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STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ANASTASIA
SCHIMANSKI
(SC 20550)
Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins,
Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js.
Syllabus
Pursuant to statute ((Rev. to 2017) § 14-227b (i) (1)), the Commissioner of
Motor Vehicles shall suspend, for a period of forty-five days, the motor
vehicle operator’s license of a person against whom a decision was
issued concerning, inter alia, a refusal to submit to a blood, breath or
urine test to determine sobriety, and, as a condition for the restoration
of that license, ‘‘such person shall be required to install an ignition
interlock device on each motor vehicle owned or operated by such
person and, upon such restoration, be prohibited from operating a motor
vehicle unless such motor vehicle is equipped with a functioning,
approved ignition interlock device’’ for a specified period of time.
Convicted, on a conditional plea of nolo contendere, of the crime of operating
a motor vehicle with a suspended license in violation of the applicable
statute (§ 14-215 (c) (1)), the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court.
The defendant had been arrested and charged with operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and her license
was suspended for forty-five days pursuant to § 14-227b (i) (1) as a
result of her refusal to take a chemical alcohol test. Two days after the
forty-five day license suspension period lapsed, the defendant allegedly
struck another vehicle while operating a motor vehicle that did not have
an ignition interlock device installed in it. As a result of that incident,
the defendant was charged in the present case with, inter alia, operating
a motor vehicle with a suspended license. The defendant moved to
dismiss that charge on the ground that she could not have violated § 14-
215 (c) (1) because the forty-five day license suspension period ended
two days before the incident. The trial court disagreed, concluding that
the installation of an ignition interlock device is a mandatory statutory
requirement for the restoration of a license that has been suspended
under § 14-227b and that the defendant’s suspended license was not
restored until she had an ignition interlock device installed in her vehicle
approximately one month after the incident. On appeal to the Appellate
Court from the judgment of conviction, that court affirmed the trial
court’s judgment, concluding, on the basis of its interpretation of the
relevant statutes, that the defendant’s license remained suspended following the forty-five day statutory period until she installed the ignition
interlock device because § 14-227b (i) (1) mandates the installation of
such a device in any motor vehicle operated by a person whose license
has been suspended under the statute before the restoration of her
license and does not contemplate an interim period during which such
person may lawfully operate a motor vehicle without installing such a
device. In reaching its decision, the Appellate Court determined that
State v. Jacobson (31 Conn. App. 797), and State v. Cook (
36 Conn. App.
710), on which the defendant relied, were not applicable to the present
case because they were decided prior to certain amendments to the
relevant statutes that rendered the analysis in those cases inapposite.
On the granting of certification, the defendant appealed to this court.
Held that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that § 14-227b (i)
(1) extends the suspension of a person’s license beyond the specified
forty-five day period until the motor vehicle operator subject to the
suspension has installed an ignition interlock device, and, accordingly,
the judgment of the Appellate Court was reversed insofar as that court
upheld the defendant’s conviction of operating a motor vehicle with a
suspended license, and the case was remanded with direction to reverse
the judgment of conviction and to render judgment dismissing the information: this court concluded, after a review of the text of § 14-227b (i)
(1) and its relationship to other relevant statutes, that the statute clearly
and unambiguously imposes a forty-five day license suspension period,
after which the operator’s license is no longer ‘‘under suspension’’ for
purposes of § 14-215 (c) (1), the plain language of § 14-227b (i) (1)
having indicating that the legislature made the installation of an ignition
interlock device a prerequisite for the restoration of the operator’s
license but not for the expiration of the suspension period; moreover,
this court, in reading the statute (§ 14-215b) setting forth the penalties
for operating a motor vehicle after the expiration of a suspension period
and without obtaining reinstatement and § 14-227b (i) (1) together, concluded that the completion of the forty-five day suspension period is
necessary, but not a condition, for the restoration of an operator’s license
under § 14-227b (i) (1) and is separate and distinct from the additional
restoration precondition that the operator install an ignition interlock
device; furthermore, the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that
Jacobson and Cook were inapplicable to, and controlling of, the statutory
interpretation issue in the present case on the ground that the versions
of the relevant statutes at issue in those cases predated statutory amendments that added an ignition interlock device requirement as a condition
for license restoration, as the courts in both of those cases based their
decisions on the fixed, unqualified language limiting the duration of the
statutory suspension periods and concluded that, in the absence of
express statutory language to the contrary, requirements for license
restoration do not concurrently operate as preconditions for the termination of a license suspension period, and the rationale in Jacobson and
Cook was not rendered obsolete by virtue of the statutory amendments,
as the versions of the statutes applicable to the present case still provided
a fixed, unqualified license suspension period; in addition, contrary to
the Appellate Court’s conclusion that the defendant’s interpretation of
§ 14-227b (i) (1) would yield an absurd result because a person whose
license has been suspended pursuant to that statute would have an
incentive not to install an ignition interlock device and thereby complete
the restoration process in order to avoid harsher penalties, a related
statute ((Rev. to 2017) § 14-227k (a)) not only prohibits the exact conduct
that the Appellate Court feared would be incentivized, namely, the operation of a motor vehicle without an ignition interlock device by an individual who is subject to the provisions of § 14-227b (i) (1), but also imposes
the same penalties for a violation of its provisions as § 14-215 (c) (1),
and, although certain regulations adopted by the Commissioner of Motor
Vehicles that implement the provisions of § 14-227b supported the Appellate Court’s interpretation of the statue, those regulations were entitled
to no deference because the statute unambiguously limits the suspension
period to forty-five days, and an agency’s interpretation of a statute is
entitled to deference only when, inter alia, the statute is ambiguous.
Argued February 23—officially released August 23, 2022
Procedural History
Substitute information charging the defendant with
the crimes of operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license, avoidance of an interlock ignition
device, and evading responsibility in the operation of
a motor vehicle, brought to the Superior Court in the
judicial district of New Haven, geographical area number twenty-three, where the court, Spader, J., denied the
defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges of operating
a motor vehicle with a suspended license and avoidance
of an interlock ignition device; thereafter, the state filed
a second substitute information charging the defendant
with the crime of operating a motor vehicle with a
suspended license; subsequently, the defendant was
presented to the court on a conditional plea of nolo
contendere to the charge of operating a motor vehicle
with a suspended license; judgment of guilty in accordance with the plea, from which the defendant appealed
to the Appellate Court, Elgo, Bright and Moll, Js., which
dismissed the appeal with respect to the trial court’s
denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge
of avoidance of an interlock ignition device in the state’s
first substitute information and affirmed the trial court’s
judgment denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the
charge of operating a motor vehicle with a suspended
license, and the defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Reversed in part; judgment directed.
James B. Streeto, senior assistant public defender,
for the appellant (defendant).
Kathryn W. Bare, senior assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were Patrick J. Griffin, chief
state’s attorney, and Sean P. McGuinness, assistant
state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
KELLER, J. The defendant, Anastasia Schimanski,
appeals1 from the judgment of the Appellate Court
upholding the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s
motion to dismiss the charge of operating a motor vehicle while her license was under suspension in violation
of General Statutes § 14-215 (c) (1).2 The defendant
claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined
that the forty-five day license suspension period
imposed by General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 14-227b
(i) (1)3 on persons who refuse to submit to a chemical
analysis of their blood, breath, or urine, as required by
§ 14-227b (b), does not terminate upon the expiration
of the forty-five days specified in the statute but, rather,
continues indefinitely until such time as the persons
subject to the suspension install an ignition interlock
device (IID) on their vehicles. The defendant contends
that, because the conduct underlying her conviction
occurred after the expiration of the forty-five day suspension period authorized by § 14-227b (i) (1), the state
could not lawfully charge her pursuant to § 14-215 (c)
(1).4 We agree with the defendant and, accordingly,
reverse in part the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the
following relevant facts and procedural history. ‘‘On
September 18, 2017, the defendant was arrested and
charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence in violation of General Statutes [Rev. to 2017]
§ 14-227a.5 Pursuant to . . . § 14-227b (i), the Department of Motor Vehicles (department) suspended the
defendant’s license for a period of forty-five days, beginning on October 18, 2017, and ending on December 2,
2017, as a result of the defendant’s refusal to take a
chemical alcohol test. On December 4, 2017, the trial
court, Spader, J., granted the defendant’s application
for the pretrial alcohol education program. See General
Statutes § 54-56g. In connection with its consideration
of the application, the court engaged in the following
colloquy with the defendant:
‘‘ ‘The Court: One of the key things about the alcohol
education program is if you violate the [department’s]
interlock device program, that’s a violation of the alcohol education program. So just—don’t be operating a
motor vehicle unless you have the interlock device attached
to it.
‘‘ ‘[The Defendant]: Yes. Sir—I’m sorry—I don’t own
a vehicle.
‘‘ ‘The Court: No—yeah, well, the thing is, don’t borrow
a vehicle either that doesn’t have an interlock device
on it—you know—if there’s—once your license is
restored, once your privileges are restored, okay?
‘‘ ‘[The Defendant]: Yes, sir.’
‘‘That same day, shortly after leaving the courthouse
following the hearing, the defendant operated a motor
vehicle, which did not have an IID installed in it, and
allegedly struck another motor vehicle. As a result of
that incident, the defendant was issued a misdemeanor
summons and complaint, giving rise to the present case,
charging her with operating a motor vehicle while her
license was under suspension in violation of § 14-215
. . . . On February 23, 2018, the state filed its first
substitute information. In count one, the state charged
the defendant with operating a motor vehicle while her
license was under suspension in violation of § 14-215
(c) (1). In count two, the state charged the defendant
with operating a motor vehicle not equipped with an
IID in violation of [General Statutes (Rev. to 2017)]
§ 14-227k (a) (2).6 In count three, the state charged the
defendant with evasion of responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle in violation of [General Statutes]
§ 14-224 (b) (3).
‘‘On March 5, 2018, the defendant filed a motion to
dismiss counts one and two of the first substitute information. With respect to count one, the defendant argued
that she could not properly be charged with having
committed a violation of § 14-215 (c) (1) on December
4, 2017, because, at such time, her license was not under
suspension on account of § 14-227b (i) (1). According
to the defendant, the forty-five day suspension of her
license pursuant to § 14-227b (i) (1) had expired on
December 2, 2017. With respect to count two, the defendant argued that she was not obligated on December
4, 2017, either by direction of the department or by
order of the trial court, to operate a motor vehicle with
an IID installed, and, thus, she could not properly be
charged with having violated § 14-227k (a) (2) on that
date.7
‘‘On March 19, 2018, after having heard argument on
March 9, 2018, the trial court issued a memorandum of
decision denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss in
its entirety. As to count one charging the defendant
with a violation of § 14-215 (c) (1), the court determined
that, pursuant to §§ 14-227a and 14-227b, the installation
of an IID is a ‘mandatory statutory requirement implemented by the state legislature that must be fulfilled to
‘‘unsuspend’’ a suspended license.’ The court further
determined that the defendant did not have an IID
installed on December 4, 2017, and that the department
did not lift her suspension and restore her privilege to
operate a motor vehicle until January 2, 2018, by which
time the defendant had installed an IID. . . . In light
of the foregoing, with respect to count one, the court
concluded that the state could prosecute the defendant
for a violation of § 14-215 (c) (1). With respect to count
two, the court determined that, during the hearing held
on December 4, 2017, it unequivocally and directly had
ordered the defendant not to operate any motor vehicle
without an IID installed. Thus, the court concluded, the
state could prosecute the defendant for a violation of
§ 14-227k (a) (2).
‘‘On May 9, 2018, the state filed a second substitute
information charging the defendant solely with operating a motor vehicle while her license was under suspension in violation of § 14-215 (c) (1). On May 25, 2018,
pursuant to General Statutes § 54-94a, the defendant
entered a plea of nolo contendere to that charge, conditioned on her right to take an appeal from her conviction
on the basis of the court’s denial of her motion to
dismiss. After a canvass, the court accepted the conditional plea, entered a finding of guilty, and sentenced
the defendant to a term of one year of incarceration,
execution suspended, with one year of probation.’’
(Footnote added; footnote in original.) State v. Schimanski, 201 Conn. App. 164, 167–70,
242 A.3d 119
(2020). ‘‘The thirty day mandatory minimum term of
imprisonment was suspended in light of mitigating circumstances determined by the court. See General Statutes § 14-215 (c) (1).’’ State v. Schimanski, supra,
170 n.2.8
On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant
claimed that, under State v. Jacobson,
31 Conn. App.
797,
627 A.2d 474 (1993), aff’d,
229 Conn. 824,
644 A.2d
331 (1994), and State v. Cook,
36 Conn. App. 710,
653
A.2d 829 (1995), ‘‘her failure to have installed an IID
did not extend the suspension of her license under § 14-
227b (i) (1) beyond the forty-five day period, which
expired on December 2, 2017, and, as a result, she
could not have been charged with having committed a
violation of § 14-215 (c) (1) on December 4, 2017.’’ State
v. Schimanski, supra,
201 Conn. App. 170. The Appellate Court disagreed, concluding that ‘‘the legislature
clearly and unambiguously created a statutorily mandated condition—i.e., the installation of an IID . . .
that must be satisfied before an individual may have
his or her license restored and thereupon legally operate
a motor vehicle. Stated differently, § 14-227b (i) (1) does
not contemplate an interim period between suspension
and restoration, whereby an individual whose license
or operating privilege has been suspended thereunder
could operate a motor vehicle, while escaping the
responsibility of installing an IID . . . and avoiding
exposure to criminal liability under, inter alia, § 14-
215 (c).’’ Id., 174. To conclude otherwise, the court
reasoned, ‘‘would incentivize an individual, whose
license or operating privilege has been suspended pursuant to § 14-227b (i) (1), not to install an IID and
complete the restoration process’’; (emphasis in original) id., 174–75; leading to ‘‘an absurd result and not
one intended by the legislature.’’ Id., 175.
In reaching its determination, the Appellate Court
rejected the defendant’s contention that Jacobson and
Cook, which held that the license suspension periods
imposed for operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol (Jacobson) and for refusing to sub-
mit to a blood alcohol test (Cook) do not continue
beyond the fixed time periods specified by statute until
the person whose license was suspended completes
the administrative steps required for restoration of the
license, supported her claim. Id., 175–77. The court reasoned that, ‘‘[i]n deciding Jacobson and Cook, [it] analyzed prior revisions of §§ 14-227a and 14-227b.9 As the
trial court in the present case observed in its memorandum of decision, although Jacobson and Cook have not
been overruled, §§ 14-227a and 14-227b have been
amended since those decisions were published. The
[1989] revision of § 14-227a at issue in Jacobson specified a fixed one year license suspension without statutorily mandated conditions for restoration, and the 1991
revision of § 14-227b at issue in Cook contained a fixed
six month license suspension, also without statutorily
mandated conditions for restoration. Sections 14-227a
and 14-227b were amended in 2014, effective in 2015,
to shorten the mandatory license suspension period
to forty-five days and to add the IID requirement in
connection with restoration. [See Public Acts 2014, No.
14-228, §§ 5 and 6.] Accordingly, Jacobson and Cook are
inapplicable to the present case.’’ (Emphasis in original;
footnote added; footnote omitted.) State v. Schimanski,
supra,
201 Conn. App. 177.
On appeal to this court following our grant of certification, the defendant claims that the Appellate Court
erred in interpreting § 14-227b (i) (1) as extending the
suspension of a person’s license beyond the specified
forty-five days until the motor vehicle operator subject
to the suspension has installed an IID.10 The defendant
contends that the Appellate Court’s decision is contrary
to the plain language of the statute, controlling case
law—specifically, Jacobson and Cook, which the defendant argues are fully applicable to the present case—
and the legislative history. More specifically, the defendant argues that the text of § 14-227b sets forth a suspension period that is strictly limited to forty-five days
and that the operation of the statute within the entire
statutory framework unambiguously indicates that preconditions for restoring an individual’s license do not
concurrently operate as preconditions for terminating
a license suspension period. We agree.
We begin our analysis by setting forth the standard
of review and legal principles governing our resolution
of this appeal. ‘‘Because a motion to dismiss effectively
challenges the jurisdiction of the court, asserting that
the state, as a matter of law and fact, cannot state a
proper cause of action against the defendant, our review
of the court’s legal conclusions and resulting denial of
the defendant’s motion to dismiss is de novo. . . . Factual findings underlying the court’s decision, however,
will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kallberg,
326 Conn. 1, 12,
160 A.3d 1034 (2017).
The defendant’s appeal also requires us to interpret
various provisions of our state’s motor vehicle statutes.
‘‘Because statutory interpretation is a question of law,
our review is de novo. . . . When construing a statute,
[o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give
effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In
other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language . . . .’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pond, 315
Conn. 451, 466,
108 A.3d 1083 (2015). ‘‘In seeking to
determine the meaning of a statute, [General Statutes]
§ 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute
itself and its relationship to the broader statutory
scheme. If, after examining such text and considering
such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and
unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable
results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the
statute shall not be considered. General Statutes § 1-2z.
The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute,
when read in context, is susceptible to more than one
reasonable interpretation.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Dudley,
332 Conn. 639, 645,
212 A.3d
1268 (2019).
The defendant was charged and convicted pursuant
to § 14-215 (c) (1), which provides in relevant part that
‘‘[a]ny person who operates any motor vehicle during
the period such person’s operator’s license or right to
operate a motor vehicle in this state is under suspension . . . on account of a violation of section 14-227a
. . . or pursuant to section 14-227b, or in violation
of a restriction or limitation placed on such person’s
operator’s license or right to operate a motor vehicle
in this state by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
pursuant to subsection (i) of section 14-227a or pursuant to an order of the court under subsection (b) of
section 14-227j . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
Whether the defendant’s license was ‘‘under suspension’’ within the meaning of § 14-215 (c) (1) turns on
our interpretation of § 14-227b (i) (1), which provides
in relevant part: ‘‘The commissioner shall suspend the
operator’s license . . . of a person . . . against whom
a decision was issued, after a hearing, pursuant to subsection (h) of this section, as of the effective date contained in the suspension notice, for a period of forty-five days. As a condition for the restoration of such
operator’s license . . . such person shall be required
to install an ignition interlock device on each motor
vehicle owned or operated by such person and, upon
such restoration, be prohibited from operating a motor
vehicle unless such motor vehicle is equipped with
a functioning, approved ignition interlock device, as
defined in section 14-227j . . . .’’11 (Emphasis added.)
The state argues that the phrase ‘‘[a]s a condition for
the restoration,’’ as used in § 14-227b (i) (1), indicates
the legislature’s intent that the license suspension
period last a minimum of forty-five days and continue
until such time as the individual installs an IID. This
reading, however, cannot be reconciled with the plain
language of the text. Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary defines the word ‘‘condition’’ as ‘‘a circumstance that is essential to the appearance or occurrence
of something else: prerequisite . . . .’’ Webster’s Third
New International Dictionary (2002) p. 473; see also
Southern New England Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission,
144 Conn. 516, 522,
134 A.2d 351
(1957) (defining ‘‘condition’’ as ‘‘[t]hat which limits or
modifies the existence or character of something . . .
a restriction or qualification’’ (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Here, the legislature made the installation
of an IID a prerequisite ‘‘for the restoration’’ of the
operator’s license, not for terminating the operator’s
suspension. Under well established rules of statutory
construction, we must assume that, if the legislature
had intended the latter, it would have indicated such
intent expressly. See, e.g., In re Jusstice W.,
308 Conn.
652, 673,
65 A.3d 487 (2012) (‘‘it is a well settled principle
of statutory construction that the legislature knows how
to convey its intent expressly . . . or to use broader
or limiting terms when it chooses to do so’’ (citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted)) ‘‘[W]e are
not permitted to supply statutory language that the legislature may have chosen to omit.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Josephs,
328 Conn. 21, 27,
176
A.3d 542 (2018).
Similarly, if the forty-five day suspension period mandated by the statute was intended to operate as a baseline minimum suspension period, the legislature would
have unambiguously indicated that intent as well, just
as it has done in numerous other statutes. See, e.g.,
General Statutes § 14-44f (‘‘[i]f the [C]ommissioner [of
Motor Vehicles] finds that . . . the holder of [a commercial driver’s] license has supplied false information
in order to obtain the license, he shall withhold the
issuance of the license or suspend the license for sixty
days, and thereafter until the true and correct information is submitted’’); General Statutes § 14-223 (b) (‘‘Any
person who violates this subsection . . . [and] causes
the death or serious physical injury . . . of another
person, such person . . . shall have [his or her] motor
vehicle operator’s license suspended for one year for
the first offense . . . . For any subsequent offense
. . . if any prior offense by such person under this
subsection caused, and such subsequent offense
causes, the death or serious physical injury . . . of
another person, such person shall . . . have [his or
her] motor vehicle operator’s license suspended for not
less than eighteen months nor more than two years
. . . .’’); General Statutes § 20-233 (‘‘[a]ny person . . .
who violates any provision of [specified statutes] shall
. . . for the second offense . . . [have] his license
. . . suspended for such period, not less than six
months, as the [B]oard [of Examiners] determines’’);
General Statutes § 26-61 (b) (‘‘the [C]ommissioner [of
Energy and Environmental Protection] may suspend
any such . . . license . . . for not more than three
years, except that for a third violation . . . the suspension period shall be not less than five years and may be
indefinite’’).12 These statutes plainly demonstrate that,
when the legislature chooses to do so, it is perfectly
capable of suspending a license for a minimum period
of time and, thereafter, extending the suspension until
such time as the occurrence of a specific event.
In reaching a contrary conclusion, it is apparent that
the Appellate Court failed to take into account several
related statutes governing license suspension, restoration, and the IID requirement that, when read together
with § 14-227b (i) (1), make clear that license restoration does not automatically occur upon the expiration
of the suspension period. See, e.g., Maghfour v. Waterbury,
340 Conn. 41, 46,
262 A.3d 692 (2021) (‘‘§ 1-2z
directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself
and its relationship to other statutes’’ (emphasis added;
internal quotation marks omitted)). Two such statutes,
General Statutes §§ 14-215b and 14-227k, are particularly instructive in this regard.
Section 14-215b provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any person whose motor vehicle operator’s license has been
suspended who operates a motor vehicle after the expiration of such period of suspension without obtaining
the reinstatement of such license shall (1) during the
first sixty days after such expiration, be deemed to
have failed to renew such license and be subject to the
penalty for failure to renew a motor vehicle operator’s
license under subsection (c) of section 14-41 . . . .
Any operator so charged shall not be prosecuted under
section 14-215 for the same act constituting a violation
under this section.’’ (Emphasis added.) Section 14-215b
indicates that the conditions for restoration are unrelated to the period of suspension and that the legislature
clearly contemplated an interim period postsuspension
during which, although the person’s operator’s license
is no longer suspended, the person’s driving privileges
have yet to be restored.13 Our conclusion that the statutory scheme contemplates a postsuspension, prerestoration interim period accords with the Appellate Court’s
interpretation of § 14-215b in State v. Vlahos,
138 Conn.
App. 379,
51 A.3d 1173 (2012), cert. denied,
308 Conn.
913,
61 A.3d 1101 (2013). In Vlahos, the court stated:
‘‘The overall legislative scheme is quite plain and unambiguous. [General Statutes §] 14-36 (a) provides that no
person shall operate a motor vehicle on a public highway until such person has obtained an operator’s license.
If one then loses driving privileges, through either suspension or inadvertence, one may not operate again
until he or she has obtained a license. Sections 14-215b
and 14-41 provide exceptions, but functionally one’s
status reverts to that of an unlicensed driver until one
becomes licensed again.’’ (Emphasis added.) State v.
Vlahos, supra,138 Conn. App. 389.
Consequently, reading §§ 14-227b (i) (1) and 14-215b
together indicates that completion of the forty-five day
suspension period is necessary, but not a condition, for
restoration of one’s operator’s license under § 14-227b
(i) (1) and is separate and distinct from the additional
restoration precondition that the operator install an
IID. Thus, an operator’s suspension period could expire
without the person’s installation of an IID, which would
make it a violation of other statutes if the person were
to operate a motor vehicle,14 but not a violation of § 14-
215 (c) (1), i.e., operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license. Accordingly, after considering the language of § 14-227b (i) (1) and its relationship to other
relevant statutes, we conclude that the statute clearly
and unambiguously imposes a forty-five day license
suspension period, after which, although the person is
prohibited from operating a motor vehicle without an
IID and is subject to the supplementary requirement of
installing an IID as a condition for restoring his or
her license, the license is no longer ‘‘suspended’’ for
purposes of § 14-215 (c) (1).
Indeed, were we to adopt the Appellate Court’s reading of the statute and conclude that termination of the
suspension period is conditioned on the installation of
an IID, we would have to conclude that all restoration
requirements, not just the IID requirement, similarly
operate as conditions that must be satisfied before the
license suspension period expires. This would render
all other conditions necessary for restoration, such as
restoration fees; see General Statutes § 14-50b (b)
(‘‘[a]ny person whose motor vehicle registration or right
of operation of a motor vehicle in this state has been
suspended or revoked . . . shall pay a restoration fee
. . . prior to . . . the restoration of such registration
or such right of operation’’); or proof of insurance coverage; see General Statutes § 14-213b (c) (‘‘[n]o operator’s
license which has been suspended pursuant to this subsection shall be restored until the owner has provided
evidence to the commissioner that he maintains the
security required by section 38a-371 or any other security requirements imposed by law for each motor vehicle registered in his name’’); to functionally extend
suspension periods until those prerequisites for restoration are met, which is inconsistent with prior Appellate
Court case law. See State v. Jacobson, supra, 31 Conn.
App. 803–804 (holding that administrative requirement
of providing proof of financial responsibility to restore
license pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 14-
112 may not indefinitely extend one year suspension
imposed by General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 14-227a);
see also State v. Cook, supra, 36 Conn. App. 714–15
(holding that categorical statutory six month suspension period pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1991)
§ 14-227b may not be extended).
We disagree with the Appellate Court that State v.
Jacobson, supra, 31 Conn. App. 797, and State v.
Cook,
supra,36 Conn. App. 710, are inapplicable in light of
subsequent revisions to the statutory scheme. The
defendant relies on these cases for the proposition that,
when a statute provides a strict, unqualified, and specific license suspension period, that period may not be
extended beyond the specified term, and the expiration
of such term is not contingent on fulfillment of any
statutory condition required for license restoration. We
conclude that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that Jacobson and Cook are not controlling
because the versions of §§ 14-227a and 14-227b at issue
in those cases predate the 2014 amendments to those
statutes, which added the IID requirement as a condition for license restoration. See State v. Schimanski,
supra,
201 Conn. App. 177.15
In Jacobson, the defendant’s operator’s license was
suspended for one year after he was convicted of
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1989)
§ 14-227a.16 State v. Jacobson, supra,
31 Conn. App. 799.
After the one year suspension period ended, the defendant was required to provide proof of financial responsibility to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles in order to
have his license restored pursuant to General Statutes
(Rev. to 1989) § 14-112.17 Id. Subsequent to the expiration of the defendant’s suspension, but prior to his presenting the proof of financial responsibility required for
restoring his license, the defendant was convicted of
operating a motor vehicle while under suspension in
violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 14-215
(c). Id. On appeal, he claimed that the state improperly
had charged him with operating a motor vehicle while
his license was under suspension because the one year
suspension period imposed by General Statutes (Rev.
to 1989) § 14-227a had already expired at the time of
the commission of the charged offense. Id., 800. The
Appellate Court agreed. Id., 803–804. In doing so, the
court explained that ‘‘[the] legislature has set out a
comprehensive scheme for punishing violators of our
operating while intoxicated statutes. That scheme
unambiguously mandates a one year suspension of a
violator’s operator’s license under § 14-227a and provides that a license shall be restored upon proof of
financial responsibility in another section, § 14-112.
Nothing in the statutory scheme, however, indefinitely
extends the period of suspension, pursuant to § 14-227a,
past one year. If the legislature chooses to amend § 14-
215 (c) to extend the period of suspension of a license
beyond one year, and until the defendant has complied
with § [14-112], it may do so. Meanwhile, we are bound
by the present language of § 14-215 (c). The defendant
. . . was not charged with a violation of a statute
regarding failure to show financial responsibility or of
a statute relating to the administrative steps necessary
to restore a license.’’18 (Emphasis added.) Id.
In Cook, the defendant’s nonresident operator’s privileges were suspended for six months pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 14-227b19 after the
defendant refused to take a blood alcohol test mandated
by the statute. State v.
Cook, supra,36 Conn. App. 711.
After the six month suspension period expired, the
defendant was charged with and subsequently convicted
of operating
a motor vehicle while his license was under suspension,
in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 14-215
(c). Id., 712. On appeal, the Appellate Court relied on
its reasoning in Jacobson in concluding that General
Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 14-227b ‘‘is unambiguous in
its provision that the refusal to submit to a blood alcohol
test subjects a driver to the suspension of his license
or operating privileges for a period of six months. It
does not require that the suspension continue beyond
that six month period until such time that the driver’s
privileges are formally restored. Therefore, upon completion of the six month period, a driver’s license or
operating privileges are no longer suspended on
account of a violation of [General Statutes (Rev. to
1991)] § 14-227b and the driver may not be subjected
to the enhanced penalties of [General Statutes (Rev. to
1991)] § 14-215 (c).’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., 714–15.
As we indicated, in the present case, the Appellate
Court concluded that Jacobson and Cook were inapplicable because ‘‘[t]he [1989] revision of § 14-227a at issue
in Jacobson specified a fixed one year license suspension without statutorily mandated conditions for restoration, and the 1991 revision of § 14-227b at issue in
Cook contained a fixed six month license suspension,
also without statutorily mandated conditions for restoration. Sections 14-227a and 14-227b were amended in
2014, effective in 2015, to shorten the mandatory license
suspension period to forty-five days and to add the IID
requirement in connection with restoration.’’ (Emphasis in original.) State v. Schimanski, supra, 201 Conn.
App. 177. Contrary to the Appellate Court’s reasoning,
the courts in Jacobson and Cook based their decisions
on the fixed, unqualified language limiting the duration
of the respective suspension periods in the relevant
statutes. See State v. Jacobson, supra, 31 Conn. App.
803–804 (‘‘Th[e] [statutory] scheme unambiguously
mandates a one year suspension of a violator’s operator’s license under [General Statutes (Rev. to 1989)]
§ 14-227a, and provides that a license shall be restored
upon proof of financial responsibility in another section, [General Statutes (Rev. to 1989)] § 14-112. Nothing
in the statutory scheme, however, indefinitely extends
the period of suspension, pursuant to [General Statutes
(Rev. to 1989)] § 14-227a, past one year.’’); State v.
Cook,
supra,36 Conn. App. 714 (‘‘[General Statutes (Rev. to
1991)] § 14-227b is unambiguous in its provision that
the refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test subjects
a driver to the suspension of his license or operating
privileges for a period of six months. It does not require
that the suspension continue beyond that six month
period . . . .’’).
In both Jacobson and Cook, the Appellate Court concluded that, in the absence of express statutory language to the contrary, requirements for license
restoration do not concurrently operate as preconditions for terminating a license suspension period. See
State v. Jacobson, supra,
31 Conn. App. 804 (‘‘If the
legislature chooses to amend [General Statutes (Rev.
to 1991)] § 14-215 (c) to extend the period of suspension
of a license beyond one year, and until the defendant
has complied with [a condition for restoration], it may
do so. Meanwhile, we are bound by the present language
of [the statute].’’); see also State v.
Cook, supra,36 Conn.
App. 714 (‘‘[General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 14-227b]
does not require that the suspension continue beyond
that six month period until such time that the driver’s
privileges are formally restored’’). Contrary to the
Appellate Court’s reasoning in the present case, neither
of these rationales was rendered obsolete by the 2014
amendments to §§ 14-227a and 14-227b. Both statutes
still provided a fixed, unqualified license suspension
period. See General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 14-227a
(g) (‘‘[a]ny person who violates any provision of subsection (a) of this section shall: (1) For conviction of a
first violation . . . have such person’s motor vehicle
operator’s license or nonresident operating privilege
suspended for forty-five days’’); General Statutes (Rev.
to 2017) § 14-227b (i) (1) (‘‘[t]he commissioner shall
suspend the operator’s license or nonresident operating
privilege . . . for a period of forty-five days’’).
Although the 2014 amendments added a new requirement—i.e., installation of an IID—that requirement
expressly qualifies license restoration, not expiration
of the license suspension period. See Public Acts 2014,
No. 14-228, §§ 5 and 6. Accordingly, we conclude that
Jacobson and Cook are fully applicable to and controlling of the issue of statutory interpretation presented
in this case.
In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Appellate
Court distinguished Jacobson on the ground that the
IID requirement for restoration is incorporated within
§ 14-227b, whereas the proof of financial responsibility
requirement for restoration in Jacobson was imposed
by a separate statute. See State v. Schimanski, supra,
201 Conn. App. 177 (‘‘The [1989] revision of § 14-227a
at issue in Jacobson specified a fixed one year license
suspension without statutorily mandated conditions for
restoration, and the 1991 revision of § 14-227b at issue
in Cook contained a fixed six month license suspension,
also without statutorily mandated conditions for restoration. Sections 14-227a and 14-227b were amended in
2014, effective in 2015, to shorten the mandatory license
suspension period to forty-five days and to add the IID
requirement in connection with restoration.’’ (Emphasis in original.)) However, the distinction drawn by the
Appellate Court is irrelevant, as both the IID requirement and the proof of financial responsibility requirement are understood to operate as preconditions for
restoration, which is the salient similarity for purposes
of our analysis. Thus, regardless of where the legislature
elected to incorporate the requirement within the statutory framework, the court in Jacobson confronted an
identical issue to the one now before us—specifically,
whether a statutory precondition for restoration
extends an expressly defined suspension period.
In reaching its decision, the Appellate Court further
reasoned that the defendant’s interpretation of § 14-
227b (i) (1) would ‘‘yield an absurd result’’ by ‘‘incentiviz[ing] an individual, whose license or operating privilege has been suspended pursuant to § 14-227b (i) (1),
not to install an IID and complete the restoration process’’ because, then, they would only be subject to lesser
penalties.20 (Emphasis in original.) State v. Schimanski,
supra, 201 Conn. App. 174–75. The Appellate Court’s
reasoning failed to take into account General Statutes
(Rev. to 2017) § 14-227k (a), as amended by Public Acts
2017, No. 17-79, § 13, which provides that ‘‘[n]o person
whose right to operate a motor vehicle has been
restricted pursuant to an order of the court under subsection (b) of section 14-227j, by the Commissioner of
Motor Vehicles or by any provision of law that requires
the use of an ignition interlock device, shall (1) request
or solicit another person to blow into an ignition interlock device or to start a motor vehicle equipped with
an ignition interlock device for the purpose of providing
such person with an operable motor vehicle, or (2)
operate any motor vehicle not equipped with a functioning ignition interlock device or any motor vehicle
that a court has ordered such person not to operate.’’
(Emphasis added.) Contrary to the Appellate Court’s
reasoning, therefore, § 14-227k (a) not only penalizes
the exact conduct the Appellate Court fears will be
incentivized under the defendant’s interpretation, but
the statute imposes the same penalties for a violation
of its provisions as § 14-215 (c) (1). See General Statutes
(Rev. to 2017) § 14-227k (c) (2) (‘‘[a]ny person who
violates any provision of subdivision (2) of subsection
(a) of this section shall be subject to the penalties set
forth in subsection (c) of section 14-215’’); General Statutes § 14-215 (c) (1) (providing that person who violates
section ‘‘shall be fined not less than five hundred dollars
or more than one thousand dollars and imprisoned not
more than one year, and, in the absence of any mitigating circumstances as determined by the court, thirty
consecutive days of the sentence imposed may not be
suspended or reduced in any manner’’).
We disagree with the state that § 14-227k is applicable
only after a person has restored his or her license.
Section 14-227k does not distinguish between restored
and unrestored status. Moreover, an individual may not
lawfully operate a motor vehicle in the absence of a restored license; see General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 14-
36 (a) (‘‘no person shall operate a motor vehicle on any
public highway of this state or private road on which
a speed limit has been established in accordance with
subsection (a) of section 14-218a until such person has
obtained a motor vehicle operator’s license’’); and § 14-
227b (i) (1) requires installation of an IID before an
individual’s license may be restored. Therefore, § 14-
227b (i) (1) places a restriction on a person’s right to
operate a motor vehicle that requires the use of an IID
for purposes of § 14-227k (a). Consequently, an individual who is subject to the provisions of § 14-227b (i) (1)
and who operates a motor vehicle without an IID, prior
to having his or her license restored, is in violation of
§ 14-227k (a).
Finally, the state argues that the regulations adopted
by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to implement
the provisions of § 14-227b support the Appellate Court’s
interpretation of the statute. See General Statutes § 14-
227b (o) (‘‘[t]he Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall
adopt regulations, in accordance with chapter 54, to
implement the provisions of this section’’). Specifically,
the state points to §§ 14-227b-12 and 14-227b-13 of the
Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies.21 Although
the cited regulations support the Appellate Court’s interpretation, they are entitled to no deference because,
as we explained, the statute unambiguously limits the
suspension period to forty-five days, and an agency’s
interpretation of a statute is entitled to deference only
when the statute is ambiguous and has previously been
subjected to judicial scrutiny, and when the agency’s
interpretation has been time tested. See, e.g., Vincent v.
New Haven,
285 Conn. 778, 784 n.8,
941 A.2d 932 (2008).
In sum, the suspension of a motor vehicle operator’s
license pursuant to § 14-227b (i) (1) does not continue
until the operator has installed an IID but, rather, is
strictly limited to the forty-five days specified in the
statute. Because the defendant’s license suspension
period expired on December 2, 2017, she was not
operating a motor vehicle while her operator’s license
was under suspension on December 4, 2017.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed insofar as that court dismissed the defendant’s appeal with
respect to her motion to dismiss the second count of
the state’s first substitute information; the judgment of
the Appellate Court is otherwise reversed, and the case
is remanded to that court with direction to reverse the
judgment of the trial court and to remand the case
to the trial court with direction to render judgment
dismissing the state’s second substitute information.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
1
This court granted the defendant’s petition for certification to appeal
limited to the following issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court properly uphold the
trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of
operating a motor vehicle while her operator’s license was under suspension
pursuant to General Statutes § 14-215 (c) (1)?’’ State v. Schimanski, 336
Conn. 903, 903–904,
242 A.3d 1009 (2021).
2
General Statutes § 14-215 (c) (1) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any person
who operates any motor vehicle during the period such person’s operator’s
license or right to operate a motor vehicle in this state is under suspension
. . . pursuant to section 14-227b . . . shall be fined not less than five hundred dollars or more than one thousand dollars and imprisoned not more
than one year, and, in the absence of any mitigating circumstances as determined by the court, thirty consecutive days of the sentence imposed may
not be suspended or reduced in any manner.’’
3
General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 14-227b (i) (1) provides in relevant
part: ‘‘The commissioner shall suspend the operator’s license . . . of a
person . . . against whom a decision was issued, after a hearing, pursuant
to subsection (h) of this section, as of the effective date contained in the
suspension notice, for a period of forty-five days. As a condition for the
restoration of such operator’s license . . . such person shall be required
to install an ignition interlock device on each motor vehicle owned or
operated by such person and, upon such restoration, be prohibited from
operating a motor vehicle unless such motor vehicle is equipped with a
functioning, approved ignition interlock device, as defined in section 14-
227j, for the longer of either (A) the period prescribed in subdivision (2) of
this subsection for the present arrest and suspension, or (B) the period
prescribed in subdivision (1), (2) or (3) of subsection (g) of section 14-
227a or subdivision (1), (2) or (3) of subsection (c) of section 14-227m or
subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection (c) of section 14-227n for the present
arrest and conviction, if any.’’ (Emphasis added.)
Hereinafter, unless otherwise indicated, all references to § 14-227b in this
opinion are to the 2017 revision of the statute.
4
As we explain more fully hereinafter, the defendant’s conduct may have
violated other motor vehicle statutes. For reasons unknown, the state failed
to charge her pursuant to them.
5
Hereinafter, unless otherwise indicated, all references to § 14-227a in
this opinion are to the 2017 revision of the statute.
6
Hereinafter, unless otherwise indicated, all references to § 14-227k in
this opinion are to the 2017 revision of the statute.
7
‘‘Notwithstanding the language in the suspension notice, during oral
argument before the trial court, the state conceded that the defendant was
not restricted by the department to operate a motor vehicle with an IID
installed.’’ State v. Schimanski, 201 Conn. App. 164, 168 n.1,
242 A.3d 119
(2020).
8
As the Appellate Court noted, it is unclear, but irrelevant to our analysis,
why the state did not argue before the trial court that the defendant could
also be charged under § 14-215 (c) (1) on the alternative theory that she
had violated ‘‘a restriction or limitation placed on [her] license or right to
operate a motor vehicle . . . pursuant to an order of the court under subsection (b) of section 14-227j . . . .’’ General Statutes § 14-215 (c) (1); see State
v. Schimanski, supra, 201 Conn. App. 172 n.4. General Statutes (Rev. to
2017) § 14-227j (b) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any person who has been
arrested for a violation of section 14-227a . . . may be ordered by the court
not to operate any motor vehicle unless such motor vehicle is equipped
with an ignition interlock device. Any such order may be made . . . as a
condition of granting such person’s application for participation in the pretrial alcohol education program under section 54-56g . . . .’’ However, General Statutes § 54-94a provides in relevant part: ‘‘When a defendant, prior
to the commencement of trial, enters a plea of nolo contendere conditional
on the right to take an appeal from the court’s denial of the defendant’s
. . . motion to dismiss, the defendant after the imposition of sentence may
file an appeal within the time prescribed by law provided a trial court has
determined that a ruling on such . . . motion to dismiss would be dispositive of the case. The issue to be considered in such an appeal shall be
limited to whether it was proper for the court to have denied . . . the
motion to dismiss. . . .’’ Moreover, ‘‘in the absence of a showing of good
cause, an appellate court should decline to review an issue that has not
been raised in accordance with the provisions of § 54-94a.’’ State v. Revelo,
256 Conn. 494, 503,
775 A.2d 260, cert. denied,
534 U.S. 1052,
122 S. Ct. 639,
151 L. Ed. 2d 558 (2001).
The parties’ arguments concerning the defendant’s motion to dismiss are
entirely centered on whether the defendant’s license was suspended for
refusing a chemical blood alcohol test pursuant to § 14-227b (i) (1) at the
time she operated a motor vehicle, as this was the only charge on which
the state pursued its prosecution. Therefore, the narrow issue before this
court is whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to
dismiss the state’s charge under § 14-215 (c) (1) based on a theory that the
defendant operated a motor vehicle while her license was under suspension,
not whether the state was at liberty to charge the defendant under § 14-215
(c) (1) generally.
9
General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 14-227a (h), at issue in Jacobson, provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any person who violates any provision of subsection
(a) of this section shall: (1) For conviction of a first violation . . . have his
motor vehicle operator’s license or nonresident operating privilege suspended for one year . . . .’’
General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 14-227b (h), at issue in Cook, provides
in relevant part: ‘‘The commissioner [of motor vehicles] shall suspend the
operator’s license or nonresident operating privilege . . . of a person who
did not contact the department to schedule a hearing, who failed to appear
at a hearing or against whom, after a hearing, the commissioner held pursuant to subsection (g) of this section, as of the effective date contained in
the suspension notice or the date the commissioner renders his decision,
whichever is later, for a period of . . . six months if such person refused
to submit to such test or analysis . . . .’’
10
In her brief to this court, the defendant also claims that the Appellate
Court’s interpretation of §§ 14-227a and 14-227b violates the equal protection
clause of the United States constitution and the equal protection of the
law guaranteed by the Connecticut constitution. Specifically, the defendant
argues that interpreting the statutes as requiring installation of an IID as a
prerequisite for ending the suspension periods imposed under those statutes
would have a disparate impact along socioeconomic lines, resulting in
shorter suspension periods for individuals with the economic means to
pay the fees associated with installing and maintaining the IID, and longer
suspension periods for indigent persons unable to pay for such fees. In light
of our determination that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that
the suspension periods specified in §§ 14-227a and 14-227b continue until
an IID is installed, it is unnecessary for us to address this claim. We note,
however, that General Statutes § 14-227o, which was enacted subsequent
to the defendant’s conviction; see Public Acts 2018, No. 18-30, § 1; provides
in relevant part that ‘‘any provider of ignition interlock device services . . .
may include in a lease agreement with a person required to install such
device . . . a reduction to or an elimination of the charge for such services
if such person is indigent. . . .’’ As a result of its permissive character, § 14-
227o potentially mitigates the issue raised by the defendant but, without
more, does not go so far as to render the claim moot.
11
Although the defendant’s license was suspended pursuant to § 14-227b
(i) (1), we note that § 14-227a (g) also requires suspension of an operator’s
license for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol
or drugs in violation of § 14-227a (a), using very similar statutory language.
General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 14-227a (g) provides: ‘‘Any person who
violates any provision of subsection (a) of this section shall: (1) For conviction of a first violation . . . have such person’s motor vehicle operator’s
license . . . suspended for forty-five days and, as a condition for the
restoration of such license, be required to install an ignition interlock
device on each motor vehicle owned or operated by such person and, upon
such restoration, be prohibited for the one-year period following such restoration from operating a motor vehicle unless such motor vehicle is equipped
with a functioning, approved ignition interlock device, as defined in section
14-227j . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
12
The state points to the language in General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 14-
36 (g) (7), which provides that the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles may
restrict a person’s license by requiring an IID if ‘‘such person’s operator’s
license [was] suspended under [§ 14-227b (i)] and [he or she] has served
not less than forty-five days of the prescribed period of such suspension,’’
to support its assertion that § 14-227b (i) (1) provides for a forty-five day
suspension period, plus the time it takes to install an IID. (Emphasis added.)
We are not persuaded. The statutory language refers to the minimum period
of time a person must serve on suspension before he or she may be subject to
an IID requirement, not a minimum suspension period that may be imposed.
Moreover, the use of the language, ‘‘the prescribed period,’’ undermines the
state’s position by referring to the forty-five days in relatively definitive
terms.
13
Although §§ 14-227b and 14-215b do not define the words ‘‘restoration’’
and ‘‘reinstatement,’’ as used in those statutes, their plain meaning and
application in their corresponding statutory contexts indicate that they are
intended to be applied synonymously. See 13 Oxford English Dictionary (2d
Ed. 1998) pp. 539, 754 (defining ‘‘reinstatement’’ as a synonym for ‘‘restoration’’ and defining ‘‘restoration’’ as ‘‘the fact of being restored or reinstated’’
(emphasis added)); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (2002)
pp. 1915, 1936 (defining ‘‘reinstatement’’ as ‘‘the action of replacing or restoring the effectiveness of (as something damaged, worn out, or lapsed),’’ and
defining ‘‘restoration’’ as ‘‘a bringing back to or putting back into a former
position or condition: reinstatement, renewal, reestablishment’’ (emphasis
added)). Moreover, the legislature appears to employ the terms interchangeably throughout the statutory scheme, and there is no language in the statutes
that would suggest otherwise. See General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 14-227b
(h) (‘‘reinstate such license or operating privilege’’); General Statutes (Rev.
to 2017) § 14-227b (i) (1) (‘‘restoration of such operator’s license or operating
privilege’’); see also General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 14-227a (g) (‘‘restoration of such license’’); General Statutes § 14-227l (‘‘reinstatement of the
operator’s license or nonresident operating privilege’’).
It should be noted that the words ‘‘restoration’’ and ‘‘reinstated’’ are both
included in § 14-227b. Although we previously have stated that ‘‘[t]he use
of . . . different terms . . . within the same statute suggests that the legislature acted with complete awareness of their different meanings . . . and
that it intended the terms to have different meanings’’; (internal quotation
marks omitted) 1st Alliance Lending, LLC v. Dept. of Banking, 342 Conn.
273, 285 n.3,
269 A.3d 764 (2022); when, as in the present case, we conclude
that the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous under the plain
meaning analysis set forth in § 1-2z, we are restrained from making such
presumptions in determining legislative intent. See Achillion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Law,
291 Conn. 525, 532 n.8,
970 A.2d 57 (2009) (‘‘[Legal]
presumptions are rules of construction and, accordingly, are to be used
only after we have determined that a statute is ambiguous pursuant to
§ 1-2z. If we determine that no such ambiguity exists, these presumptions
are inapplicable.’’).
14
See General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 14-215b (operation after expiration
of period of suspension and without obtaining reinstatement of license);
General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 14-227k (a) (avoidance of or tampering
with IID). In this case, the defendant was initially charged with a violation
of § 14-227k (a) for avoidance of an IID, a charge the trial court specifically
held the state could pursue. For reasons unknown, the state chose not to
do so.
15
The state makes the additional argument that Jacobson and Cook are
distinguishable because the defendants in those cases were not operating
under operating under the influence based suspensions but were operating
under suspensions imposed by a failure to complete administrative steps
required for restoration. The state also argues that the cases are distinguishable because the defendants in Jacobson and Cook were ‘‘eligible’’ for restoration at the time of their arrests, whereas the defendant in the present case
was not eligible until she installed an IID. We find no merit to either of
these arguments. First, the courts in Jacobson and Cook both held that the
licenses of the defendants in those cases were not under suspension; State
v. Cook, supra,36 Conn. App. 715; State v. Jacobson, supra,
31 Conn. App.
804; and it would be nonsensical to differentiate between different kinds
of suspensions for purposes of § 14-215 (c). Second, the defendants in those
cases and the defendant in the present were all subject to conditions for
restoration that they failed to complete prior to operating a motor vehicle.
See State v.
Cook, supra, 711–12; State v. Jacobson, supra, 799; Contrary to
the state’s arguments, there is nothing in the statutory framework that
distinguishes one condition for restoration from another for purposes of
determining who may be considered ‘‘eligible’’ for restoring his or her license.
16
General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 14-227a (h) provides in relevant part:
‘‘Any person who violates any provision of subsection (a) of this section
shall: (1) For conviction of a first violation . . . have his motor vehicle
operator’s license or nonresident operating privilege suspended for one
year . . . .’’
17
General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 14-112 (a) provides in relevant part:
‘‘To entitle any person to receive or retain a motor vehicle operator’s license
or certificate of registration of any motor vehicle when, in the opinion of
the commissioner, such person has violated . . . subsection (a) of section
14-227a . . . the commissioner shall require from such person proof of
financial responsibility to satisfy any claim for damages by reason of personal
injury to, or the death of, any one person, of twenty thousand dollars, or
by reason of personal injury to, or the death of, more than one person on
account of any accident, of at least forty thousand dollars, and for damage
to property of at least ten thousand dollars . . . . If any person fails to
furnish such proof, the commissioner shall, until such proof is furnished,
suspend or revoke the license of such person to operate a motor vehicle
or refuse to return any license which has been suspended or revoked in
accordance with the provisions of section 14-111 . . . . Prior to such suspension, revocation or withdrawal, notice thereof shall be given by the
commissioner by a notice forwarded by bulk certified mail to the address
of such person as shown by the records of the commissioner. . . .’’
18
On appeal, we adopted the Appellate Court’s reasoning in Jacobson and
forwent further explication on the matter, stating that ‘‘[t]he issue on which
we granted certification was properly resolved in the Appellate Court’s
thoughtful and thorough unanimous opinion. It would serve no useful purpose for this court to repeat the discussion contained therein.’’ State v.
Jacobson, 229 Conn. 824, 828,
644 A.2d 331 (1994).
The original text of the Appellate Court’s decision in Jacobson stated:
‘‘If the legislature chooses to amend § 14-215 (c) to extend the period of
suspension of a license beyond one year, and until the defendant has complied with § 14-211, it may do so.’’ State v. Jacobson, supra, 31 Conn. App.
804. We believe that the Appellate Court’s reference to § 14-211 was a
scrivener’s error and that the court intended to reference § 14-112, which
makes more sense in context because § 14-112 was central to the court’s
analysis.
19
General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 14-227b (h) provides in relevant part:
‘‘The commissioner shall suspend the operator’s license or nonresident
operating privilege, and revoke the temporary operator’s license or nonresident operating privilege issued pursuant to subsection (c) of this section,
of a person who did not contact the department to schedule a hearing,
who failed to appear at a hearing or against whom, after a hearing, the
commissioner held pursuant to subsection (g) of this section, as of the
effective date contained in the suspension notice or the date the commissioner renders his decision, whichever is later, for a period of . . . six
months if such person refused to submit to [a blood alcohol] test or analysis
. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
20
Although the Appellate Court did not expressly state what lesser penalties it is referring to, one such penalty may be the aforementioned § 14-
215b, which would have imposed a maximum penalty of a $25 late fee. See
General Statutes § 14-41 (c) (‘‘[a]ny previously licensed operator who fails
to renew a motor vehicle operator’s license in accordance with subsection
(a) of this section shall be charged a late fee of twenty-five dollars upon
renewal of such operator’s license’’).
21
Section 14-227b-12 (b) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies
provides in relevant part that the ‘‘Connecticut operator’s license or privilege’’ of a person who refuses a chemical test associated with an arrest for
operating under the influence ‘‘shall be suspended automatically on the
effective date for the period of time prescribed in subsection (i) of section
14-227b of the Connecticut General Statutes and shall remain suspended
thereafter until such person has installed an ignition interlock device in
accordance with subsection (i) of section 14-227b of the Connecticut General Statutes and sections 14-227a-11a through 14-227a-28a, inclusive, of the
Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
Section 14-227b-13 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies provides that an operator who received a suspension notice, but failed to request
a hearing on their suspension, shall receive an additional notice affirming
their suspension that must state that ‘‘(1) as a condition of reinstatement
of such person’s Connecticut operator’s license or privilege, such person
shall install an ignition interlock device in each motor vehicle owned or
operated by such person and maintain such device for the period of time
required in subsection (i) of section 14-227b of the Connecticut General
Statutes and specified in the suspension notice; and (2) such person’s operator’s license or privilege shall remain suspended until such person has
installed an ignition interlock device.’’ (Emphasis added.)
