344 Ill. App. 3d 1105 - People v. Rish’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

10 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 13 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “We next consider defendant’s challenge to the dismissals of counts nine and ten of her post-conviction petition. Count nine argued that a Brady violation occurred when the State made a knowing false argument to the jury in its closing arguments regarding her alleged purchase of distilled water. Count ten also averred a Brady violation in closing arguments because of the State’s failure to disclose a laboratory report relating to the distilled water. One week prior to trial, the Illinois State Police forensic science laboratory returned a report to the State’s Attorney’s office that no analysis of the liquid found in the jug next to Small’s body could be done because of possible contamination of the sample by the forensic science laboratory equipment. Defendant asserts that the report would have enabled the defense to impeach the connection between herself and the liquid found in the box where Small had been buried. We believe the State committed a discovery violation when it failed to hand over the laboratory report to the defendant. Defendant requested the results of any testing pertinent to the case, and the attending forensic scientist was disclosed by the State as a possible witness. However, we find that the State’s failure to divulge the report was not material within the meaning of Brady, because even had the report been divulged, there is no reasonable probability that it would have affected the outcome of the proceedings. See [Pennsylvania v.] Ritchie, 480 U.S. [39] ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 959 F. Supp. 2d 1096 - Rish v. Thompson

2. “Contrary to defendant’s contention, knowledge by police officers is not automatically imputed to the prosecution in a per se manner. Rather, the imputation requires an individualized focus on the factual circumstances. Among the factors to be considered would be the reasonableness of such imputation, whether the failure to transmit such knowledge up the informational chain was inadvertent or intentional, and whether any real prejudice occurred. In this case we are uncertain whether Willis’ knowledge should be imputed to the prosecution. One factor weighing against such attribution is that defendant helped to create the problem by misidentifying the maker of the statement as Detective Erickson.... On the other hand, because no evidentiary hearing was held, we do not know whether Willis intentionally hid his knowledge from the prosecution, nor do we know whether he told any other officers or investigators about the incident. Under the circumstances, we believe that an evidentiary hearing is necessary. We therefore reverse the dismissal of count four of defendant’s post-trial conviction and remand for such a hearing.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 959 F. Supp. 2d 1096 - Rish v. Thompson

3. ““[T]he evidence must be material to guilt or punishment. [Citation.] Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had it been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” People v. Rish, 344 Ill. App. 3d 1105, 1111 (2003).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 376 Ill. App. 3d 251 - People v. Buckner