State v. Lander

600                 October 29, 2025          No. 953

  This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
   pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
        except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

        IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                STATE OF OREGON

                 STATE OF OREGON,
                 Plaintiff-Respondent,
                           v.
              STEVEN DWAYNE LANDER,
                 Defendant-Appellant.
              Douglas County Circuit Court
                 20CR56688; A183120

  George William Ambrosini, Judge.
  Submitted August 20, 2025.
  Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Rond Chananudech, Deputy Public Defender,
Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the briefs for
appellant.
   Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Timothy A. Sylwester, Assistant
Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Joyce, Judge, and
Hellman, Judge.
  JOYCE, J.
  Affirmed.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 

 (2025)             601

        JOYCE, J.
         Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for five
drug-related offenses: delivery of heroin; delivery of heroin within 1,000 feet of a school; delivery of methamphetamine; delivery of methamphetamine within 1,000 feet of a
school; and delivery of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school.
On appeal, he raises two assignments of error. In his first
assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court
erred by denying his motion to dismiss because the three-year delay in bringing his case to trial violated his state and
federal rights to a speedy trial. In his second assignment of
error, he argues that the trial court erred by imposing an
unconstitutionally disproportionate sentence for his conviction for delivery of heroin. Because defendant did not establish that he was prejudiced by the delay in bringing him to
trial and his sentence is not disproportionate, we affirm.
         Motion to Dismiss for Lack of a Speedy Trial: The relevant facts are few. The state charged defendant in October
2020 and the case did not proceed to trial until three years
later. In that time, defendant was convicted on unrelated
federal drug charges and received a 120-month prison sentence. Almost two years after his sentencing in the federal
case, defendant was brought to trial on the crimes at issue
here. Defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds that the
three-year delay in bringing his case to trial violated his
state and federal constitutional rights to a speedy trial.
The trial court denied the motion, concluding, in part, that
defendant had not proven that he suffered prejudice warranting dismissal. Defendant was convicted, and the trial
court sentenced him to 180 months’ imprisonment.
         On appeal, he reprises his claim that he was entitled to dismissal. “We review a trial court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial for legal
error and we are bound by the trial court’s findings of fact
if they are supported by the record.” State v. Krieger, 

, 

 (2020), rev den, 

 (2021).
        We consider defendant’s claim under the Oregon
Constitution first. See State v. Velykoretskykh, 

, 707 n 2, 

 (2015) (“Under Oregon court’s ‘first
602                                            State v. Lander

things first’ doctrine, we have an obligation to address state
constitutional law claims before federal ones.”). Determining
whether a defendant’s speedy trial rights were violated
involves consideration of three factors: “(1) the length of the
delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; and (3) the resulting prejudice to the defendant.” Krieger, 

. In turn,
there are three ways a defendant can establish prejudice:
“(1) excessive pretrial detention, (2) anxiety and concern, and
(3) impairment of the defense.” State v. Fleetwood, 

, 

, rev den, 

 (2003). The
burden is on the defendant to show they suffered actual prejudice due to the state’s delay. State v. Stinnett, 

, 

 (2018).
          Here, the state argues, and we agree, that even if
the first two factors weigh in defendant’s favor, he failed to
establish that the delay prejudiced him to an extent that
would warrant dismissal. Defendant’s only claim of prejudice is that the delay caused him anxiety because he learned
that he could receive a sentence of up to 240 months’ imprisonment on the state charges, yet he had believed his federal
sentence was a global settlement that included the state
charges. Defendant’s anxiety alone, however, is insufficient
to establish prejudice warranting dismissal. See State v.
Dykast, 

, 

 (1985) (concluding that
while “[m]ost criminal prosecutions cause stress, discomfort
and interference with a normal life” and “[d]elay adds to the
problem,” the defendant’s added anxiety and stress “were
[not] so great as to require dismissal”); Krieger, 

 (reasoning that the defendant’s “generalized argument
of stress and anxiety is not supported by any evidence beyond
that expected in the resolution of any criminal charge”). As
the trial court observed, defendant was “involved in a federal prosecution and was dealing with incarceration and
imprisonment in that case.” Thus, the anxiety that defendant experienced was not over whether he would receive
prison time; that much was already assured by his convictions on the federal charges. Rather, his anxiety was over
how much longer he would be incarcerated. That anxiety
does not establish a state constitutional speedy trial violation. Because defendant failed to establish that he suffered
actual prejudice from the three-year delay, the trial court
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 

 (2025)                               603

correctly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss on state
speedy-trial grounds.
        Defendant’s claim under the United States
Constitution fails for the same reason as his claim under the
Oregon Constitution: defendant failed to prove that he was
prejudiced by the delay.1 Therefore, the trial court correctly
denied defendant’s motion to dismiss on federal speedy-trial
grounds.
         Proportionality Challenge to Sentence: In his second claim of error, defendant argues that his 180-month
sentence for delivery of 100 grams or more of heroin was
disproportionate under the state and federal constitutions.2 We review whether a sentence is unconstitutionally
disproportionate under Article I, section 16, of the Oregon
Constitution for legal error, and “we are bound by any findings of historical fact that the trial court may have made, if
they are supported by evidence in the record.” State v. Ryan,

, 

 (2017).
          The trial court’s imposition of a 180-month sentence
for delivery of heroin was proportional. Article I, section 16,
provides, in part, that “all penalties shall be proportioned
to the offense.” When considering whether a sentence is proportional, we ask whether the length of the sentence would
“shock the moral sense of reasonable people.” Ryan, 

. We consider three factors in determining whether a
sentence is proportional: “(1) a comparison of the severity
of the penalty and the gravity of the crime; (2) a comparison of the penalties imposed for other, related crimes; and
(3) the criminal history of the defendant.” State v. Rodriguez/
Buck, 

, 

 (2009) (analysis of the
three factors under Article I, section 16, also provides a sufficient basis to decide whether a defendant’s sentence was

    1
       The speedy trial analysis under the Sixth Amendment is similar to the
state constitutional analysis—but requires consideration of a fourth factor: the
defendant’s diligence in asserting the right to a speedy trial. Krieger, 

. Defendant’s diligence is not at issue here.
    2
       The state argues that defendant’s challenge to his sentence is not reviewable on appeal because our authority is limited by ORS 138.105(8)(b). Because
defendant’s challenge fails on its merits, we assume, without deciding, that it is
reviewable.
604                                          State v. Lander

disproportionate and cruel and unusual under the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution).
          Defendant’s criminal history influenced the severity of the penalty; we thus begin with that factor. Defendant
had a criminal history that involved multiple drug-related
convictions. His criminal history thus weighs against a conclusion that his sentence was disproportionate. With respect
to the first factor—the gravity of the crime—defendant’s
conduct in delivering 100 or more grams of heroin was
grave. Cf. State v. Miller, 

, 

, rev den, 

 (2018) (explaining that the specific
circumstances and facts of the defendant’s conduct are less
useful for the analysis when statutes, like those prohibiting
delivery of methamphetamine, narrowly define the crime,
because the graveness of a defendant’s specific acts in committing the offenses cannot be compared to different acts
also within the scope).
         As to the second factor, defendant does not point us
toward any related but more serious crimes that would have
resulted in a less severe sentence. Instead, defendant urges
us to compare the 180-month sentence in his state case to
his 120-month sentence on similar charges in his federal
case and to the sentences of the people to whom defendant
sold drugs. We are not convinced that these are appropriate
comparisons, as there are differences in charges, criminal
histories, and enhancement factors. Like defendant’s sentence for delivery of heroin, the sentences for convictions
for the unlawful delivery of significant quantities of other
controlled substances are guided by ORS 475.925 and ORS
475.930. As a result, related crimes are subject to similar
penalties, depending on the quantities of different drugs
the legislature has deemed comparable and the defendant’s
criminal history.
         Thus, we conclude that defendant’s sentence would
not shock the moral sense of reasonable people and is proportioned to his crime under the state and federal constitutions.
        Affirmed.