Riverside Trust Co. v. Twitchell’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 2 district · 50 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 76 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““ ‘. . . It being the intent and purpose of this Trust to maintain and preserve the corpus of the Trust Fund unimpaired, it is hereby expressly agreed that there shall be no power of anticipation or of pledge or assignment either of the income or of the principal of the Trust Fund, or of any interest therein whatsoever; and the Trustee, its successors and assigns, shall hold and administer the Trust and pay over the income received by it as aforesaid, and the principal sum upon the termination of the Trust, as herein provided, free from any debts, liabilities, obligations or other engagements whatsoever of the Grantor, or of any persons who, by the terms hereof, may be or become beneficiaries hereunder.’ ” (Italics supplied.)”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Peggy S. Levin v. Wachovia Bank · 30 Pa. D. & C.2d 384 - Ginsburg v. Hilsdorf

2. ““The law rests its protection of what is known as a spendthrift trust fundamentally on the principle of cujus est dare, ejus est disponere. It allows the donor to condition his bounty as suits, himself, so long as he violates no law in so doing. When a trust of this kind has been created, the law holds that the donor has an individual right of property in the execution of the trust; and to deprive him of it would be a fraud on his generosity. For the law to appropriate a gift to a person not intended would be an invasion of the donor’s private dominion: Holdship v. Patterson, 7 Watts, 547 .””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Heyl's Estate

3. “. . . [T]he distinction between a vested and a contingent remainder lies in the fact that a vested remainder is an estate while a contingent remainder is merely the possibility or prospect of an estate. Whether, in any particular case, a remainder is contingent or vested depends on the construction of the language used, as creating a mere possibility of an estate, or as creating an estate. The uncertainty which distinguishes a contingent remainder is not the uncertainty whether the remainderman will ever enjoy it, but the uncertainty whether there will be a right to such enjoyment . . .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Subranni v. Remington (In Re Remington)