344 Ill. App. 620 - Cockrell v. Sullivan’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

11 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 11 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““. . . There is imposed upon the owner of the car a duty to reasonably foresee the consequence of his negligence, that being one of the tests of proximate cause. He should not be permitted to say that he could not reasonably foresee that by leaving the key in the ignition, one might tamper with or steal the car and become reckless in its operation, causing damage. Certainly the provision of the statute was not to protect the owner of the car against theft but was a safety measure intended to protect the public. . . . He is required by all rules of common sense and reason to know that a thief, in his effort to escape from the scene of the theft, may have no greater regard for traffic lights or traffic regulations than he had for the criminal statute making it a felony to steal the car. He must foresee that the thief who steals his car will not be Concerned, when fleeing from the scene of the theft, about the rule of care and diligence in driving the car, which a driver is required under the "law to exercise.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 122 Ind. App. 587 - Kiste v. Red Cab, Inc.

2. ““. . . The evident purpose of requiring motor vehicles to be locked is not to prevent theft for the sake of owners or the police, but to promote the safety of the public in the streets. An unlocked motor vehicle creates little more risk of theft than an unlocked bicycle, or for that matter an unlocked house, but it creates much more risk that meddling by children, thieves, or others will result in injuries to the public. The ordinance is intended to prevent such consequences. Since it is a safety measure, its violation was negligence. This negligence created the hazard and thereby brought about the harm which the ordinance was intended to prevent. It was therefore a legal or ‘proximate’ cause of the harm. . . .””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 122 Ind. App. 587 - Kiste v. Red Cab, Inc.