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IN RE VADA V. ET AL.*
(SC 20603)
(SC 20604)
Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins,
Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js.
Syllabus
The respondents appealed from the judgments of the trial court terminating
their parental rights with respect to their minor children. After the
children were adjudicated neglected and committed to the care and
custody of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families,
the petitioner sought to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with
respect to the children on the ground that the respondents had failed
to rehabilitate. During the COVID-19 pandemic, a virtual trial on the
termination petitions was held via Microsoft Teams. The respondents
were represented by separate counsel and participated in the proceedings through audio and video means. The respondents joined the trial
via a shared cell phone, outside the proximity of their counsel, but they
were able to communicate with counsel through e-mail, text messages,
and a messaging application. After the conclusion of the trial, the trial
court terminated the respondents’ parental rights. On appeal from the
trial court’s judgments, held:
1. The respondents’ unpreserved claims that the trial court had violated their
rights under article first, § 10, and article fifth, § 1, of the Connecticut
constitution by conducting the termination of parental rights trial virtually rather than in person, and that they had been denied their rights
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to physically
confront the witnesses against them at the virtual trial were unavailing;
this court, having addressed the same issues and underlying arguments
in the companion case of In re Annessa J. (343 Conn. 642), adopted
the reasoning and conclusions set forth in that decision, concluded,
with respect to the respondents’ claims under the state constitution,
that the respondents failed to establish that there is a fundamental right
to an in person termination of parental rights trial, and concluded, with
respect to the respondents’ due process claims, that, even if there is a
right to in person confrontation under these circumstances, there was
no factual record or factual findings on which this court could rely in
order to determine whether that right was violated or whether the trial
court correctly concluded that the state’s interests were sufficiently
great to warrant a virtual trial.
2. The record was inadequate to review the respondents’ unpreserved claims,
which they asserted either under the federal constitution or both the
federal and state constitutions, that the state did not provide them with
adequate devices and internet connection to participate both visually
and by audio in the termination proceeding: the record was silent on,
and, in some cases, undermined, the factual predicates necessary to
evaluate the respondents’ claims, as counsel for the respondent mother
stated, during the trial, that the mother had more than one device, which
contradicted the respondents’ claim that they were forced to share the
same device, the record indicated that the trial court took numerous
steps to ensure that the respondents could meaningfully participate and
communicate with their counsel throughout the trial, the record was
largely silent as to the manner in which the respondents participated
throughout the trial, including whether the respondents participated via
audio or video or both at any given time, the record was devoid of any
indication that the respondents’ cell phone did not allow them to view
the trial, and there was no indication that the respondents asked for
technical assistance or accommodations from the trial court; nevertheless, this court emphasized the importance of ensuring equal access to
justice in the context of virtual hearings and trials and observed that
those public policy considerations were identical to those that this court
expressed in the companion case of In re Aisjaha N. (343 Conn. 709).
Argued November 18, 2021—officially released June 20, 2022**
Procedural History
Petitions by the Commissioner of Children and Families to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with
respect to their minor children, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of New Haven, Juvenile
Matters, and tried to the court, Marcus, J.; judgments
terminating the respondents’ parental rights, from
which the respondents filed separate appeals. Affirmed.
Albert J. Oneto IV, assigned counsel, for the appellant
in Docket No. SC 20603 (respondent father).
David E. Schneider, Jr., assigned counsel, for the
appellant in Docket No. SC 20604 (respondent mother).
Seon Bagot, assistant attorney general, with whom
were Evan O’Roark, assistant attorney general, and,
on the brief, William Tong, attorney general, for the
appellee in both appeals (petitioner).
Opinion
McDONALD, J. These appeals are companion cases
to In re Annessa J., 343 Conn. 642, A.3d (2022),
and In re Aisjaha N.,
343 Conn. 709, A.3d (2022),
which we also decide today. The respondents, Sebastian
V. and Samantha C., appeal from the judgments of the
trial court, which terminated their parental rights pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112 (j). On appeal, the
respondents raise three unpreserved constitutional
claims relating to the virtual nature of the termination
of parental rights trial. Specifically, the respondents
contend that the trial court violated their rights under
article first, § 10, and article fifth, § 1, of the Connecticut
constitution by conducting the termination of parental
rights trial virtually, via Microsoft Teams,1 rather than
in person. They also contend that they were denied the
right to physically confront the witnesses against them
at the virtual trial, in violation of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution. Finally, the respondents contend that their
constitutional rights were violated when the state required
them to participate in the virtual trial without providing
them with an electronic device and internet connection
that allowed them to appear before the trial court in
the same manner as if they were in a courtroom. We
affirm the judgments of the trial court.
The record reveals the following relevant facts and
procedural history. The Department of Children and
Families first became involved with the respondents at
the time of the birth of their daughter, Vada V., in
August, 2017. The department received numerous referrals alleging that Samantha was abusing Xanax, opiates,
and marijuana during her pregnancy, and that Sebastian
was selling his prescribed medications of Xanax and
Adderall. Shortly after being discharged from the hospital following her birth, Vada was readmitted to the hospital for suspected methadone toxicity while in the care
of the respondents. On September 6, 2017, the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, filed
a motion for an order of temporary custody and a
neglect petition with respect to Vada. On September
22, 2017, the order of temporary custody was sustained
by agreement of the respondents, and Vada was placed
with her paternal aunt. On December 22, 2017, Vada
was adjudicated neglected and committed to the care
and custody of the petitioner. Due to the respondents’
continued mental health issues and drug abuse, Vada
was not reunified with them.
Thereafter, in December, 2018, the respondents’ son,
Sebastian V., Jr., was born. Both Samantha and Sebastian, Jr., tested positive for methadone and benzodiazepines. The petitioner filed a motion for an order of
temporary custody and a neglect petition with respect
to Sebastian, Jr., as the same issues that existed at the
outset of the case regarding Vada continued to exist.
On January 11, 2019, the order of temporary custody
was sustained by agreement of the respondents, and
Sebastian, Jr., was ultimately placed with Samantha’s
stepsister. Sebastian, Jr., was subsequently adjudicated
neglected and committed to the care and custody of
the petitioner on May 1, 2019. The trial court approved
a permanency plan for both Vada and Sebastian, Jr., of
termination of parental rights and adoption. On August
27, 2019, the petitioner filed petitions for termination
of parental rights with respect to both Vada and Sebastian, Jr., on the ground that the respondents had failed
to rehabilitate.2
In October and November, 2020, during the COVID-19
pandemic, a two day virtual trial was held, via Microsoft
Teams, on the petitions for termination of the respondents’ parental rights. The respondents were represented by separate counsel and participated in the
proceedings through audio and video means.3
On the first day of the virtual trial, the respondents,
who had a history of arriving late to their court proceedings, were not present at the time trial was scheduled
to begin. Before trial commenced, Samantha and Sebastian’s respective counsel confirmed that they had provided their clients with the link to the trial, informed
them of the time at which the proceedings would begin,
and ensured that their clients had the technology
needed to participate. The trial court subsequently
asked that Samantha’s counsel confirm, for the second
time, that Samantha ‘‘acknowledged that [the respondents] had the technology to participate by [phone].’’
Samantha’s counsel responded: ‘‘Yes. We were going
over how we would be able to communicate during the
trial, and [Samantha] said she had multiple devices, so
she would be able to be on video and . . . perhaps
text me on another device.’’4 The trial court then commenced the trial in the respondents’ absence.
During the cross-examination of the petitioner’s first
witness, the respondents joined the trial via a shared
cell phone, outside the proximity of their counsel. The
cross-examination was paused, and the trial court
offered to recess, so that the respondents’ counsel could
have the opportunity to confer with their clients. Both
attorneys declined the court’s offer, and the cross-examination continued.
Following the first witness’ testimony, the trial court
asked the respondents’ counsel how they planned to
confer with their clients during trial. The court indicated
that it was ‘‘willing to proceed in . . . any way [the
respondents’ counsel] would like’’ to ensure that they
had adequate contact with their clients. Samantha’s
counsel stated that she had been communicating with
Samantha through text messages and e-mail during trial.
Sebastian’s counsel similarly indicated that Sebastian
was communicating with him through a messaging
application. The court then noted that, ‘‘if there’s any-
thing that the court needs to do in order to help you
effectuate that communication, let me know . . . and
we’ll do our best to accommodate.’’ The court then
stood in recess to allow the respondents’ counsel to
confer with their clients.
The petitioner’s counsel presented the testimony of
four additional witnesses on the first day of trial. The
respondents’ counsel cross-examined each of the witnesses, and, at the close of the examination of three of
those witnesses, before each witness was released, the
trial court asked the respondents’ counsel whether they
needed an opportunity to confer with their clients to
determine whether they should ask additional questions
of the witness. The respondents’ counsel declined the
court’s offer to do so each time, and, on at least one
occasion, Samantha’s counsel explained that she had
already been communicating with Samantha during the
witness’ examination. Moreover, at the close of the
examination of the final witness, the court asked
whether the respondents’ counsel, after consulting with
their clients, had any further questions for the witness.
On the second day of the virtual trial, the respondents
timely appeared via video, although the trial court commented that their video was frozen. Presumably, the
respondents then turned their video off, as the court
inquired, ‘‘[d]id you want to have your video on?
Because, at the moment, it is not—your camera is not
on.’’ Samantha responded that she turned the video off
because ‘‘it was lagging a lot,’’ and she thought that
turning the video off would ‘‘help the connection
. . . .’’ Samantha indicated that she could attempt to
turn the video back on if the court wanted, to which
the court responded: ‘‘No. Whatever way works best
for you. We just want to make sure that you have full
participation in the proceedings, that’s all.’’ Samantha
responded that the audio only feature was the ‘‘clearest
[the respondents could] hear [the court] at the moment’’
and that she ‘‘[could] try again.’’ The court responded:
‘‘All right. That’s fine.’’ The court then proceeded with
trial.
Both respondents testified at trial. At the start of her
direct examination, Samantha participated by video,
but, shortly after beginning to testify, her video froze.
She then turned her video off, and the trial court indicated that it could hear her ‘‘much better.’’ She proceeded to testify. At a later point during her testimony,
however, the court paused the proceedings due to connectivity issues, and the respondents logged off of the
virtual trial. Following a brief recess, the respondents
‘‘called in’’ and rejoined the proceedings. The court
stated that the technical difficulties with the respondents’ connection had been resolved, and the direct
examination of Samantha continued. The record does
not indicate whether Samantha testified via audio only
for the duration of her testimony or, alternatively,
whether she was able to utilize video technology for
any portion of the remainder of her testimony.
Sebastian appeared via video at the beginning of his
testimony, although, initially, his image appeared upside
down, and his speech was muffled. His testimony was
also interrupted, shortly into his counsel’s questioning,
by connectivity issues. The remainder of Sebastian’s
testimony proceeded without significant technological
difficulty. As with Samantha, however, the record does
not indicate whether Sebastian continued to utilize
video technology throughout his testimony, or whether
he, at some point, switched to audio only.
In its memorandum of decision, the trial court, Marcus, J., terminated the parental rights of the respondents as to both Vada and Sebastian, Jr. The trial court
found that the department had made reasonable efforts
to reunify the respondents with Vada and Sebastian,
Jr., and that neither parent was able or willing to benefit
from reunification efforts. The court found by clear and
convincing evidence that Sebastian failed to rehabilitate
because he failed to address his significant mental
health and substance abuse disorders, and had not
engaged in the services ordered and required for reunification. The trial court found by clear and convincing
evidence that Samantha failed to rehabilitate, in part,
because she had failed to commit to drug rehabilitation
in a serious and sustained way. After making the seven
findings required by § 17a-112 (k), the court found by
clear and convincing evidence that termination of
parental rights was in the children’s best interests.
These appeals followed.
On appeal to this court, the respondents raise three
unpreserved constitutional claims, arguing that the trial
court violated their constitutional rights by conducting
their termination of parental rights trial via Microsoft
Teams instead of holding it in person. First, the respondents contend that the trial court acted in derogation
of its duty under article first, § 10, and article fifth,
§ 1, of the Connecticut constitution, which, they argue,
combine to constitutionalize the right to an in person,
civil, public trial of the kind that existed at common
law. Second, the respondents argue that the trial court
denied them the right to physically confront and crossexamine the witnesses against them at the virtual trial,
thereby violating their right to due process guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution. Finally, they assert various state and federal
constitutional claims premised on the fact that the trial
court did not provide the respondents, who were indigent persons, with their own exclusive devices and
internet connection to participate both visually and by
audio in the proceeding. Accordingly, the respondents
ask this court to reverse the trial court’s judgments
terminating their parental rights.
The petitioner contends that the respondents’ unpre-
served constitutional claims cannot satisfy the requirements set forth in State v. Golding,
213 Conn. 233,
239–40,
567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel
R.,
317 Conn. 773, 781,
120 A.3d 1188 (2015). Specifically, the petitioner contends that the respondents’ first
claim—that article first, § 10, and article fifth, § 1, of
the state constitution combine to constitutionalize the
right to an in person trial as it existed at common law—
fails Golding’s second prong, as the state ‘‘constitution
does not guarantee the right to a trial in the physical
presence of the judicial authority.’’ See State v.
Golding,
supra, 239. As to the respondents’ remaining claims,
the petitioner argues that the record is inadequate for
review, and the claims therefore fail Golding’s first
prong.5 See
id. We affirm the judgments of the trial
court terminating the respondents’ parental rights.
I
We begin with the respondents’ first two unpreserved
constitutional claims, namely, their contentions that the
trial court violated their rights under article first, § 10,
and article fifth, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution and
their right to physically confront the witnesses against
them, in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution.
Those issues and the merits of the underlying arguments
presented in these appeals are identical to those that
we considered in part I of In re Annessa J., which we
also decide today. See In re Annessa J., supra, 343
Conn. 653–64. We conclude that our examination of the
same issues in In re Annessa J. thoroughly resolves the
claims in the present appeals and that there is nothing
in the present cases that would mandate a different
result. In particular, with respect to the respondents’
claim under the state constitution, we conclude that
the respondents’ claim fails under the second prong of
Golding because they failed to establish that there
exists a fundamental right under article first, § 10, and
article fifth, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution to an
in person termination of parental rights trial. See id.,
656–61. With respect to the respondents’ federal due
process claim, we conclude that their claim fails under
the first prong of Golding because, even if this court
were to assume that there is a constitutional right to
in person confrontation, there is no factual record or
factual findings for this court to rely on to determine
whether that right was violated or whether the trial
court correctly concluded that the government’s interests were sufficiently great to warrant conducting the
trial virtually.6 See id., 661–64. Namely, the record lacks
many of the factual predicates to this claim. Accordingly, we adopt the reasoning and conclusions in part
I of In re Annessa J. herein. See id., 653–64.
II
The respondents’ final claim on appeal raises various
unpreserved state and federal constitutional arguments
premised on the fact that the state did not provide
the respondents, who were indigent, with their own
exclusive devices and internet connection to participate
both visually and by audio in the proceeding. Specifically, Samantha claims that the trial court denied her
due process of law, in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution, when it failed
to provide her with an adequate device and internet
connection to participate in the trial. In addition to a
federal due process challenge, Sebastian also asserts
that this failure to provide adequate technology denied
him equal protection of the law under the federal constitution and open access to the courts under the state constitution.
The respondents concede that they did not raise these
claims before the trial court and, therefore, seek review
under State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239–40. Pursuant to Golding, ‘‘a [respondent] can prevail on a claim
of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all
of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is
adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the
claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the
[respondent] of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless
error analysis, the [petitioner] has failed to demonstrate
harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation
beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ (Emphasis in original;
footnote omitted.) Id.; see In re Yasiel R., supra,
317
Conn. 781 (modifying third prong of Golding). ‘‘The
first two steps in the Golding analysis address the
reviewability of the claim, [whereas] the last two steps
involve the merits of the claim.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) In re Azareon Y.,
309 Conn. 626, 634–
35,
72 A.3d 1074 (2013).
As we have explained, under Golding, an appellant
‘‘may raise . . . a constitutional claim on appeal, and
the appellate tribunal will review it, but only if the
trial court record is adequate for appellate review. The
reason for this requirement demands no great elaboration: in the absence of a sufficient record, there is no
way to know whether a violation of constitutional magnitude in fact has occurred. Thus, as we stated in Golding, we will not address an unpreserved constitutional
claim [i]f the facts revealed by the record are insufficient, unclear or ambiguous as to whether a constitutional violation has occurred . . . . It is well
established . . . that parties must affirmatively seek
to prevail under . . . Golding . . . and bear the burden of establishing that they are entitled to appellate
review of their unpreserved constitutional claims.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Canales,
281 Conn. 572, 581,
916 A.2d 767 (2007). To
assess the adequacy of the record, we must first determine whether the alleged constitutional violation requires
any factual predicates. See, e.g., In re Azareon Y., supra,
309 Conn. 636.
As factual predicates to their constitutional claims,
the respondents allege that their shared device was inadequate because they were unable to appear before the
trial court, to confer spontaneously with counsel, or to
view the proceedings. We conclude that the record is
inadequate to review the respondents’ constitutional
claims because the record is silent on, and in some cases
undermines, those factual predicates. First, the record
does not indicate that the respondents shared a device
because they had access to only one device. Indeed,
after assuring the court that Samantha had the technology needed to participate in the proceedings, Samantha’s counsel explained that Samantha had ‘‘said she
had multiple devices . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
Samantha subsequently confirmed that she had internet
connectivity and a cell phone.
Second, contrary to the respondents’ assertions, the
trial court took numerous steps to ensure that the
respondents could meaningfully communicate with
their counsel throughout trial. The trial court specifically asked the respondents’ counsel how they planned
to confer with their clients during trial and explained
that it was ‘‘willing to proceed in . . . any way that
[the respondents’ counsel] would like’’ to ensure that
they had adequate contact with their clients. Samantha’s counsel explained to the court that she had gone
‘‘over how we would be able to communicate during
the trial, and [Samantha] said she had multiple devices,
so she would be able to be on video and . . . perhaps
text me on another device.’’ Samantha’s counsel subsequently stated that she has ‘‘been texting [Samantha],
and [Samantha has] been e-mailing, and, so, we are
communicating . . . during the trial.’’7 For his part,
Sebastian’s counsel similarly indicated that Sebastian
was communicating with him through a messaging
application.8 The court then noted that, ‘‘if there’s anything that the court needs to do in order to help you
effectuate that communication, let me know . . . and
we’ll do our best to accommodate.’’ Moreover, after the
testimony of three of the petitioner’s witnesses, before
each witness was released, the court asked the respondents’ counsel whether they needed an opportunity to
confer with their clients to determine whether they
should ask additional questions of the witness. The
respondents’ counsel declined the court’s offer to do
so each time. On at least one occasion, Samantha’s
counsel explained that she had already been communicating with Samantha during the witness’ examination.
Third, other than a few instances in which the trial
court noted that the respondents were appearing by
video or audio only, the record is silent as to the manner
in which the respondents participated throughout the
trial. Indeed, as Sebastian conceded in his brief, the
record is silent as to whether the respondents partici-
pated via audio or video on the morning of the first day
of trial. The record indicates, however, that, following
an afternoon recess, the court noted, ‘‘[the respondents]
have joined us by video, which is great.’’ (Emphasis
added.) In addition, on the second day of trial, the court
noted, at various points, that the respondents were visible via video. As a result, it is clear that the device the
respondents were using to participate in the proceedings had video capabilities, and, contrary to the respondents’ assertions, the record is devoid of any indication
that the respondents’ cell phone did not enable them
to view the proceedings. Moreover, the record reflects
that, when technical issues arose during trial, the court
took corrective measures to ensure that it, the parties
and counsel could meaningfully participate. See, e.g.,
People ex rel. R.J.B.,
482 P.3d 519, 525 (Colo. App.
2021) (noting importance of trial court’s taking steps
to remedy technological issues during virtual termination of parental rights trial), cert. denied, Colorado
Supreme Court, Docket No. 21SC115 (March 15, 2021);
In re M.M., Docket No. 21A-JT-840,
2021 WL 4839067,
*3 (Ind. App. October 18, 2021) (decision without published opinion,
176 N.E.3d 589) (explaining that trial
court rectified any technological issues during virtual
termination of parental rights hearing and respondent
mother was able to meaningfully participate). At one
point, when the respondents were experiencing technical difficulties, the court explained to the respondents,
‘‘[w]hatever way works best for you. We just want to
make sure that you have full participation in the proceedings, that’s all.’’
Finally, neither Samantha nor Sebastian asked for
technical assistance or accommodations from the trial
court. Because the respondents did not raise any issue
with their technology at trial, the trial court was unable
to assess any potential problems with their ability to
participate via video and had no occasion to consider
alternative means for them to participate via video,
to provide them technology or internet access, or to
continue the trial until it could be held in person. As
this court repeatedly has observed, ‘‘[o]ur role is not
to guess at possibilities . . . but to review claims based
on a complete factual record developed by a trial court.
. . . Without the necessary factual and legal conclusions furnished by the trial court . . . any decision
made by us respecting [the appellant’s claims] would
be entirely speculative.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Brunetti,
279 Conn. 39, 63,
901 A.2d
1 (2006), cert. denied,
549 U.S. 1212,
127 S. Ct. 1328,
167 L. Ed. 2d 85 (2007). Because the record is silent on
or, in some instances, undermines many of the factual
predicates necessary to evaluate the respondents’
claims, we conclude that the record is inadequate to
review those unpreserved claims.
We take this opportunity, however, to emphasize the
importance of ensuring equal access to justice, which is
particularly significant in the context of virtual hearings
and trials, given the digital divide. These public policy
considerations are identical to those that we expressed
in part II of In re Aisjaha N., which we also decide
today. See In re Aisjaha N., supra, 343 Conn. 727–30.
Accordingly, the public policy discussion in part II of
In re Aisjaha N. applies with equal force to the present cases.
The judgments are affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in these
appeals are not disclosed. The records and papers of these cases shall be
open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and
upon order of the Appellate Court.
… June 20, 2022, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,
is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
1
Microsoft Teams is ‘‘collaborative meeting [computer software] with
video, audio, and screen sharing features.’’ Connecticut Judicial Branch,
Connecticut Guide to Remote Hearings for Attorneys and Self-Represented
Parties (November 23, 2021) p. 5, available at https://jud.ct.gov/HomePDFs/
ConnecticutGuideRemoteHearings.pdf (last visited June 15, 2022).
2
The trial court’s thorough and well reasoned memorandum of decision
contains a detailed account of the extensive history of the department’s
involvement with the respondents.
3
For the purposes of these appeals, the parties stipulate that the respondents were sharing a cell phone to participate in the virtual termination of
parental rights trial, outside the proximity of their respective counsel.
4
Samantha subsequently confirmed that she had internet connectivity and
a cell phone.
5
Counsel for the minor children, Vada and Sebastian, Jr., adopted the
petitioner’s briefs and all of her legal arguments.
6
Unlike the respondent parents in In re Annessa J., the respondents in
the present cases did not raise any objection to the virtual nature of the
trial before the trial court.
7
The trial court even asked Samantha’s counsel: ‘‘So, going forward, you’ll
be able to communicate by text, and it’s really almost the same as [Samantha]
sitting there and writing you a note because you’re getting that note in real
time. Is that correct?’’ Samantha’s counsel responded, ‘‘[t]hat is correct,
Your Honor.’’
8
As with Samantha’s counsel, the trial court specifically asked Sebastian’s
counsel whether he would be able to communicate with Sebastian during
the testimony of a witness, to which Sebastian’s counsel responded, ‘‘[Sebastian] can send me messengers. I get something from messenger from him.’’
