Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 344 Md. 642 - Gardner v. State

Gardner v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1997

Citation profile

88
cited by 88 later decisions
1
states following
April 2021
most recently cited

88 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 88 later decisions — most recently April 2021 · most notably Mayor of Baltimore v. Chase (2000), Nesbit v. Government Employees Insurance (2004)

88 state decisions

5001997200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on United States v. Bass · Bell v. United States · Parke v. Raley · Rewis v. United States · Simpson v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 88 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““Because both statutes are being applied to a single count, they must be construed together and in context.” Whack, 338 Md. at 673, 659 A.2d at 1350 (citing State v. Thompson, 332 Md. 1, 7 , 629 A.2d 731, 734 (1993))(“when we are called upon to interpret two statutes that involve the same subject matter, have a common purpose, and form part of the same system, we read them in pari materia and construe them harmoniously.”); Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 436 , 639 A.2d 675, 679 (1994); Jones v. State, 311 Md. 398, 405 , 535 A.2d 471, 474 (1988); State v. Loscomb, 291 Md. 424, 432 , 435 A.2d 764, 768 (1981). “Full effect is given to each statute to the extent possible, and we will not add or delete words to obtain a meaning not otherwise evident from the statutory language.” Accord, Geico [GEICO] v. Insurance Comm’r, 332 Md. 124, 132 , 630 A.2d 713, 717 (1993). Moreover, § 286(c) is but a subsection of § 286, section (g) of which also addresses sentence enhancements. Because it is imperative that statutory language be interpreted in its full context, it follows that § 286(e) must “be read in conjunction with the other subsections of § 286 so that we may give effect to the whole statute and harmonize all of its provisions.” Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 436 , 639 A.2d 675, 678-79 (1994) (citing Williams v. State, 329 Md. 1, 15-16 , 616 A.2d 1275, 1282 (1992) for the proposition that a court must discern “legislative intent from the entire statutory scheme, as opposed to scr”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “"(b) Required Notice of Additional Penalties. When the law permits but does not mandate additional penalties because of a specified previous conviction, the court shall not sentence the defendant as a subsequent offender unless the State's Attorney serves notice of the alleged prior conviction on the defendant or counsel before the acceptance of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or at least 15 days before trial in circuit court or five days before trial in District Court, whichever is earlier. "(c) Required Notice of Mandatory Penalties. When the law prescribes a mandatory sentence because of a specified previous conviction, the State’s Attorney shall serve a notice of the alleged prior conviction on the defendant or counsel at least 15 days before sentencing in circuit court or five days before sentencing in District Court. If the State’s Attorney fails to give timely notice, the court shall postpone sentencing at least 15 days unless the defendant waives the notice requirement.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. ““[statutes that are clear when viewed separately may well be ambiguous where their application in a given situation, or when they operate together, is not clear.” See Sullins v. Allstate, 340 Md. 503, 508 , 667 A.2d 617, 619 (1995) (a term which is unambiguous in one context may be ambiguous in another); Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 74 , 517 A.2d 730, 732 (1986) (“That a term may be free from ambiguity when used in one context but of doubtful application in another context is well settled.”); Bernhardt v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 102 Md.App. 45, 54 , 648 A.2d 1047, 1051 (1994) (quoting Town & Country v. Comcast Cablevision, 70 Md.App. 272, 280 , 520 A.2d 1129, 1132 , cert. denied, 310 Md. 2 , 526 A.2d 954 (1987)) (“Language can be regarded as ambiguous in two different respects: 1) it may be intrinsically unclear .. .; or 2) its intrinsic meaning may be fairly clear, but its application to a particular object or circumstance may be uncertain.”).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.