No. 880 October 8, 2025 133
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of J. B.,
a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness.
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent,
v.
J. B.,
Appellant.
Crook County Circuit Court
24CC03932; A184888
Daina A. Vitolins, Judge.
Submitted September 10, 2025.
Liza Langford filed the brief for appellant.
Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Rebecca M. Auten, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and
O’Connor, Judge.
SHORR, P. J.
Affirmed.
134 State v. J. B.
SHORR, P. J.
In this civil commitment case, appellant seeks
reversal of a judgment committing him to the Oregon
Health Authority for a period not to exceed 180 days based
on the trial court’s determination that appellant has a mental disorder that causes him to be a danger to others. ORS
426.130; ORS 426.005(f)(A). Appellant assigns error to the
trial court’s finding that he was a danger to others due to a
mental disorder. He argues that the state failed to meet its
burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that his
dangerous behavior was the result of a mental disorder, as
opposed to being caused by kidney dysfunction. The state
argues that it presented legally sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that appellant’s mental disorder caused him to be a danger to others. We affirm.
Appellant does not request that we review his case
de novo, and this is not an exceptional case that justifies
such review. ORAP 5.40(8)(C) (providing that we will exercise discretion to review de novo “only in exceptional cases”).
Therefore, “[w]e review whether the state presented sufficient evidence to support appellant’s civil commitment for
legal error and are bound by the trial court’s factual findings that are supported by evidence in the record.” State v.
C. M. C., 301 Or App 206, 207,
454 P3d 30 (2019).
A court may order that a person be involuntarily
committed if, “based upon clear and convincing evidence,”
the court determines that the individual is “a person with
mental illness” and is unwilling or unable to participate in
voluntary treatment. ORS 426.130(1). “A person with mental illness” includes a person who, because of a mental disorder, is dangerous to others. ORS 426.005(1)(f)(A). A person
is “dangerous to others” for purposes of ORS 426.005(1)(f)(A)
if his “mental disorder makes [him] highly likely to engage
in future violence toward others, absent commitment.” State
v. S. E. R., 297 Or App 121, 122,
441 P3d 254 (2019).
Appellant does not dispute the finding that he had
delusional thoughts that rendered him a danger to others.
The state presented evidence that appellant had acted violently toward his wife and his grandfather over the course of
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 344 Or App 133 (2025) 135
several days leading up to his hospitalization. We need not
recount the details of his actions for purposes of this memorandum disposition. Appellant challenges only the causation
element, asserting that the record does not contain clear
and convincing evidence that his actions were the result of a
mental disorder, as opposed to his kidney disease. “[I]t is not
sufficient for the state merely to prove that a person has a
mental disorder and that the person is dangerous to others[.]
… Rather, the state must prove a causal nexus between the
mental disorder and” the basis for civil commitment. State v.
Gjerde,
147 Or App 187, 192,
935 P2d 1224 (1997).
We have reviewed the record. The state presented
medical evidence that attributed appellant’s violent behavior to his delusional disorder and not to physical-medical
causes. There was also evidence that medical causation had
been ruled out, but that further examination, which appellant refused, had not been done so there could not be certainty regarding that conclusion.
Based on that testimony and the accompanying
medical records, appellant argues that the evidence was
not persuasive that his delusions were the result of mental
illness, and asserts that the evidence was highly persuasive that his delusions were the result of cognitive impairment due to a worsening of his untreated kidney disease.
We conclude that the record was sufficient to support the
trial court’s determination. Although Dr. Beoire, a treating
psychiatrist, acknowledged the possibility that more testing
could reveal additional information, he believed at the time
that appellant’s symptoms and dangerousness were the
result of his mental disorder. This is not a situation where an
alternate explanation for the behavior, unrelated to a mental disorder, is equally or more probable. See, e.g., State v.
D. A. H., 241 Or App 391, 398,
250 P3d 423 (2011) (on de novo
review, concluding record was insufficient to show that the
individual’s disorder caused the allegedly dangerous behavior when the psychiatrist did not explain how the individual’s actions were linked to her mental disorder, and it was
equally plausible that her behavior was the product of distressing circumstances in her personal life); State v. Webber,
181 Or App 229,
45 P3d 1046 (2002) (on de novo review,
136 State v. J. B.
concluding no clear and convincing evidence established that
the individual was a danger to others because of his mental
disorder when that inference was “equaled or outweighed”
by the reasonable inference that the physical altercation
that the individual was involved in was started by the other
person, and no witness attributed the appellant’s physical
response to his mental disorder). The two experts both indicated that appellant’s behavior was the result of his mental
disorder, despite acknowledging the possibility that more
medical information could change that conclusion. A lack
of medical certainty does not render the record insufficient
to support the trial court’s conclusion that appellant was a
danger to others as a result of his mental disorder.
Affirmed.
