State v. Samuolis

***********************************************
    The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was
released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions
and petitions for certification is the “officially released”
date appearing in the opinion.

   All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut
Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of
discrepancies between the advance release version of an
opinion and the latest version appearing in the Connecticut
Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports
or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to
be considered authoritative.

   The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the
opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and
bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not
be reproduced and distributed without the express written
permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
***********************************************
 STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ANDREW SAMUOLIS
                (SC 20299)
             Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins,
                       Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js.

                                  Syllabus

Pursuant to the emergency exception to the warrant requirement of the
   fourth amendment to the United States constitution, the police are
   permitted to enter a home without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured
   or imminently threatened with such injury.
Convicted of the crimes of murder, assault in the first degree, and attempt
   to commit assault in the first degree, the defendant appealed to this
   court, claiming that the trial court improperly had denied his motion
   to suppress certain evidence seized by the police as a result of their
   warrantless entry into his home. Prior to the challenged entry, the defendant’s neighbor contacted the police because he and other neighbors
   were concerned that they had not seen the defendant’s father, S, who
   lived with the defendant, in a long time. Thereafter, two police officers
   were dispatched to the defendant’s residence to check on S’s well-being.
   The officers assessed the exterior of the residence, knocked on the
   doors, and called into open windows but received no response and
   concluded that no one was home. Immediately after the well-being
   check, one of the officers was told by his supervising officer that the
   defendant had, or possibly had, mental health issues. Four days later,
   the defendant’s neighbor again contacted the police and requested
   another well-being check. The officers conducting the second well-being
   check were warned that the defendant was possibly a mentally disturbed
   person. Upon their arrival, the officers spoke with the neighbor, who
   told them that, after the previous visit by the police, the defendant
   covered the lower rear windows with chicken wire. The neighbor also
   indicated that he noticed a mass of flies around the upper rear window
   of the residence. One of the officers believed, based on his prior experience, that the sheer number of flies indicated that there might be a dead
   body inside the house. Using a ladder, one of the officers climbed to
   the upper rear window, which had been propped open slightly with an
   air freshener. There were flies everywhere but no odor. The officer
   looked into the window but was unable to see anything noteworthy.
   Both officers then contacted their supervisor because they believed that
   entry into the residence might be necessary for the well-being of both
   S and the defendant. After arriving at the residence and being apprised
   of the situation, the supervisor concluded that there was a dead body
   in the home and that they would need to enter the residence to see if
   anyone inside needed assistance. One of the officers thereafter cut a
   screen and entered the residence through an open second floor window.
   After announcing his presence and not receiving a response, the officer
   went downstairs and opened the front door. The defendant then shot
   the officer and fled the residence. Soon thereafter, the defendant was
   apprehended, and the officers entered the home to secure it and to
   search for any injured persons. Police officers eventually found a badly
   decomposed body on the second floor. Thereafter, the police obtained
   a search warrant, and the defendant voluntarily gave a statement to the
   police in which he admitted that he had shot S several months earlier
   and that, when S’s body started to smell, he sealed the room in which
   it was located. In denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the seizure
   of S’s dead body, the trial court concluded, inter alia, that the officers’
   entry into the home was justified under the emergency exception to
   the warrant requirement because that entry was objectively reasonable
   under the totality of the circumstances. On appeal, the defendant
   claimed, inter alia, that the facts did not provide an objectively reasonable basis for the police officers to conclude that there was an emergency
   justifying a warrantless entry into his residence. Held that, under the
   totality of the circumstances, it was objectively reasonable for the officers to conclude that there was an emergency justifying their initial
   entry into the defendant’s home, and, accordingly, the trial court properly
   denied the defendant’s motion to suppress: the defendant could not
   prevail on his claim that it was unclear, in light of the United States
   Supreme Court’s decision in Caniglia v. Strom (

), whether
   a warrantless entry into a home is still permitted to assist a person
   who is injured or facing imminent injury, as this court found no such
   ambiguity in that decision and observed that other courts have continued
   to apply the emergency exception post-Caniglia; moreover, although
   the state did not meet its burden of establishing that it was objectively
   reasonable for the officers to believe that the defendant required emergency assistance, it did meet its burden of establishing that it was
   objectively reasonable for the officers to believe that S required immediate emergency assistance, as the record indicated that S was an elderly
   man who had not been seen by any of his neighbors for at least one
   month, the family’s only vehicle had not been moved since S was last
   seen, S did not respond to the officers’ knocks on the door or shouts
   into the open windows, and there was an extraordinary infestation of
   flies around the upper rear window of the residence, which led the
   officers to believe, on the basis of their past experience, that the most
   likely explanation for the infestation was the presence of a dead body,
   and which also left open the possibility that an occupant might be injured
   rather than dead; furthermore, the defendant’s mental condition was a
   relevant factor in the officers’ calculation of whether S needed emergency assistance and what actions were necessary to provide that assistance, as the defendant’s conduct in attempting to fortify the home
   against intruders and in refusing to answer the door would have indicated
   to the officers that they were not going to be able to obtain timely
   information from the defendant about the whereabouts or condition of
   S, and the defendant’s failure to remediate the fly infestation in plain
   view reasonably suggested that his mental condition may have impaired
   his capacity to appreciate the gravity of the conditions that existed and
   the need to elicit prompt medical assistance; in addition, there was no
   merit to the defendant’s contentions that the officers’ actions in driving
   to the residence without activating their emergency lights or sirens and
   waiting for their supervisor’s approval before entering the residence
   indicated that they did not perceive the situation as an emergency, and
   that the officers failed to consider alternative explanations for the facts
   presented that would indicate that no emergency existed.
          Argued March 24—officially released August 9, 2022

                           Procedural History

   Three substitute informations charging the defendant, in the first case, with two counts of the crime of
attempt to commit assault in the first degree and, in
the second case, with two counts of the crime of attempt
to commit assault in the first degree and one count of
the crime of assault in the first degree, and, in the third
case, with the crime of murder, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Windham, where the
cases were consolidated; thereafter, the court, J. Fischer, J.,
denied the defendant’s motion to suppress certain evidence; subsequently, the charge of murder was tried to
a three judge panel, A. Hadden, J. Fischer and Solomon,
Js., and the remaining charges were tried to the court,
J. Fischer, J.; judgments of guilty of murder and one
count each of attempt to commit assault in the first
degree and assault in the first degree, from which the
defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
  Jeffrey C. Kestenband, for the appellant (defendant).
   Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state’s attorney, with
whom were Andrew J. Slitt, senior assistant state’s
attorney, and, on the brief, Anne F. Mahoney, state’s
attorney, for the appellee (state).
                          Opinion

   KELLER, J. Following a trial to the court, the defendant, Andrew Samuolis, was convicted of murder in
violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a, assault in the
first degree by means of the discharge of a firearm in
violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (5), and attempt
to commit assault in the first degree by means of the
discharge of a firearm in violation of General Statutes
§§ 53a-49 and 53a-59 (a) (5). In his direct appeal to
this court; see General Statutes § 51-199 (b) (3); the
defendant challenges only his murder conviction. The
sole issue is whether the trial court properly denied the
defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from
his home, specifically, the dead body of the defendant’s
father, John Samuolis, on the grounds that (1) the police
officers’ warrantless entry into the Samuolis home was
justified under the emergency exception to the warrant
requirement of the fourth amendment to the United
States constitution, or, alternatively, (2) the defendant’s
alleged actions in shooting at the officers upon their
initial entry attenuated the taint from that unlawful
initial entry and justified their subsequent reentries into
the home. We affirm the trial court’s judgment on the
basis of the first ground.
   The trial court made the following findings of fact.
‘‘On [Friday] June 21, 2013, Willimantic Police Officer[s]
[Amy] Hartman [and Elvin Salas were] dispatched to
31 Tunxis Lane [in Willimantic] to check on the well-being of John Samuolis [Samuolis], the owner of the
property. Earlier in the day, [Salas] had been on routine
patrol on the street and hailed by Mark Curtis, who
lived next door to Samuolis. Curtis related that he and
the neighbors across the street, [Andy and Shirley Lebiszczak], were concerned that they had not seen [Samuolis], who was referred to as the ‘old man,’ in a long
time. . . .
   ‘‘At about 7:30 that evening, [while it was still light
out] . . . Salas and Hartman arrived . . . at [31]
Tunxis Lane, which is a split-level style home [on a
cul-de-sac] in a residential neighborhood described as
‘quiet.’ . . . A car . . . was parked in the driveway.
Some of the [second floor] windows of the house were
open and part[s] of the lawn had been mowed recently.
There was no visible accumulation of trash or mail. The
officers walked around the house and knocked on the
doors, which were locked. They noticed a cat in the
window. Salas called into the open windows announcing their presence, but they received no response. They
concluded that no one was home.
   ‘‘The officers then spoke with Curtis and the Lebiszczaks and learned that the house was occupied by [Samuolis] and his adult son, [the defendant], and that the
[defendant’s] mother . . . was deceased. The neighbors also noted that [the defendant] was ‘a little weird’
and ‘not all there’ and that he might be in the house.
. . . The officers intended to return later that evening
to recheck the house but . . . other duties . . . prevented them from returning.
   ‘‘On [the morning of Monday] June 25, 2013 . . . Curtis called the Willimantic Police [Department] and asked
them to recheck the Samuolis house because [of
changes since the prior visit, namely] there was now
chicken wire covering the lower rear windows of the
house and there were a huge number of flies massing
at an upper rear window. [Officer Kevin] Winkler was
dispatched to the scene, and . . . Salas responded as
back up when he recognized the address being broadcast. . . . [N]either officer used [his] lights or sirens
on [his] way to 31 Tunxis Lane. . . . Since Salas’ earlier
visit, the weather had been extremely hot and dry.
   ‘‘Both officers exited their vehicles and walked
around the house. They found the doors were all locked
and all the curtains were [now] drawn. The front upper
windows of the house were open. Salas saw [that] the
car was still parked in the same place and ran the
[license] plate. The registration came back to 31 Tunxis
Lane. Salas did not check to see if any other vehicles
were registered to the house.
  ‘‘The officers also had a short discussion with Curtis,
who told them that [the defendant] had put the chicken
wire up after the police had left the home [following]
the previous well-being check.1 Curtis also pointed out
the mass of flies at the upper rear window. Salas told
Winkler that neither the wire nor the flies had been
there earlier. Salas, based on his experience, thought
that the sheer number of flies indicated that there might
be a dead body in the house.
   ‘‘Curtis offered the use of a ladder, and Winkler put
it in place and climbed up to look into the upper rear
window. The window was propped open slightly by an
air freshener. There were flies everywhere, but no odor.
Winkler looked in but was unable to see anything. The
officers did not have a phone number for the house;
nor did they ask Curtis [if he had] any contact information. The officers were now concerned for the well-being of the ‘old man,’ [Samuolis], and his son, [the
defendant], due to his possible ‘state of mind.’
   ‘‘Salas and Winkler thought that an entry into the
house might be necessary, so they called their supervisor, Sergeant [Roberto] Rosado, and related what they
had found. Rosado came to the scene without using his
lights and siren, [arriving a few minutes later] . . . .
After being apprised of the current situation and what
had transpired on June 21, Rosado concluded that there
was a dead body in the house and that they would have
to make an entry into the house in order to search for
it and anyone else who might need help. . . . [T]hese
officers . . . did not believe that criminal activity had
occurred. . . . Winkler move[d] [the ladder around the
house] to the front upper windows to gain entry [into
a better lit room].2 The officers testified that they would
have handled the issues differently if they were not in
community caretaking mode.3 . . .
   ‘‘Winkler then ascended the ladder [and] cut the window screen . . . . He told Rosado and Salas that he
would go down and open the front door and let them in.
. . . [After he entered the second floor of the residence]
Winkler heard a noise from the basement. Winkler
stopped and announced his presence as a police officer
and waited, but he heard nothing in response. Winkler
then went down the stairs to the front door, which was
barred by a heavy metal bar. He removed the bar and
tossed it . . . toward the basement . . . . Winkler
then opened the front door . . . while keeping an eye
on the basement . . . .
   ‘‘At that point, Winkler saw a rifle barrel stick out
around the wall at the bottom of the basement stairs
carried by a male who was dressed ‘for battle’ in camouflaged clothing and a ballistic style vest. The male aimed
and fired the weapon at Winkler, hitting him in the
elbow. This male was later identified as the defendant
. . . .’’4 (Footnotes added.)
  The officers then fled from the home. Salas saw the
defendant run through the backyard of the house carrying the rifle and disappear into the woods. Rosado
radioed police dispatch and reported what had
occurred, and, thereafter, other officers arrived at the
scene to assist. Detective Lucien Frechette received a
text message that a Willimantic police officer had been
shot and drove to the police station, where ‘‘he gathered
information about the residence and the family, including a phone number. Frechette donned protective gear
and went to the command center, which had been set
up a short distance from 31 Tunxis Lane. Frechette
asked for and received permission to call the phone
number he had, and then he called it from the command
center. No one answered the call, and he left a message
on a recording device.’’
   At about 12:53 p.m., the state police reported that
they had captured the defendant and that he was in their
custody. ‘‘As soon as Frechette and the other officers
learned that the defendant was in custody, he and other
[special operations officers] entered the house to secure
it and [to] search for any injured parties. This was at
about 1:02 p.m. Frechette observed that the door to the
rear second floor bedroom was sealed with tape and
plastic and a rope. Suspecting [that] it might be booby-trapped,
Frechette ordered everyone out of the house . . . .
  ‘‘Once outside, Frechette went up a ladder to the rear
second floor window and raised the window enough
to lean inside. The flies were still thick. Frechette saw
a badly decomposed body on the floor directly below
the window [wrapped in plastic]. He also visually
inspected the room for booby traps, but found nothing.
No physical evidence was seized during this protective
sweep. The Connecticut State Police then procured a
search warrant, which was executed later, and physical
evidence [including what was later confirmed to be the
dead body of Samuolis] was seized.’’
  While these events were unfolding, the defendant
waived his rights and voluntarily gave a statement to
Connecticut State Police Detective Adam Pillsbury.
Prior to taking the defendant’s statement, ‘‘Pillsbury did
not know that [Samuolis] was dead or that his body
was still in the house. The defendant told Pillsbury that
the police had come to the house to check on his father.
The defendant stated that he had shot his father several
months before. He further stated that the body was still
in the house, and it had started to smell so he sealed
the room. Pillsbury then called his superiors to tell them
that there was a body in the house.’’
   The defendant was charged with murder, assault in
the first degree, and several counts of attempt to commit
assault in the first degree. The defendant filed a motion
to suppress the evidence seized from the warrantless
entry into his home. The state objected to the motion on
the ground that entry was justified under the emergency
doctrine and other theories. During the hearing on the
motion, testimony was adduced from a number of police
officers and Curtis. The trial court expressly found that
all of the witnesses were credible and none of their
testimony was in substantial conflict.
   Because two matters that were the subject of this
testimony have particular significance to this case—
the information provided to the officers about the defendant prior to entering the home and the nature of the
conditions that the officers encountered—we elaborate
on the testimony that supported the trial court’s findings
as to those two matters.5 With regard to information
about the defendant, the officers initially entering the
home were specifically made aware that the defendant
had, or possibly had, mental deficiencies. Right after
the initial well-being check, Salas was told by his supervising officer, who was familiar with the Samuolis family, that the defendant had ‘‘[m]ental health issues.’’ The
dispatch to the officers for the second well-being check
also was coded to indicate that the defendant was a
possible ‘‘file 18,’’ a code that meant ‘‘a possible mentally
disturbed or mentally malfunctioning person.’’
   With regard to the changed conditions that the officers
encountered since the first visit, witnesses described
the upper rear window of the house as follows: ‘‘totally
caked with flies,’’ you ‘‘[c]ouldn’t even see glass’’
because it was ‘‘[l]oaded’’ with flies, and flies were
‘‘pretty much infesting the entire . . . window,’’
appearing to be ‘‘both inside and out,’’ ‘‘seem[ing] like
they were coming through the window and siding
. . . .’’ The window directly below that window was
now covered with chicken wire and a small hole had
been cut in the blinds, which appeared to have been
‘‘staged . . . to be able to look outside . . . almost
like a spy hole.’’
   The trial court concluded, on the basis of the preceding facts, that the police entry into the home under the
emergency doctrine was ‘‘objectively reasonable under
the totality of the circumstances.’’ The court pointed
to the following circumstances: the police went to the
home on both occasions to make a welfare check, not
to investigate a crime; the presence of flies indicated
to the officers the presence of a dead body; the ‘‘bizarre’’
and ‘‘inexplicable’’ act of covering the windows with
chicken wire; the ‘‘ ‘old man’ ’’ remained missing; and
there was a concern for the defendant’s state of mind.
The court found that the officers did not know for
certain that there was a dead body in the home, or if
there was, whose body it was, which left them reasonably concerned for the safety of ‘‘either an ‘old man’
or his son who had ‘mental issues.’ ’’ The court concluded that, given the unsuccessful efforts of the police
to make contact at the home and the circumstances
presented, it was unnecessary for the police to obtain
a telephone number to call the home or residents prior
to their entry. Alternatively, the court determined that,
even if the initial entry was unlawful, the defendant’s
alleged shooting of Winkler sufficiently attenuated that
unlawful act from the subsequent lawful search and
seizure of evidence. Accordingly, the trial court denied
the defendant’s motion to suppress.
   At his trial to the court, the defendant raised the
affirmative defense of lack of capacity to appreciate
the wrongfulness of his conduct or to control his conduct due to mental disease or defect, specifically,
autism spectrum disorder. The court found the defendant guilty of murder, assault in the first degree, and
attempt to commit assault in the first degree. The court
imposed a total effective sentence of forty-five years
of imprisonment, followed by eight years of special
parole. The defendant’s direct appeal to this court, challenging only his murder conviction, followed.
   The defendant claims that, even if a warrantless entry
into a home is permitted to assist someone who is
injured or facing imminent injury, there was no emergency justifying entry into his home. He argues that the
objective facts did not provide a reasonable basis to
believe that someone in the home was dead or in need
of immediate aid, and that recovery of a dead body is
not an emergency in any event. The defendant further
contends that his alleged criminal conduct did not justify
the subsequent entries into the home, which resulted
in the illegal seizure.
  The state claims that all of the entries were part of
the same justifiable emergency. It further contends that,
if we conclude that an emergency did not exist when
the police initially entered the home, we should conclude that it existed as a consequence of the defendant’s
shooting at the officers after they entered. Alternatively,
the state contends that the evidence seized is admissible
under the independent source doctrine because the
home would have been searched pursuant to the search
warrant issued in connection with the assault, or under
the inevitable discovery doctrine, because the defendant independently confessed to the killing.
   Our analysis begins with the observation that the
defendant does not challenge any of the trial court’s
factual findings. His challenge instead is to the reasonableness of the conclusion drawn from those facts,
namely, that they provided an objectively reasonable
basis for the officers to conclude that there was an
emergency justifying a warrantless entry into his home.
See generally State v. Pompei, 

, 756, 

 (2021) (‘‘[w]hen a question of fact is essential
to the outcome of a particular legal determination that
implicates a defendant’s constitutional rights . . . and
the credibility of witnesses is not the primary issue,
our customary deference to the trial court’s factual
findings is tempered by a scrupulous examination of
the record to ascertain that the trial court’s factual
findings are supported by substantial evidence’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Our review of his claim
therefore is plenary. See id.; cf. United States v. Porter,

 (10th Cir. 2010) (existence of exigent circumstances is mixed question of law and fact,
under which ‘‘[t]he ultimate question regarding the reasonableness of the search is a question of law which
we review de novo’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Davis, 

, 246–47, 

 (2019) (de novo review was undertaken when factual findings were not challenged and claim was that
those findings did not support conclusion that police
had reasonable and articulable suspicion that defendant
was engaged in criminal activity).
   Settled principles of fourth amendment jurisprudence guide this inquiry. ‘‘It is a basic principle of
[f]ourth [a]mendment law that searches and seizures
inside a home without a warrant are presumptively
unreasonable. . . . Entry by the government into a person’s home . . . is the chief evil against which the . . .
[f]ourth [a]mendment is directed.’’ (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fausel, 

, 

 (2010). ‘‘The warrant
requirement protects an individual in his home from
official intrusion whether the purpose of the search is
to further a criminal investigation or the government’s
enforcement of an administrative regulation. Camara
[v. Municipal Court, 

, 

,

 (1967)] (‘[i]t is surely anomalous to
say that the individual and his private property are fully
protected by the [f]ourth [a]mendment only when the
individual is suspected of criminal behavior . . .’).’’
State v. Vargas, 

, 

 (2013).
Thus, ‘‘merely because police activities are ‘divorced
from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute,’
Cady [v. Dombrowski, 

, 

,

 (1973)], does not mean that persons
have a lesser expectation of privacy in their homes, see
Camara [v. Municipal 

] (concluding
administrative searches constituted ‘significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the [f]ourth
[a]mendment’).’’ State v. 

 325–26.
  ‘‘As a result, [w]arrants are generally required to
search a person’s home . . . unless the exigencies of
the situation make the needs of law enforcement so
compelling that the warrantless search is objectively
reasonable under the [f]ourth [a]mendment. . . . Brigham City v. Stuart, 

, 

,

 (2006). Searches conducted pursuant
to emergency circumstances are one of the recognized
exceptions to the warrant requirement under both the
federal and state constitutions. State v. Blades, 

, 617–18, 

 (1993).
   ‘‘The emergency exception to the warrant requirement allows police to enter a home without a warrant
when they have an objectively reasonable basis for
believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury. Brigham City v.

. . . . [T]he state actors
making the search must have reason to believe that life
or limb is in immediate jeopardy and that the intrusion
is reasonably necessary to alleviate the threat.6 . . .
The test is not [however] whether the officers actually
believed that an emergency existed, but whether a reasonable officer would have believed that such an emergency existed.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote added;
internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. 

 295 Conn. 794–95; see also Michigan v. Fisher,

, 

, 

 (2009)
(addressing ‘‘emergency aid’’ exception).
   ‘‘The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious
injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal
absent an exigency or emergency. . . . Mincey v. Arizona, 

, 

, 

(1978).’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

; see also United States v.
Barone, 

 (2d Cir.) (‘‘[t]he right of the
police to enter and investigate in an emergency without
the accompanying intent to either search or arrest is
inherent in the very nature of their duties as peace
officers, and derives from the common law’’), cert.
denied, 

, 

, 

(1964). ‘‘The state bears the burden of demonstrating
that a warrantless entry falls within the emergency
exception.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. 

.
   In the present case, the trial court concluded that
the police were confronted with an emergency but also
emphasized the fact that the case had commenced as
a well-being check and not as a criminal investigation.
Although courts have recognized that the emergency
aid doctrine has its roots in the police’s caretaking
function, as opposed to its law enforcement function,7
this doctrine must be distinguished from what had been
called the ‘‘community caretaking’’ exception to the
warrant requirement. Many courts, including our own,
have interpreted the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Cady v. 

, as
recognizing a community caretaking warrant exception.
See, e.g., Sutterfield v. Milwaukee, 

, 553–54,
556–57 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 

, 

, 

 (2014); State v. Pompei, supra,

. The court in Cady had sustained the
warrantless search of an automobile in police custody
that was conducted for a routine public safety purpose,
noting that police officers frequently ‘‘engage in what,
for want of a better term, may be described as community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the
detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.’’ Cady v. Dom-

. Following Cady, courts held that,
under the community caretaking doctrine, when the
police take actions ‘‘not for any criminal law enforcement purpose but, rather, to protect members of the
public . . . searches . . . conducted for the latter
purpose are deemed exempt from the [f]ourth [a]mendment warrant requirement.’’ Sutterfield v. 

 553–54; see also 

 553 n.5 (acknowledging overlap and distinction between community caretaking
exception and emergency aid exception); Hunsberger
v. Wood, 

 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting overlap
and distinction between community caretaking and exigent circumstances doctrines), cert. denied, 

, 

, 

 (2010). State and
federal courts have divided, however, over whether the
community caretaking exception was limited to automobile searches or extended more broadly to include
warrantless entry into a home. See Sutterfield v. Mil-

 556–57 (citing cases).
  The United States Supreme Court recently made clear
that the mere fact that the police are acting solely for
community caretaking purposes is not sufficient, in and
of itself, to excuse warrant requirements for entry into
a home. Caniglia v. Strom,           U.S.       , 

, 1599, 

 (2021); see 

 (Cady’s
acknowledgment of police’s ‘‘ ‘caretaking’ duties’’ did
not create ‘‘a standalone doctrine that justifies warrantless searches and seizures in the home’’). Significantly for our purposes, the court’s majority opinion
in Caniglia, as well as the three concurring opinions,
underscored that the court’s decision was not intended
to undermine settled law holding that no warrant is
required to enter a home when there is a ‘‘need to assist
persons who are seriously injured or threatened with
such injury.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 

 (Roberts, C. J., with whom Breyer, J., joins, concurring); see also 

 (majority opinion); 

 1601–
1602 (Alito, J., concurring);8 

 1603–1604 (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring). The majority opinion made a point of
noting that the courts below had relied exclusively on
the so-called community caretaker warrant exception.9

.
   Although the defendant asserts in his brief to this
court that it is unclear, in the wake of Caniglia, whether
warrantless entry is still permitted to assist someone
who is injured or facing imminent injury, we find no
such ambiguity in that decision. Other courts have continued to apply the emergency exception post-Caniglia;
see, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 

, 677 (8th
Cir. 2021), cert. denied,         U.S.    , 

,

 (2022); Gaetjens v. Loves Park, 

, 492–93 (7th Cir. 2021), cert. denied,         U.S.    ,

, 

 (2022); McCarthy v.
Commonwealth, 

, 642–43, 

 (2021); State v. Ware, 

, 127–28, 

 (App. 2021); and the defendant has identified no case in which a court deemed the emergency
exception no longer valid.
   The issue before us, therefore, is whether there was
an objectively reasonable basis for the responding officers to believe that there was a need to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect
an occupant from imminent injury, either the defendant
or Samuolis, when Winkler made the initial entry into
the home. With regard to the defendant, we disagree
that it would have been objectively reasonable for the
officers to believe that he needed emergency assistance.
There was every reason to believe that, in the days
immediately preceding the initial warrantless entry, the
defendant had performed tasks around the house. All
of the evidence points to the defendant’s being present
at the home when the police first attempted to make
contact with the occupants and thereafter actively seeking to avoid that contact. See Florida v. Jardines, 

, 

, 

 (2013) (‘‘[a]t
the . . . very core [of the fourth amendment] stands
the right of a man to retreat into his own home and
there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Without
more, odd behavior that might be symptomatic of some
sort of mental disability (placing chicken wire over
windows, cutting a spy hole in window blinds, and
leaving some parts of the lawn unmowed) does not
reasonably indicate a need for immediate medical
assistance, physical or mental. That the facts suggested
that the defendant could be living in a house with a dead
or decomposing body raises a concern of a different
magnitude, no doubt. It is significant that the state has
not claimed that the police had reasonable cause to
believe that the defendant suffered from a mental condition that would have permitted them to take him into
custody for an emergency examination pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-503 (a),10 and no specific findings
were made to support the application of that statute.11
Cf. Sutterfield v. 

 751 F.3d 545–46
(factor in assessing whether officers’ entry to respond
to concern about suicide threat was reasonable was
whether officers had complied with statutory emergency detention procedure to provide involuntary treatment to those at risk of suicide); State v. Hyde, 

, 676–77 (N.D. 2017) (same). Indeed, there
is no indication that the officers sought to obtain any
information that might better inform them as to the
nature of the defendant’s mental health issues or any
concerns that these issues might present. Nor did they
make a reasonable attempt to find less intrusive means
to make contact with a possibly mentally impaired person, directly or through a friendly third party, than
knocking on his door and then breaking into his home.
See Brigham City v. 

 (‘‘the
ultimate touchstone of the [f]ourth [a]mendment is ‘reasonableness’ ’’). We therefore conclude that the state
did not meet its burden of establishing that immediate
entry was necessary because the defendant required
emergency aid. As we explain subsequently in this opinion, however, this does not mean that the defendant’s
mental condition was irrelevant to the officers’ actions.
   With regard to Samuolis, although we share some of
the defendant’s concerns about shortcomings in the
officers’ investigation prior to their entry into the home,
we conclude that there was a reasonably objective basis
for believing that an elderly occupant was in need of
immediate medical assistance.12 The ‘‘old man,’’ Samuolis, had not been seen by any of his neighbors for at
least one month, which was unusual enough that his
absence was reported to the police. The Samuolis family’s only vehicle had not been moved since Samuolis
was last seen.13 Samuolis did not respond to the officers’
knocks on the door or shouts into the open windows.
None of this would have been sufficient, however, in
the absence of the extraordinary infestation of flies
amassing around the upper rear window.
   Two of the officers testified that, when they previously had encountered similar conditions, a dead
body had been found. We need not decide, however,
whether the presence of a dead body in a home would
constitute an emergency.14 Although the responding
officers thought, based on their experience, that the
most likely explanation for this fly infestation was the
presence of a dead body, they also left open the possibility that an occupant might be injured rather than dead.
We cannot say that this supposition was unreasonable.
See State v. Scott, 

, 

(1996) (emergency doctrine was applicable when officer investigating missing person report noticed flies
accumulating at door to underside of house and smelled
odor of decaying flesh, and officer testified that he had
previously encountered similar conditions and discovered, upon further investigation, live person with rotting
feet). It is well documented that flies can be strongly
attracted to uncovered wounds, open sores, and certain
bodily excretions.15 See, e.g., J. Chan & E. Imwinkelried,
‘‘The Use of Forensic Entomology in Determining the
Time of Death,’’ 

, 129 (2009); J.
Dinulos, Cutaneous Myiasis, (last modified December,
2021), available at https://www.merckmanuals.com/
home/skin-disorders/parasitic-skin-infections/cutaneousmyiasis (last visited August 2, 2022). Warrantless entry
into the home ‘‘has been upheld even when the information reaching the police, if assessed in terms of probabilities, makes it much more probable that the victim is
dead than that he is still alive.’’ 3 W. LaFave, Search
and Seizure (6th Ed. 2020) § 6.6 (a), p. 633. As long as
there is a reasonable possibility that the person remains
alive, the situation is an emergency because, in all likelihood, time is of the essence.
   Courts have concluded that the discovery of other
circumstances that may be suggestive of death will not
necessarily render the emergency doctrine inapplicable.16 See, e.g., People v. McGee, 

,
680–81, 

 (1986) (‘‘In Illinois, appellate
decisions have applied the ‘emergency’ exception to
the warrant requirement where [the] police entered a
residence without a warrant while investigating a possible missing person and after detecting a stench they
believed came from [a] dead body inside . . . and
where [the] police investigating a report of a homicide
observed from a window flies in one of the rooms. . . .
In [one case], the court reasoned that the odor may
have been caused by rotting flesh of a living person after
severe burns or other injury, and the very uncertainty
created by the totality of circumstances created a justification and need for the police to take immediate action.
. . . In other jurisdictions, the odor of decomposing
flesh or reliable information of death have been held
to constitute an emergency situation sufficient to justify
an immediate warrantless search of [the] premises
because the apparent death may turn out to be a barely
surviving life, still to be saved.’’ (Citations omitted.));
Smock v. State, 

, 404–405 (Ind. App. 2002)
(rejecting argument that odor of decay precluded belief
that someone was in need of aid because such facts
show that fatality had already occurred and thus no
exigent circumstances existed because presence of
odor, along with other evidence indicating that tenant
was missing, supported officers’ ‘‘reasonable belief that
someone may have been in need of immediate assistance’’); Hughes v. Commonwealth, 

(Ky. 2002) (rejecting argument that officer ‘‘should have
known when he smelled the odor of decomposing
human remains that the victim was no longer in need
of assistance’’); People v. Molnar, 288 App. Div. 2d 911,
911–12, 

 (2001) (warrantless entry into
defendant’s apartment was justified under emergency
exception when police detected foul odor, and, even
though officers did not immediately recognize odor as
that of decomposing body ultimately discovered, they
forcibly entered apartment ‘‘to discover the source of
the odor and to render aid if necessary’’), aff’d, 

, 

, 

 (2002); Rauscher
v. State, 

 (Tex. App. 2004) (‘‘even
if [the officer] believed the foul odor to be that of a
decomposing body, under the circumstances, [the officer] could have reasonably believed that [the victim]
might still be alive, but in need of immediate emergency aid’’).
   Although the defendant’s mental condition did not
indicate his need for emergency assistance, that condition nonetheless would have been a relevant factor in
the officers’ reasonable calculation of whether Samuolis needed such aid and what actions were necessary
to provide that aid. The defendant’s conduct in attempting
to fortify the home against intruders and refusing to
answer the door would have indicated to the officers
that they were not going to be able to obtain timely
information from the defendant about Samuolis’ whereabouts or condition. The defendant’s failure to remediate the fly infestation in plain view reasonably suggested
that his mental disabilities may have impaired his capacity to appreciate the gravity of the conditions that
existed and the need to elicit prompt medical assistance, if such assistance was required.
   The defendant’s mental condition also bears on the
defendant’s complaint that the officers’ actions—driving to the scene without activating lights or sirens, and
waiting for supervisor approval to conduct a warrantless search before entering the home—indicated
that they did not perceive the situation as an emergency.17 The officers clearly recognized the possibility,
or even the likelihood, that entry into the home could
lead to an encounter with a mentally ill individual who
did not want them there. The fact that the responding
officers waited a few minutes for their supervisor to
arrive before entering must be viewed with that factor
in mind. See United States v. Jones, 

(8th Cir. 1980) (‘‘[w]hen the police have a reasonable
suspicion that someone is injured or that the public
safety is in jeopardy, but refrain from taking immediate
action in an effort to confirm or deny that suspicion,
and then act once they have received no indication that
the danger has dissipated, the waiting period does not
defeat the applicable exception to the warrant rule’’);
see also 

 (‘‘[a]ny delay that occurred was primarily the result of careful police work’’).
   The defendant nonetheless contends that the officers
did not consider the ‘‘totality of circumstances,’’ as they
were required to do, because they failed to consider
alternative explanations for the facts presented that
would indicate that no emergency existed.18 We disagree with the significance that the defendant ascribes
to the ‘‘primary’’ facts that the officers did not consider—when Winkler climbed the ladder and looked in
the window, he did not see anything amiss inside the
house or smell an odor of decomposition. Winkler testified that it was difficult to see into the rear bedroom
because it was so dark. Although Winkler was never
asked whether he detected any odor, he testified that
he never put any part of his body (presumably face
included) into the window opening. The air freshener
wedged in the small opening may have done its job of
masking any odor emanating from inside the room. In
fact, it was only after the third entry, when one of the
officers was able to insert his upper torso into that
room, that an odor of decomposition was detected.
   The defendant also suggests that there were other
reasonable explanations for the fly infestation: a dead
animal (e.g., the cat that had been seen in the front
window on the prior visit) or rotting food or garbage.
The officers indicated in their testimony that they did
not consider either scenario as a possible cause of the
fly infestation because those explanations did not jibe
with the conditions and the officers’ past experience.
We note that one would similarly expect an odor to be
emitted from a dead animal or rotting food or garbage
on a hot summer day. The defendant does not explain
why it would have been reasonable for the officers to
credit either of those explanations when they did not
detect an odor but it was unreasonable for the officers
to believe that there was an injured or dead person
because they did not detect an odor of decomposition.
    It defies common sense to conclude that, if there is
any plausible, nonemergency explanation for the facts
presented, no entry can be made until there is definitive
proof that a person is present who is in need of emergency aid. The standard ‘‘must be applied by reference
to the circumstances then confronting the officer,
including the need for prompt assessment of sometimes
ambiguous information concerning potentially serious
consequences. As one court usefully put it, the question
is whether the officers would have been derelict in their
duty had they acted otherwise. This means, of course,
that it is of no moment that it turns out there was in fact
no emergency.’’ (Footnotes omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) 3 W. LaFave, supra, § 6.6 (a), pp.
629–31; see also Michigan v. 

(‘‘[o]nly when an apparent threat has become an actual
harm can officers rule out innocuous explanations for
ominous circumstances’’); United States v. Cooks, 

 (11th Cir.) (‘‘we must be mindful that the
police must act quickly, based on hurried and incomplete information’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)),
cert. denied,      U.S.     , 

, 

 (2019). The defendant’s position could prove
especially deadly when an elderly person is the potential
victim. See R. Gurley et al., ‘‘Persons Found in Their
Home Helpless or Dead,’’ 334 New. Eng. J. Med. 1710,
1710 (June, 1996) (study of patients found in their
homes helpless determined that such circumstances
increased with age and that total mortality was 67 percent for patients who were estimated to have been
helpless for more than seventy-two hours, as compared
with 12 percent for those who had been helpless for
less than one hour).
   We conclude that, under the totality of the circumstances, it was objectively reasonable for the officers
to conclude that there was an emergency justifying their
initial entry into the defendant’s home. In light of this
conclusion, the subsequent entries were similarly justified. We therefore need not consider the state’s alternative arguments that the defendant’s criminal conduct
subsequent to the initial entry established an emergency
that justified the subsequent entries or that the search
and seizure were proper under the inevitable discovery
or the independent source doctrines.
      The judgment is affirmed.
      In this opinion the other justices concurred.
  1
     Curtis unambiguously testified that he never saw anyone actually installing the chicken wire on the window. Winkler testified, however, that he
received information from dispatch that ‘‘the neighbor had observed [the
defendant] leaving the residence after law enforcement . . . left on Friday
and then affixing chicken wire to the back windows . . . .’’
   2
     The officers also chose to enter through that upper floor window because
doing so would cause the least amount of damage, only requiring them to
cut the screen.
   3
     The officers testified that they would have done things differently if they
had been responding to an active crime.
   4
     Testimony indicates that, at the time of the incident, at least two of the
three officers believed that the defendant was the shooter.
   5
     The trial court made generalized findings as to both of these matters,
although the finding regarding the defendant’s ‘‘ ‘mental issues’ ’’ was embedded in the trial court’s legal conclusions. The defense did not attempt to
discredit the testimony of any of the state’s witnesses but, rather, focused
on information that had not been ascertained or alternative explanations
that had not been considered by the officers prior to entry into the home.
   6
     Another requirement of the emergency exception is that ‘‘the search’s
scope and manner were reasonable to meet the need.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) United States v. Ward, 

, 683 (9th Cir.
2018). See generally 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure (6th Ed. 2020) § 6.6
(a), p. 649 (‘‘[a] warrantless search must be strictly circumscribed by the
exigencies that justify its initiation’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The scope of the search is not challenged in the present case.
   7
     See, e.g., Sutterfield v. Milwaukee, 

 (7th Cir.) (emergency aid doctrine ‘‘recognizes that police play a service and protective role
in addition to a law enforcement role’’), cert. denied, 

, 

, 

 (2014); United States v. Najar, 

,
714–15 (10th Cir.) (‘‘the emergency aid exigency emerged, informed by the
practical recognition of critical police functions quite apart from or only
tangential to a criminal investigation’’), cert. denied, 

, 

, 

 (2006); State v. Kendrick, 

, 230, 

 (2014) (‘‘[t]he emergency doctrine . . . is rooted in the caretaking
function of the police’’); 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure (6th Ed. 2020)
§ 6.6 (a), p. 625 n.7 (‘‘emergency aid exception is one of many community
caretaking functions of the police’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
   We note that there does not appear to be any material distinction between
courts’ use of the terms ‘‘emergency aid’’ doctrine or exception and ‘‘emergency’’ doctrine or exception.
   8
     Although Justice Alito indicated in his concurring opinion in Caniglia
that the court’s exigency case law had not addressed a situation in which
no warrant would have been available even if there had been time to get
one, such as to check on a missing person’s medical condition, he also
expressed the view that courts could deem a warrantless entry under such
circumstances reasonable under proper circumstances. Caniglia v. Strom,
supra, 

 (Alito, J., concurring); see id. (‘‘[p]erhaps [s]tates
should institute procedures for the issuance of such warrants, but in the
meantime, courts may be required to grapple with the basic [f]ourth [a]mendment question of reasonableness’’); see also Brigham City v. 

 (‘‘the ultimate touchstone of the [f]ourth [a]mendment is ‘reasonableness’ ’’).
   9
     In Caniglia, the police became involved in the matter after receiving a
phone call from the petitioner’s wife expressing concern that she had been
unable to contact the petitioner at their home, that he possessed handguns,
and that he had taken actions the prior evening that indicated that he might
be suicidal. Caniglia v. Strom, supra, 

. The petitioner was
on the porch of his home when the officers arrived to assess the situation.
Id. He admitted to the officers that his wife had accurately reported his
actions of the prior evening but denied that he was suicidal. Id. He agreed
to be transported to a hospital for a psychiatric evaluation, allegedly subject
to the officers’ promise that they would not confiscate his guns. Id. After
the petitioner left, however, the officers allegedly secured the wife’s consent
to enter the home without relaying the petitioner’s wishes and removed two
handguns. Id. In the decision that was the subject of the appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit expressed doubt that the emergency doctrine would have applied under these circumstances because of
the absence of imminent harm. See Caniglia v. Strom, 

, 122
n.5 (1st Cir. 2020), vacated on other grounds,        U.S.     , 

,

 (2021).
   10
      General Statutes § 17a-503 (a) provides: ‘‘Any police officer who has
reasonable cause to believe that a person has psychiatric disabilities and
is dangerous to himself or herself or others or gravely disabled, and in need
of immediate care and treatment, may take such person into custody and
take or cause such person to be taken to a general hospital for emergency
examination under this section. The officer shall execute a written request
for emergency examination detailing the circumstances under which the
person was taken into custody, and such request shall be left with the
facility. The person shall be examined within twenty-four hours and shall
not be held for more than seventy-two hours unless committed under section
17a-502.’’
   11
      The fact that the evidence suggested that the defendant was living in
a house with a dead or decomposing body could reasonably indicate that
the defendant was suffering from a serious psychological impairment. The
question before us, however, is whether immediate warrantless entry into
the home was justified to provide emergency aid or to prevent injury. We
do not believe that the defendant’s perceived condition warranted immediate
entry under these parameters. Whether the emergency doctrine should be
expanded beyond its current limitations to address the defendant’s condition
in the present case is a question with profound implications that we need
not reach in light of our conclusion regarding Samuolis. See C. Slobogin,
‘‘Police as Community Caretakers: Caniglia v. Strom,’’ 2020–2021 Cato Sup.
Ct. Rev. 191, 193–94 (interpreting Caniglia to leave open possibility that
some tasks that go beyond criminal law enforcement do permit warrantless
entry, ‘‘even when there is time to get a warrant,’’ but suggesting that, ‘‘given
the potential for police misuse of force and for pretextual actions by the
police, warrantless home entries in the absence of real exigency should
never be part of policing’s mission, even when a ‘caretaking’ goal can be
articulated’’); see also id., 194–95 (arguing that statistics show that having
police, who are trained to use deadly force and have means to use it, as
primary responder to person experiencing mental health crisis is wrong
answer to problem).
   12
      Entry into a home for the purpose of rendering emergency aid has been
deemed reasonable in connection with a search for ‘‘an occupant reliably
reported as missing.’’ (Emphasis added.) 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure
(6th Ed. 2020) § 6.6 (a), pp. 638–39; see also State v. 

 225
Conn. 619–20. There was no testimony in the present case indicating whether
the officers obtained information from the neighbors reporting Samuolis’
absence as to how well they knew Samuolis or the defendant, whether
Samuolis had previously been absent for other similar periods of time, or
what efforts they had made to make contact with Samuolis or to obtain
other information that would validate their concern about his absence. In
another case, this lacunae might be fatal. In the present case, it is not, most
significantly because of the fly infestation.
   We note that the evidence indicates that three neighbors spoke with the
police to express concern about Samuolis’ absence: Curtis, who lived next
door to the Samuolis home, and Shirley Lebiszczak and Andy Lebiszczak,
who lived directly across the cul-de-sac from the Samuolis home. Only Curtis
testified. He stated that he had lived next door to the Samuolis family for
seventeen years at the time of the incident. Curtis indicated that he had
minimal direct contact with the family. In the three or four years preceding
the incident, following the death of Samuolis’ wife, Curtis would see Samuolis driving his car up the road once a week and returning thereafter with
a cup of Dunkin’ Donuts coffee. Curtis told the officers that he found it odd
that the car had not been moved ‘‘for some time.’’ It would be reasonable
to infer from Curtis’ testimony that the car had not been moved in the
month or more during which Samuolis had not been seen. It also would be
reasonable to infer from the fact that the neighbors were concerned enough
about Samuolis’ absence to ask the police to investigate that this extended
absence was an anomaly.
   13
      Winkler testified that one of the neighbors informed the officers that
the parked car was the family’s only vehicle.
   14
      Neither party briefed the issue, before the trial court or this court, of
whether a warrant, criminal or administrative, would have been available
to retrieve a dead body. We note that there is a statute that provides in
relevant part: ‘‘The body of each person who dies in this state shall be
buried, removed or cremated within a reasonable time after death. The
person to whom the custody and control of the remains of any deceased
person are granted by law shall see that the certificate of death required
by law has been completed and filed in accordance with section 7-62b prior
to final disposition of the body. . . . Any person who violates any provision
of this section shall be guilty of a class D felony.’’ General Statutes § 7-64.
It is unclear whether the criminal penalty applies exclusively to the person
assigned custody of the body by law. There is also a statute that provides
a penalty for failing to promptly notify the Office of the Chief Medical
Examiner of ‘‘any death coming to their attention which is subject to investigation by the Chief Medical Examiner under this chapter . . . .’’ General
Statutes § 19a-407; see also General Statutes § 19a-406 (a) (prescribing categories of death that chief medical examiner is required to investigate).
The violation of a public health code also could justify issuance of an
administrative warrant to inspect the property under General Statutes § 19a-
220. See State v. Saturno, 

, 93–94, 

 (2016).
   15
      Examples abound, sadly, in a cursory review of elder and child abuse
cases. See, e.g., Layne v. State, 

, 

 (1975);
People v. Mattos, Docket No. C076743, 

, *1 (Cal. App. January
13, 2016), review denied, California Supreme Court, Docket No. S232311
(March 30, 2016); Wolf v. State, 

, 

 (2000);
Hug v. State, Docket No. 27A05-1410-CR-478, 

, *1 (Ind.
App. March 25, 2015) (decision without published opinion, 

);
Johnson v. State, Docket No. W2020-00184-CCA-R3-PC, 

,
*1–2 (Tenn. App. September 7, 2021).
   16
      There are numerous cases in which courts have recognized that ‘‘apparent death may turn out to be barely surviving life, still to be saved.’’ State
v. Epperson, 

 (Mo. 1978), cert. denied, 

, 

, 

 (1979); see also Patrick v. State, 

 (Del. 1967) (‘‘[f]requently, the report of a death proves inaccurate and
a spark of life remains, sufficient to respond to emergency police aid’’).
These spark of life cases typically involve a report of a dead body from
laypersons, who lack medical knowledge to determine whether a person
actually is dead or merely appears to be dead but could be revived with
prompt medical treatment. See, e.g., United States v. Stafford, 

 (9th Cir. 2005) (911 call of possible dead body); United States
v. Richardson, 

 (7th Cir.) (911 caller reported that woman
had been raped and murdered), cert. denied, 

, 

,

 (2000); State v. Kraimer, 

, 

 (1980) (although 911 caller reported that he had shot and killed his wife
four days earlier, ‘‘the police had no way of knowing this as a verity’’), cert.
denied, 

, 

, 

 (1981). An often
quoted passage from former United States Supreme Court Chief Justice
(then Judge) Burger in his opinion in Wayne v. United States, 

(D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 

, 

, 

(1963), explains: ‘‘Acting in response to reports of ‘dead bodies,’ the police
may find the ‘bodies’ to be common drunks, diabetics in shock, or distressed
cardiac patients. But the business of policemen and firemen is to act, not
to speculate or meditate on whether the report is correct. People could well
die in emergencies if police tried to act with the calm deliberation associated
with the judicial process. Even the apparently dead often are saved by swift
police response.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) Id., 212. Of course, at some point,
hope will be extinguished, and we reserve for another day the issue of
whether the emergency doctrine remains applicable once a reasonable police
officer would perceive no realistic possibility that the person remains alive.
   17
      Rosado testified that the responding officers were required under Willimantic Police Department policy to obtain their supervisor’s approval before
entering a home. The facts to which the defendant points involve a delay
of a few minutes; Rosado testified that it took him three or four minutes
to drive to the scene. Testimony from the officers acknowledging that swifter
action might have been taken had they believed that there was an active
crime also does not negate the perceived emergency. During an active crime,
the police may be seeking to protect someone from sustaining injury, or
further injury, not to provide aid for an injury already sustained. As one
court explained: ‘‘Not all emergencies are the same. In some, a person’s life
may hinge on the passage of mere seconds, demanding immediate police
action. In others, police must act with reasonable swiftness but their
response need not be calculated in seconds.’’ People v. Molnar, 

, 

, 

 (2002); see also 

 (‘‘It would
be an ironic result were we to ‘punish’ the constabulary by suppressing
the evidence merely because they took the time to exercise judgment and
circumspection before resorting to force. The appropriately measured
response of the police should not be declared illegal merely because they
thoughtfully delayed entry for a relatively brief time.’’).
   18
      The defendant also points to the fact that the officers did not attempt
to obtain a telephone number for Samuolis and to call him before initially
entering the home. One of the officers reasonably testified that they did not
expect to get a response to a call into the house because no one responded
to knocking or the officers’ announcement of their presence. Although there
is evidence that Frechette was able to locate a ten year old telephone number
associated with the Samuolis family in the police database, he did not know
whether the number was for a landline or a cell phone. Cf. State v. DeMarco,

, 527, 

 (2014) (citing evidence that defendant’s cell
phone number was known to animal control officer, but officer did not have
number with him when he called police headquarters to request backup to
enter house). There was no evidence presented as to how readily that
information could be accessed. Frechette could not have provided that
information to the officers prior to the initial entry because he was not
present at the police station when the officers entered the Samuolis home.
Frechette received no answer when he repeatedly called that number following the officers’ initial entry into the home. Although the better practice
would have been for the officers dispatched for the well-being check to ask
the neighbors whether they had a cell phone number for Samuolis, it is fair
to infer that the neighbors did not because, if they had, they would have
called it prior to reporting him missing and would have informed the police
that he had not answered the call.