State v. Graham

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    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JAMES GRAHAM
                  (SC 20447)
              Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins,
                        Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js.

                                    Syllabus

Convicted of felony murder, conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree,
     and carrying a pistol without a permit, the defendant appealed. The
     defendant and two friends, M and C, encountered the victim on a walking
     path and decided to rob him. C attempted to shoot the victim, but his
     gun jammed, and the defendant used his own gun to fatally shoot the
     victim. The three men took money and other belongings from the victim,
     and fled the scene. Approximately one week later, the defendant
     recounted the details of the incident to his friend, B. Around the same
     time, M described the incident to S, a friend, while they were together
     in M’s backyard. At trial, B and S both testified, pursuant to cooperation
     agreements they each had with the state, regarding the conversations
     that they had with the defendant and M, respectively. Defense counsel
     objected when the state attempted to question S regarding the statement
     M had made to him, but the trial court determined that M’s statement
     to S was admissible under the relevant provision (§ 8-6 (4)) of the
     Connecticut Code of Evidence embracing the hearsay exception for
     statements against penal interest. In making that determination, the
     court found that M was unavailable to testify, M’s statement to S was
     sufficiently trustworthy, and the statement was against M’s penal interest
     insofar as it implicated M in a plan to rob the victim, even if the statement
     also was, to some extent, self-serving. The defendant testified in his
     own defense, claiming that an unknown individual had shot the victim.
     During closing argument, the prosecutor suggested that the jury should
     discredit the defendant’s testimony because he had tailored it to reflect
     the evidence presented by the other witnesses who had testified before
     the defendant took the stand. On the defendant’s appeal, held:
1. The trial court properly admitted M’s statement to S, in which M inculpated
     the defendant in the shooting:
    a. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting M’s statement
    as a statement against penal interest under § 8-6 (4) of the Connecticut
    Code of Evidence: M’s statement to S, which the state offered as a dual
    inculpatory statement insofar as it inculpated both M and the defendant,
    was against M’s penal interest because M implicated himself in a plan
    to rob the victim and admitted his participation in the robbery, which
    gave rise to a homicide, exposing himself to a risk of punishment for
    conspiracy to commit robbery, robbery, and felony murder; moreover,
    regardless of the extent to which M’s statement was intended to minimize
    his participation in the homicide by identifying the defendant as the
    shooter, the entire statement was self-inculpatory, including the specific
    portions in which M specifically identified the defendant as the shooter,
    because it exposed M to potential criminal liability for the same types
    of crimes with which the defendant was charged, and, inasmuch as this
    court concluded that M’s entire statement was inculpatory, it declined
    the defendant’s invitation to consider adopting a rule that prohibits the
    admission non-self-inculpatory statements, even if they are made within
    a broader narrative that is generally self-inculpatory; furthermore, the
    circumstances under which M made the statement were strongly indicative of its reliability, as M made the statement of his own volition, only
    one week after the crime took place, to an individual with whom he had
    a close relationship, during a casual encounter in his own backyard, and
    other evidence presented at trial, including video surveillance footage,
    the testimony of other witnesses, and physical evidence corroborated
    the trustworthiness of M’s statement.
    b. The admission of M’s statement to S did not violate the defendant’s
    federal constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him: M’s
    statement was nontestimonial, as it was made in an informal setting, on
    M’s own initiative, and to a friend before any criminal charges had been
    filed, and, therefore, it was not made under circumstances that would
    lead to a reasonable belief that it would be available for use at a later
    trial; accordingly, the defendant’s unpreserved confrontation clause
    claim failed under the third prong of State v. Golding (

),
    insofar as this court was unable to conclude that an alleged constitutional
    violation existed.
2. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that his right
     of confrontation under article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution
     was violated when the prosecutor, during closing argument, presented
     a generic tailoring argument: a generic tailoring argument is a comment,
     often made during closing argument, asking the jury to infer that the
     defendant had fabricated his testimony to conform to the testimony of
     previous witnesses, solely on the basis of the defendant’s presence at
     trial and without reference to evidence from which the fact finder might
     reasonably infer that the substance of the defendant’s testimony was
     fabricated in light of the evidence admitted at trial; in the present case,
     the prosecutor indicated that the defendant had listened to all of the
     testimony during the trial before deciding which pieces of evidence he
     would agree with, but in the context of noting that the defendant’s
     account of the incident was inconsistent with his behavior on surveillance video and sharply diverged from the testimony of S and B, which
     supported the inference that the defendant’s version of events was
     fabricated to conform to the evidence presented; accordingly, the challenged tailoring comments were specific rather than generic, as the
     prosecutor’s suggestion of tailoring was tied to evidence admitted at
     trial that, if credited by the jury, could have supported the prosecutor’s
     claims, and, therefore, the challenged comments did not violated the
     defendant’s state constitutional right of confrontation.
3. This court declined to review the defendant’s claim that the prosecutor
     improperly had elicited certain information contained in the cooperation
     agreements between the state and S and B, and improperly presented
     closing argument relating to that information: the defendant’s claim was
     an unpreserved evidentiary claim masquerading as a claim of prosecutorial impropriety, because, during closing argument, the prosecutor
     merely commented on evidence that the trial court explicitly had allowed
     during S’s and B’s testimony, which was not improper, and the defendant
     failed to claim in his main brief filed with this court that the trial court
     had abused its discretion in admitting such testimony.
                       (Two justices concurring separately)
         Argued February 23—officially released October 4, 2022

                             Procedural History

   Substitute information charging the defendant with
the crimes of felony murder, conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree and carrying a pistol without a
permit, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of New Haven and tried to the jury before Vitale,
J.; thereafter, the court denied the defendant’s motions
to preclude certain evidence; subsequently, verdict and
judgment of guilty, from which the defendant appealed
to this court. Affirmed.
  Alice Osedach, assistant public defender, for the
appellant (defendant).
  Timothy F. Costello, senior assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were Patrick J. Griffin, former
state’s attorney, Seth R. Garbarsky, senior assistant
state’s attorney, and Andrew Reed Durham, former
assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
                         Opinion

   McDONALD, J. The defendant, James Graham,
appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after
a jury trial, of one count each of felony murder, conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, and carrying
a pistol without a permit. On appeal, the defendant
claims that (1) the trial court erred in admitting the
statement of an accomplice that inculpated the defendant, in violation of § 8-6 (4) of the Connecticut Code
of Evidence and the defendant’s sixth amendment right
to confrontation, (2) the prosecutor committed impropriety by presenting a generic tailoring argument during
closing argument, which violated the defendant’s confrontation rights under our state constitution, and (3)
the prosecutor committed impropriety by eliciting certain information contained in two witnesses’ cooperation agreements and by presenting closing argument
related to those materials. We affirm the judgment of
conviction.
   The jury reasonably could have found the following
relevant facts. In 2017, the defendant and two of his
friends, Robert Moye and Brennan Coleman, walked
from the defendant’s home in New Haven to the area
where the Farmington Canal Heritage Trail (Canal Line
Trail), a walking and bike path, intersects with Dudley
Street in Hamden. Along the way, they observed Donavan Lowndes—a friend of Coleman’s—driving along
Dudley Street. Coleman flagged Lowndes down, and the
three men approached Lowndes’ vehicle, where they
talked briefly. During their conversation, Coleman
pulled out a semiautomatic pistol and showed it to
Lowndes.
  Moments later, the defendant, Moye, and Coleman
observed the victim, Leandre Benton, walking along the
Canal Line Trail. The defendant and his friends were
members of ‘‘Read Street’’ and ‘‘Starr Block,’’ allied
groups in New Haven. The victim, however, was a member of ‘‘SLB,’’ a rival group in Hamden. When they saw
the victim, Coleman suggested, ‘‘let’s go stain him,’’
meaning they should rob him. They approached the
victim and asked him whether he was ‘‘SLB.’’ In
response, the victim punched Coleman in the face. Coleman took out his gun to shoot the victim, but the gun
jammed. The defendant then pulled out his .380 caliber
pistol and fatally shot the victim. Following the shooting, the three men took money and a cell phone from
the victim. They also took some of the victim’s clothing
and then fled the scene on foot.
  Thereafter, Moye messaged his friend, Steven Capers,
and asked him to pick him up in Hamden. Capers
agreed. Shortly after Capers arrived, the defendant,
Moye, and Coleman emerged from a backyard, running
away from the direction of Dudley Street. They rushed
into the back seat of Capers’ car, leaving the doors
open, and told Capers to ‘‘go.’’ They appeared ‘‘out of
breath,’’ ‘‘nervous,’’ and smelled like gunpowder. Capers
sensed that ‘‘something was going on,’’ and, having
noticed that there was increased police activity in the
area, he told the three men to get out of his car. The
three exited the car and ran southbound. Moye then
messaged Shyquan Bellamy, who picked up the defendant, Moye, and Coleman in New Haven and drove them
to a location in Waterbury.
  Later that same evening, Moye initiated a FaceTime
call with Donald Harris, who was in the car with Capers.
The defendant, Moye, and Coleman were all visible on
the screen. They informed Harris and Capers that they
were staying in Waterbury. During the call, the defendant, Moye, and Coleman were ‘‘flashing guns.’’ Moye
displayed a .38 caliber revolver, Coleman displayed a
nine millimeter semiautomatic pistol, and the defendant
displayed a .380 caliber pistol.
   Approximately one week later, while the defendant
was at the home of his friend, Jalen Bacote, Bacote
mentioned that he had seen a post on Facebook about
the victim’s death. The defendant went on to recount
the details of the incident, including that he shot the
victim and that he, Moye, and Coleman then took
money, a cell phone, and some clothes from the victim.
Around the same time, Capers visited Moye. While they
were smoking marijuana, in Moye’s backyard, with Harris, Moye asked Capers to swear that he would not tell
anyone what he was about to say. Capers agreed, and
Moye proceeded to divulge certain details about the
murder.
   The state charged the defendant with one count each
of felony murder, conspiracy to commit robbery in the
first degree, and carrying a pistol without a permit. At
trial, the state called, among other witnesses, Capers
and Bacote, who, pursuant to their cooperation agreements with the state, testified regarding the aforementioned conversations they had with Moye and the defendant, respectively. The defendant also testified in his
own defense. Although the defendant admitted that he
was at the scene of the murder, along with Moye and
Coleman, he denied any involvement. According to the
defendant, he, Moye, and Coleman walked to Dudley
Street because Coleman was planning to meet someone
there. Because that person never arrived, they began
walking back toward the defendant’s house and encountered the victim. The defendant explained that the victim called them over and asked for marijuana bags,
which Coleman happened to be carrying. The defendant
testified that, while Coleman and the victim began to
engage in a drug transaction, someone wearing a black
hooded sweat suit and a face covering came up from
behind and aimed a gun at them. The defendant claimed
that he yelled out and began running back toward Dudley Street. Moye and Coleman followed. He also said
that he heard gun shots. The defendant claimed that,
after the shooting, he, Moye, and Coleman went back
to the defendant’s house and then went to Waterbury
to get guns. He confirmed that Bellamy gave them a
ride to Waterbury but denied ever having encountered
Capers that day or having entered his car. The defendant
also denied that any of them were carrying guns at the
time of the shooting and contended that the first time
he saw anyone with a gun was when they obtained
the guns in Waterbury. He also acknowledged that he,
Moye, and Coleman approached Lowndes’ car before
they encountered the victim but claimed that Coleman
had showed Lowndes a cell phone, not a gun.
   Ultimately, at the conclusion of the trial, the jury
found the defendant guilty as charged. The court sentenced the defendant to a total effective sentence of
fifty-two years of incarceration. This appeal followed.
Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
                             I
                             A
   We begin with the defendant’s challenge to the trial
court’s admission of Capers’ testimony regarding
Moye’s statement to him about the murder. The following additional facts are relevant to our analysis. At trial,
the prosecutor called Capers to testify. During Capers’
direct examination, the prosecutor alerted the court
that he anticipated that defense counsel would object
to questions he intended to ask regarding a ‘‘dual inculpatory statement’’ that Moye had made to Capers after
the murder. The prosecutor conducted a proffer examination of Capers outside the presence of the jury. In
response to the prosecutor’s questions, Capers explained
that, approximately one week after the murder, Moye,
Capers, and Harris were smoking marijuana in Moye’s
backyard. During that gathering, Moye made Capers
‘‘do a solemn . . . oath, like say on word of [his] son
[that he] wasn’t going to tell something’’ or, in other
words, ‘‘swear to God [he would not] say nothing.’’
Capers ‘‘told [Moye] to say the same thing,’’ and they
went on to exchange secrets. Moye divulged details
about the murder to Capers. Specifically, Moye told
Capers that, when he was walking with Coleman and
the defendant on the Canal Line Trail, they saw the
victim and decided to ‘‘stain’’ him. Moye explained that
he, Coleman, and the defendant approached the victim
and asked if he was ‘‘SLB.’’ Moye stated that the victim
then punched Coleman in the face, and Coleman, in
turn, pulled out his gun, a ‘‘baby nine,’’ and attempted
to shoot the victim, but the gun jammed, so the defendant shot him with his .380 caliber pistol. Moye did not
tell Capers whether he was carrying a gun, himself, or
whether they actually stole anything from the victim.
  Defense counsel objected to the state’s proffer,
arguing that Moye’s statement to Capers constituted
inadmissible hearsay. Further, defense counsel argued
that the statement could not be admitted as a statement
against penal interest, an exception to the rule against
hearsay, because it was ‘‘a very self-serving statement
from Moye,’’ insofar as ‘‘[h]e distanced himself from
the whole process . . . .’’ The prosecutor, in turn,
argued that Moye’s statement to Capers did constitute a
statement against penal interest. The prosecutor noted
that Moye made the statement to Capers within one
week of the murder, the person to whom Moye made
the statement was a longtime friend, there was corroborating evidence in the case that supported Moye’s statement, and the statement was against Moye’s penal interest because he implicated himself in two felonies—
robbery and felony murder—insofar as he was aware
that Coleman and the defendant were armed with firearms and ‘‘that there was a likelihood that a death could
result as a result of [the] robbery.’’
   Ultimately, the trial court overruled defense counsel’s
objection to Capers’ testimony and concluded that the
statement was admissible as a statement against penal
interest. Specifically, after finding that Moye was
unavailable,1 the court applied the test set forth in § 8-
6 (4) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence to determine
whether Moye’s statement to Capers was sufficiently
trustworthy to constitute a statement against penal
interest. The court made the following findings: ‘‘A fair
reading of [Moye’s] statement, viewed through the lens
of common sense, makes it abundantly clear that [his]
statements . . . subject[ed] both [him] and the defendant to criminal liability; to wit, a conspiracy or plan
to rob the victim. . . . With regard to the factors, the
time that the statement was made, it was made only
one week following the commission of the crime. The
person to whom it was made, this witness, who, there’s
evidence before the jury, is a longtime friend. They hung
out together almost on a daily basis, and the evidence
demonstrates that . . . Capers is a person in whom,
based on their relationship, [Moye] would be likely to
confide . . . . In fact, the testimony is that . . . Moye
made . . . Capers swear an oath not to repeat the
statement, and . . . Capers testified [that] he told
[Moye], in fact, a confidence in return. In terms of corroboration of the evidence, there is the evidence before
the jury with regard to the state’s exhibit, the video [of
the defendant, Moye, and Coleman walking to and from
the Canal Line Trail], which shows all these individuals
together. And the jury now knows, through the testimony, if [the jury chooses] to accept it, from . . .
Lowndes, that at least one of them, as far as the jury
knows at this point, was armed. In terms of penal interest, [State v.] Azevedo, [

, 

 (2017), cert. denied, 

, 

 (2018)], indicates that whether a statement is
against a declarant’s penal interest is an objective
inquiry of law, rather than a subjective analysis of the
declarant’s personal legal knowledge. Statements are
evaluated according to a reasonable [person] standard.
To the extent, if any, based on [defense counsel’s] argument that it’s self-serving, I don’t think it’s self-serving.
He . . . implicates himself in a plan to rob the victim.
. . . Moye’s statements about himself, even if they were
neutral or even to some extent self-serv[ing], they are
still admissible. . . . And the statement certainly
[tends] to incriminate . . . Moye.’’ (Citation omitted.)
Accordingly, Capers proceeded to testify before the jury
regarding Moye’s admissions, consistent with the state’s
proffer. He also added that Moye ‘‘kept saying that they
probably [were] going to get caught.’’
   On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court
incorrectly concluded that the statement satisfied the
dual inculpatory hearsay exception because the statement (1) was not truly against Moye’s penal interest,
in that it minimized Moye’s role in the criminal conduct,
while inculpating the defendant and Coleman, and (2)
was not trustworthy. The state disagrees and argues
that the trial court properly found that the statement
at issue (1) was against Moye’s penal interest, even
though he did not portray himself as the actual shooter,
and (2) was sufficiently trustworthy, under the factors
set forth in § 8-6 (4) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, to be admitted into evidence.
   We begin with the standard of review and relevant
legal principles. ‘‘The law regarding out-of-court statements admitted for the truth therein is well settled. An
out-of-court statement offered to establish the truth of
the matter asserted is hearsay. . . . As a general rule,
such hearsay statements are inadmissible unless they
fall within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rivera, 

, 

 (2004). ‘‘Section 8-6 (4)
of the Connecticut Code of Evidence carves out an
exception to the hearsay rule for an out-of-court statement made by an unavailable declarant if the statement
was ‘trustworthy’ and, ‘at the time of its making, so far
tended to subject the declarant to criminal liability that
a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would
not have made the statement unless the person believed
it to be true.’ ’’ 

; see also, e.g., State v. Patel, 

, 

 (2022), petition for cert.
filed (U.S. August 18, 2022) (No. 22-155). Section 8-6
(4) further instructs that, ‘‘[i]n determining the trustworthiness of a statement against penal interest, the court
shall consider (A) the time the statement was made
and the person to whom the statement was made, (B)
the existence of corroborating evidence in the case,
and (C) the extent to which the statement was against
the declarant’s penal interest.’’ Conn. Code Evid. § 8-6
(4). ‘‘[N]o single factor . . . is necessarily conclusive
. . . . Thus, it is not necessary that the trial court find
that all of the factors support the trustworthiness of
the statement. The trial court should consider all of the
factors and determine whether the totality of the circumstances supports the trustworthiness of the statement.’’
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Lopez, 

, 

 (2000).
   In this case, the state offered Moye’s statement to
Capers as a dual inculpatory statement, which is ‘‘a
statement that inculpates both the declarant and a third
party, in this case the defendant.’’ State v. Schiappa,

, 145 n.15, 

, cert. denied, 

, 

, 

 (1999). We
evaluate a dual inculpatory statement using the same
criteria that govern the admission of a statement against
penal interest. See, e.g., 

 153–54. ‘‘Whether a statement is against a declarant’s penal interests is an objective inquiry of law, rather than a subjective analysis of
the declarant’s personal legal knowledge. Under § 8-6
(4) [of the Connecticut Code of Evidence], we must
evaluate the statements according to a reasonable person standard, not according to an inquiry into the
declarant’s personal knowledge or state of mind.’’ State
v. Camacho, 

, 

, cert.
denied, 

, 

, 

(2007). Moreover, ‘‘it is not the fact that the declaration
is against interest but the awareness of that fact by
the declarant which gives the statement significance.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bryant, 

, 

 (1987). ‘‘[W]hen viewing
this issue through an evidentiary lens, we examine
whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

.
   We first consider whether Moye’s statement was
against his penal interest. The essential characteristic
as to what is against penal interest is ‘‘the exposure to
risk of punishment for a crime.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. 

 202 Conn. 695–
96. Here, Moye’s statement exposed him to a risk of
punishment for conspiracy to commit robbery, robbery,
and felony murder. As the trial court noted, Moye implicated himself in a plan to rob the victim. Moye also
told Capers that he was aware that Coleman and the
defendant were armed with firearms and, therefore,
was aware that there was a likelihood that death could
result during the commission of the robbery. He also
admitted that he was present when the defendant shot
and killed the victim. Moye, therefore, admitted his
participation in a robbery that gave rise to a homicide
and exposed himself to the possibility of a charge of
felony murder. See General Statutes § 53a-54c. Accordingly, we conclude that Moye’s statement was against
his penal interest.
  To the extent that Moye attempted to minimize his
participation in the homicide by stating that the defendant was the one who shot the victim, we find this
court’s decision in State v. 

, instructive. In Rivera, we held that the declarant
in that case ‘‘admitted his participation in a burglary
that had given rise to a homicide, and thus exposed
himself to the possibility of a charge of felony murder.
As the trial court correctly noted, even if [the declarant’s] statement had attempted to minimize his participation in the homicide, the minimization would have
been limited to ‘one type of murder versus another
type of murder.’ The statement further implicated [the
declarant] as a principal in the crime of burglary, and
an accomplice in the crimes of arson and tampering
with evidence. Therefore, [the declarant’s] statement
exposed him to potential liability for the same types of
crimes with which the defendant has been charged and,
accordingly, the statement fully and equally implicated
both [the declarant] and the defendant.’’ (Footnote
omitted.) 

. Similarly, here, to the extent that the
defendant argues that Moye’s statement was intended
to distance Moye from the murder or to minimize his
participation in the crime, we conclude—as was the
case in Rivera—that Moye’s statement was indeed
inculpatory, as it exposed him to potential criminal
liability for the same types of crimes with which the
defendant was charged. A difference in degree of inculpation, rather than in kind, does not affect the conclusion that it is still an inculpatory statement.
  We also find it significant that Moye requested that
Capers undertake ‘‘a solemn . . . oath’’ before divulging the details of the murder. This ‘‘oath,’’ coupled with
the fact that Moye repeatedly told Capers ‘‘that they
probably [were] going to get caught,’’ bolsters the conclusion that Moye was aware that the statement was
against his penal interest. See, e.g., State v. 

 282 Conn. 360–61; see also, e.g., State v. 

 268 Conn. 368–69 (fact that declarant drove to
remote location before making inculpatory statement,
told nephew that he and defendant had done something
wrong, and admonished nephew not to repeat statement indicated that declarant ‘‘reasonably could have
foreseen that the statement was against his penal interest’’).
   The defendant nevertheless contends that, short of
excluding the entire statement, the trial court should
have admitted only those portions of the statement in
which Moye explicitly inculpated himself in the crime.
Specifically, he contends that Moye’s statement ‘‘that
the defendant took out his gun and shot the victim is
a non-self-inculpatory statement contained in an overall
broader narrative.’’ To that end, he argues that we
should reject the approach to statements against penal
interest that we adopted in State v. 

 202
Conn. 696–97, namely, that, ‘‘[when] the disserving parts
of a statement are intertwined with self-serving parts,
it is more prudential to admit the entire statement and
let the trier of fact assess its evidentiary quality in the complete context,’’ and, instead, follow the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Williamson v. United
States, 

, 

, 

(1994). In Williamson, the United States Supreme Court
interpreted the analogous federal rule to § 8-6 (4) of
the Connecticut Code of Evidence, rule 804 (b) (3) of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, and concluded that ‘‘the
most faithful reading of [that rule] is that it does not
allow [the] admission of non-self-inculpatory statements, even if they are made within a broader narrative
that is generally self-inculpatory.’’ Id., 600–601.
   Because we conclude that Moye’s entire statement,
including those specific portions naming the defendant
as the shooter, was self-inculpatory, we need not decide
whether to adopt the approach taken by Williamson.
See, e.g., State v. 

(concluding that codefendant’s entire statement was
self-inculpatory, including any portions that were designed
to minimize codefendant’s participation in crime).
Indeed, although Moye identified the defendant as the
actual shooter, Moye also directly and explicitly incriminated himself by admitting his own participation in the
plan to commit a robbery that gave rise to the murder.
Moreover, even if Moye’s statement served as an
attempt to minimize his participation in the actual homicide, the statement still implicated him in the murder
and exposed him to potential liability for the same types
of crimes with which the defendant was charged. See,
e.g., State v. 

 (codefendant’s statements were not blame shifting because they
exposed him to potential liability for same crimes with
which defendant was charged, thereby implicating
codefendant and defendant equally); State v. 

 178 Conn. App. 685–88 (statements were against
penal interest when declarant, who was accessory to
defendant’s crimes, stated that defendant was responsible for setting house on fire and detailed how defendant
set fire that destroyed home).
   We also note an important factual distinction that
differentiates this case from Williamson. In Williamson, the United States Supreme Court was required to
determine whether an accomplice’s confession to the
United States Drug Enforcement Administration, which
inculpated the defendant, was admissible pursuant to
rule 804 (b) (3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See
Williamson v. United 

 512 U.S. 596–98.
The court was largely concerned with the reliability of
a codefendant’s postarrest statements made to authorities, particularly those that inculpated or shifted blame
to the defendant. See 

; see also, e.g., United
States v. Ebron, 

, 134 n.9 (5th Cir. 2012)
(determining that, although court in Williamson pronounced broad rule, ‘‘its analysis is predicated on the
assumption that the challenged statement was a [postarrest] confession’’), cert. denied, 

, 

, 

 (2013).2 Although the court in
Williamson broadly pronounced that rule 804 (b) (3)
of the Federal Rules of Evidence ‘‘does not allow [the]
admission of non-self-inculpatory statements, even if
they are made within a broader narrative that is generally self-inculpatory’’; Williamson v. United States,
supra, 600–601; it nevertheless expressly recognized
that an inculpatory statement may be admitted under
the rule if ‘‘the statement was sufficiently against the
declarant’s penal interest that a reasonable person in
the declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true . . . [which is a]
question [that] can only be answered in light of all the
surrounding circumstances.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 603–604. In our view,
which is reflected in our own Code of Evidence; see
Conn. Code Evid. § 8-6 (4); one important, and informative, ‘‘surrounding circumstance’’ is the party to whom
the declaration was made. Indeed, the advisory committee note to rule 804 (b) (3) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, relied on by United States Supreme Court
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy in his concurrence in Williamson; see Williamson v. United States, supra,
614–15 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); provides in relevant part: ‘‘[A] statement admitting guilt
and implicating another person, made while in custody,
may well be motivated by a desire to curry favor with
the authorities and hence fail to qualify as against interest. . . . On the other hand, the same words spoken
under different circumstances, e.g., to an acquaintance, would have no difficulty in qualifying [as a
statement against interest].’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis added.) Fed. R. Evid. 804 (b) (3), advisory committee
note. In this case, Moye’s statement was not made to
law enforcement agents, and, thus, the fear that his
statement was made to shift blame to the defendant
and curry favor with law enforcement is not present.
Indeed, as we explain in detail subsequently in this
opinion, the circumstances under which Moye made
the statement—in a casual setting to a longtime friend—
strongly support the statement’s reliability and, thus,
its admissibility.
   The application of the foregoing principles leads us
to conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Moye’s statement was against
his penal interest. Having so concluded, we turn next
to the remaining factors under the trustworthiness component of our inquiry, namely, ‘‘(A) the time the statement was made and the person to whom the statement
was made, [and] (B) the existence of corroborating
evidence in the case . . . .’’ Conn. Code Evid. § 8-6 (4).
   With regard to the first factor, we conclude that the
circumstances under which Moye made his statement
to Capers were strongly indicative of its reliability. ‘‘In
general, declarations made soon after the crime suggest
more reliability than those made after a lapse of time
[when] a declarant has a more ample opportunity for
reflection and contrivance.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Pierre, 

, 

, cert. denied, 

, 

, 

 (2006). Here, the trial court found that Moye’s
statement to Capers was made only one week after the
crimes took place. This narrow time frame supported
the trial court’s finding that the statement was reliable.
See, e.g., State v. 

 (statements made approximately one week after crime were
trustworthy); State v. 

 70–72 (statements
made within ‘‘couple of weeks’’ of crime were trustworthy); State v. 

 268 Conn. 370–71 (statements made within five months of crime were trustworthy).
   Additionally, Moye made the contested statement of
his own volition, to people with whom he had a close
relationship, during a casual encounter in his backyard.
Capers testified that he had known Moye for six or
seven years and that he, Harris, and Moye were all part
of a group who regularly hung out together. It is well
settled that statements made to friends and close associates ‘‘are significantly more trustworthy than statements obtained by government agents for the purpose
of creating evidence that would be useful at a future
trial. . . . In short, neither facing arrest nor being
under arrest when making his statements to [the witness], [the declarant] lacked the obvious incentive to
shift blame or curry favor with the police. . . . Additionally, although [the witness] was not a relative of
[the declarant] . . . a factor that we have previously
noted when evaluating whether a statement is trustworthy, the trial court specifically found that [the witness]
was far from a stranger . . . . [T]he fact remains that
they shared a friendship and a relationship of trust.’’
(Citations omitted.) State v. 

; see also, e.g., State v. 

; State v. 

; State v.
Bryan, 

, 305 n.15, 

, cert.
denied, 

, 

 (2019). We therefore
conclude that the fact that Moye made the contested
statement in a noncoercive atmosphere to a person
with whom he had a close relationship further supports
the statement’s reliability and weighs in favor of admissibility.3
  The defendant nevertheless contends that the circumstances in which Moye made his statement are ‘‘no
different’’ from the circumstances in which the declarant made a statement in State v. Boyd, 

,

 (1990), which we held were not trustworthy. See 

. We disagree. In Boyd, the defendant
was charged with felony murder and first degree burglary, among other crimes. 

. The only evidence
offered by the state to implicate the defendant in the
victim’s murder was a written statement made by the
codefendant, Tyrone Wilson. 

. This court held
that the statement was inadmissible on evidentiary
grounds because it ‘‘was made to the police while Wil-
son was in custody.’’ 

. We cautioned that such
statements, made against a codefendant by a third party
in police custody, often lack sufficient indicia of reliability, considering ‘‘there [exist] obvious motives for falsification—the very natural desire to curry favor from
the arresting officers, the desire to alleviate culpability
by implicating others, the enmity often generated in a
conspiracy gone awry, the desire for revenge, all [of
which] might lead an arrestee-declarant to misrepresent
or to exaggerate the role of others in the criminal enterprise.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 

 139–40.
Furthermore, ‘‘no evidence was offered [at the probable
cause hearing] that corroborated Wilson’s statement
to the extent that it implicated the defendant in [the
victim’s] murder.’’ 

.
   This case is clearly distinguishable from Boyd. Here,
Moye’s statement was not made during police interrogation, and, thus, there was no such ‘‘obvious [motive]
for falsification,’’ namely, ‘‘the very natural desire to
curry favor from the arresting officers . . . .’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) 

 Furthermore, as we
explain hereinafter, there was evidence adduced at trial
that corroborated Moye’s account insofar as it implicated the defendant in the murder. As our Appellate
Court aptly stated, ‘‘Boyd does not create a blanket
rule of inadmissibility of all declarations against penal
interest when they are inculpatory as to both the declarant and the defendant. Instead, based [on] the traditional analysis of trustworthiness, such statements are
inadmissible when made after the crime is complete and
when made in a custodial environment to a custodian
such as a law enforcement officer.’’ (Emphasis added.)
State v. Lynch, 

, 

,
cert. denied, 

, 

 (1990). Far
from giving a statement in a custodial environment to
law enforcement, Moye made his statement during a
casual backyard gathering to a longtime friend. Thus,
we conclude that the first factor strongly weighs in
favor of the statement’s trustworthiness.
  With regard to the second factor, there was other
evidence presented at trial that corroborated the trustworthiness of Moye’s statement. The trial court expressly
relied on the fact that video surveillance captured Moye,
Coleman, and the defendant in the vicinity immediately
before and after the shooting. Further, the jury heard
testimony from Lowndes that, prior to their encounter
with the victim, either the defendant, Moye, or Coleman
was armed, as Coleman showed Lowndes a gun after
approaching his car. In addition to the evidence on
which the trial court explicitly relied, additional, independent evidence adduced at trial further corroborated
Moye’s statement. Moye’s account was consistent with
the physical evidence; Moye told Capers that the defendant used a .380 caliber pistol, which was corroborated
by the .380 caliber bullet recovered from the victim’s
body during his autopsy. Additionally, Moye accurately
recounted the nature of the victim’s head wound, as
Capers testified that Moye told him that the bullet had
passed through the victim’s head, and the autopsy
showed that the bullet had entered the mid-front of the
victim’s head, passed through his cranium, and exited
near his left ear. Moye’s testimony was also consistent
with the defendant’s account of the events surrounding
the murder, as relayed to the jury through Bacote’s trial
testimony. The existence of this corroborating evidence
also supports the statement’s reliability and weighs in
favor of its admissibility.
  In sum, in light of the inculpatory nature of the statement, the fact that the statement was made only one
week after the crime during a casual encounter in
Moye’s backyard, and the existence of corroborating
evidence presented at trial that supported the statement’s trustworthiness, we conclude that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion when it admitted Moye’s
dual inculpatory statement to Capers under § 8-6 (4) of
the Connecticut Code of Evidence.
                            B
   We next address whether the admission of Moye’s
statement violated the defendant’s sixth amendment
right to confrontation.4 At the outset, we note that the
defendant makes only cursory reference to his sixth
amendment right in his brief and does not separately
analyze this constitutional claim from his evidentiary
claim. Indeed, he does not cite or apply the controlling
standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court
in Crawford v. Washington, 

, 

, 

 (2004), or its progeny, Davis v.
Washington, 

, 

, 

 (2006). Nevertheless, to the extent that this
unpreserved claim was adequately briefed, we conclude
that Moye’s statement was nontestimonial, and its
admission, therefore, did not violate the defendant’s
confrontation rights.
   The defendant did not raise his sixth amendment
claim at trial and seeks review pursuant to State v.
Golding, 

, 239–40, 

 (1989),
as modified by In re Yasiel R., 

, 781,

 (2015). Under Golding, ‘‘a defendant can
prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved
at trial only if all of the following conditions are met:
(1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim
of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude
alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the
alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . .
deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject
to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ (Emphasis in original;
footnote omitted.) State v. 

 239–40; see
In re Yasiel 

 (modifying third prong of
Golding). Because the record is adequate for review,
and the defendant’s claim, which alleges a violation
of his sixth amendment right to confrontation, is of
constitutional magnitude, our inquiry focuses on whether
the violation alleged by the defendant exists.
   As we have explained: ‘‘Beyond [the previously mentioned] evidentiary principles, the state’s use of hearsay
evidence against an accused in a criminal trial is limited
by the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment.
. . . The [c]onfrontation [c]lause . . . bars the admission of some evidence that would otherwise be admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. 

.
   In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court ‘‘drew
a distinction between testimonial hearsay statements
and those deemed nontestimonial.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. 

.
‘‘Under Crawford . . . the hearsay statements of an
unavailable witness that are testimonial in nature may
be admitted under the sixth amendment’s confrontation
clause only if the defendant has had a prior opportunity
to cross-examine the declarant. Hearsay statements
that are nontestimonial in nature are not governed by
the confrontation clause, and their admissibility is governed solely by the rules of evidence.’’ (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Holley, 

, 585 n.5, 

 (2018).
   Since the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Crawford, the court has formulated a ‘‘primary purpose’’ test for determining whether a statement is testimonial in nature. Davis v. Washington, supra, 

. The primary purpose test directs courts to consider
‘‘whether, in light of all the circumstances, viewed
objectively, the ‘primary purpose’ of [a given] conversation was to ‘creat[e] an out-of-court substitute for trial
testimony.’ ’’ Ohio v. Clark, 

, 

, 

 (2015), quoting Michigan v.
Bryant, 

, 

, 

 (2011). Accordingly, this court applies a primary
purpose test for evaluating whether a statement is testimonial. See, e.g., State v. Sinclair, 

,

 (2019). Additionally, we have consistently
applied the rule that, in determining a declarant’s primary purpose in making a statement, courts must consider ‘‘the formality attendant to the making of the statement . . . .’’ Id.; see also Ohio v. 

;
Michigan v. Bryant, supra, 366, 377; State v. 

, 464–65.
   A review of our case law in this area persuades us
that Moye’s statement was nontestimonial, and, therefore, its admission did not violate the defendant’s confrontation rights. See, e.g., Ohio v. 

 (‘‘[A] statement cannot fall within the [c]onfrontation [c]lause unless its primary purpose was testimonial. [When] no such primary purpose exists, the
admissibility of a statement is the concern of state and
federal rules of evidence, not the [c]onfrontation [c]lause.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.)). Moye’s statement
to Capers inculpating himself and the defendant was
not made under circumstances that would ‘‘lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.’’ State
v. 

. In particular, Moye’s
statement was made in an informal setting, in his own
backyard, and on his own initiative to his friend, before
anyone had been charged. See, e.g., State v. 

 277 Conn. 77–78 (determining that declarant’s
statements were nontestimonial because statements
were made on declarant’s ‘‘own initiative, to a friend
whom he had known for several years, nearly six
months before either he or the defendant [was] arrested
for the crime’’); State v. 

 (concluding
that statement was nontestimonial because declarant
‘‘made the statement in confidence and on his own
initiative to a close family member, almost eighteen
months before the defendant was arrested and more
than four years before his own arrest’’). Accordingly,
we conclude that Moye’s statement to Capers was nontestimonial, and its admission at trial did not violate
the defendant’s sixth amendment right to confrontation.
The defendant’s unpreserved constitutional claim therefore fails under Golding’s third prong.
                              II
   We next address the defendant’s claim that the prosecutor committed impropriety by presenting a generic
tailoring argument during closing argument when he
suggested that the jury should discredit the defendant’s
testimony because the defendant testified after ‘‘hear-
[ing] all the testimony.’’ The defendant contends that
this argument violated his confrontation rights under
article first, § 8, of the state constitution.
   The following additional facts are relevant to our
analysis. During his closing argument, the prosecutor
summarized the defendant’s testimony as follows: ‘‘[The
defendant] indicate[d] that [the person who shot the
victim] wasn’t him. It was a masked man in a track suit
who came in from somewhere, not anywhere on camera
. . . but from somewhere in the trees, and aimed this
gun at them and fired.’’ The prosecutor proceeded to
replay a video, which was shown during the course of
trial, of the defendant, Moye, and Coleman running
away from the scene after the victim was shot. The
prosecutor then asked: ‘‘Do you see any of those men
duck? Do you see any of them scatter, dive behind a
car, get behind a tree, try to get anywhere away from
the shooter? Do you see them running with arms pumping like an Olympic sprinter, or do they have their hands
in their pockets, jogging, like they are trying to get away
from a crime scene?’’
  The prosecutor then returned to the defendant’s ver-
sion of events. He argued: ‘‘The defendant sat here
throughout the course of the trial. He heard all the
testimony. And, I’d submit to you, he had an opportunity
to decide which pieces of evidence he wanted to disagree with and which pieces of evidence he was going
to concede. He heard his own mother come in here and
testify that it was him on the camera on Goodrich Street
[in Hamden]. His own mother identifies him from a
[photograph] at the very head of the Canal Line [Trail].
So, he admits it’s him. We have [global positioning system (GPS)] records . . . showing him leaving his
house at 3:24 [p.m.] and getting back there twenty-two
minutes later. He can’t dispute those electronic records,
so he concedes it. . . . Bellamy, he didn’t have a dog
in this fight. He comes in and says, ‘yeah, I gave some
guys a ride.’ The defendant can’t dispute that, so he
concedes it. It says ‘Waterbury’ on the video in . . .
Moye’s phone. There’s a [photograph] of him, two days
prior, pulling a weapon. He can’t dispute that, so he
says, ‘I don’t know the caliber of that gun.’ But . . .
Capers and . . . Bacote know the caliber of that gun,
and [it] was a .380. So, the one portion of the evidence
[for which] the defendant has an opportunity to give
a piece of information—it can’t easily be challenged
because it’s not on camera—is the [moment] of the
shooting. So, the [moment] of the shooting, he tells you
the story that we’ve been talking about. That, just by
happenstance, the exact [moment when] he . . . Coleman, and . . . Moye are walking up to [the victim],
there is a masked man in a track suit who aims at them,
fires at them without provocation, just by coincidence.’’
   The defendant’s claim on appeal rests on two predicates, both of which must be satisfied in order for him to
prevail. First, the defendant argues that the prosecutor
made a generic tailoring argument in two particular
portions of the closing argument. In the first instance,
the prosecutor said: ‘‘The defendant sat here throughout
the course of the trial. He heard all the testimony. And,
I’d submit to you, he had an opportunity to decide which
pieces of evidence he wanted to disagree with and
which pieces of evidence he was going to concede.’’ In
the second instance, the prosecutor argued: ‘‘So, the
one portion of the evidence [for which] the defendant
has an opportunity to give a piece of information—it
can’t easily be challenged because it’s not on camera—
is the [moment] of the shooting. So, the [moment] of
the shooting, he tells you the story that we’ve been
talking about.’’ Second, the defendant argues that,
although permissible under the federal constitution,
generic tailoring arguments violate the right to confrontation guaranteed by article first, § 8, of the state constitution, which, according to the defendant, provides
broader protections than the federal constitution. The
state argues, however, that the contested portions of the
prosecutor’s closing argument constituted a specific,
rather than generic, tailoring argument, which this court
has held is permissible. Therefore, the state argues,
this court has no occasion to consider whether generic
tailoring arguments are impermissible under the state
constitution. We agree with the state.
   Defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor’s
closing argument at trial, and the defendant therefore
seeks review of his unpreserved claim under State v.

 213 Conn. 239–40, as modified by In re
Yasiel 

. See part I B of this
opinion. Because the record is adequate for review and
the defendant alleges a violation of a state constitutional
right, we must determine whether the alleged violation exists.
   ‘‘A prosecutor makes a tailoring argument when he
or she attacks the credibility of a testifying defendant
by asking the jury to infer that the defendant has fabricated his testimony to conform to the testimony of
previous witnesses. . . . The term most frequently is
used to refer to a prosecutor’s direct comment during
closing argument on the defendant’s opportunity to tailor his testimony, although a prosecutor sometimes also
will use cross-examination to convey a discrediting tailoring message to the jury. There are two types of tailoring arguments: generic and specific. The former
occurs when the prosecutor argues the inference solely
on the basis of the defendant’s presence at trial and
his accompanying opportunity to fabricate or tailor his
testimony. . . . A specific tailoring argument, by contrast, occurs when a prosecutor makes express reference to the evidence, from which the jury might reasonably infer that the substance of the defendant’s testimony was fabricated to conform to the state’s case as
presented at trial.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Weatherspoon, 

, 543–44, 

 (2019).
   In State v. Cassidy, 

, 125–29, 

, cert. denied, 

, 

,

 (1996), this court first addressed the
constitutionality of tailoring arguments. We concluded
that generic tailoring arguments violate a criminal
defendant’s sixth amendment right to confrontation;
id., 125, 128–29; but specific tailoring arguments are
constitutionally permissible because such arguments
are ‘‘linked solely to the evidence and not, either directly
or indirectly, to the defendant’s presence at trial.’’ Id.,
128 n.17. Four years later, however, the United States
Supreme Court released its decision in Portuondo v.
Agard, 

, 

, 

(2000), in which it held that generic tailoring arguments
do not violate any federal constitutional rights. 

 70–
71, 73.
   The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Portuondo required us to overrule Cassidy, which we did
in State v. Alexander, 

, 

(2000). In Alexander, this court noted that, to the extent
that the defendant, through supplemental briefing,
raised a claim that generic tailoring arguments violate
our state constitution, this court was ‘‘not persuaded
by his argument.’’ 

 296 n.9. Recently, in State v.

, a defendant
claimed on appeal to this court that the prosecutor’s
generic tailoring arguments violated his right to confrontation guaranteed by article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution. See id., 547. After closely examining the evidentiary record in that case, however, we
concluded that the contested statements constituted
specific, rather than generic, tailoring. See id., 548–49.
In light of that conclusion, we did not decide whether
our state constitution provides broader protection
against generic tailoring arguments than does the federal counterpart. Id., 550.
   In determining whether a tailoring comment is specific or generic, ‘‘we must view [the] statement in context to determine the true nature of the prosecutor’s
argument.’’ Id., 549. In this case, immediately preceding
the first contested statement—that ‘‘[t]he defendant sat
here throughout the course of the trial. He heard all
the testimony. And, I’d submit to you, he had an opportunity to decide which pieces of evidence he wanted
to disagree with and which pieces of evidence he was
going to concede’’—the prosecutor summarized the
defendant’s version of events, then played a surveillance video that showed the defendant, Moye, and Coleman leaving the scene of the crime. The prosecutor
suggested that the defendant’s version of events was
tailored to fit the evidence showing that he and his
compatriots were captured on video leaving the scene
of the crime, a fact that required him to fabricate a
story about a masked gunman. The prosecutor then
argued that the defendant’s story was demonstrably
false because his version—that an unnamed, masked
assailant shot at the victim—was inconsistent with the
video surveillance, which did not show the men ducking, hiding, or taking cover, as one would expect a
person to do when faced with an armed assailant.
  In the portion of argument between the two contested
statements, the prosecutor noted that the defendant
agreed with the state only with respect to those elements of his story that were established by indisputable
evidence, namely, the GPS data, surveillance imaging,
and electronic records. The prosecutor urged the jury
to evaluate the defendant’s credibility by reference to
his behavior in the surveillance video, GPS records,
which recorded the time at which the defendant left
and returned to his home, and the testimony of the
defendant’s mother, Bellamy, Capers, and Bacote. He
went on, in the second contested statement, to suggest
that the defendant fabricated the only thing with which
there was no irrefutable evidence to support—the true
identity of the person who shot the victim.
   Although the state’s tailoring theory could have been
conveyed with more precise reference to the evidence,
the prosecutor’s argument contained several evidence-based assertions. First, the defendant’s account that a
masked assailant began shooting at him was inconsistent with his behavior in the surveillance video, which
supports the inference that his in-court testimony was
fabricated to conform to the evidence. Second, the
nearly identical accounts from Capers and Bacote,
describing the plan of the defendant, Moye, and Coleman, sharply diverged from the defendant’s in-court
testimony, which supports the inference that the defendant’s version of events was likewise fabricated. Finally,
the evidence, including video surveillance, GPS imaging,
and electronic records confirming the fact that Bellamy
drove the defendant, Moye, and Coleman to Waterbury,
supports the inference that the defendant conformed
his version of events to the indisputable evidence and
fabricated the testimony regarding the presence of an
unknown masked assailant. These evidence-based
assertions distinguish this specific tailoring argument
from a generic tailoring argument. Cf. Portuondo v.

, 70–71 (The prosecutor made
generic tailoring argument when she remarked: ‘‘You
know, ladies and gentlemen, unlike all the other witnesses in this case the defendant has . . . the benefit
. . . to sit here and listen to the testimony of all the
other witnesses before he testifies. . . . That gives you
a big advantage, doesn’t it? You get to sit here and think
what am I going to say and how am I going to say it?
How am I going to fit it into the evidence? . . . He’s
a smart man. I never said he was stupid. . . . He used
everything to his advantage.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.)); Martinez v. People, 

 (Colo.
2010) (prosecutor made generic tailoring arguments
when she suggested that defendant was ‘‘able to sit in
here the whole time and listen to what everybody had
to say’’ and ‘‘was able to tailor his statement with what
everybody else had to say because he’s been [in court]’’
but failed to tie tailoring arguments to evidence in
record (internal quotation marks omitted)).
   We therefore conclude that the challenged tailoring
comments were specific, rather than generic, because
the suggestion of tailoring was tied to evidence that, if
credited by the jury, could have supported the prosecutor’s claims. See, e.g., State v. 

332 Conn. 549–50 (because prosecutor’s statement that
defendant’s testimony ‘‘was entirely self-serving with
the benefit of hearing all the testimony that came
before’’ was supported by explicit evidence that could
lead to reasonable inference of tailoring, it was specific
tailoring argument (emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted)); see also State v. Mattson, 

, 

 (2010) (because prosecutor
referred to specific evidence presented at trial, in addition to referring to defendant’s presence at trial, court
concluded that it could not ‘‘be said that the prosecutor’s remarks during closing argument constituted a
‘generic accusation’ that [the defendant] tailored his
testimony based solely on his presence at trial’’ (emphasis in original)).5 Accordingly, we also conclude that the
prosecutor’s comments did not violate the defendant’s
right to confrontation under the state constitution. In
light of this conclusion, we need not resolve the defendant’s contention that our state constitution affords
greater protection against generic tailoring arguments
than does the federal constitution.
                            III
   Finally, we turn to the defendant’s second claim of
prosecutorial impropriety. Specifically, the defendant
claims that the prosecutor improperly elicited certain
information contained in the cooperation agreements
of two of the state’s witnesses, Capers and Bacote, and
improperly presented closing argument related to those
materials. The state contends that the defendant erroneously attempts to recast routine claims of alleged evidentiary error as claims of prosecutorial impropriety.
Because the defendant did not challenge the trial court’s
evidentiary rulings admitting the testimony regarding
Capers’ and Bacote’s cooperation agreements on appeal,
the state argues that the defendant’s evidentiary claim
is unreviewable. We agree with the state.
   Our courts have recognized that it is usually not
impropriety for a prosecutor to ask a question that may
elicit objectionable testimony, let alone one—as in this
case—that garners an objection that the trial court overrules, in favor of the prosecution. See, e.g., State v.
Holmes, 

, 

 (‘‘simply
posing an objectionable question does not amount to
an actionable impropriety’’), cert. denied, 

, 

 (2016); see also State v. Garcia, 

, 

 (1986); cf. State v.
Rowe, 

, 151–52, 

 (2006)
(defendant’s claim was premised on propriety of prosecutor’s questioning on subject of consciousness of guilt,
rather than on alleged prosecutorial impropriety, and
claim, therefore, must be considered evidentiary rather
than constitutional). Moreover, ‘‘[a]rguing on the basis
of evidence explicitly admitted [by the trial court] for
that purpose cannot constitute prosecutorial [impropriety].’’ State v. 

. In this case, during
closing argument, the prosecutor merely commented
on evidence that the court explicitly allowed during the
course of Capers’ and Bacote’s respective testimonies.
This certainly was not improper.
   As a result, we conclude that the defendant’s claim
regarding Capers’ and Bacote’s cooperation agreements
is an unpreserved evidentiary claim masquerading as a
claim of prosecutorial impropriety. It is well settled that
we will not review such a claim. See, e.g., State v.

; see also, e.g., State v.


 279 Conn. 151–52. Furthermore, to the
extent that the defendant contends in his reply brief
that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
Capers’ and Bacote’s testimony regarding the cooperation agreements, we decline to address this claim
because the defendant failed to raise it in his main brief.
See, e.g., State v. Devalda, 

, 519 n.26, 

 (2012) (declining to review claim ‘‘because it
is well settled that claims that are not raised in parties’
main briefs, but instead are raised for the first time in
reply briefs, ordinarily are considered abandoned’’).
      The judgment is affirmed.
 In this opinion ROBINSON, C. J., and MULLINS,
KAHN and KELLER, Js., concurred.
  1
     The prosecutor told the court that Moye’s attorney had informed the
state that she would advise Moye to invoke his fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination if called to testify, and that he had invoked the
privilege in a prior probable cause hearing. Defense counsel agreed that
Moye was unavailable to testify, and neither party, on appeal, disputes the
trial court’s finding that Moye was unavailable.
   2
     The defendant relies on State v. Britt, 

, 

(2016), a case decided by the Nebraska Supreme Court, in support of his
argument that Moye’s statement should not have been admitted in its
entirety. In Britt, the court determined that certain statements made by the
declarant, a codefendant, were inadmissible as statements against penal
interest. Id., 422. The court concluded that, although the statements were
partially inculpatory because they implicated the declarant in the plan to rob
the victim, they were not sufficiently against the declarant’s penal interests
because the declarant shifted blame to the defendant ‘‘for the fact that a
robbery turned into a triple homicide.’’ Id. Although the facts of Britt bear
some similarity to this case, we find the Nebraska Supreme Court’s analysis
unpersuasive, primarily because it is predicated on what we consider to
be a broad interpretation of Williamson, an interpretation that has been
questioned by other courts; see, e.g., United States v. Lovato, 

 (10th Cir. 2020), cert. denied,       U.S.     , 

, 

 (2021); United States v. 

.
   3
     The defendant argues that Moye, by naming the defendant as the shooter,
‘‘could have been more concerned about [retaliation] from rival gang members . . . . By placing the blame of the shooting on the [defendant and
Coleman], Moye may have been attempting to get word on the street that
the others shot the victim, not him.’’ Aside from the lack of evidence in the
record to support this theory, the defendant has not cited any cases, and
we have found none, in which we have concluded that a statement made
in such a circumstance is unreliable. Indeed, our case law supports the
proposition that statements made to acquaintances in casual settings, rather
than to law enforcement while inside ‘‘the coercive atmosphere of official
interrogation,’’ tend to be more reliable, as the declarant ‘‘lack[s] the obvious
incentive to shift blame or curry favor with the police.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. 

; see, e.g., State v. Bonds,

, 

, cert. denied, 

, 

 (2017).
   4
     The sixth amendment right to confrontation is made applicable to the
states by incorporation through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States constitution. E.g., Pointer v. Texas, 

, 

, 

 (1965).
   The defendant does not raise a state constitutional claim in this regard.
Accordingly, we have no occasion to consider whether our state constitution
affords greater protection than the federal constitution.
   5
     In support of his generic tailoring claim, the defendant relies on State
v. Daniels, 

, 

 (2004). In Daniels, the Supreme Court
of New Jersey exercised its supervisory authority to prohibit generic tailoring
arguments and to constrain a prosecutor’s ability to make specific tailoring
arguments. With regard to specific tailoring, the court explained that the
prosecutor’s comments were ‘‘precisely the type that a prosecutor is prohibited from making, even when the record indicates that [the] defendant
tailored his testimony.’’ (Emphasis added.) 

. We are not persuaded.
  First, the defendant does not ask us to exercise our supervisory authority
to place similar constraints on specific tailoring arguments. Recently, in
Weatherspoon, we declined the defendant’s request to exercise our supervisory authority and to reverse the judgment of conviction and create a rule
prohibiting generic tailoring arguments. See State v. 

 (‘‘we do not disapprove of specific tailoring arguments when
they are warranted by the evidentiary record’’). Second, in Weatherspoon,
we did nothing to suggest such a narrow view of specific tailoring; nor did
we purport to adopt the rule announced by the New Jersey Supreme Court
in Daniels.