Morrison's Estate’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

29 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 39 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““We deem it to be the law in Pennsylvania and the approved opinion in most other jurisdictions that a partnership is not recognized as an entity like a corporation, that it is not a legal entity having as such a domicile or residence separate and distinct from that of the individuals who compose it. It is rather a relation or status between two or more persons who unite their labor or property to carry on a business for profit. This is subject to an apparent exception, for while a partnership as such is not a person, it, as a matter of fact, is treated by a legal fiction as a quasi person or entity for such purposes as keeping of partnership accounts and marshaling assets. . . . Until the promulgation of Pa. B. C. P. 2128, a partnership could not be sued in its firm name, and even yet, under Pa. R. C. P. 2127, partners must be named individually in actions by a partnership.” (Italics supplied.)”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 165 Pa. Super. 546 - McElhinney v. Belsky · 529 F. Supp. 194 - Nationwide Mutual Insurance v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.

2. ““... Section 13 [a] was not intended to disturb liens against real estate entered of record prior to the decedent’s death. This represents the settled policy of our decisions covering many years. That section is but a reenactment of section 21 of the Act of February 24, 1834 (1 Purdon, p. 1103), which was founded on section 14 of the Act of April 19, 1794, 3 Sm. L. 143. In Ramsey’s Appeal, 4 Watts 71, 74 , we said: ‘The fund which arises from the sale of the real estate must be paid to the judgment-creditors, according to their respective priorities in point of time.’ To the same effect is Boud’s Appeal, 2 Pennypacker 241. Also, see Hocker’s Estate, 14 Phila. 659 , and Wade’s Appeal, 29 Pa. 328 . The preferences created by our intestate laws in favor of funeral expenses, etc., have never been permitted to postpone record liens, even though personalty may have been lacking for the payment of such preferences. Just so, the order of priorities fixing payments to the Commonwealth last in order cannot be construed as taking from the owner of record liens priorities existing at the date of death. The claim of the Commonwealth is not a simple debt, but a judgment of record acquired before the decedent’s death, and by reason of its prior entry it is entitled to the fund.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. De Peio Estate