State v. Jihad’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 4 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “A police officer may conduct a constitutionally valid traffic stop when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that either the vehicle or an occupant is subject to seizure for violation of the law. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 , 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). As long as an officer reasonably suspects the driver is violating “any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations,” the police officer may legally stop the vehicle. Id. at 661 , 99 S.Ct. at 1400 , 59 L.Ed.2d at 672 . Reasonable suspicion is a lesser standard than probable cause and allows an officer to effectuate a stop when there is some objective manifestation of criminal activity involving the person stopped. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). Reasonable suspicion exists when an officer can identify specific facts that, when taken together with rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the detainee has committed (or is committing) a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The propriety of a stop must be viewed in light of the totality of the surrounding circumstances. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). No further inquiry beyond the requirement of reasonable suspicion is necessary or warranted. State v. Carlson, 102 Ohio App.3d 585 , 657 N.E.2d 591 (1995). Thus, if the specific and articulable”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Padgett