Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

344 Conn. 113

State v. Council

Supreme Court of Connecticut

Decided July 26, 2022

Supreme Court of Connecticut · decided 2022-07-26

Convicted of the crimes of murder and criminal possession of a firearm in connection with the shooting death of the victim near a gas station in New Haven, the defendant appealed to this court. At trial, the state presented a witness who qualified as an expert in historical cell site analysis and testified that the defendant's cell phone utilized cell towers near the gas station around the time of the shooting. In order to corrobo- rate the defendant's theory that he was not present at the gas station at the time of the shooting, defense counsel proffered testimony from O, an investigator for a private investigation company who had received training in cell phone analytics, as to the defendant's location at relevant times on the basis of certain cell phone carrier data. The trial court sustained the prosecutor's objections to O's proffered testimony and precluded O from testifying on the grounds that the evidence was imma- terial and irrelevant, O did not possess sufficient qualifications to provide expert testimony on the cell phone carrier data, and O did not establish the reliability of the methodology on which he relied. On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial court had violated his constitutional right to present a defense by precluding O's testimony. Although the defendant acknowledged that his right to present a defense was limited by the rules of evidence, he nevertheless claimed that the trial court had improperly excluded O's testimony because O was qualified as an expert pursuant to the applicable provision (§ 7-2) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, which permits testimony by a qualified expert when his or her testimony will assist the fact finder in understanding the evidence or in determining a disputed fact. Held that the defendant's appeal was dismissed as moot; even if this court agreed with the defen- dant that the trial court improperly had determined that O lacked suffi- cient qualifications under § 7-2 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence to provide expert testimony on the cell phone carrier data, this court could not afford the defendant any practical relief, as there were two independent grounds for the trial court's exclusion of O's testimony that the defendant did not challenge on appeal, namely, that the proffered evidence was immaterial and irrelevant and that O did not establish the reliability of the methodology on which he relied. Argued March 22—officially released July 26, 2022

Relies on State v. Golding · State v. Nardini · State v. Cerreta

Decided 2022-07-26

***********************************************
    The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was
released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions
and petitions for certification is the “officially released”
date appearing in the opinion.

   All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut
Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of
discrepancies between the advance release version of an
opinion and the latest version appearing in the Connecticut
Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports
or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to
be considered authoritative.

   The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the
opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and
bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not
be reproduced and distributed without the express written
permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
***********************************************
  STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOSHUA COUNCIL
                (SC 20513)
             Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins,
                       Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js.

                                   Syllabus

Convicted of the crimes of murder and criminal possession of a firearm in
   connection with the shooting death of the victim near a gas station in
   New Haven, the defendant appealed to this court. At trial, the state
   presented a witness who qualified as an expert in historical cell site
   analysis and testified that the defendant’s cell phone utilized cell towers
   near the gas station around the time of the shooting. In order to corroborate the defendant’s theory that he was not present at the gas station
   at the time of the shooting, defense counsel proffered testimony from
   O, an investigator for a private investigation company who had received
   training in cell phone analytics, as to the defendant’s location at relevant
   times on the basis of certain cell phone carrier data. The trial court
   sustained the prosecutor’s objections to O’s proffered testimony and
   precluded O from testifying on the grounds that the evidence was immaterial and irrelevant, O did not possess sufficient qualifications to provide
   expert testimony on the cell phone carrier data, and O did not establish
   the reliability of the methodology on which he relied. On appeal, the
   defendant contended that the trial court had violated his constitutional
   right to present a defense by precluding O’s testimony. Although the
   defendant acknowledged that his right to present a defense was limited
   by the rules of evidence, he nevertheless claimed that the trial court
   had improperly excluded O’s testimony because O was qualified as an
   expert pursuant to the applicable provision (§ 7-2) of the Connecticut
   Code of Evidence, which permits testimony by a qualified expert when
   his or her testimony will assist the fact finder in understanding the
   evidence or in determining a disputed fact. Held that the defendant’s
   appeal was dismissed as moot; even if this court agreed with the defendant that the trial court improperly had determined that O lacked sufficient qualifications under § 7-2 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence to
   provide expert testimony on the cell phone carrier data, this court
   could not afford the defendant any practical relief, as there were two
   independent grounds for the trial court’s exclusion of O’s testimony
   that the defendant did not challenge on appeal, namely, that the proffered
   evidence was immaterial and irrelevant and that O did not establish the
   reliability of the methodology on which he relied.
            Argued March 22—officially released July 26, 2022

                             Procedural History

   Substitute information charging the defendant with
the crimes of murder and criminal possession of a firearm, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven and tried to the jury before Vitale,
J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Appeal dismissed.
   Richard S. Cramer, for the appellant (defendant).
  Kathryn W. Bare, senior assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were Patrick J. Griffin, chief
state’s attorney, and Stacey Miranda, supervisory assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
                         Opinion

   McDONALD, J. In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial court properly precluded the
proffered testimony of the defendant’s expert on cell
phone location data. The defendant, Joshua Council,
appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after
a jury trial, of murder and criminal possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon. At trial, defense counsel
proffered testimony from an expert witness as to the
defendant’s location during certain relevant times on
the basis of cell phone carrier data. The trial court
precluded the witness from testifying on the grounds
that (1) the evidence was immaterial and irrelevant, (2)
the witness did not articulate sufficient qualifications
to provide expert opinion on the data, and (3) the testimony did not establish the reliability of the data. On
appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court
improperly excluded the testimony because the witness
was qualified as an expert pursuant to § 7-2 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence.1 We dismiss the defendant’s
appeal as moot because he has not challenged all of
the trial court’s bases for its evidentiary ruling, and,
therefore, this court cannot provide him practical relief.
  The jury reasonably could have found the following
facts. In January, 2018, the defendant encountered the
victim, Kenneth Cooper, in the parking lot of a gas
station in New Haven. After a brief interaction, the
victim attempted to reenter his vehicle when the defendant fired eight shots from a .45 caliber firearm at him.
The victim later died from multiple gunshot wounds to
the torso and extremities. The defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with murder and criminal
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
   At trial, the state presented an expert witness, James
J. Wines, to testify as to the defendant’s location and
movements at times relevant to the shooting. Wines is
a special agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and an expert in historical cell site analysis. Using cell
phone tower data, Wines plotted the defendant’s cell
phone use and determined that the defendant’s phone
used cell towers near the gas station around the time
of the shooting.
   The defendant’s theory of the case was predicated
on his testimony that he was not present at the gas
station at the time of the shooting. To corroborate the
defendant’s theory, and to counter the testimony from
the state’s witnesses, defense counsel proffered his own
evidence concerning data from cell site locations. Specifically, defense counsel presented two witnesses:
Linda Thomas, a trial analyst and custodian of records
for AT&T, and James Oulundsen, an investigator for a
private investigation company.
  During the proffer, which was held outside the presence of the jury, Thomas testified that the defendant’s
cell phone records contained AT&T network location
system or network location service (NELOS) data.
Thomas testified that NELOS data comprise ‘‘historical
precision location information’’ collected by AT&T engineers to ‘‘help maintain the network . . . .’’ The examination of Thomas revealed that NELOS data are ‘‘best
estimate[s] of where the device was based on the unverifiable sources’’ that the data were retrieved from.
Thomas cited possible use of the data in customer billing or customer complaints of dropped calls. Thomas
was unable to articulate the sources of the NELOS
points or to verify the accuracy of the points. The
NELOS data records from AT&T that were the subject
of Thomas’ testimony contained a printed disclaimer
warning that the user should ‘‘exercise caution in using
[the] records for investigative purposes as location data
[are] sourced from various databases [that] may cause
location results to be less than exact.’’
   Thereafter, Oulundsen testified, during the proffer,
that he was a digital forensic investigator for a private
investigation company and had received training in cell
phone analytics. He offered testimony and an accompanying report that detailed his mapping of the NELOS
points and their respective latitude and longitude over
Google Maps to estimate the defendant’s location at
times relevant to the shooting.2 Oulundsen was unable
to verify the accuracy of the NELOS data or the methodology used to arrive at those NELOS points. Throughout
Oulundsen’s testimony, the prosecutor objected on the
grounds of lack of foundation, lack of expert qualifications concerning the NELOS data and the accompanying
exhibits,3 and lack of reliability of the methodology.
   Following arguments from the prosecutor and defense
counsel regarding the admissibility of the testimony
and accompanying exhibits, the court sustained the
prosecutor’s objections. As a result, the testimony and
exhibits were excluded and were not presented to the
jury. Initially, the court based its ruling on the relevance
and materiality of the evidence under § 4-1 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, concluding: ‘‘The court is
not persuaded that using the methods . . . [and] the
information [the witness] testified to has been adequately explained to be material and relevant for the
purpose for which it’s being offered.’’ The court reasoned that the evidence was speculative and that it
would not ‘‘have a logical tendency to aid the jury in
determining where the cell phone was located.’’ The
next day, before returning to the presentation of evidence, the court amplified its ruling, adding that, in
addition to the relevance and materiality concerns,
‘‘none of the factors in State v. Edwards, [
325 Conn. 97
, 
156 A.3d 506
 (2017)], or State v. Steele, 
176 Conn. App. 1
, [
169 A.3d 797
, cert. denied, 
327 Conn. 962
, 
172 A.3d 1261
 (2017)],4 [was] presented or articulated with
a sufficient evidentiary basis on the record given the
testimony from . . . Thomas and . . . Oulundsen,
separately and in combination . . . .’’ (Footnote
added.) The court also ‘‘was not persuaded . . . that
. . . Oulundsen possessed any articulated background
or specific training . . . using the so-called NELOS
data that qualified him to render opinions on that topic.’’
  At the conclusion of trial, the jury found the defendant guilty on both counts, and the trial court sentenced
the defendant to a total effective sentence of seventy
years of incarceration. This appeal followed.
   On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court
violated his sixth amendment right to present a defense5
by precluding Oulundsen’s testimony and related exhibits regarding the NELOS data.6 Although the defendant
acknowledges that his right to present a defense is
limited by the rules of evidence; see, e.g., State v. Cerreta, 
260 Conn. 251
, 260–61, 
796 A.2d 1176
 (2002); he
argues that the admissibility of Oulundsen’s testimony
is governed by § 7-2 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, which permits testimony by qualified experts
when the testimony will assist the fact finder in understanding the evidence or in determining a disputed fact.
The defendant asserts that Oulundsen’s testimony was
admissible pursuant to § 7-2 because Oulundsen was a
qualified expert with specialized knowledge and training in cell phone analysis and his testimony, if allowed,
would have assisted the trier of fact in understanding
the evidence. The defendant further asserts that the
nature of the NELOS data, including flaws in accuracy
or specificity, goes to weight and not to admissibility.
   The state argues that the defendant’s claim on appeal
is not reviewable because the defendant failed to challenge all of the independent bases for the trial court’s
evidentiary ruling. Specifically, the state contends that
the defendant failed to challenge the trial court’s conclusions that the evidence was immaterial, irrelevant and
not reliable. The state also argues that the defendant’s
unpreserved claim is not reviewable under State v.
Golding, 
213 Conn. 233
, 39–40, 
567 A.2d 823
 (1989), as
modified by In re Yasiel R., 
317 Conn. 773
, 781, 
120 A.3d 1188
 (2015), ‘‘because a trial court’s ruling on the
proper evidentiary foundation for admitting evidence is
not an issue of constitutional dimension.’’ Alternatively,
the state maintains that, even if the defendant’s claim
is reviewable, the trial court acted well within its discretion in excluding the proffered expert testimony from
Oulundsen because, during the proffer, defense counsel
failed to establish Oulundsen’s expertise, the reliability
of the testimony or data points, and the relevance of
the evidence under § 4-1 of the Connecticut Code of
Evidence. We agree with the state that the defendant
failed to challenge all of the independent bases of the
trial court’s evidentiary ruling, and, therefore, the defendant’s claim on appeal is moot.
   The issue of mootness presents a threshold question
of justiciability that we must determine prior to a review
on the merits because it implicates this court’s subject
matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Lyon v. Jones, 
291 Conn. 384, 392
, 
968 A.2d 416
 (2009). The principles underpinning the mootness doctrine and justiciability are well
settled. ‘‘We begin with the four part test for justiciability established in State v. Nardini, 
187 Conn. 109
, 
445 A.2d 304
 (1982). . . . Because courts are established
to resolve actual controversies, before a claimed controversy is entitled to a resolution on the merits it must
be justiciable. Justiciability requires (1) that there be
an actual controversy between or among the parties to
the dispute . . . (2) that the interests of the parties be
adverse . . . (3) that the matter in controversy be
capable of being adjudicated by judicial power . . .
and (4) that the determination of the controversy will
result in practical relief to the complainant.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Lyon v. 
Jones, supra, 393
;
see also State v. 
Nardini, supra,
 111–12. ‘‘In determining
mootness, the dispositive question is whether a successful appeal would benefit the [complainant] . . . in any
way.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lyon v.
Jones, supra, 394
.
   ‘‘[When] an appellant fails to challenge all bases for
a trial court’s adverse ruling on his claim, even if this
court were to agree with the appellant on the issues
that he does raise, [this court] still would not be able
to provide [him] any relief in light of the binding adverse
finding[s] [not raised] with respect to those claims. . . .
Therefore, when an appellant challenges a trial court’s
adverse ruling, but does not challenge all independent
bases for that ruling, the appeal is moot.’’ (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lester, 
324 Conn. 519
, 526–27, 
153 A.3d 647
 (2017).
  Here, the trial court’s ruling to exclude Oulundsen’s
testimony rested on three separate grounds. First, the
court concluded that the testimony was speculative and
would not have a logical tendency to aid the jury in
determining the location of the defendant’s cell phone,
therefore making it immaterial and irrelevant. See Conn.
Code Evid. § 4-1. Second, the court determined that the
defendant failed to establish that Oulundsen possessed
the qualifications necessary to provide expert testimony
about NELOS data. See Conn. Code Evid. § 7-2. Lastly,
the court also held that the testimony failed to satisfy
any of the factors set forth in Steele or Edwards to
establish the reliability of the methodology for the proffered testimony. See footnote 4 of this opinion.
   The defendant challenges only one of the trial court’s
bases for excluding Oulundsen’s testimony, namely, the
qualifications of Oulundsen as an expert under § 7-2
of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. The defendant’s
initial brief fails to challenge the court’s exclusion of
the evidence on the ground of reliability under Steele
and Edwards or on the grounds of relevancy and materiality. Although the defendant makes cursory reference
to reliability in his reply brief, it is well settled that we
will not consider claims of error that are raised for the
first time in an appellant’s reply brief. See, e.g., Barlow
v. Commissioner of Correction, 
343 Conn. 347
, 362 n.2,
273 A.3d 680
 (2022) (‘‘It is axiomatic that a party may
not raise an issue for the first time on appeal in [his]
reply brief. . . . Although the function of the appellant’s reply brief is to respond to the arguments and
authority presented in the appellee’s brief, that function
does not include raising an entirely new claim of error.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.)).
  The reliability, materiality, and relevancy grounds of
the trial court’s ruling to exclude Oulundsen’s testimony
are independent bases for the exclusion, and these
unchallenged bases remain binding. Regardless of
whether we were to agree with the defendant in his
challenge to the trial court’s ruling on Oulundsen’s
expert qualifications under § 7-2 of the Connecticut
Code of Evidence, we cannot provide him with any
practical relief. Therefore, the defendant’s claim is
moot, and this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
      The appeal is dismissed.
      In this opinion the other justices concurred.
  1
     In his primary brief to this court, the defendant also raises a claim of
error relating to the trial court’s jury charge. Specifically, the defendant
argues that the trial court should have instructed the jury that the defendant’s
knowledge of his previous felony conviction was an element of criminal
possession of a firearm. Defense counsel expressly abandoned this claim
at oral argument before this court. Specifically, when asked whether he
was ‘‘still pressing’’ the jury instruction issue, defense counsel responded:
‘‘[W]e’re not pressing that issue. . . . [T]here is a distinction between the
federal [criminal possession] statute and the state statute [that] is significant.
I recognize that now.’’ Thereafter, defense counsel explicitly conceded that
there was no error in this regard.
   2
     The exact purpose of Oulundsen’s testimony is unclear from the record,
as the proffer did not reach Oulundsen’s conclusions beyond the identification of three known addresses in the data: the scene of the crime, the
defendant’s residence, and another witness’ residence. The defendant asserts
in his brief, however, that this evidence was to ‘‘discredit [the] highly damaging testimony [from Wines]’’ that placed the defendant near the gas station
at the time of the shooting.
   3
     In addition to Oulundsen’s report, the defendant also sought to admit
the Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence (SWGDE) Recommendations for Cell Site Analysis, which contained guidance on using data, such
as NELOS points, for cell site analysis. The document, however, contained
a disclaimer requiring that the SWGDE receive notification before the introduction of the document at any judicial or adjudicatory hearing. Oulundsen
conceded that he did not notify the SWGDE prior to using the document
during his testimony.
   4
     Edwards and Steele held that expert testimony based on scientific evidence is inadmissible unless the party offering it establishes that the underlying methodology is reliable. See State v. 
Edwards, supra,
 325 Conn. 124–25;
State v. 
Steele, supra,
 176 Conn. App. 33–35.
   5
     The sixth amendment right to present a defense is made applicable to
the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
See, e.g., State v. Andrews, 
313 Conn. 266
, 272 n.3, 
96 A.3d 1199
 (2014).
   6
     The defendant does not challenge the exclusion of Thomas’ testimony.

/344/conn/113 · .json · Public domain