State v. Guillen

546                 October 29, 2025              No. 940

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                 STATE OF OREGON

                 STATE OF OREGON,
                  Plaintiff-Respondent,
                            v.
               DAVID TINO GUILLEN,
                  Defendant-Appellant.
              Malheur County Circuit Court
                 22CR59233; A183618

  Erin K. Landis, Judge.
  Argued and submitted July 9, 2025.
   Brett Allin, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause
for appellant. Also on the brief were Ernest G. Lannet,
Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Oregon Public
Defense Commission.
   Emily N. Snook, Assistant Attorney General, argued the
cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Dan Rayfield,
Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
  Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Joyce, Judge, and
Hellman, Judge.
  JOYCE, J.
  Reversed.
  Hellman, J., dissenting.
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 (2025)                                             547

            JOYCE, J.
         Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him
of unauthorized use of a vehicle (UUV). In a single assignment of error, defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of
his motion for judgment of acquittal, arguing that there was
insufficient evidence to prove that he “knowingly” rode in a
truck without the owner’s consent. We agree. Accordingly,
we reverse.
         When reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment
of acquittal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the state to determine whether a rational factfinder could
have found that the essential elements of the crime were
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Cervantes, 

, 

 (1994). Given the question raised on
appeal, i.e., whether a rational trier of fact could have found
that defendant knew that he was riding in a truck without
the owner’s consent, we focus on the facts relevant to that
question.
         Between 2:30 p.m. on December 10, 2022, and
9:40 a.m. the next morning, at least two individuals broke
into the shop on Winegar’s property, ransacked it, and stole
his pickup truck. While investigating the theft, Officer
Rand saw tire tracks in the snow leading up to the shop and
footprints going around the side of the shop into a window,
neither of which had been there before the theft. Based on
those markings, Rand concluded that “at least two” people
were involved in stealing the truck—one to drive the vehicle
used to reach the property, and another to drive away the
stolen truck. Rand entered the truck’s information into a
national database of stolen vehicles.
         Later in the afternoon on the same day that
Winegar’s son reported the truck missing, Michael
McGourty was driving on a dirt road about an hour away
from Winegar’s property when he saw a truck broken down
in the middle of the road.1 McGourty saw two men near the
truck—one inside it and one underneath it—and he stopped
to ask if they needed help. The men declined and said that
their friend was coming to pick them up.
   1
       The truck that McGourty saw turned out to be Winegar’s stolen vehicle.
548                                        State v. Guillen

        About 45 minutes later, McGourty drove by them
again and renewed his offer of help, but the men still
declined. At that point, McGourty noted the license plate
number and reported the truck to the sheriff’s department
because he was concerned that the truck’s position in the
middle of the rural road presented a hazard. He later saw
the men walking away from the truck and into town.
         Deputy Hale and Deputy Rice responded to
McGourty’s call about the truck and dispatch informed them
that it was stolen. When the deputies arrived at the scene,
the two men were no longer at the truck and McGourty
returned to provide a statement. Based on the descriptions
that McGourty provided, Hale and Rice split up and drove
toward town to try to locate the men.
         Hale eventually located defendant and Erik
Sanchez walking alongside the road, and he noticed that
they matched McGourty’s descriptions of the men he had
seen with the truck. Hale then attempted to conduct a “felony stop” of defendant and Sanchez, which consisted of him
drawing his firearm and ordering the men to “get down on
[their] knees” and show their hands “or else.” Sanchez complied with Hale’s orders, but defendant fled down a snowy
embankment and into a nearby field.
         Hale handcuffed Sanchez and searched his person.
During his search, Hale found binoculars, several wallets,
miscellaneous tools, a methamphetamine pipe, and a walkie-talkie. After Hale secured Sanchez, he and the other
responding officers began looking for defendant.
         One of the officers followed defendant’s footprints
in the snow and found a coat tucked under a shrub about
100 yards from the road. Beyond that shrub, it appeared to
the officer that defendant had crawled because there were
arm marks in the snow. The officer followed those tracks
and discovered defendant curled up under another shrub,
shivering, with hypothermia setting in.
        Due to defendant’s pre-stage hypothermia, an officer had to assist defendant with walking, and the officer
led defendant back to a patrol car to warm up. The officers
called an ambulance to the scene to provide hypothermia
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treatment. Once law enforcement identified defendant, they
did not find any warrants or other alerts on him. They also
searched defendant’s clothing and did not find any concerning items or paraphernalia on his person.
        The next day, the police released the truck to
Winegar. When Winegar retrieved his truck, he noticed that
there were several items on the bed of the truck that had
not been there before including, tires, battery chargers, a
mag drill, and a plasma cutter. The plasma cutter was large
enough that it likely required two people to lift it onto the
truck.
        After the police released the truck to Winegar, law
enforcement located Sanchez’s car, which had broken down
in the middle of a road about 20 miles away from where
Winegar’s truck had been found.
         Based on those events, and as relevant here, the
state indicted defendant for UUV.2 The state alleged that
defendant “did unlawfully and knowingly take, operate, ride
in, and / or exercise control over … a truck … without the
consent of the owner.”
        After the state’s case-in-chief, defendant moved for
a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the state’s evidence
was insufficient to prove an element of UUV—that is, defendant’s actual knowledge that he was riding in the truck
without the owner’s consent. The court denied defendant’s
motion.
         The court found defendant guilty of UUV. In issuing its verdict, the court identified several facts that were
significant to its ruling.
   •    First, the court found that it was significant that
        Sanchez and defendant declined McGourty’s offers of
        assistance. In the court’s view, given the snowy conditions and their remote location, “most people in that
        situation, unless they knew that they were up to something, would have taken Mr. McGourty’s help.”

     2
       The state also charged defendant with third-degree escape and possession
of a stolen vehicle. The state dismissed the escape charge pre-trial, and the court
acquitted defendant of possession of a stolen motor vehicle because it found that
the state had failed to prove that defendant drove or possessed the truck.
550                                               State v. Guillen

  •   Second, the court stated that it was significant that
      “there was really no one else in the area” and that they
      were “wandering around on the shoulder of a snowy
      highway in the middle of the night.” The court clarified
      that this was significant because it was “[n]ot exactly a
      safe place for people to be walking around” and because
      “that shows a certain amount of desperation in terms of
      trying to get out of a situation.”
  •   Third, the court stated that it was important that two
      vehicles were found—the stolen truck and Sanchez’s
      vehicle—because “[t]here [was] no way that Mr. Sanchez
      could have gotten his car to [the location where it was
      found] and [the stolen truck] to [where it had broken
      down] by himself.” The court found that that evidence
      “clearly indicate[d] … that there was more than one
      person involved in moving those two vehicles.”
  •   Fourth, the court noted that it was important that the
      plasma cutter found on the truck was so large that it
      was “[n]ot one that could be easily lifted by one man”
      because that also suggested that lifting it there “would
      more likely have been a two-man job.”
  •   Fifth, the court found it significant that there were two
      sets of tire tracks left in the snow at the Winegar property because that also served as a “clear indication” that
      there was a “two-man job going on,” which was “consistent” with two men being found with the stolen vehicle.
  •   Finally, the court highlighted that it was “extremely
      significant” that defendant decided to run and hide in
      freezing conditions when he was contacted by the police.
      In fact, the court stated that “absent his actions when
      [he was] found by the police, [the court did not] think [it]
      … could find [defendant] guilty.” In the court’s view,
      defendant’s flight from the police was “a clear indication
      of guilt” and signaled that defendant “clearly knew that
      something was going on with this vehicle when he was
      contacted by the police.”
         Based on that evidence, the court concluded that
defendant “knowingly rode in a vehicle … without the consent of the owner” and, consequently, that he was guilty of
UUV. In so concluding, the court noted that it was “not sure
that the [state had] proven that [defendant was] the one
that took it,” but that the state had met its burden to prove
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that “he rode in it” and that “he clearly knew something
was afoot with that vehicle based upon his actions when the
police officers contacted them.”
         On appeal, defendant assigns error to the trial
court’s denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the state failed to prove UUV because the evidence
did not establish an element of that crime—that defendant knowingly rode in the truck without the owner’s consent. See ORS 164.135(1)(b) (a person commits the crime of
UUV when they “knowingly ride[ ] in another’s vehicle …
know[ing] that the owner of the vehicle … does not consent to the person’s riding” therein).3 In response, the state
contends that defendant’s actions, including his flight and
refusal of offered assistance, showed that defendant knew
he did not have the owner’s consent to ride in the truck.
Because we conclude that a rational trier of fact could not
have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew
that he was riding in the truck without the owner’s consent,
we reverse.
         As relevant to this appeal, a person commits the
crime of UUV when (1) “[t]he person knowingly rides in
another’s vehicle,” (2) “the person knows that the owner of
the vehicle … does not consent to the person’s riding in the
vehicle,” and (3) “[t]he owner or an authorized user of the
vehicle … did not consent to the person’s riding in the vehicle.” ORS 164.135(1)(b). Accordingly, to convict a defendant
under that theory of UUV, the state is required to prove
    3
      The current UUV statute, as amended in 2019, distinguishes between two
categories of alleged conduct: (1) taking, operating, exercising control over, or
otherwise using a vehicle, and (2) riding in a vehicle. ORS 164.135(1)(a)-(b). When
the state alleges that a person took, operated, exercised control over, or otherwise used a vehicle, the statute requires the state to prove that the person acted
with a reckless mental state as to the owner’s lack of consent. ORS 164.135(1)(a).
In contrast, when the state proceeds under a rides-in theory, the statute—now
in a separate subsection—requires the state to prove that the person knowingly
lacked the owner’s consent. ORS 164.135(1)(b). Here, despite that distinction,
the state alleged in its indictment that defendant “did unlawfully and knowingly
take, operate, ride in, and / or exercise control over … a truck … without
the consent of the owner.” (Emphasis added.). On appeal, the parties agree that,
because the state charged UUV only as “knowingly,” the state was required to
prove that defendant had a knowing mental state as to the owner’s lack of consent. Furthermore, because the pre-2019 version of the statute required a knowing mental state for both categories of conduct, case law interpreting the former
statute remains relevant to our analysis.
552                                           State v. Guillen

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that
they did not have the owner’s consent to be in the vehicle.
         The state may prove a defendant’s knowledge
through circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences that follow from it. See Delgado v. Souders, 

, 

 (2002) (an element of a criminal offense
may be established by “circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from such evidence”). However, an
inferred fact “must be one that a rational factfinder can be
convinced follows beyond a reasonable doubt from the underlying facts.” State v. Bell, 

, 

(2008). Evidence is insufficient to support an inference when
the conclusion depends on a leap in logic that is too large—
either because the reasoning is overly strained or because it
relies on stacking multiple inferences “to the point of speculation.” State v. Bivins, 

, 

(2004). Whether the evidence supports a particular inference is a question of law. Delgado, 

.
         Summarized, the evidence viewed in the light most
favorable to the state is that defendant and Sanchez were
found with the stolen truck within roughly 24 hours of its
theft and approximately an hour’s drive from where it was
taken. Given the tire marks that were left at Winegar’s
property, at least two people were involved in the theft of the
truck: one to drive a vehicle to and from the property and
another to drive the stolen truck away. Despite snowy conditions and being in a remote location, defendant and Sanchez
refused McGourty’s two offers to help with the broken-down
truck, stating that they had a friend coming to help them.
Sanchez’s car was found in the middle of a road 20 miles
away from where the stolen truck broke down. Finally, when
the police approached defendant and Sanchez, defendant
fled and hid in the snow to the point of developing pre-stage
hypothermia.
        According to the state, that evidence supports a
reasonable inference that “defendant assisted Sanchez with
stealing the truck” and that he therefore “knew that the
vehicle was stolen.” We disagree. Although the evidence
indicates that at least two people were involved in stealing
the truck, the state did not present any evidence that either
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defendant or Sanchez were those people. And while defendant and Sanchez were later found with the stolen truck,
their presence with the vehicle alone is insufficient to infer
that they took it. See State v. Huerta-Contreras, 

, 

 (2024), rev allowed, 

 (2025) (concluding that presence in the driver’s seat of a reported-stolen car, by itself, does not support inference of the defendant
knowing or acting with a reckless disregard for the fact that
the vehicle was stolen).
         Furthermore, even assuming that the truck was
stolen shortly before 9:00 a.m. and discovered that same
afternoon about an hour away, several hours elapsed
during which the vehicle could have changed hands. The
state introduced no evidence showing how or when defendant came into possession of the truck nor any evidence
that the truck was damaged such that defendant would
have had reason to believe that it was stolen and that he
was riding in it without the owner’s consent. Cf. State ex rel
Juv. Dept. v. Hal, 

, 

 (2000)
(driver of a stolen vehicle “at least had reason to believe”
that the vehicle was stolen, in part because the interior
had been stripped and wires hung from where the stereo
had been). Without more—such as inconsistent statements,
visible damage to the vehicle that defendant recognized as
indicative of theft, or any evidence linking defendant to the
scene of the theft—mere possession, even under suspicious
circumstances, does not establish that defendant knew the
vehicle was stolen and that he was thus riding in it without
the owner’s consent. See State v. Korth, 

,

 (2015) (insufficient evidence to support finding
that defendant knew the truck was stolen where defendant
operated the truck with a valid key and there was nothing about the appearance of the vehicle that would have
indicated to the defendant that it had been stolen, “such as
evidence of damage to the truck’s locks, windows, or ignition”); State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Mitchell, 

, 

 (1996) (insufficient evidence to establish the youth’s knowledge that the vehicle he was riding
in was stolen, despite the fact that the vehicle’s door locks
were punched and the ignition was damaged, because there
was no evidence that the youth perceived that damage); cf.
554                                          State v. Guillen

State v. Peirce, 

, 

 (2019)
(concluding that, in a sale of a stolen vehicle, evidence of,
among other things a “very cheap price,” damage to the
ignition, and inconsistent statements, was enough together
to allow a factfinder to infer the defendant’s knowledge that
the vehicle was stolen).
         Indeed, the trial court itself acknowledged the
weakness of the inference that defendant participated in
the theft, stating, “I’m not sure that the State’s proven that
[defendant] is the one that took [the truck].” We agree and
find that the conclusion that the state urges—that “defendant assisted Sanchez with stealing the truck” and therefore “knew that the vehicle was stolen” and that he was riding in it without the owner’s consent—requires a “stacking
of inferences to the point of speculation” and a leap in logic
too great to satisfy the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See Bivins, 

.
         The state further contends that “defendant’s flight
and other actions permitted the inference that he knew that
the vehicle was stolen” and that he did not have the owner’s
consent to ride in the truck. To be sure, and as we have previously explained, flight may be relevant as circumstantial
evidence of a guilty mind. State v. Minchue, 

, 

 (2001) (“Oregon courts have long held that
evidence of flight is relevant as circumstantial evidence of
guilty knowledge, which is some evidence of guilt.”); see also
State v. Raney, 

, 705-06, 

 (2024)
(“evidence of a person’s flight is admissible as relevant to
show consciousness of guilt”). But that principle does not
extend so far as to support a specific finding that defendant
knew the truck was stolen. In other words, although flight
may reflect a generalized consciousness of guilt or fear of
legal trouble, it does not, on its own, reveal what the person fleeing actually knew. See State v. Edwards, 

, 

 (2025) (concluding that defendant’s
flight did not support a reasonable inference that defendant
knew he had committed the specific crime being investigated, because the flight was not tied to any conduct indicating knowledge of that offense).
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         That reasoning applies with even greater force here.
When the officer approached defendant, he did not mention
the truck or otherwise indicate that it was stolen. Instead,
the officer drew his weapon, pointed it at defendant and
Sanchez, and ordered them to “[s]how me your hands or else”
and “[g]et down on your knees.” In the absence of any statement connecting the officer’s commands to the vehicle or
any other evidence shedding light on what motivated defendant’s flight, there is no basis to infer that defendant fled
because he knew the truck was stolen, as opposed to some
other reason, such as fear of the police. In the absence of any
statements or conduct tying defendant’s flight to knowledge
of the truck’s stolen status and the owner’s lack of consent
that defendant ride in it, defendant’s behavior is insufficient
to allow a rational factfinder to find that the state proved
the mental state that UUV requires beyond a reasonable
doubt. See State v. Shuneson, 

, 

 (1995) (holding that a passenger’s knowledge that the
vehicle she was riding in was stolen could not be inferred
beyond a reasonable doubt merely because the vehicle was
being driven recklessly and the defendant attempted to flee
from the police).
        Finally, the state also contends that, considering
the evidence as a whole, a rational factfinder could infer
that defendant knew that he did not have the owner’s consent to ride in the vehicle. But none of the facts, whether
alone or stacked, meaningfully ties defendant to the theft
or otherwise demonstrates that defendant had the requisite
knowledge. At most, they raise a suspicion—insufficient to
support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt of the requisite
mental state.
         In sum, the record does not include evidence legally
sufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt
that defendant actually knew that he did not have the owner’s consent to ride in the truck, even when that evidence
is viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the
state. Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on UUV.
        Reversed.
556                                                        State v. Guillen

         HELLMAN, J., dissenting.
         I respectfully dissent. This record contains sufficient evidence for the trial court to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crime of unauthorized use of a vehicle (UUV), ORS 164.135(1)(b). I agree
with the majority that under that statute, the state had to
prove that defendant knew he “did not have the owner’s consent to be in the vehicle.” 

. I disagree,
however, that a determination of guilt in this case would
require impermissible inference stacking, that the record
contained insufficient evidence to support a conviction, and
that the trial court erred when it denied defendant’s motion
for judgment of acquittal on the UUV charge. I take no issue
with the majority’s clear and correct explanation of the controlling law. I simply part ways with its the application of
the law on these facts, as set forth below.
         The key events occurred on December 10 and
December 11, 2022. The state presented evidence that
the weather conditions on those dates were “snowy” and
“slushy” “wintertime weather.” On the morning of December
11, a law enforcement officer responded to the Winegar
property after a family member reported a stolen vehicle.
The Winegar property is located in Grant County, approximately two miles from Prairie City, Oregon. Prairie City
has a population of roughly 500 people.1 Because Winegar
was in the excavation business, the property contained “a
lot of equipment parked out in [a] shop yard.” On December
10 or December 11, Winegar’s flatbed truck was stolen from
the shop on his property, and the shop was “ransacked.”
        At around 3:00 or 4:00 p.m. on December 11, when
the weather was still “terrible” and “snowy,” McGourty
encountered defendant, Sanchez, and the truck near Brogan,
Oregon. State’s Exhibit 2, a map of the area, indicates that
    1
      I appreciate that the prosecutor offered into evidence two maps of the area
and asked the witnesses specific questions about the distances between the locations, those areas’ populations, and the witnesses’ observations about the community. Although those facts may have been common knowledge and obvious to
the trial participants, the prosecutor—wisely—tried the case without assuming
that the factfinder knew those facts and would evaluate the evidence accordingly.
Those maps and that background testimony provided important context for the
witness testimony about the events at issue and were invaluable in my assessment of this case.
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Brogan is approximately the same size as Prairie City.
McGourty observed that the truck was “pretty much in the
middle of” Hill Road and “not [in] a real safe spot.” Hill Road
is a “dirt road” that is “[p]art of the pasture for cattle” with
“cows all around.” Because it is “a local road” that is “a few
miles” from the highway, Hill Road is not “traveled by people who are using the highway.”
         When the men told him that “they had somebody
coming to pick them up,” McGourty offered to tow the truck
“down to the highway because the cell service” in the Hill
Road area was “pretty spotty.” After the men declined,
McGourty left. When he returned about 45 minutes later,
the men were still with the truck. McGourty noticed that
they “had jackets on” and was “concerned for their wellbeing … because it was wintertime.” McGourty then saw
the men abandon the truck and walk north “down the county
road.” According to McGourty, during hunting season, it
was common to see “some strange rigs around.” However,
during winter, it was “not very common at all” for individuals to take walks in Brogan “in those conditions” because
the weather was “terrible” and “snowy.”
         After McGourty contacted law enforcement and
described the two men, Malheur County Deputy Hale
responded, found the truck, and spoke with McGourty. Hale
traveled north on the highway toward Brogan “to see if [he]
could locate anybody walking.” Hale then “located two subjects that matched the description” that McGourty had provided and activated his emergency lights. After Hale drew
his weapon and ordered the men to “show me your hands
or else!” defendant fled and hid for so long that he became
hypothermic. At trial, three law enforcement officers who
had investigated the theft—including Hale—testified that
they did not see any other individuals walking on the highway near Brogan that day.
        On December 13, law enforcement found a vehicle
registered to Sanchez in Ironside, Oregon, approximately
20 miles from the location where Hale had located defendant and Sanchez. That vehicle was parked in the middle
of the road about a mile away from the highway. When
Winegar went to Brogan to recover his truck, he discovered
558                                           State v. Guillen

that the starter and the clutch had been damaged and were
inoperable.
         In concluding that the evidence was legally insufficient to support a conviction, the majority rejects the state’s
argument that “defendant’s flight and other actions permitted the inference that he knew the vehicle was stolen.”
Relying on our opinion State v. Huerta-Contreras, 

, 

 (2024), rev allowed, 

 (2025), the
majority concludes that defendant and Sanchez’s “presence
with the vehicle alone is insufficient to infer that they took
it.” 

. However, this case is distinguishable
from Huerta-Contreras for several reasons. Significantly,
unlike in that case, defendant was not merely “sitting in the
driver’s seat of a stolen car.” Huerta-Contreras, 

. Rather, the record contains evidence of defendant’s
deliberate conduct, including repeated refusals for help and
for transport to the highway while it was snowing, abandoning the truck in a “cow pasture,” and flight from police.
        In addition, the circumstances of defendant’s conduct here differ from the circumstances in Huerta-Contreras.
Unlike that case, which occurred in Marion County, the
relevant events here occurred near “small towns” in Grant
County and Malheur County that had populations of roughly
500 people. Although we did not consider the weather or
geography relevant to our decision in Huerta-Contreras,
those facts are relevant here. Specifically, defendant does
not dispute that his relevant conduct occurred during the
winter, after 3:00 p.m., outdoors, and during “slushy” and
“snowy” conditions in a rural Oregon county.
          Further, the majority concludes that, even if the
truck had been stolen in the morning, McGourty did not
encounter it until the afternoon and that “several hours
[had] elapsed during which the vehicle could have changed
hands.” 

. Based on this record, however, it is speculative, not reasonable, doubt that the truck
could have changed hands between its theft from the
Winegar property and McGourty’s encounters with defendant. As noted above, the truck was stolen from and recovered near towns with populations of about 500 people. The
theft occurred during “terrible” “wintery” weather when
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people were not typically out and about. McGourty encountered the truck, defendant, and Sanchez on a dirt road that
was a part of a cattle pasture—miles from the highway and
not a typical road for travel—and defendant was a stranger
in a small town at a time of year when strangers were not
typically present.
         The majority also relies in part on the fact that that
the record does not contain evidence of “visible damage to
the vehicle that defendant recognized as indicative of theft,”
such as to the “locks, windows, or ignition” to conclude that
there was insufficient evidence to “establish that defendant
knew the vehicle was stolen.” 

. But UUV does not
require that the vehicle have been “stolen” with smashing of
glass or hotwiring ignitions as is commonly represented in
movies or video games. It only requires that a person rode in
a vehicle knowing that they did not have the owner’s consent
to do so. Indeed, there are many instances in which a thief
may not need to cause any damage, let alone “visible damage,” to a vehicle to steal it.
         This is one of those instances. Winegar left the
truck in his shop, unlocked, with the keys inside so that a
mechanic could install injectors in his absence. In addition,
law enforcement officers determined that, because the shop
doors were still “intact and locked” and had not been “damaged,” someone had “gained entry” to the shop “through th[e]
window.” When, as here, a vehicle owner stores the vehicle
in a locked structure like a shop or a garage—rather than
in a driveway or at a curb—and leaves it unlocked with the
keys inside, the absence of visible damage says little about a
defendant’s knowledge as to whether he had the owner’s permission to ride in the vehicle. So even without “visible damage … indicative of theft,” 

 the evidence here allowed
the trial court to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew that he did not have the permission to ride in the
truck.
        In sum, several independent facts—considered as
a whole—establish that defendant knew that he did not
have Winegar’s permission to ride in the truck. Those facts
include: (1) Winegar was not present and neither defendant nor the co-defendant owned the truck; (2) the truck
560                                                          State v. Guillen

carried industrial equipment, such as a plasma cutter, but
the truck was not being used for industrial work; (3) despite
the snowing and freezing conditions, defendant refused
McGourty’s repeated offers for help and to tow the truck
to the highway, where defendant could have better contacted the person who was picking him up; (4) even though
the truck was several miles from the highway, defendant
abandoned it—again, after refusing McGourty’s help—and
instead walked toward the highway; and (5) defendant fled
from law enforcement and hid for so long that he suffered
hypothermia.2
         Could there be innocent explanations for defendant’s conduct? Yes. But just because I can imagine innocent explanations does not mean that the inferences of guilt
here are impermissible or that the evidence was insufficient
to support a guilty verdict. Importantly, when reviewing a
motion for judgment of acquittal we consider the evidence
in the light most favorable to the state, which means that
we allow reasonable inferences to be drawn in the state’s
favor. State v. Cervantes, 

, 

(1994). Moreover, the Supreme Court has explained that
“reasonable doubt [does not] include[ ] imaginary doubt.”
State v. Williams, 

, 

 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, jurors are
instructed that reasonable doubt is “based on common sense
and reason. Reasonable doubt is not an imaginary doubt.
Reasonable doubt means an honest uncertainty as to the
guilt of the defendant.” UCrJI 1009. Using common sense
and reason to evaluate the evidence in this case, a factfinder
could permissibly determine beyond a reasonable doubt that


    2
      I also observe that the truck had a manual transmission, and the clutch
was rendered inoperable, indicating that the person who drove the truck from
the shop onto the dirt road in the cow pasture was completely unable to operate a manual transmission. It is a stretch to imagine that the owner of a work
truck would permit someone who could not operate a manual transmission to use
the truck to travel a long distance; indeed, they would not. And it is similarly a
stretch to believe that someone could ride for any length of time in a work truck
driven by a person who could not operate a manual transmission and not find it
questionable that the driver was permitted to use that truck. Although the inoperable manual transmission fact is not dispositive, it is one more piece of evidence
that indicates defendant knew he did not have the owner’s consent to be in the
truck.
Cite as 

 (2025)                                                561

defendant knew he did not have the owner’s permission to
be in the truck.3
          Before I conclude, I make one final point about this
case. If I were evaluating the evidence in the first instance,
I would not place a great deal of weight on defendant’s flight.
Indeed, I do not agree with the expansive use of evidence of
flight to prove that a defendant committed a charged crime.
To be sure, a person may flee from law enforcement to avoid
being caught for current criminal activity. But flight from
law enforcement can reflect many considerations, including fear and distrust of law enforcement based on personal
experience or community knowledge, a purely instinctual
response to an overwhelming show of force, a fear of false
accusations that could lead to legal consequences, guilt over
an unrelated matter, fear of being apprehended for reasons
unrelated to criminal conduct, or any number of reasons
based on a person’s lived experience that I cannot surmise.
Without knowing precisely why a person might flee from
law enforcement in any given interaction, it strikes me
as a stretch to allow a factfinder to place much weight on
that flight as evidence of the defendant’s culpability of the
charged crime. That said, our law permits such an inference, e.g., State v. Minchue, 

, 

(2001), and State v. Raney, 

, 

(2024)—unless we revisit those holdings. Accordingly, the
trial court’s use of that inference was permissible and supported its ultimate determination that defendant was guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of UUV.
         In sum, although the trial court relied on inferences to determine that the state met its burden to prove
that defendant knew he did not have the owner’s permission
to be in the truck, those inferences were permissible on this
record. As a result, I would affirm the trial court’s denial of
defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the UUV
charge. Because of that, I respectfully dissent.

     3
       The Supreme Court has explained that “reasonable inferences” need not
“follow necessarily from the state’s evidence.” State v. Hedgpeth, 

,

 (2019) (emphasis added). Rather, “evidence may give rise to multiple
reasonable inferences and … the choice between those reasonable inferences is
a matter for the jury.”