No. 935 October 29, 2025 491
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
KENNETH SCOTT EVERS HOOD,
Defendant-Appellant.
Washington County Circuit Court
21CR51603; A179070
Brandon M. Thompson, Judge.
Argued and submitted May 13, 2024.
Bear Wilner-Nugent argued the cause and filed the briefs
for appellant.
Christopher A. Perdue, Assistant Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen
F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General.
Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and
Hellman, Judge.
ORTEGA, P. J.
Affirmed.
492 State v. Hood
ORTEGA, P. J.
Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction
for unlawfully manufacturing a Schedule I controlled substance, ORS 475.752,1 after emergency responders entered
defendant’s apartment to respond to a fire and found evidence of manufacturing psylocibin in plain view. Defendant
assigns error to the trial court’s denial of his motion to
suppress, arguing that police lacked objectively reasonable
grounds to believe that there might be people inside that
needed assistance under the emergency-aid exception to
Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. Defendant
also asserts that pertinent factual findings in the court’s
order denying his motion to suppress were not supported
by constitutionally sufficient evidence. We conclude that
the trial court’s findings were sufficiently supported by the
record, that the emergency aid exception to Article I, section
9, authorized police to enter the premises without a warrant, and that the police found the evidence in plain view.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
We review the trial court’s denial of a motion to
suppress evidence gathered during a warrantless search for
legal error. State v. Ehly, 317 Or 66, 75,
854 P2d 421 (1993).
In doing so, we are bound by the trial court’s express and
implied findings of fact, when those facts are supported by
sufficient evidence in the record. Id.; State v. Garcia,
276 Or
App 838, 839,
370 P3d 512 (2016). We recite the facts in light
of that standard and defendant’s contention that the record
did not support one of the trial court’s findings.
A maintenance worker at defendant’s apartment
complex, Marino, was notified that alarms were sounding in
defendant’s and neighboring apartments. He entered defendant’s apartment to check for residents, and not finding anyone, proceeded to open windows and leave to retrieve “blowers” to dissipate the smoke. Shortly after, Officer Scifres and
Sergeant Cooper responded to the fire. They were let into
the building and led toward defendant’s apartment by a different maintenance worker who did not mention previously
1
ORS 475.752 has been amended since defendant committed his crime; however, because those amendments do not affect our analysis, we refer to the current version of the statute in this opinion.
Cite as 344 Or App 491 (2025) 493
entering or whether anyone was inside. Scifres and Cooper
saw and smelled significant amounts of smoke coming from
defendant’s apartment, leading them to believe that if people were present, they could be unconscious inside the apartment. Scifres and Cooper entered the apartment to search
for occupants without any information as to whether it had
been searched or if there were, in fact, people present inside.
No evidence was presented to suggest that the officers had
any reason to believe the apartment was empty, either. As
the officers entered, they first searched downstairs, then the
children’s bedrooms, and finally defendant’s bedroom, where
they found the source of the fire: a plastic tub placed on top
of an electric heating pad and towels. In it were psylocibin
mushrooms in plain view.
Marino, the maintenance worker who had already
searched for occupants, testified that he saw police arrive
after the fire department. Defendant argues that Marino’s
testimony directly contradicted the finding of the court that
the maintenance worker who let Scifres and Cooper in must
not have been Marino. We disagree. The trial court made
a reasonable inference based on all the witness testimony
before it. See Ehly, 317 Or at 75 (explaining that we are
bound by the factual findings of the trial court, including
any reasonable inferences it made, so long as there is sufficient evidence to support them). No testimony expressly
contradicted the trial court’s inference that more than one
maintenance worker must have been involved nor does any
testimony support defendant’s assertion that the officers
knew the apartment had already been searched. Thus, the
court’s findings are supported by the record, and we are
bound by them.2
Article I, section 9, as well as the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution, protects against warrantless searches in the absence of a valid exception. Rendering
emergency aid is one such valid exception, which applies
“when police officers have an objectively reasonable belief,
based on articulable facts, that a warrantless entry is
2
We also agree with the state that the court’s finding that the maintenance
workers were two different people does not impact the analysis of the officers’
subjective belief regarding the need for entry or whether that belief was objectively reasonable.
494 State v. Hood
necessary to either render immediate aid to persons, or to
assist persons who have suffered, or who are imminently
threatened with suffering, serious physical injury or harm.”
State v. Baker, 350 Or 641, 647,
260 P3d 476 (2011) (footnotes
omitted).
We acknowledge that our case law applying the
emergency-aid exception has generally required that an officer’s subjective belief that a person is in imminent danger of
serious physical injury include some articulable facts establishing a threat to a particular person. See State v. Rennells,
253 Or App 580, 584,
291 P3d 777 (2012), rev den,
353 Or 410
(2013) (explaining that while evidence of a life-threatening
emergency is not required, “entry is permitted if there are
articulable facts reasonably indicating that a person is imminently threatened with suffering serious physical injury or
harm”); see also Baker,
350 Or at 650 (holding that officers’
belief that emergency aid was necessary was objectively reasonable based on reports of yelling and screaming inside of
a residence and the potential presence of a child); State v.
Clay,
293 Or App 797, 803,
429 P3d 1038, rev den,
364 Or
209 (2018) (holding that officers’ belief that emergency aid
was necessary was objectively reasonable when they heard
concerning sounds but had no other evidence of imminent
threat). “If officers believe only that a search is necessary to
discover if there is a person in the location who needs immediate aid, rather than that the search was necessary because
a person who is seriously injured needs their aid, officers are
acting with a ‘purely speculative’ belief that there is a ‘risk
and gravity of harm’ requiring their immediate action.” State
v. Hamilton,
285 Or App 315, 323,
397 P3d 61 (2017). However,
in the case of a residential fire, where it is objectively reasonable for emergency responders to believe that anyone caught
inside could be unconscious and unable to call for help, emergency responders are not operating on a “purely speculative”
belief that aid is required. Cf.
id. at 324-25 (holding that officers acted in a purely speculative manner when they continued their search of the home after finding the person they
believed was in need of emergency aid).
Officers who receive a report of a residential fire,
arrive to significant smoke and no evidence that the fire
Cite as 344 Or App 491 (2025) 495
department has entered the building to extinguish the fire,
and have no reason to believe the building is empty, do not act
on pure speculation in reasonably believing that emergency
aid is necessary. Holding otherwise would go against the
public’s interest in ensuring first responders provide emergency aid when absolutely necessary. Thus, we conclude that
the emergency aid exception extends to these circumstances,
and the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion
to suppress evidence under Article I, section 9.3
Affirmed.
3
To the extent that defendant argues that the Fourth Amendment provides
greater protection than the Oregon constitution on this matter, the federal case
law forecloses that argument. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 US 499, 509,
98 S Ct
1942,
56 L Ed 2d 486 (1978) (“A burning building clearly presents an exigency of
sufficient proportions to render a warrantless entry ‘reasonable.’ Indeed, it would
defy reason to suppose that firemen must secure a warrant or consent before
entering a burning structure to put out the blaze.”).
