State v. Flores

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   STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ADRIAN FLORES
                 (SC 20512)
          Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins, Kahn,
                            Ecker and Keller, Js.

                                  Syllabus

Convicted of home invasion, burglary in the first degree, attempt to commit
     robbery in the first degree, and conspiracy to commit home invasion,
     the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant and his friend, B,
     had agreed to steal drugs and money from the home of the defendant’s
     drug dealer, D. After ingesting cocaine and acquiring various tools and
     supplies from B’s workplace, the defendant and B drove to D’s home,
     which they entered through the basement. The defendant and B were
     wearing facemasks and armed with box cutters, and B also held a
     machete. After they were confronted by D and other occupants of D’s
     home, the defendant and B fled and were later apprehended by the police.
     Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress a written statement he
     made after being brought to the police station, claiming that it was
     inadmissible pursuant to the statute (§ 54-1o) governing the admissibility
     of statements made in the course of an unrecorded custodial interrogation at a place of detention. Following a hearing, at which the defendant
     and several police officers testified, the court denied the motion to
     suppress. The court concluded that, although the electronic recording
     of the encounter in which the defendant had made his statement was
     not preserved, the state had overcome the statute’s presumption of
     inadmissibility of the defendant’s written statement under § 54-1o (h)
     because the failure to preserve the electronic recording was not in bad
     faith and because the state had established, by a preponderance of the
     evidence, that the defendant’s statement was voluntary and reliable. At
     trial, the prosecutor also sought to admit into evidence a cooperation
     agreement that the state had entered into with B. Pursuant to that
     agreement, B agreed to testify truthfully, and the state agreed that it
     would ‘‘make known to the sentencing court [in B’s criminal case] the
     nature, extent, value, and truthfulness of [B’s] information and testimony.’’ Defense counsel objected to the admission of that agreement,
     claiming that the portions of the agreement regarding B’s obligation to
     testify truthfully constituted improper vouching for B’s credibility. The
     trial court overruled defense counsel’s objection and admitted the agreement in its entirety. Held:
1. The trial court correctly determined that the state had established, by a
     preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant’s written statement
     to the police was both voluntary and reliable and, therefore, admissible
     under § 54-1o, and, accordingly, the court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress:
    a. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court’s
    findings were clearly erroneous insofar as the court determined that,
    while the defendant was in a holding cell and without any prompting,
    he told a police sergeant that he wanted to give a statement: there was
    no evidence that the sergeant approached the defendant in his cell, as
    the sergeant testified that he had joined the defendant in the processing
    room, and this court therefore declined to rely on that subsidiary factual
    finding in determining whether the defendant’s statement was voluntary;
    moreover, because there was at least some evidence in the record that
    the defendant’s offer to make a statement was not prompted by the
    police, that subsidiary finding was not clearly erroneous, and, regardless
    of whether the statement was unprompted, it was undisputed that the
    defendant responded affirmatively when the police asked if he would
    provide a statement.
    b. The defendant’s statement was voluntary insofar as he implicitly gave
    a knowing, voluntary waiver of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona
    (

): the defendant responded affirmatively and without any
    reservations when asked whether he would provide a statement, he
    received two Miranda warnings before making his statement, at all times,
    he stated that he understood his rights and had a calm and cooperative
    demeanor, and the facts demonstrated, and the defendant specifically
    testified, that he was not coerced or threatened in any manner; moreover,
    the trial court specifically discredited the defendant’s testimony that he
    had been cold, tired, under the influence of alcohol and narcotics, and
    not proficient in English at the time he made his statement, the court
    instead credited the police officers’ testimony that the defendant spoke
    and understood English and did not appear to be tired or under the
    influence of alcohol or drugs, and, because the defendant did not dispute
    the trial court’s findings in that regard as clearly erroneous, this court
    would not second-guess the trial court’s credibility determinations; furthermore, this court declined the defendant’s request to read a requirement into § 54-1o that the state provide a valid explanation for its failure
    to record and preserve a custodial interrogation for the defendant’s
    statement to be admissible, the legislature having declined to require
    the state to provide such an explanation in order to overcome the presumption of inadmissibility set forth in that statute.
    c. In view of the totality of the circumstances, the defendant’s statement
    was voluntary under due process principles: the record supported the
    trial court’s findings, which the defendant did not claim were clearly
    erroneous, that he spoke and understood English at the time of the
    interrogation, the interrogation occurred only a few hours after the defendant’s arrest and lasted for only about thirty minutes, and there was no
    evidence of physical or psychological punishment or the use of any
    potentially coercive interrogation methods.
    d. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the
    defendant’s statement was reliable: the testimony of B, D, and the occupants of D’s home corroborated the defendant’s statement, the defendant
    testified that the substance of the statement was accurate, and none of
    the undisputed facts demonstrated that the defendant was coerced into
    giving a false confession.
2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the truthfulness provisions contained in the cooperation agreement between B and the state
     constituted improper vouching for B’s credibility, as a matter of both
     evidentiary law and prosecutorial impropriety: truthfulness provisions
     do not constitute impermissible vouching when they merely reveal that
     a witness has an obligation to testify truthfully and explain the consequences of a breach of that obligation, but such provisions constitute
     impermissible vouching when the prosecutor explicitly or implicitly
     indicates that he or she has verified the truth of the testimony presented
     to the fact finder, when they refer to facts not in evidence, or when
     they offer the prosecutor’s personal opinion of the truthfulness of the
     witness’ testimony; in the present case, the provisions stating that B
     had a duty to ‘‘truthfully disclose’’ and ‘‘truthfully testify,’’ and that he
     could be charged with perjury if he lied, did not constitute impermissible
     vouching, as they merely stated B’s obligation to testify truthfully and
     explained the consequences of his failure to do so; moreover, although
     the provision stating that the prosecutor would ‘‘make known to the
     sentencing court [in B’s criminal case] the nature, extent, value, and
     truthfulness of [B’s] information and testimony’’ came very close to
     impermissibly suggesting to the jury that the prosecutor had access to
     tools or information, not available to the jury, that the prosecutor would
     use to ensure that the witness tells the truth, nothing in the agreement
     suggested that the prosecutor already had verified the truth of B’s testimony, the determination of the truthfulness of B’s testimony was left
     to the jury, and the state’s role in determining credibility under the
     agreement would not arise until the sentencing hearing in B’s separate
     criminal case; furthermore, although it would have been better if the
     trial court had omitted the reference to the provision regarding what
     the prosecutor would have made known to the sentencing court in B’s
     criminal case, this court stopped short of concluding that the trial court
     abused its discretion, as an evidentiary matter, in admitting it; accordingly, because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
     the truthfulness provisions as a matter of evidentiary law, the defendant’s
     claim that the admission of the truthfulness provisions constituted prosecutorial impropriety also failed; nevertheless, this court emphasized that
     the state must take care in drafting cooperation agreements and that
     trial courts must carefully examine their language before admitting them
     fully into evidence, it cautioned the state not to insinuate in future
     cooperation agreements or in argument to the jury that it has verified
     testimony or that it is in a position to monitor and accurately verify a
     witness’ testimony, and it encouraged courts to address concerns about
     improper vouching in cooperative agreements by making appropriate
     redactions.
3. The evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
     defendant committed the crimes of which he was convicted:
    a. The evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of attempt to
    commit robbery in the first degree: contrary to the defendant’s argument
    that the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt both that he
    intended to commit a larceny and that he intended to do so through the
    use or threatened use of force, it was well settled that the intent element
    of robbery relates to the commission of the larceny and not to the use
    or threatened use of physical force; moreover, even if the evidence was
    insufficient to establish that the defendant actually used or threatened
    the use of a box cutter, the defendant was charged and convicted of
    only attempt to commit robbery, and the defendant’s conduct in asking
    B to procure weapons, kicking down the door to D’s basement knowing
    that at least one person was home, and stating that he would do whatever
    it took to get money and drugs, including using force and tying up the
    occupants, was sufficient to establish that he took a substantial step in
    using or threatening to use the box cutter.
    b. The evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of burglary in
    the first degree: the defendant conceded that, to establish the particular
    offense of burglary in the first degree with which he was charged, the
    state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt only that he was armed
    with a dangerous instrument, not that he used or displayed a dangerous
    instrument; moreover, the jury reasonably could have found that the
    defendant used or attempted to use a box cutter in circumstances such
    that its use or attempted use was capable of causing death or serious
    physical injury.
    c. The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of
    conspiracy to commit home invasion, predicated on his attempt to commit robbery in the first degree: because conspiracy is a specific intent
    crime, specific intent is required for every element of home invasion,
    including, in this case, the predicate felony of attempt to commit robbery
    in the first degree, and, although the defendant relied on his own testimony in support of his claim that he and B had agreed only to enter
    and commit a larceny in D’s home and not to hurt anyone therein,
    the jury was not required to credit his testimony; moreover, there was
    sufficient other evidence, which the jury was entitled to credit, that the
    defendant had the specific intent to use or threaten the use of physical
    force against another person for the purpose of compelling that person
    to deliver property, including B’s testimony that the defendant had agreed
    to use whatever force was necessary to force the occupants of D’s home
    to comply and that he had asked B to gather the machete, box cutters,
    and other supplies, including zip ties and duct tape, the defendant’s own
    statement to the police, in which he indicated those supplies would be
    used in case they needed to tie up D, and the testimony of D’s brother that
    the defendant was holding a sharp object or knife when the occupants
    of D’s home confronted the defendant after he forced his way into
    their basement.
            (Two justices concurring separately in one opinion)
         Argued March 28—officially released September 20, 2022

                             Procedural History

   Substitute information charging the defendant with
two counts each of the crimes of home invasion, burglary in the first degree, conspiracy to commit home
invasion and conspiracy to commit burglary in the first
degree, and with one count each of the crimes of
attempt to commit robbery in the first degree and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, brought
to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Windham,
where the court, Swords, J., denied the defendant’s
motion to suppress certain evidence; thereafter, the
case was tried to the jury before Swords, J.; verdict of
guilty; subsequently, the court vacated the verdict as
sion and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first
degree, and two counts of conspiracy to commit burglary in the first degree; judgment of guilty of two counts
each of home invasion and burglary in the first degree,
and one count each of attempt to commit robbery in
the first degree and conspiracy to commit home invasion, from which the defendant appealed to this court.
Affirmed.
  Alice Osedach, assigned counsel, for the appellant
(defendant).
   Meryl R. Gersz, deputy assistant state’s attorney, with
whom, on the brief, were Anne F. Mahoney, state’s
attorney, and Louis J. Luba, Jr., senior assistant state’s
attorney, for the appellee (state).
                          Opinion

   D’AURIA, J. The defendant, Adrian Flores, directly
appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after
a jury trial, of home invasion in violation of General
Statutes § 53a-100aa (a) (1); home invasion in violation
of General Statutes § 53a-100aa (a) (2); burglary in the
first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-101 (a)
(1); burglary in the first degree in violation of General
Statutes § 53a-101 (a) (3); attempt to commit robbery
in the first degree in violation of General Statutes
§§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-134 (a) (3); and conspiracy to
commit home invasion in violation of General Statutes
§§ 53a-48 (a) and 53a-100aa (a) (1). On appeal, he claims
that (1) the trial court improperly denied his motion to
suppress his written statement to the police, who failed
to comply with the requirements of General Statutes
§ 54-1o, (2) the trial court improperly admitted into
evidence the entirety of the cooperation agreement
between the state and his accomplice, Benjamin J. Bellavance, including portions regarding Bellavance’s obligation to testify truthfully, and (3) there was insufficient
evidence to convict him of attempt to commit robbery
in the first degree, home invasion predicated on attempt
to commit robbery in the first degree, burglary in the
first degree, home invasion predicated on burglary in
the first degree, and conspiracy to commit home invasion. We affirm the judgment of conviction.
  Based on the evidence admitted at trial, the jury reasonably could have found the following facts. The
defendant approached his friend, Bellavance, about a
plan to steal drugs and money from the residence of
the defendant’s drug dealer, Daniel Bowling (Daniel).
The defendant knew where Daniel lived because he
previously had been to the residence to buy drugs from
him. Bellavance, who was addicted to cocaine at the
time, agreed to the defendant’s plan.
   On the day of the incident, December 21, 2017, the
defendant and Bellavance ingested cocaine and then
drove to A.J. Manufacturing, LLC, where Bellavance
worked. Both men went inside and obtained two box
cutters, zip ties, duct tape, two chisels, and plastic
gloves. Once it was dark outside, Bellavance drove the
defendant to Daniel’s residence in Woodstock, a singlefamily house where he resided with his mother, Rhonda
Bowling, and his father, Raymond M. Bowling, Jr. (Raymond Jr.). The defendant directed Bellavance not to
park near Daniel’s house but, rather, to park about one
mile down the road. The defendant and Bellavance,
who took turns holding a black duffel bag containing
the items gathered at the store, then walked toward
Daniel’s house. Both men wore partial facemasks, and
each had a box cutter. Bellavance also carried a
machete, which he concealed in his pants, although the
defendant was aware that he carried it. The men walked
to the back basement door of Daniel’s house. The defen-
dant kicked in the door, and they entered the residence.
   Daniel, whose bedroom was located in the basement
of the house, was home with his mother and father.
Daniel’s older brother, Raymond Bowling III (Raymond
III), also was at the residence visiting his family. All
four family members were upstairs when they heard a
loud noise from the basement. Daniel, Raymond Jr.,
and Raymond III ran down the basement stairs while
Rhonda grabbed a kitchen knife and called 911. When
Daniel, Raymond Jr., and Raymond III reached the bottom of the basement steps, they saw the defendant and
Bellavance standing inside the basement with masks
partially covering their faces. Bellavance was holding
a machete and carrying a black duffel bag. The defendant was holding ‘‘[s]ome type of knife’’ or ‘‘something
else sharp . . . .’’ Raymond III asked the intruders
what they were going to do. Bellavance raised the
machete, but, when Raymond III repeated his question,
the defendant and Bellavance remained quiet, and then
turned and ran out of the basement door. Raymond III
grabbed a shovel and chased the intruders down the
driveway. The defendant slipped and fell on the driveway, causing his facemask to slip and allowing Raymond III to see his face. Raymond III hit the defendant
in the chest with the shovel. Bellavance, seeing this
altercation, swung the black duffel bag at Raymond III
but missed him. The defendant grabbed the shovel from
Raymond III, threw it in the woods and, with Bellavance, ran toward their vehicle.
   Raymond III got into his vehicle and drove in the
direction that the defendant and Bellavance had run
until he encountered their unoccupied vehicle parked
down the road. He drove back to his parents’ residence
and gave the license plate number to Rhonda, who
remained on the telephone with the police. He then
drove back to the intruders’ unoccupied vehicle to prevent them from fleeing. Meanwhile, the defendant and
Bellavance hid in the woods near their vehicle. They
remained in the woods for approximately one to one
and one-half hours until the police discovered them.
While being taken into custody, the defendant stated
that Daniel was his drug dealer. A patdown of the defendant revealed that he had a box cutter in the front
pocket of his jacket. Additionally, the police found the
machete and the black duffel bag containing the zip
ties, duct tape, two chisels, and plastic gloves on the
ground by a tree near the defendant and Bellavance. The
defendant was arrested and transported to the police
station, where he gave a statement to the police.
  Following his arrest, the defendant was charged with
two counts of home invasion, two counts of burglary
in the first degree, one count of attempt to commit
robbery in the first degree, and five conspiracy counts.1
After a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty on all
ten counts. At sentencing, the court vacated the verdict
as to four of the five conspiracy counts,2 leaving intact
only the verdict on the count of conspiracy to commit
home invasion predicated on robbery. The court sentenced the defendant to a total effective term of twentyfive years of incarceration, execution suspended after
fifteen years, ten years of which was a mandatory minimum, followed by five years of probation. The defendant appealed directly to this court pursuant to General
Statutes § 51-199 (b) (3). We will discuss additional
facts and procedural history as necessary.
                            I
  The defendant claims that the trial court improperly
denied his motion to suppress his written statement to
the police because the police had failed to comply with
the requirements of § 54-1o. Specifically, he argues that
the state failed to prove that he voluntarily made the
statement and that the statement was reliable. We disagree.
   The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to this claim. After the defendant was
arrested and brought to the police station, he provided
a written statement to the police. Prior to trial, the
defendant filed a motion to suppress this statement,
arguing that it was inadmissible under § 54-1o because
it was made as part of a custodial interrogation, which
the state had failed to electronically record. The trial
court then held a hearing on the motion during which
several police officers and the defendant testified. The
trial court later issued an oral decision on the record
denying the defendant’s motion to suppress.
   In ruling on the defendant’s motion, the trial court
made the following subsidiary findings, which we quote
at length: ‘‘[The defendant and Bellavance] were . . .
transported to [the state police] Troop D [barracks in
Danielson] and placed in individual cells at approximately 11:30 p.m. While the defendant was in his cell,
Sergeant John Gregorzek . . . approached his cell and
asked the defendant his name and date of birth; at that
time, the defendant, unprompted, told Gregorzek that
he wanted to give a statement; Gregorzek followed up
by asking if the defendant would provide a statement,
and the defendant responded yes, and . . . then . . .
the defendant, unprompted, proceeded to give . . . a
rundown of the events . . . of that night. Gregorzek
then assigned Trooper Michael P. Gibson to advise the
defendant of his rights. Accordingly, Gibson removed
the defendant from the cell and brought him into the
processing room . . . . At approximately 3:10 a.m.
Gibson . . . advised the defendant, inter alia, of his
right[s] to [remain] silen[t], to an attorney, and to be
interviewed about the conditions of his release. State’s
exhibit 3 sets out those rights in both English and in
Spanish. After Gibson read this form to the defendant,
the defendant was allowed to read state’s exhibit 3 for
himself; after doing so, the defendant signed his name
in the box at the bottom of the form. This entire procedure was witnessed by Gregorzek.
   ‘‘The defendant told Gibson that he wanted to give a
statement. Commencing at 3:20 a.m., therefore, Gibson
read to the defendant state’s exhibit 2, titled ‘Notice
and Waiver of Rights.’ Gibson started by reading verbatim the top portion of the form, which advised the
defendant, inter alia, of his right to remain silent, right
to an attorney, right to have an attorney present during
any questioning, and the right to stop answering questions at any time. The defendant told Gibson he understood these rights; he then signed the notice of rights
form, and Gibson signed as a witness. Gibson then read
the defendant the lower portion of the form, state’s
exhibit 3, consisting of three separate waivers of rights.
These waivers included the desire to speak with the
state police without consulting with an attorney or having an attorney present and the defendant’s acknowledgment that he was waiving his rights freely, voluntarily, and without threats or promises. Gibson read each
of these rights one by one, and the defendant placed
his initials after each one. . . .
   ‘‘After the defendant signed his waiver of rights form,
Gibson then began to fill in the blanks at the top of the
form, including the date, location, case number, etc. At
this point, the case officer, Trooper Jana R. Mazzarella
. . . entered the room and took over questioning the
defendant while Gibson left to help process the evidence.
  ‘‘The defendant told Mazzarella what had occurred
during the [incident]. Simultaneously, Mazzarella typed
this information onto the statement form . . . [then]
put the events in chronological order. . . . According
to Mazzarella, this information was consistent with the
facts reported by the residents and found by state police
investigators.
   ‘‘The written statement was completed at 3:48 a.m.
After the statement was completed, Mazzarella read the
entire statement verbatim to the defendant, including
the preprinted notice at the top, which again advised
the defendant, inter alia, of his right[s] to remain silent,
to consult with an attorney, to have an attorney present,
and to terminate questioning at any time. . . . The
defendant then read his statement himself; after doing
so, he signed it in Mazzarella’s presence. . . .
   ‘‘At no time during the various advisements of rights
or during his interview did the defendant ask any questions about his rights or indicate that he didn’t understand his rights. At all times, he spoke with Gibson,
Gregorzek and Mazzarella in English, and he never
asked for a Spanish interpreter. The defendant did not
appear to be under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or
any other substance, and he never indicated that he
was in any way under the influence or . . . incapaci-
tated. At all times, he appeared to understand and be
aware of what was happening. He never indicated that
he was cold or uncomfortable or injured or that he
wanted to take a break or was tired. No threats or
promises were made to the defendant by Gregorzek,
Gibson, or Mazzarella; nor is there any evidence of
physical or mental coercion being exerted against him.
The defendant never asked for an attorney, never asked
to stop answering questions, and never indicated that
he wanted to stop talking to the state police. His
demeanor was calm and cooperative throughout. . . .
  ‘‘In his testimony, the defendant claimed that, in 2017,
his English was not very good and that, on the night
he was arrested by the police, he was under the influence of alcohol, cocaine and Percocet. He further
claimed that he was confused, cold, tired, and scared
when questioned by the police. Moreover, he claims
that, prior to December 21, [2017], he had never heard
of Miranda3 rights . . . [and] that he didn’t understand
he had the right to an attorney or the right not to talk
to the police. . . .
   ‘‘At the time of his arrest, the defendant was the
manager of a restaurant in Putnam. At no point during
the hearing before this court did the defendant use
the assistance of a Spanish language interpreter, even
though one was available and sitting in the courtroom.
Throughout his testimony, it was obvious to the court
that the defendant understands English very well. Additionally, consistent with his multiyear upbringing in California, where he undoubtedly attended public school,
the defendant speaks English without any trace of an
accent. The court finds that the defendant’s claims that
he was under the influence, that he was confused, tired
and scared, that he didn’t understand his right[s] to an
attorney or to silence, and that his English was not good
in 2017, to be not credible. The court finds Mazzarella’s,
Gibson’s, and Gregorzek’s testimony to be credible and
adopts their versions of the events surrounding the
defendant’s advisement . . . the advisement of the
defendant’s rights, his waiver of rights, and the execution of his statement.’’
   The court further stated: ‘‘Although the defendant’s
confession was recorded, no . . . steps were taken on
December 21, [2017], to preserve the interview. Mazzarella testified [that] she was not aware on December
21, 2017, that she needed to notify a supervisor of the
necessity to preserve the defendant’s interview and that
the supervisor would thereafter have preserved it. . . .
Because no request to preserve the defendant’s interview was received within thirty days, according to Mazzarella, in accordance with state police procedures, the
defendant’s interview was recorded over. Mazzarella
further testified that she only discovered in October,
2018, that the confession had not been preserved.’’
  In light of the totality of these subsidiary facts, the
trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence
that (1) the state’s failure to preserve the defendant’s
statement was not done in bad faith, intentionally, recklessly, or negligently, (2) the defendant voluntarily gave
the statement, and (3) the defendant’s statement was
reliable. As a result, the trial court concluded that the
state had satisfied its burden of overcoming the presumption of inadmissibility under § 54-1o.
   ‘‘[Section] 54-1o provides that, if a person suspected
of one of several enumerated classes of felonies gives
a statement to law enforcement as a result of a custodial
interrogation at a detention facility, the statement will
be presumed to be inadmissible unless officers make
an audiovisual recording of the interrogation. Under
subsection (h) of the statute, the state may overcome
the presumption of inadmissibility in any case by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement ‘was voluntarily given and is reliable, based on
the totality of the circumstances.’ General Statutes § 54-
1o (h).’’ State v. Christopher S., 

, 258–59,

 (2021). ‘‘The voluntariness inquiry
addresses a defendant’s constitutional right to due process and, potentially, those rights protected by Miranda,
without regard to whether a confession is true. Reliability, on the other hand, is concerned with whether a
statement is true.’’ 

. ‘‘[T]he defendant’s claim is
constitutional with respect to the voluntariness inquiry
and evidentiary with respect to the reliability inquiry.’’

. The defendant claims that the trial court erred
in finding that the defendant’s statement was voluntary
and reliable.
                            A
   ‘‘The standard of review of a trial court’s ruling on
voluntariness in the context of the state’s motion to
admit a defendant’s confession under § 54-1o (h) is the
same as when a defendant moves to suppress a statement on the ground that it was given involuntarily. [T]he
trial court’s findings as to the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s interrogation and confession
are findings of fact . . . which will not be overturned
unless they are clearly erroneous. . . . [A]lthough we
give deference to the trial court concerning these subsidiary factual determinations, such deference is not
proper concerning the ultimate legal determination of
voluntariness. . . . Consistent with the well established approach taken by the United States Supreme
Court, we review the voluntariness of a confession independently, based on our own scrupulous examination
of the record. . . . Accordingly, we conduct a plenary
review of the record in order to make an independent
determination of voluntariness.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 274–75.
  In Christopher S., we recognized that the term ‘‘voluntariness’’ may encompass two traditional tests: ‘‘(1) that
the defendant’s statement was taken in accordance with
the requirements of Miranda, and (2) that the police
did not overbear the defendant’s will in violation of his
right to due process.’’ Id., 273–74. We did not decide,
however, whether the state must prove both due process voluntariness and compliance with Miranda
because we held in that case that, even if we assumed
that the state did have to prove both, the record supported the trial court’s determination that there was
no Miranda violation and that the defendant gave his
statement voluntarily under the totality of the circumstances. See id., 274. In the present case, we likewise
do not decide this issue. Here, too, the record supports
the trial court’s determination that there was no
Miranda violation and that the defendant’s statement
was voluntarily given under the totality of the circumstances.
                            1
  Initially, we note that the parties do not dispute most
of the trial court’s subsidiary factual findings. The
defendant, however, argues that the trial court’s findings were clearly erroneous inasmuch as there is no
evidence to support the court’s finding that, while he
was in his cell, he, ‘‘unprompted, told Gregorzek that
he wanted to give a statement’’ and, ‘‘unprompted, [he]
proceeded to give . . . a rundown of the events . . .
of that night.’’4 The defendant contends that he never
offered to give a statement ‘‘unprompted’’ and that,
when he agreed to give a statement, he was not in
his cell.
   The state concedes that there is no evidence that
Gregorzek approached the defendant in his holding cell.
Rather, Gregorzek testified that he joined Gibson and
the defendant in the processing room as Gibson read
the defendant his rights. As a result, we do not rely on
this subsidiary factual finding in determining whether
the defendant’s statement was voluntary. The state does
not concede, however, that the trial court’s finding that
the defendant offered to give a statement to Gregorzek
‘‘unprompted’’ was clearly erroneous, arguing that the
testimony was ambiguous as to this fact.
  During the hearing on the defendant’s motion to suppress, Gregorzek testified that he went to the processing
room where Gibson and the defendant were located to
ensure that Gibson read the defendant his rights. He
stated that he was present while Gibson advised the
defendant of his rights. The prosecutor then asked Gregorzek if there was any type of coercion of the defendant to sign the forms waiving his rights. Gregorzek
responded that ‘‘the defendant was more than willing
to provide a statement at that time and actually was—
was the one that almost approached us to—to provide
a statement. We—we asked him if he was willing to
provide one, and he was more than willing at that point.’’
To clarify, the prosecutor asked, ‘‘based [on] what
you’re saying, he [the defendant] was the one [who]
actually approached—or broached the subject—subject of giving a statement.’’ Gregorzek responded,
‘‘[c]orrect.’’ Subsequently, however, Gregorzek testified
that he ‘‘asked [the defendant] if he would be willing
to provide a statement to us, and he was, again, willing,
and so I said okay.’’ To again clarify, the trial court
asked the following: ‘‘Did I understand correctly that
you went to the holding cell, and you asked the defendant if he would give a statement, and he said that he
was willing to, and then he proceeded to tell you what
the events were that had taken place?’’ Gregorzek
responded, ‘‘[y]es, Your Honor, aside from it wasn’t the
holding cell, it was the processing room.’’ Gibson also
testified that Gregorzek asked the defendant if he
wanted to provide a statement and that the defendant
responded that he was willing to do so.
   We agree with the state that the record is ambiguous
regarding whether the defendant offered to provide a
statement ‘‘unprompted.’’ There was at least some evidence in the record to support the trial court’s subsidiary finding that the defendant offered to give a statement unprompted and we, therefore, cannot say that
this finding is clearly erroneous. Even if we do not rely
on this finding in our determination regarding voluntariness, we conclude that the trial court correctly determined that the defendant’s statement was voluntary. In
so concluding, we do rely, however, on the trial court’s
undisputed finding that, when asked if he would provide
a statement, the defendant responded affirmatively.
                            2
   Regarding his Miranda rights, the defendant argues
that his statement was inadmissible because he never
gave a ‘‘knowing’’ and ‘‘voluntary’’ waiver of his Miranda
rights. The waiver of a defendant’s Miranda rights
‘‘must be voluntary in the sense that it was the product
of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation,
coercion, or deception, and made with a full awareness
of both the nature of the right being abandoned and
the consequences of the decision to abandon it. . . .
Despite this seemingly difficult task, [t]he prosecution
. . . does not need to show that a waiver of Miranda
rights was express. An implicit waiver of the right to
remain silent is sufficient to admit a suspect’s statement
into evidence. . . . [When] the prosecution shows that
a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused’s uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to
remain silent. . . . [T]he state must demonstrate . . .
(1) that the defendant understood his rights, and (2)
that the defendant’s course of conduct indicated that
he did, in fact, waive those rights . . . .’’ (Citations
omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Christopher S., supra, 

.
  The undisputed subsidiary facts show that, when the
defendant was asked if he would provide a statement,
he responded affirmatively without any reservations.
He then received two Miranda warnings before he
made his statement to the police. Additionally, after
the defendant gave his statement, Mazzarella read it
verbatim back to him, including the preprinted notice
at the top, which again advised him of his right to remain
silent, to consult with an attorney, to have an attorney
present, and to terminate questioning at any time. At
all times, the defendant stated that he understood his
rights, and his demeanor remained calm and cooperative. Additionally, the trial court credited the testimony
of Mazzarella, Gibson, and Gregorzek that the defendant
spoke and understood English, did not appear tired,
and did not appear under the influence of alcohol or
narcotics. The subsidiary facts also show that the defendant’s statement was not coerced. In fact, the defendant
specifically testified that he was not coerced or threatened in any manner. Nor does anything in the record
suggest that Mazzarella obtained the defendant’s cooperation through physical or psychological coercion,
trickery, threats, promises of leniency, or other questionable tactics. On this record, it is clear that the defendant received his Miranda warnings, understood these
warnings, and voluntarily participated in Mazzarella’s
interrogation of him. Accordingly, he implicitly gave a
knowing, voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights.
   The defendant nevertheless argues that his statement
was not voluntary because he did not have the ability
to understand or to act on his constitutional rights. He
relies on his own testimony at the suppression hearing
that he had been cold, tired, and under the influence
of alcohol and narcotics. He also highlights his testimony that his English was not good at the time of the
statement and that he did not understand that he could
refuse to give a statement. The defendant, however,
does not dispute as clearly erroneous the trial court’s
subsidiary findings that he did not appear to be under
the influence of alcohol or narcotics, that he was cooperative and calm, that he spoke English and understood
what was happening, and that he never indicated that
he was tired or cold. Rather, the defendant urges this
court to credit his testimony, which the trial court specifically discredited, over the testimony of Gregorzek,
Gibson, and Mazzarella, which the trial court specifically credited. ‘‘[I]t is not the function of this court
to [second-guess] the trial court’s reasoned credibility
determinations . . . .’’ State v. Jones, 

, 

 (2007).
  Additionally, in arguing that his statement was not
voluntary, the defendant asks this court to determine
whether the state validly explained its failures to record
and preserve the confession.5 He argues that, without
this consideration, the statute is essentially toothless,
given the low standard required for the state to overcome the statutory presumption.
   This court has recognized that it is for the legislature,
not this court, to ‘‘[weigh] and balanc[e] . . . the benefits and drawbacks of an electronic recording requirement, and to create the parameters of such a rule.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Christopher 

. In doing so, our legislature
determined that the statutory presumption of inadmissibility under § 54-1o may be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence. Although this is a low standard,
we must assume that the legislature was aware of that
when it enacted the statute. Additionally, the legislature
did not include any requirement in § 54-1o that the state
provide a ‘‘valid explanation’’ for its failures to record
and preserve the confession. We therefore decline the
defendant’s request that we go beyond the legislature’s
prescribed requirements and require the state to establish a valid explanation for its failure to comply with
§ 54-1o for the defendant’s statement to be admissible.
If the legislature wants to revisit this issue, it is, of
course, free to do so. See State v. Christopher 

299–300.
                             3
   Regarding the defendant’s due process rights, ‘‘any
use in a criminal trial of an involuntary confession is
a denial of due process of law. . . . The state has the
burden of proving the voluntariness of the confession
by a fair preponderance of the evidence. . . . [T]he
test of voluntariness is whether an examination of all
the circumstances discloses that the conduct of law
enforcement officials was such as to overbear [the
defendant’s] will to resist and bring about confessions
not freely self-determined . . . . The ultimate test
remains . . . [i]s the confession the product of an
essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker?
If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used against
him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne and his
capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the
use of his confession offends due process. . . . The
determination, by the trial court, whether a confession
is voluntary must be grounded [on] a consideration of
the circumstances surrounding it. . . . Factors that
may be taken into account, upon a proper factual showing, include: the youth of the accused; his lack of education; his intelligence; the lack of any advice as to his
constitutional rights; the length of detention; the
repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; and
the use of physical punishment, such as the deprivation
of food and sleep. . . . Under the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment, however, in order for a
confession to be deemed involuntary and thus inadmissible at trial . . . there must be an essential link
between [the] coercive activity of the [s]tate, on the
one hand, and a resulting confession by a defendant,
on the other . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) 

 280–81.
   The record in the present case simply does not support the defendant’s claim that the interrogation violated his due process rights. Instead, the record supports the trial court’s determination that the defendant
voluntarily gave his statement to Mazzarella. Based on
the trial court’s subsidiary findings, which the defendant does not dispute as clearly erroneous on appeal,
at the time of the interrogation, the defendant spoke
and understood English, did not appear to the officers
to be under the influence of alcohol or narcotics, and
maintained a calm and cooperative demeanor. Even if
the defendant did dispute the trial court’s subsidiary
finding that he understood English, the record fully
supports this finding. Although the defendant was born
in Mexico City, the trial court simply did not credit the
defendant’s claim that, at the time of the interrogation,
he did not speak or understand English well, undermining the voluntariness of his statement. He spoke without
an accent at trial and worked as a manager at a restaurant in Putnam at the time of his arrest. He had lived
in San Diego in his youth before moving back to Mexico,
and then, around age eighteen to twenty, lived in the
United States continuously for the fourteen to sixteen
years before his arrest.
  Additionally, the defendant agreed to provide a statement, and was advised of his Miranda rights twice. The
interrogation occurred only a few hours after his arrest
and lasted only approximately thirty minutes. There is
no evidence of physical or psychological punishment.
There also is no evidence that Mazzarella used any
potentially coercive methods, such as threats, promises
of leniency, or deception. Accordingly, the defendant’s
statement was voluntary under both Miranda and due
process principles.
                             B
   ‘‘[T]he reliability inquiry is evidentiary in nature. The
standard that we apply in reviewing a trial court’s evidentiary ruling depends on the context in which the
ruling was made. . . . When a trial court’s determination of admissibility is founded on an accurate understanding of the law, it must stand unless there is a
showing of an abuse of discretion. . . . When the
admissibility of the challenged testimony turns on the
interpretation of an evidentiary rule, however, we are
presented with a legal question and our review is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 284. In
determining reliability, courts consider the circumstances under which a statement was given and any
evidence that independently corroborates the substantive truth of the defendant’s statement. See id., 286–87.
  In the present case, the defendant’s argument that
his statement was not reliable derives only from the
fact that it was not recorded and preserved, as the
statute requires. It is clear from the trial court’s subsid-
iary findings and the record, however, that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in determining that
the defendant’s statement was reliable. First, and most
important, the defendant testified that the substance of
his statement was accurate. Second, there was significant, independent evidence that corroborated the
defendant’s statement—specifically, the testimony of
Bellavance and the testimony of the four victims. Moreover, as discussed, none of the undisputed subsidiary
facts shows that the defendant was coerced into giving
a false confession.
  Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly
found that the state established by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant’s statement was both
voluntary and reliable and, therefore, admissible under
§ 54-1o.
                            II
   Next, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence the entire cooperation
agreement between Bellavance and the state. More precisely, he argues that the admission of the provisions
regarding Bellavance’s obligation to testify truthfully
constituted improper vouching, both as a matter of evidentiary law and as a matter of prosecutorial impropriety. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting the challenged provisions in the
present case. We emphasize, however, that the state
must take care in drafting its cooperation agreements,
and trial courts must carefully examine their language
before admitting them fully into evidence.
   In its case-in-chief, the state questioned Bellavance
on direct examination regarding the fact that he had
entered into a plea agreement and a cooperation agreement with the state. Specifically, Bellavance testified
that, in January, 2019, he entered into a plea agreement
that included a sentencing range of zero to twenty years
of incarceration. According to Bellavance, at the time he
entered into this plea deal, the state had not discussed
entering into a cooperation agreement with him. Bellavance testified that, after entering into the plea agreement, on the advice of his counsel, he approached the
state about entering into a cooperation agreement.
   Bellavance ultimately entered into such a cooperation agreement, which provided in relevant part that,
‘‘at the time of sentencing the [s]tate’s [a]ttorney’s
[o]ffice will make known to the sentencing court the
nature, extent, value, and truthfulness of the witness’
information and testimony. The defendant retains the
right to argue for a lesser sentence than that recommended by the [s]tate, including a sentence that
includes a period of probation and/or special parole.
The witness understands that the sentence to be
imposed rests entirely with the sentencing court and
that he cannot rescind or withdraw his plea of guilty
in the event that the court imposes a sentence different
from that recommended by the [s]tate’s [a]ttorney’s
[o]ffice.’’ (Emphasis added.) The cooperation agreement further provided: ‘‘The witness understands that
he must truthfully disclose all information with respect
to his criminal activities and the criminal activities of
others concerning all matters about which this office
and any investigating police agency inquires of him and,
furthermore, that he shall truthfully testify at any trial
or other court proceeding with respect to any matters
about which this office or the investigating police
agency may request his testimony. . . . It is further
understood and agreed that the witness must at all times
give complete, truthful and accurate information and
testimony and must not commit any further crimes
whatsoever during the pendency of this agreement.
Should the witness commit any further crimes or should
it be reasonably determined by the [s]tate’s [a]ttorney’s
[o]ffice that he has given false, incomplete or misleading
testimony or information, or has otherwise violated any
provision of this agreement, he shall thereafter be subject to prosecution for any state criminal offense of
which this office has knowledge, including, but not
limited to, the offenses described above, perjury, and
hindering prosecution.’’
   The prosecutor then sought to enter the entire cooperation agreement into evidence during his direct examination of Bellavance. Defense counsel objected,
arguing that it was not relevant and that it constituted
vouching because ‘‘the prosecutor is going to be making
a decision about whether . . . Bellavance is telling the
truth or not into whether he gets his bargain . . . .’’
He argued that ‘‘it’s a little bit of a backdoor way of
getting in for the state and the prosecutor to be vouching
for the credibility of the witness . . . .’’ The trial court
assumed that, in cross-examining Bellavance, defense
counsel planned to attack his credibility and ruled that
the cooperation agreement was ‘‘clearly relevant’’ to
rehabilitate his credibility. The trial court asked defense
counsel if he had a problem with any particular portions
of the cooperation agreement. In response, defense
counsel admitted that he ‘‘intend[ed] on attacking . . .
Bellavance’s credibility. That’s going to be part of my
cross-examination.’’ Nevertheless, he argued that he did
not agree that the cooperation agreement would rehabilitate Bellavance unless there would be evidence that
the prosecutor believed he was telling the truth, which
would be improper. Defense counsel also requested
that the trial court specifically redact the provision stating that, ‘‘at the time of sentencing the [s]tate’s [a]ttorney’s [o]ffice will make known to the sentencing court
the nature, extent, value, and truthfulness of the witness’ information and testimony,’’ arguing that this
showed that the state was going to decide the truthfulness of Bellavance’s testimony. The prosecutor
responded, stating that the cooperation agreement did
not contain any vouching because it merely stated that
it was Bellavance’s ‘‘obligation to be truthful and that
he understands that there are penalties that are related
to it as far as perjury and other charges that can be
filed against him if he’s not being truthful, which is an
accurate recitation of the law . . . .’’ The prosecutor
argued that nothing in the cooperation agreement stated
that Bellavance’s testimony was in fact truthful. The
trial court overruled defense counsel’s objection and
admitted the agreement in its entirety.
   After the trial court admitted the agreement, Bellavance testified that the prosecutor had told him that
he ‘‘[j]ust [had] to be honest and . . . tell the truth.’’ On
cross-examination, defense counsel asked Bellavance
if the prosecutor in the present case, Louis J. Luba, Jr.,
was ‘‘the one [who’s] going to let the sentencing court
know about how your testimony went?’’ Bellavance
replied in the affirmative. Attacking Bellavance’s credibility further, defense counsel asked: ‘‘[B]ased [on] this
agreement, your testimony could play a part [in] how
your sentencing goes?’’ Again, Bellavance responded in
the affirmative. He also answered in the affirmative
when defense counsel asked him whether Luba would
have ‘‘a lot of input’’ at his sentencing, whether he
wanted to have Luba on his side, and whether he agreed
that the better he looked to Luba, the more likely that
was to happen. Defense counsel then asked Bellavance
whether ‘‘it [is] safe to say you’re also trying to be
careful in not making yourself look too bad?’’ Bellavance responded: ‘‘No. I just spoke the truth.’’
   The state’s policy of committing all cooperation
agreements to writing is relatively recent. In Marquez
v. Commissioner of Correction, 

, 

 (2019), commenting on the state’s ‘‘practice of
informal, off-the-record leniency understandings with
cooperating witnesses’’; 

; this court encouraged
prosecutors ‘‘to enter into a written cooperation agreement that memorializes the potential benefits that may
ensue as a result of a cooperating [witness’] testimony.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) 

 606–607. We
noted with approval the practice of some trial courts
‘‘to make a clear record of the nature of the agreement
or understanding, including the anticipated charge(s)
and the maximum and minimum penalties for those
charges.’’ 

. These cooperation agreements would
protect against prosecutors’ having ‘‘understandings’’—
often not with a witness, but with his counsel—whereby
the state ‘‘suggest[s] . . . a favorable recommendation
to the sentencing judge . . . in exchange for the witness’ testimony inculpating another defendant.’’ 

603–604. Both the prosecutor (to the court and to
defense counsel) and the witness (to the jury) could
then ‘‘den[y] that there is any actual ‘agreement’ or
‘deal’ . . . .’’ 

. ‘‘These vague understandings can
prevent defense counsel from effectively impeaching
the witness for bias, perhaps leaving jurors with the
impression . . . that [the witness did not have] any
incentive to testify favorably for the state.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) 

 In reality, however,
‘‘counsel operating in a courthouse in which he or she is
familiar with the practices of prosecutors and presiding
judges can comfortably advise the witness of the possible credit that might follow from his testimony. Thus,
these ‘hypothetical’ outcomes serve as a real incentive
to motivate a witness to testify for the state.’’ Id.; see
also 

 (Palmer, J., concurring) (because they are
really no different from cooperation agreement, ‘‘such
understandings, although informal and perhaps somewhat undefined, are no less a motivating factor for a
cooperating witness than a more formal cooperation
agreement’’).
    ‘‘Left out of this equation, however, is the jury,’’ we
noted, which is ‘‘not well versed in the nuanced vagaries
of such leniency agreements. Yet, we rely on jurors
to assess a witness’ credibility—including a witness’
motivation to testify—while withholding from them
critical information that would help them assess just
how motivated that witness might be.’’ 

 604–605; see
also 

 (Palmer, J., concurring) (‘‘it is well known
that . . . cooperating witnesses in this state invariably
receive significant consideration’’). To combat any misimpressions these ‘‘understandings’’ might leave the
jury with, we noted that defense counsel might be motivated to ‘‘explore other means to reveal to the jury a
cooperating witness’ motivation to testify,’’ including
retaining and offering testimony from an expert witness, who might educate the jury to these ‘‘nuanced
vagaries . . . .’’ 

 605–606. But ‘‘[t]his approach has
its own disadvantages. In addition to increased costs,
it leaves the jury to choose between competing experts
without a framework from which to properly assess
the significance of those experts’ opinions.’’ 

;
see also 

 (Palmer J., concurring) (‘‘if other
approaches to identifying the true nature of that understanding are not undertaken by the state or the trial
court, defense counsel may find it necessary to seek a
jury instruction’’ explaining benefits cooperating witness can expect to receive).
   ‘‘To its credit, following our decision in Marquez, the
Division of Criminal Justice voluntarily adopted a new
policy, entitled ‘515 Cooperating Witnesses,’ ’’ which
requires cooperation agreements to be reduced to writing. Gomez v. Commissioner of Correction, 

, 189 n.10, 

 (2020). Although the division has adopted a commendable policy, and one that
we encouraged, that does not, a fortiori, make those
agreements admissible in their entirety. Rather, a new
concern arises when the state and a cooperating witness
enter into an agreement that the state has drafted, virtually in its sole discretion, and the state then seeks to
admit into evidence not only the fact of an agreement
between the two, but also every word of that (at least
arguably) self-serving document. Cf. State v. Tony M.,

, 829–30, 833–35, 

 (2019)
(letter regarding plea negotiations written by defendant
was not admissible, in part, because of concern defendant may use language framed with eye toward its self-serving use at trial).6 Moreover, at least in the present
case, the state sought to enter the agreement into evidence in its case-in-chief to inoculate its own witness
against impeachment even before defense counsel challenged his credibility.
   We note initially that the defendant raises this argument as both an evidentiary and a prosecutorial impropriety claim. Both claims are premised on the argument
that the truthfulness provisions of the cooperation
agreement constitute improper vouching. We will upset
a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence
only upon a showing of a clear abuse of the court’s
discretion. See id., 831. Because we hold as a matter
of evidentiary law that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting the truthfulness provisions of
the cooperation agreement, we likewise hold that no
impropriety occurred. Thus, the defendant’s claim fails
both as an evidentiary and a prosecutorial impropriety
matter. See State v. Taft, 

, 761–62, 

 (2012) (claims of prosecutorial impropriety require
analysis consisting of two separate and distinct steps:
‘‘(1) whether [the impropriety] occurred in the first
instance; and (2) whether that [impropriety] deprived
a defendant of his due process right to a fair trial’’
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
   Although Connecticut appellate courts have not previously addressed the extent to which cooperation
agreements are admissible as a matter of evidentiary
law, other appellate courts have. The similarity between
how the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Connecticut
Code of Evidence treat evidence of truthfulness7 leads
us to look to federal case law for guidance. See, e.g.,
State v. Favoccia, 

, 790–91, 

(2012). The federal courts of appeals are divided on the
issue of the admissibility of cooperation agreements
and, in particular, provisions of those agreements obliging the witness to testify truthfully. The majority of
federal appeals courts have held that provisions in cooperation agreements regarding truthfulness are admissible on direct examination of a witness, even prior to
any challenge to the witness’ credibility. See United
States v. Anderson, 

 (7th Cir. 2002);
United States v. Tocco, 

, 416–17 (6th Cir.
2000); United States v. Santana, 

 (8th
Cir. 1998); United States v. Spriggs, 

, 323–24
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 

, 

,

 (1993); United States v. Weston, 

, 215–16 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Lord,

 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Binker, 

 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,

, 

, 

 (1987);
United States v. Oxman, 

, 1302–1303 (3d
Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds sub nom. United
States v. Pflaumer, 

, 

, 

 (1985); United States v. Henderson, 

, 137–38 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 

,

, 

 (1984). These courts
have adopted this approach because, although they recognize that ‘‘evidence concerning a plea agreement and
its provisions may have both a bolstering and an
impeaching effect on the [witness’] credibility’’;8 United
States v. 

; they also recognize that it
is difficult for trial courts to distinguish between
impeaching and bolstering provisions of a cooperation
agreement. 

 1030–31. As a result, these courts conclude that ‘‘introduction of this evidence enables the
jury to more accurately assess the [witness’] credibility
. . . regardless of whether the defense intends to use
the agreement to impeach the [witness’] testimony
. . . .’’ (Citations omitted.) 

.
   By contrast, the United States Courts of Appeals for
the Second and Eleventh Circuits have held that,
although cooperation agreements may be admissible if
relevant, only ‘‘the impeaching aspects of cooperation
agreements may be brought out in the government’s
direct examination of a witness who testifies pursuant
to such an agreement.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United States v. Certified Environmental Services, Inc., 

 (2d Cir. 2014); see also United
States v. Knowles, 

, 1161–62 (11th Cir.
1995), cert. denied sub nom. Wright v. United States,

, 

, 

 (1996);
United States v. Cruz, 

, 1479–80 (11th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 

, 

, 

 (1987), and cert. denied sub nom. Thomas
v. United States, 

, 

, 

 (1987). ‘‘[I]mpeaching aspects of cooperation
agreements’’ include ‘‘the fact of the agreement and the
[witness’] understanding of it, as a motivation for the
witness to testify for the [g]overnment . . . .’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) United States v. Certified
Environmental Services, Inc., supra, 86. The state,
however, ‘‘may not introduce the bolstering aspects of
a cooperation agreement unless and until the [witness’]
credibility has been questioned in ways that ‘open the
door’ to the admission of the agreement.’’ Id. ‘‘This
proposition stems from well established rules of evidence relating to relevance, hearsay, bias, completeness, and otherwise, that taken together, provide that
absent an attack on the veracity of a witness, no evidence to bolster [the witness’] credibility is admissible.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Under this
approach, truthfulness provisions are considered ‘‘bolstering aspects of a cooperation agreement’’ and, thus,
are not admissible until the defendant attacks the witness’ credibility. Id., 85–86. However, it is not reversible
error ‘‘if testimony on the [truth telling] provisions of a
[witness’] cooperation agreement has been improperly
introduced before that [witness’] credibility has been
challenged, but the defense challenges the [witness’]
credibility later—for example, on cross-examination,
or during closing arguments . . . .’’ United States v.
Williams, 

, 10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
      U.S.    , 

, 

 (2019);
see also United States v. Porges, 

 (2d Cir. 2003). This minority approach is premised
on the belief that, although cooperation agreements are
‘‘ ‘a double-edged sword’ ’’; United States v. Certified
Environmental Services, Inc., supra, 85; overall, ‘‘the
entire cooperation agreement bolsters more than it
impeaches.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 86. The Second Circuit, however,
has recognized that this approach creates difficulties,
as it is sometimes not easy to draw the line between
impeaching provisions and bolstering provisions, especially during trial. For this reason, the Second Circuit
has stated that, ‘‘[w]ere we writing on a blank slate, we
might have followed the other circuits that avoid the
distinctions we have required judges and lawyers to
make during the heat of trial.’’ United States v. Cosentino, 

, 33 n.1 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 

, 

, 

 (1988).
   Under either approach, however, truthfulness provisions contained in cooperation agreements are admissible, with the divide between circuits focused on when
they are admissible—before or after the witness’ credibility is attacked. Regardless, all circuits agree that
these provisions may constitute improper vouching by
the state, with their admissibility hinging on the precise
language of the provision. ‘‘Improper vouching may
occur when the government: (1) refers to facts outside
the record or implies that the veracity of a witness is
supported by outside facts that are unavailable to the
jury; (2) implies a guarantee of truthfulness; or (3)
expresses a personal opinion about the credibility of a
witness.’’ United States v. Benitez-Meraz, 

 (8th Cir. 1998). Under this definition, courts
have explained that truthfulness provisions do not constitute impermissible vouching when they merely
‘‘reveal that the witnesses had an obligation to testify
truthfully and explain the consequences of a breach of
that obligation.’’ United States v. Bowie, 

 (10th Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Winter,

 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 

, 

, 

 (1983), and
cert. denied sub nom. Goldenberg v. United States, 

, 

, 

 (1983), and
cert. denied sub nom. Price v. United States, 

, 

, 

 (1983). These
provisions become impermissible vouching only when
the prosecutor explicitly or implicitly indicates to the
fact finder that he or she has verified the truth of the
testimony presented to the fact finder. See United
States v. Certified Environmental Services, Inc., supra,

 (‘‘while the [g]overnment may, after a [witness’] credibility is attacked, rehabilitate the witness
using a cooperation agreement, it is well established
that prosecutors may not [personally] vouch for their
witnesses’ truthfulness’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Suarez-Milian, Docket Nos. 91-
5158 and 91-5159, 

, *8 (4th Cir. October
5, 1992) (decision without published opinion, 

) (use of truthfulness portions of cooperation agreements becomes impermissible vouching only when
prosecutors explicitly or implicitly indicate they can
monitor and accurately verify truthfulness of witness’
testimony). For example, a truthfulness provision in a
cooperation agreement constitutes improper vouching
if it includes a statement that the government has verified the accuracy of the witness’ testimony. See United
States v. Certified Environmental Services, Inc., supra,
87 (‘‘[T]he prosecutor personally vouched for the truthfulness of these witnesses, stating that ‘the immunity
agreements are very simple. We wanted to ensure that
people taking the stand provided the truth.’ ’’); United
States v. 

 (truthfulness portions of
cooperation agreements become impermissible vouching when prosecutors explicitly or implicitly indicate
they can monitor and accurately verify truthfulness of
witness’ statements); United States v. DiLoreto, 

 (3d Cir. 1989) (The defendants’ convictions were vacated and the case was remanded for a
new trial when the prosecutor had attempted to bolster
the credibility of the state’s cooperating witnesses by
stating during closing rebuttal argument, ‘‘[w]e don’t
put liars on the stand. We don’t do that.’’ (Emphasis
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)), overruled
in part on other grounds by United States v. Zehrbach,

 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 

, 

, 

 (1995), and cert. denied
sub nom. Mervis v. United States, 

, 

, 

 (1995); United States v.

 795 F.2d 1222–23 n.2, 1227 (portion of
plea agreement stating that government had verified
accuracy of witness’ statement was inadmissible);
United States v. Roberts, 

, 533–34 (9th Cir.
1980) (statement that detective was in courtroom monitoring truthfulness of witness’ testimony was inadmissible). Admitting these truthfulness provisions also constitutes vouching if they refer to facts not in evidence
or offer the prosecutor’s personal opinion of the truthfulness of the witness’ testimony. See, e.g., United
States v. Lettig, 

, 840–41 (10th Cir.
2006); United States v. Dadanian, 

(9th Cir. 1987), modified, 

 (9th Cir. 1988).
   We need not decide today whether to follow the
majority or the minority of jurisdictions regarding
whether the admission of the agreements and their
truthfulness provisions must await an attack on the
witness’ credibility because the trial court did not abuse
its discretion under either approach in the present case.
Before trial, defense counsel alerted the state and the
trial court that he would indeed be attacking Bellavance’s credibility and did so on cross-examination,
suggesting that Bellavance was motivated to testify dishonestly in the state’s favor in the hope that the state
would support a reduced sentence for him at his sentencing. Thus, under the majority approach, the timing
of the admission of the truthfulness provisions was
proper, and, under the minority approach, although
these provisions were admitted before the defendant
attacked Bellavance’s credibility, there was no harm
because they would have been admissible later during
the state’s redirect examination of Bellavance. See, e.g.,
United States v. Williams, supra, 

.
    Nevertheless, the defendant argues that the trial court
should not have admitted these particular truthfulness
provisions contained in Bellavance’s cooperation agreement because they implied that the state was vouching
for the Bellavance’s credibility. Two of the three truthfulness provisions at issue, however, are similar to the
kind of provisions considered permissible in the federal
case law discussed and cited previously—specifically,
the provisions stating that Bellavance had a duty to
‘‘truthfully disclose’’ and ‘‘truthfully testify’’ and that he
may be charged with perjury if he lies. Under applicable
case law, these provisions do not constitute impermissible vouching because they do not refer to facts not in
evidence, do not explicitly or implicitly indicate that
the state has verified the accuracy of the testimony, and
do not offer the prosecutor’s personal opinion regarding
the truthfulness of the testimony. Rather, these provisions merely state that Bellavance had an obligation to
testify truthfully—a duty all witnesses are sworn to
uphold—and explain the consequences for a breach of
that obligation. We do not rule out the possibility that
gratuitous references to the threat of perjury may constitute improper vouching under certain circumstances,
but this concern does not arise in the present case.
   One provision of the parties’ agreement in this case
requires that we undertake a closer examination, however, and that trial judges do the same in future cases.
That provision states: ‘‘[A]t the time of sentencing the
[s]tate’s [a]ttorney’s [o]ffice will make known to the
sentencing court the nature, extent, value, and truthfulness of the witness’ information and testimony.’’
(Emphasis added.) The state does not distinguish this
provision from any of the other ‘‘truthfulness’’ provisions in the agreement, arguing only that the provisions
as a whole ‘‘did no more than reveal’’ that Bellavance
had an obligation to testify truthfully and the consequences of breaching that obligation. According to the
state, the provision at issue merely ‘‘provid[ed] the jury
with a full picture of Bellavance’s agreement . . . .’’
‘‘Would that it ‘twere so simple.’’ Hail, Caesar! (Univer-
sal Pictures 2016).
   To the contrary, this provision comes much closer
to suggesting, ‘‘explicitly or implicitly,’’ that prosecutors
‘‘can monitor and accurately verify the truthfulness of
the witness’ testimony.’’ United States v. 

. It comes very close to impermissibly
suggesting to the jury that the prosecutor has access
to tools or information not available to the jury that
the prosecutor will use to ensure that the witness tells
the truth. Such an implication is improper, even when
made subtly or indirectly. Nonetheless, we recognize
that this provision also can be understood to suggest
that the prosecutor would be the final arbiter of truth—
that is, that the prosecutor would decide the truthfulness of Bellavance’s testimony and, then, at the time
of Bellavance’s sentencing, inform the sentencing judge
whether he believed that Bellavance had been truthful,
despite the fact that the prosecutor has no more information about Bellavance’s truthfulness than the jury.
Such a reading would weaken Bellavance’s credibility
by suggesting that Bellavance remains at the mercy of
the prosecutor. This provision does not suggest, however, that the prosecutor explicitly or implicitly indicated to the jury that he had verified the truth of the
testimony presented to the jury. At the time of the
defendant’s trial, there remained the possibility that
Bellavance might testify in a manner that the prosecutor
deemed dishonest and not receive the benefit of the
cooperation agreement. Nothing in the cooperation
agreement suggested that the prosecutor already had
verified the truth of Bellavance’s testimony. Rather, the
cooperation agreement’s language left the determination of the truthfulness of Bellavance’s testimony to the
jury, with the state’s role in determining credibility not
arising until Bellavance’s sentencing hearing. Thus,
although it would have been better if this particular
reference to truthfulness had been omitted—and
although we believe that, in the future, the state should
avoid such language—we stop short of concluding that
the trial court abused its discretion in admitting that
portion of the cooperation agreement.
   Nevertheless, we note that, if not carefully drafted
by the state and addressed by the trial court, such provisions may lead a jury to infer not only that the prosecutor will monitor and ultimately verify the truthfulness
of the cooperating witness’ testimony before the sentencing court, but also that, at the time of the testimony,
the prosecutor believes the cooperating witness’ testimony is truthful. Ethically, of course, the state could
not knowingly put on testimony it thought to be untrue;
see Rules of Professional Conduct 3.3 (a) (3); and it
certainly would not contract for testimony it knew was
false. But the implication that the prosecutor knows,
or has the ability to determine, whether the witness is
telling the truth must be avoided.
   It is not inconsistent, however, to observe that, from
the perspective of the now cooperating and testifying
witness addressing his testimony to the trier, the ‘‘truth’’
is not the only consideration supporting the agreement.
In most instances, of course, a cooperating witness
either already has provided a police statement (as Bellavance did in the present case), or he or his counsel has
proffered his intended testimony to the state. The state
can maintain that it has bargained only for the truth
and deny that the essence of the bargain supporting
the agreement is that the witness testify consistent with
that earlier statement or proffer. But then, as in Marquez, the jury is no better informed than when we deny
that the state and the witness have an ‘‘agreement,’’ but
only an ‘‘understanding.’’ Jurors are ‘‘not well versed
in the nuanced vagaries of such leniency agreements.
Yet, we rely on jurors to assess a witness’ credibility—
including a witness’ motivation to testify—while withholding from them critical information that would help
them assess just how motivated that witness might be.’’
Marquez v. Commissioner of 

. The challenge for counsel and the court is
to help the jury with these nuanced vagaries.
   By introducing such agreements, in whole or in part,
that contain provisions that explicitly or implicitly indicate that the prosecutor can monitor and accurately
verify the truthfulness of the witness’ testimony, the
state invites the defendant to conduct a vigorous cross-examination, as in the present case: about the terms of
the agreement, who drafted it, who would enforce it,
and the witness’ motivation for entering into the agreement. It might be that, in most cases, this constitutionally protected right will suffice to protect the defendant,
while also advancing the truth-seeking function.
   As we noted in Marquez, however, defense counsel
might seek to combat any misimpressions by ‘‘explor[-
ing] other means to reveal to the jury a cooperating
witness’ motivation to testify’’ 

; including offering expert testimony to educate the jury about the
‘‘nuanced vagaries’’ of cooperation agreements. 

.
This approach increases the costs of litigation and can
potentially reduce the case to a swearing contest
between competing experts. 

. A defendant also
might ask a court to design a jury charge on the issue
of how cooperation agreements are struck or ask a
court to specifically instruct the jury that the fact that
the cooperating witness entered into a cooperation
agreement with the state does not ensure the credibility
of the testimony. See 

 (Palmer J., concurring).
    In the end, ensuring that any mention of a cooperation
agreement—and more specifically, any mention of
‘‘truthfulness’’ or its equivalent in that agreement—is
fairly portrayed to a jury is a task we are confident
can be managed by vigilant trial judges, mindful of the
circumstances and evidence at issue. We also must trust
prosecutors to avoid overreaching by drafting and introducing documents loaded with self-serving terms in a
manner that amounts to improper vouching. We caution
the state, however, that, both in any cooperation agreement and in any argument before the jury regarding
that agreement, the state must not insinuate to the jury
that it has verified the testimony placed before the jury
or that it is in a position to monitor and accurately verify
the witness’ testimony. To the extent that a cooperation
agreement includes terms or provisions that constitute
improper vouching, that needlessly include ‘‘[r]epeated
references to the [witness’] obligation to tell the truth’’;
Commonwealth v. Ciampa, 

, 

 (1989); or that are otherwise gratuitous or
irrelevant, including gratuitous references to the threat
of perjury, trial courts can and should address these
concerns by appropriate redactions.
                            III
  Last, the defendant launches a multipronged attack
on the jury’s findings, claiming that there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that he committed the crimes of (1) attempt to commit
robbery in the first degree, (2) home invasion predicated on attempt to commit robbery in the first degree,
(3) burglary in the first degree, (4) home invasion predicated on burglary in the first degree, and (5) conspiracy
to commit home invasion. We disagree with each of
the defendant’s sufficiency arguments.
   The evidence supporting each of the defendant’s challenged convictions can be summarized as follows. In
its case-in-chief, the state offered testimony from all
four victims and Bellavance, as well as testimony
regarding the defendant’s written statement to the
police. Bellavance testified that the defendant had
approached him about stealing money and drugs from
the defendant’s drug dealer and that he had agreed. The
defendant asked him if he could get a gun. Bellavance
said no. According to Bellavance, the defendant then
asked him if he could get other tools or equipment,
specifically, box cutters, zip ties, a machete, gloves and
duct tape. Bellavance agreed and obtained these items.
Bellavance testified that he and the defendant specifically had discussed what they would do if they encountered residents who would not comply with their
demands, agreeing to ‘‘tie them up’’ and ‘‘do whatever
[was] necessary’’ to ‘‘force them’’ to comply. According
to Bellavance, the defendant stated that he was willing
to ‘‘do whatever [was] necessary’’ to obtain the money
and drugs, including using force. The defendant also
told Bellavance that he intended to leave for California
after they stole the money and drugs.
  As to the incident itself, Bellavance testified that,
once he had acquired all the tools and had ingested
cocaine, he drove the defendant to Daniel’s house. As
they approached the house, the defendant told Bella-
vance to park about one mile away. The defendant and
Bellavance then walked toward Daniel’s house, with
Bellavance carrying the machete and both men taking
turns carrying a black duffel bag containing the acquired
tools. Upon approaching the house, they saw lights on
in the front of the residence and a couple of vehicles
in the driveway, and the defendant told Bellavance that
one of the vehicles belonged to Daniel. Thus, the defendant and Bellavance assumed that Daniel was home.
As a result, Bellavance testified, they decided to enter
through the back of the house where there was a door
leading to the basement. According to Bellavance, the
defendant asked him to kick down the door, but he
declined, so the defendant kicked it down. The two
men then entered the basement with Bellavance holding
the machete and duffel bag. Bellavance testified that,
just as he entered Daniel’s bedroom, he heard footsteps
coming down the basement stairs. Three men came
down the basement stairs and stopped in their tracks
when they saw Bellavance holding the machete. Bellavance testified that one of the men asked them what
they were going to do but that he and the defendant
did not respond. Bellavance and the defendant then ran
out of the residence and hid in the nearby woods until
the police apprehended them.
  Through Mazzarella, the state offered into evidence
the defendant’s written statement to the police, which
was read into the record.9 The statement was consistent10 with Bellavance’s testimony except that the defendant stated that he and Bellavance never intended to
hurt anyone.
    Raymond Jr. testified that, on the night of the incident, he heard a loud bang and followed his sons down
the basement stairs to see what had happened. In the
basement, he saw two individuals wearing masks. He
stated that one of the intruders, whom he identified as
Bellavance, was holding a machete and a backpack. He
testified that the other intruder, the defendant, also
‘‘appeared to have a weapon in his hand’’ that was
‘‘[s]ome type of knife’’ or ‘‘something else sharp . . . .’’
   Similarly, Raymond III testified that, after hearing a
loud bang and running downstairs to the basement, he
saw two men wearing masks. He stated that one of the
men was holding a knife and, when he asked what they
were going to do, the man holding the knife responded
by raising it. Raymond III explained that, when he
repeated his question, the men, who remained silent,
ran away through the basement door. Daniel’s testimony was consistent with the testimony of Raymond
III. Additionally, Raymond III testified that he had
known the defendant before the incident at issue and
recognized him during the incident but could not
remember his last name at that time.
  The defendant testified in his own defense. He stated
that he and Bellavance simply wanted to get drugs and
money and had no plan to hurt or tie up anyone. Asked
what he intended to do if someone was home, the defendant stated that, ‘‘if we would have known there was
somebody home, we wouldn’t go in there.’’ The defendant testified, contrary to Bellavance’s testimony, that
he thought no one was home because it was dark outside. He explained that he intended to use the box cutter
to cut into drywall because he believed that Daniel hid
his money in the power outlets. He also stated that he
kept the box cutter in his pocket during the entire
incident. He further testified that he did not know what
was in the black duffel bag, including the zip ties. On
cross-examination, however, he admitted that he previously had conceded that everything in his statement
to the police was accurate.
   ‘‘When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim,
we do not attempt to weigh the credibility of the evidence offered at trial, nor do we purport to substitute
our judgment for that of the jury. . . . [W]e construe
the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining
the verdict . . . [and] determine whether the jury reasonably could have concluded that the evidence established the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Haughwout, 

, 765, 

 (2021). We briefly
address each of the defendant’s insufficiency claims in
turn, none of which has merit.
                            A
  The defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of attempt to commit robbery in
the first degree11 because (1) there was no evidence
that he intended to use or threaten to use force, and
(2) there was no evidence that he actually used or
threatened the use of a dangerous instrument.12 We
disagree.
   Section 53a-49 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A person
is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with
the kind of mental state required for commission of the
crime, he . . . (2) intentionally does or omits to do
anything which, under the circumstances as he believes
them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate
in his commission of the crime.’’ The attempted crime
in the present case is robbery in the first degree under
§ 53a-134 (a) (3). Specifically, the information charged
in relevant part that, in the course of committing a
larceny with the intent to deprive another person of
property, the defendant used or threatened the use of
a dangerous instrument on another person for the purpose of compelling such person to deliver property.13
  As to his specific intent, the defendant more specifically argues that the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt both that he intended to commit a larceny
and that he intended to do so through the use or threat-
ened use of force. The defendant’s argument misconstrues the language of the relevant statutes. ‘‘[T]he specific intent required to prove an attempted robbery is
no different from the specific intent required to commit
a robbery . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Henderson, 

, 

 (2017), aff’d, 

, 

 (2019).
‘‘To prove that a defendant is guilty of robbery [under
§ 53a-134 (a) (3)], the state must prove that the defendant had the specific intent to commit a larceny and
that the larceny was committed through the use or
threatened use of force. . . . [T]he intent element of
robbery relates to the commission of the larceny and
not to the use or threatened use of physical force.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Thus, the state
was not required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant intended to use or threaten the use
of force.
   As to his actual use or threatened use of a dangerous
instrument, the defendant argues that there was evidence only that he had a box cutter in his pocket during
the incident at issue, and, thus, he only possessed the
box cutter and did not actually use or threaten its use.
Although the defendant is correct that, to be convicted
of robbery in the first degree under § 53a-134 (a) (3),
the state must establish beyond a reasonable doubt
that he actually used or threatened to use a dangerous
instrument; see State v. Nicholson, 

,
591–92, 

, cert. denied, 

, 

 (2002); the defendant was only charged with
and convicted of attempt to commit robbery. ‘‘Under
General Statutes § 53a-49 (a) (2), [a] person is guilty of
an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind
of mental state required for commission of the crime
he . . . intentionally does or omits to do anything
which, under the circumstances as he believes them to
be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step
in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his
commission of the crime. The act or acts must be something more than mere preparation for committing the
intended crime; they must be at least the start of a line
of conduct which will lead naturally to the commission
of a crime which appears to the actor at least to be
possible of commission by the means adopted. . . .
Furthermore, the actor’s intent can be inferred from his
or her verbal or physical conduct and the surrounding
circumstances. . . . [T]he attempt is complete and
punishable, when an act is done with intent to commit
the crime, which is adapted to the perpetration of it,
whether the purpose fails by reason of interruption
. . . or for other extrinsic cause.’’ (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Anderson,

, 

 (1989). The defendant
was required only to take a substantial step in using or
threatening the use of the box cutter to be convicted
of attempt to commit robbery. See, e.g., State v. Daniel
B., 

, 

 (2019); State v. Carter,

, 856, 

 (2015); State v. Holliday, 

, 

, cert. denied,

, 

 (2004).
   In the present case, there was testimony that the
defendant asked Bellavance to bring weapons (first a
gun and then the box cutters and machete); that he
stated that would tie up and do whatever it took, including using force, to get money and drugs; that he kicked
down the victims’ backdoor knowing that at least one
person was home; and that he possessed a box cutter.
Most important, there was testimony from Raymond
Jr. that the defendant held a knife or sharp object, which
the jury reasonably could have inferred to refer to the
box cutter. Even if we assume that this testimony was
insufficient to establish that the defendant actually used
or threatened the use of the box cutter as a dangerous
instrument, it was sufficient to establish that the defendant took a substantial step in using or threatening the
use of the box cutter. Accordingly, there was sufficient
evidence for the jury to find the defendant guilty of
attempt to commit robbery in the first degree.
                             B
  The defendant also claims that there was insufficient
evidence to convict him of burglary in the first degree14
because there was no evidence that the box cutter he
possessed constituted a dangerous instrument. Specifically, he argues that there was no evidence that he used
or attempted to use the box cutter in circumstances
that its use or threatened use was capable of causing
death or serious physical injury because the evidence
showed that he kept the box cutter in his pocket and
that he intended to use it only to cut through drywall.
   Section 53a-101 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree when (1)
such person enters or remains unlawfully in a building
with intent to commit a crime therein and is armed with
explosives or a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument
. . . .’’ Section 53a-3 (7) defines dangerous instrument
as ‘‘any instrument, article or substance which, under
the circumstances in which it is used or attempted or
threatened to be used, is capable of causing death or
serious physical injury . . . .’’15 ‘‘Although it is not necessary under this definition that any physical injury
actually have been inflicted . . . it is necessary that
under the circumstances in which [the instrument was]
used or attempted or threatened to be used, it was
capable of causing death or serious physical injury.’’
(Citation omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Grant, 

, 

 (1979). ‘‘[T]he analysis focuses on the actual
circumstances in which the instrument is used in order
to consider the instrument’s potential to cause harm.
. . . The statute neither restricts the inquiry to the
exact manner in which the object was actually used,
nor requires any resulting serious physical injury. . . .
The facts and circumstances [must] show only that the
general way in which the object was used could potentially have resulted in serious physical injury. . . . The
object’s potential for injury, therefore, must be examined only in conjunction with the circumstances in
which it is actually used or threatened to be used, and
not merely viewed in terms of its dangerous capabilities
in the abstract. . . . Ordinary objects that are used in
ways that would likely cause death or serious physical
injury can constitute dangerous instruments.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Schultz, 

, 721–22, 

,
cert. denied, 

, 

 (2007).
   The defendant concedes that, under § 53a-101 (a) (1),
the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt only
that he was armed with a dangerous instrument, not
that he used or displayed a dangerous instrument. See
State v. Anderson, 

, 

(1979) (‘‘Actually, ‘armed’ is commonly interpreted as
simply requiring that a weapon be in one’s possession.
. . . It is apparent that it is not necessary for a weapon
to be exhibited, displayed, utilized or referred to in
order for one to be considered ‘armed.’ ’’ (Citations
omitted.)); State v. Owens, 

, 

 (‘‘it was possible to be armed without threatening the use of a weapon’’), cert. denied, 

, 

 (1995). Nevertheless, he argues that,
under § 53a-3 (7), for the box cutter to constitute a
dangerous instrument, there must be evidence from
which the jury reasonably could infer that he used or
attempted to use it in circumstances such that its use or
threatened use was capable of causing death or serious
physical injury. He contends that there was no such
evidence because he did not brandish, show, or use
the box cutter. The defendant is correct that, although
§ 53a-101 (a) (1) does not require the use or threatened
use of force per se, the state nonetheless is required
to show that the instrument is dangerous under § 53a-
3 (7), which may be done through evidence of actual
circumstances. This court has explained, however, that
for an instrument to constitute a dangerous instrument
under § 53a-3 (7), we do not consider the way in which
the instrument was ‘‘actually used’’ but only ‘‘the actual
circumstances’’; (emphasis omitted) State v. Jones, 

, 

 (1977); in which it was
‘‘used or attempted or threatened to be used’’; (internal
quotation marks omitted) 

; ‘‘to determine its
potential as an instrument of death or serious physical
injury.’’ 

.
  In the present case, the jury reasonably could have
found that, under the circumstances, the defendant
used or attempted to use a box cutter, which was capable of causing death or serious physical injury, when
he (1) asked Bellavance to procure weapons, including
a gun, a machete, and box cutters; (2) stated that he
would do whatever it took, including using force and
tying up the residents, to obtain the money and drugs;
(3) kicked down the backdoor of the residence at night
knowing people were home; and (4) was holding the
box cutter when he encountered the residence.16 Additionally, the jury was free to disbelieve the defendant’s
testimony that he did not intend to harm anyone, that
he intended to use the box cutter only to cut into drywall, and that he kept the box cutter in his pocket
during the course of the entire incident. See, e.g., State
v. Hughes, 

, 400, 

 (2021).
Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence that the
defendant was armed with a dangerous instrument.
                            C
   The defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of conspiracy to commit home
invasion premised on attempt to commit robbery in the
first degree because the evidence showed that he and
Bellavance agreed only to enter the home and to commit
larceny, not to enter the home and to use or threaten
the use of physical force against another person for
the purpose of compelling them to deliver property.
Although for attempt to commit robbery in the first
degree, the state did not have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the specific intent
to use or threaten the use of force—only the specific
intent to commit a larceny—this court has explained
that ‘‘[c]onspiracy is a specific intent crime, with the
intent divided into two elements: [1] the intent to agree
or conspire and [2] the intent to commit the offense
[that] is the object of the conspiracy. . . . Thus, [p]roof
of a conspiracy to commit a specific offense requires
proof that the conspirators intended to bring about
the elements of the conspired offense.’’17 (Emphasis
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Pond, 

, 460, 

 (2015). As a
result, specific intent is required for every element of
home invasion,18 including, in this case, the predicate
felony of robbery in the first degree under § 53a-134
(a) (3).
   In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence from
which the jury reasonably could conclude that he and
Bellavance agreed to enter Daniel’s home and to commit
a larceny through the use or threatened use of physical
force, the defendant relies on his own testimony that
he did not intend to hurt anyone, that he and Bellavance
never discussed or agreed to use force, that he did not
know anyone was home, that the box cutter remained
in his pocket during the incident, and that he intended
to use the box cutter only to cut through drywall. The
jury, of course was not required to credit his testimony.
See, e.g., State v. Hughes, supra, 

.
  Rather, the jury was entitled to credit Bellavance’s
testimony that he and the defendant agreed to enter
the house to steal money and drugs and that, if any
residents resisted, the defendant would tie them up and
do whatever was necessary to force them to comply.
Bellavance stated that the defendant asked him to
gather a machete, several box cutters, zip ties, chisels,
and duct tape. Additionally, the defendant himself testified that he traveled to Daniel’s house at night, parked
approximately one mile away, walked to the house carrying a box cutter and the bag of items obtained by
Bellavance, knew that Bellavance had a machete, and
kicked in the basement door despite knowing at least
one resident was home. The defendant admitted much
of the same in his written statement to the police,
including that the items in the bag would be used in
case they needed to tie up Daniel. Finally, Raymond Jr.
testified that the defendant was holding a sharp object
or knife, which the jury reasonably could infer to have
referred to the box cutter. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find the defendant guilty
of conspiracy to commit home invasion predicated on
attempt to commit robbery in the first degree.
   The judgment is affirmed.
 In this opinion ROBINSON, C. J., and MULLINS,
KAHN and KELLER, Js., concurred.
   1
     Specifically, the defendant was charged with two counts of home invasion in violation of § 53a-100aa (a) (1) and (2); two counts of burglary in
the first degree in violation of § 53a-101 (a) (1) and (3); attempt to commit
robbery in the first degree in violation of §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-134 (a)
(3); two counts of conspiracy to commit home invasion in violation of §§ 53a-
48 (a) and 53a-100aa (a) (1) and (2); two counts of conspiracy to commit
burglary in the first degree in violation of §§ 53a-48 (a) and 53a-101 (a) (1)
and (3); and one count of conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree
in violation of §§ 53a-48 (a) and 53a-134 (a) (3).
   2
     The trial court vacated the verdict as to the counts of the information
that charged the defendant with conspiracy to commit home invasion in
violation of §§ 53a-48 (a) and 53a-100aa (a) (2); conspiracy to commit burglary in the first degree in violation of §§ 53a-48 (a) and 53a-101 (a) (1);
conspiracy to commit burglary in the first degree in violation of §§ 53a-48
(a) and 53a-101 (a) (3); and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree
in violation of §§ 53a-48 (a) and 53a-134 (a) (3).
   3
     See Miranda v. Arizona, 

, 478–79, 

, 

 (1966).
   4
     The defendant also argues that the finding that ‘‘Gregorzek then assigned
. . . Gibson to advise the defendant of his rights’’ was clearly erroneous.
He contends that the evidence shows that Mazzarella asked Gibson to process him and to advise him of his rights. We disagree. Gregorzek testified
that he went to the processing room to ensure that Gibson read the defendant
his rights. Gibson testified that he was asked to help Mazzarella process
the defendant but did not specify who asked him.
   5
     The defendant also argues that the lack of a valid explanation should
render the statement’s admission per se harmful and automatically reversible. Such a requirement would conflict with the statute’s plain language,
however, which allows the state to overcome the presumption of inadmissibility by a preponderance of the evidence.
   6
     Although Tony M. involved concerns regarding the defendant’s self-serving drafting of plea bargaining documents, this concern applies equally
to cooperation agreements drafted solely by the state.
   7
     Compare Fed. R. Evid. 608 (a) (‘‘evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the [witness’] character for truthfulness has been attacked’’),
with Conn. Code Evid. § 6-6 (a) (‘‘[e]vidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been
impeached’’).
   8
     Specifically, ‘‘[c]ooperation agreements can undermine a witness’ credibility by revealing a motive for the witness to tailor his testimony to satisfy
the government to receive the benefits of the agreement while at the same
time the witness’ credibility can be bolstered by the presence of a cooperation agreement that can give the witness’ testimony the appearance of having
the government’s stamp of approval. United States v. Henderson, supra,

; [see also] United States v. 

; United
States v. 

 907 F.2d 1030–31.’’ State v. Gentile, 

, 851–52, 

, cert. denied, 

, 

 (2003).
   9
     ‘‘On [December 12, 2017], me and Ben [Bellavance] drove to [Daniel’s]
house in Woodstock. We went there to get marijuana and money. I had seen
that [Daniel (Dan)] had gotten arrested for drugs on [local radio station]
WINY, so I knew he was a good score. I also knew Dan before because I
used to buy marijuana off of him. Ben picked me up at my house at almost
7:00 [p.m.] or so in his red Mini Cooper and I told him how to get to Dan’s
house. I don’t think that Ben had met Dan before today. I guess that he just
wanted to get some extra money. We parked on a road a ways from Dan’s
house and walked on the road until we got there. When we arrived at his
house I knew that Dan was there because I saw that Dan was there because
I saw his car in the driveway. I also noticed that there were two other
vehicles in the driveway as well. At [Dan’s] house I kicked the door in. We
walked into the house and went into [Dan’s] room, which was in the basement, which I knew because I had been to his house before. Dan was not
in his room. We did not know that it was his parents house, and we made
[too] much noise and they came out and started yelling at us and we ran.
There was no fighting just yelling. Ben carried the bags of things we had
in case we needed them. The machete and everything was [Ben’s], he had
said that he would grab a bag with whatever he’d need before we left. I
only carried a box cutter. We had the items in the bag in case we needed
them to tie Dan up. We never had any intention of hurting [Dan] or anyone
else we only went there to get money and drugs. Once we started running
we ran on the road a little and then went into the woods when we saw a
car coming.’’
   10
      In his statement, the defendant admitted that he and Bellavance went
to Daniel’s house to steal money and drugs, that they parked down the road
from Daniel’s residence, that the defendant saw Daniel’s vehicle in the
driveway and knew he was home, that the defendant kicked in the basement
door and entered the basement, that the defendant carried a box cutter,
that he and Bellavance had items in a bag with which to tie up Daniel, if
needed, and that the defendant and Bellavance encountered residents and
fled the scene.
   11
      As attempt to commit robbery was the predicate crime to the defendant’s
home invasion conviction, he also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
to convict him of home invasion. Because we conclude that there was
sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of attempt to commit robbery,
this claim likewise fails.
   12
      To the extent that the defendant also argues that there is no evidence
that the box cutter constituted a dangerous instrument. we address this
argument in part III B of this opinion because the term ‘‘dangerous instrument’’ under both §§ 53a-134 (a) (3) and 53a-101 (a) (1) is subject to the
same definition under § 53a-3 (7).
   13
      Robbery in the first degree under § 53a-134 (a) occurs when, ‘‘in the
course of the commission of the crime of robbery as defined in section 53a-
133 or of immediate flight therefrom, [the defendant] or another participant
in the crime . . . (3) uses or threatens the use of a dangerous instrument . . . .’’
   General Statutes § 53a-133 provides: ‘‘A person commits robbery when,
in the course of committing a larceny, he uses or threatens the immediate
use of physical force upon another person for the purpose of: (1) Preventing
or overcoming resistance to the taking of the property or to the retention
thereof immediately after the taking; or (2) compelling the owner of such
property or another person to deliver up the property or to engage in other
conduct which aids in the commission of the larceny.’’
   A defendant commits larceny under General Statutes § 53a-119 ‘‘when,
with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to
himself or a third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such
property from an owner.’’
   14
      The defendant also claims that there was insufficient evidence to convict
him of home invasion premised on burglary in the first degree. He argues
that, because there was insufficient evidence to convict him of first degree
burglary, there likewise was insufficient evidence to convict him of home
invasion, as burglary was the predicate crime. Because we conclude that
there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of first degree bur-
glary, this claim likewise fails.
   15
      ‘‘Serious physical injury’’ is defined as ‘‘physical injury which creates a
substantial risk of death, or which causes serious disfigurement, serious
impairment of health or serious loss or impairment of the function of any
bodily organ . . . .’’ General Statutes § 53a-3 (4).
   16
      In light of Raymond Jr.’s testimony that he saw the defendant holding
a sharp object or knife, we need not determine whether there would have
been sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the box cutter constituted
a dangerous instrument if it remained in his pocket during the course of
the burglary.
   17
      General Statutes § 53a-48 (a) provides: ‘‘A person is guilty of conspiracy
when, with intent that conduct constituting a crime be performed, he agrees
with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such
conduct, and any one of them commits an overt act in pursuance of such
conspiracy.’’
   18
      General Statutes § 53a-100aa (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A person is
guilty of home invasion when such person enters or remains unlawfully in
a dwelling, while a person other than a participant in the crime is actually
present in such dwelling, with intent to commit a crime therein, and, in the
course of committing the offense: (1) Acting either alone or with one or
more persons, such person or another participant in the crime commits or
attempts to commit a felony against the person of another person other than
a participant in the crime who is actually present in such dwelling . . . .’’