No. 807 September 10, 2025 371
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of C. G. P.,
a Youth.
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent,
v.
C. G. P.,
Appellant.
Clatsop County Circuit Court
23JU03184; A183721
Kirk C. Wintermute, Judge.
Submitted June 6, 2025.
Shannon Storey, Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate
Section, Oregon Public Defense Commission, and Joel C.
Duran, Deputy Public Defender, filed the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Shannon T. Reel, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and
O’Connor, Judge.
POWERS, J.
Reversed.
372 State v. C. G. P.
POWERS, J.
In this juvenile delinquency proceeding, youth
challenges his adjudication for conduct that, if committed
by an adult, would constitute criminal mischief in the second degree, ORS 164.354, involving damage to playground
equipment. Youth, who was playing at a playground in
Seaside with several other teenagers, found a can of spray
paint without a nozzle and, wanting to see if it worked,
pushed the can on a pole such that paint came out, damaging the pole. At the delinquency hearing, youth conceded that there was damage and argued that he did not
intentionally damage the playground equipment. Among
his arguments on appeal, youth contends that the juvenile court should have dismissed the delinquency petition
because the evidence was insufficient to support a finding
that he intended to damage the playground equipment. The
state remonstrates that, viewed in the light most favorable
to it, the evidence supports an inference that youth pressed
the can onto the pole with the conscious objective of damaging the playground equipment. Because the record does
not allow a reasonable inference that youth acted with the
required intent, we reverse.
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting a delinquency adjudication, we review
the evidence in the light most favorable to the state and
determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. State v.
D. B. O., 326 Or App 384, 385-86,
532 P3d 921 (2023). Here,
to prove second-degree criminal mischief as alleged in the
amended petition, the state had to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that, “[h]aving no right to do so nor reasonable ground
to believe that the [youth] ha[d] such right, the [youth] intentionally damage[d] property of another.” ORS 164.354(1)(b).
To prove that youth acted “intentionally,” the state had to
show that youth acted with a “conscious objective to cause
the result or to engage in the conduct so described.” ORS
161.085(7). Importantly, a mental state is rarely proved by
direct evidence; rather, a factfinder ordinarily infers intent
from circumstantial evidence and makes reasonable inferences from that evidence. See, e.g., State v. Rogers, 301 Or
Cite as
343 Or App 371 (2025) 373
App 393, 399, 457 P3d 363 (2019) (so observing). Whether
a particular inference is supported by circumstantial evidence is a legal question for a court to decide. State v. Bivins,
191 Or App 460, 467,
83 P3d 379 (2004) (explaining that
there is a difference between inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence and those drawn from mere speculation
and observing that “[r]easonable inferences are permissible;
speculation and guesswork are not”).
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the
evidence does not allow for a reasonable inference that youth
acted with the required intent.1 As an initial matter, the
direct evidence of youth’s state of mind consists of his statements to the officer and his testimony at the delinquency
hearing in which youth explained that he just wanted “to
see if the can worked” and that he “didn’t mean to” damage the playground equipment. The juvenile court, of course,
was permitted to disbelieve youth’s statements; however,
there still must be sufficient evidence to show that youth
acted with a conscious objective to damage the playground
equipment as a matter of law. See State v. Reed, 339 Or 239,
245,
118 P3d 791 (2005) (explaining that disbelieving a witness’s testimony “does not add anything affirmative to the
state’s evidence”). In our view, the circumstantial evidence
is insufficient.
Youth, who was 14 years old at the time, found the
can of spray paint in the bathroom of the park, noticed that
there was no nozzle, and tried to find an object that could
fit where the nozzle had been “to see if the can worked.”
Apparently not finding anything useful, youth used a pole
of the play structure to press the can onto, causing paint
to come out of the can. According to youth, he did that “just
the one time,” although a witness, who was at the park with
her son, testified that the “group of teenagers” rubbed the
paint on the playground equipment “multiple times.” The
state submitted an exhibit with four photos documenting
the orange paint on the blue playground equipment and on
the edge of the slide:
1
Our resolution based on the first assignment of error obviates the need to
address youth’s second assignment that asserts that the juvenile court’s speaking verdict implied that the court impermissibly shifted the burden to youth to
disprove his guilt.
374 State v. C. G. P.
Youth testified that he was “pretty sure” that he left the
can on the ground while he went to look in the bathroom
for paper towels to clean up the paint. However, he did not
find any, so he put the can back in the bathroom where he
found it. From that evidence, we cannot draw a conclusion
that youth acted intentionally to cause damage to the playground equipment.
Cite as 343 Or App 371 (2025) 375
There is an appreciable difference between intentional action—that is, acting with a conscious objective to
cause damage—and thoughtlessly, perhaps even recklessly,
playing with a can of spray paint in a way that results in
damage. On this record, it is not a reasonable inference
that youth acted with a conscious objective of damaging
the playground equipment. See State v. L. J. G., 339 Or App
681, 683,
568 P3d 1032 (2025) (concluding, in a proceeding
involving third-degree criminal mischief, that the youth
gave “no thought as to how his efforts to explore the hole
in the ceiling might inconvenience” others). Although a witness saw the group rub paint on the playground equipment
“multiple times,” the state still did not offer sufficient evidence to prove that youth acted with a conscious objective to
damage the equipment. That is, this is not a situation where
youth was carrying a can of spray paint at night and was
found walking away from damaged playground equipment
that had been tagged with a discernable message or initials,
for instance, or where the equipment was severely damaged.
Rather, the circumstances in this case show youth acting
carelessly and thoughtlessly—clearly causing damage to the
playground—but it is too much of an inferential leap to conclude as a matter of law that youth acted with a conscious
objective to cause that damage for purposes of a delinquency
adjudication on second-degree criminal mischief.
Reversed.
