the petition “insufficient to demonstrate a need for immediate judicial scrutiny.” Therefore, the trial court dismissed the petition without prejudice and, in the same judgment, denied the motion
to appoint counsel. In context, the court clearly declined
to appoint counsel because petitioner had failed to state a
claim. Perhaps the court would have ruled differently had
it seen something in the petition suggesting a potentially
valid claim that just needed better development with the
Nonprecedential Memo Op:
342 Or App 335 (2025) 337
assistance of an attorney. But faced with a petition that
plainly failed to state a claim, the court declined to appoint
an attorney, and we cannot say that it abused its discretion by doing so, or that the court needed to provide more
explanation under the circumstances. If trial courts were
required to appoint counsel in cases with facially meritless
petitions because of the possibility that a lawyer could root
out some alternative claim with merit, their discretionary
authority to appoint counsel in habeas cases would quickly
transform into a right to counsel, in contravention of the
statute and existing case law.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to appoint counsel because the petition failed to state a
claim.
Affirmed.
