State v. Oliver’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

83 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 86 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(b) Revocations for Persons Who Refuse Chemical Analyses or Who Are Charged With Certain Implied-Consent Offenses. —A person’s driver’s license is subject to revocation under this section if: (1) A charging officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed an offense subject to the implied-consent provisions of G.S. 20-16.2; (2) The person is charged with that offense as provided in G.S. 20-16.2(a); (3) The charging officer and the chemical analyst comply with the procedures of G.S. 20-16.2 and G.S. 20-139.1 in requiring the person’s submission to or procuring a chemical analysis; and (4) The person: a. Willfully refuses to submit to the chemical analysis; b. Has an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more within a relevant time after the driving; c. Has an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or more at any relevant time after the driving of a commercial motor vehicle; or d. Has any alcohol concentration at any relevant time after the driving and the person is under 21 years of age.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Lotharp · State v. Reid

2. “"DThe temporary ten-day driver’s license revocation provided for in N.C.G.S. 20-16.5 and the $50 restoration fee are neither excessive nor overwhelmingly disproportionate responses to the immediate dangers an impaired driver poses to the public and himself. An impaired driver presents an immediate, emergency situation, and swift action is required to remove the unfit driver from the highways in order to protect the public. We do not pretend to ignore that a driver’s license revocation, even of short duration, may for some, have a deterrent effect. However, as the United States Supreme Court recognized, whether a particular sanction constitutes punishment need not be determined from the defendant's perspective since even remedial sanctions carry the sting of punishment.” Halper, 490 U.S. at 447, n. 7 [ 109 S.Ct. at 1901, n. 7 ]. Indeed, any deterrent effect a driver’s license revocation may have upon the impaired driver is merely incidental to the overriding purpose of protecting the public’s safety. By our decision, we join with the majority of states which have considered this issue and held that a DWI conviction after a defendant has had his or her driver’s license revoked does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Tharp v. State · City of Helena v. Danichek

3. “Our ... Supreme Court ... has noted that Halper did not hold that every civil sanction be viewed as punishment; rather, Halper is a "`rule for the rare case.'" A civil sanction may invoke double jeopardy protections as a form of "punishment" only if it is grossly disproportionate to legitimate State goals separate from those served by criminal prosecution.... Neither the severity of the sanction nor the fact that it has a deterrent purpose automatically establishes that it is a form of punishment. Nor does the fact that the sanction has a punitive component invoke double jeopardy protection where the government's remedial interests are tightly intertwined with its punitive interests.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Thompson · 128 N.C. App. 547 - State v. Thompson