No. 955 October 29, 2025 607
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
Isaac Lee HASKINS,
Petitioner,
v.
PSYCHIATRIC SECURITY REVIEW BOARD,
Respondent.
Psychiatric Security Review Board
182841;
A183722
Submitted July 22, 2025.
Harris S. Matarazzo filed the brief for petitioner.
Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Jeff J. Payne, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Joyce, Judge, and
Hellman, Judge.
HELLMAN, J.
Affirmed.
608 Haskins v. PSRB
HELLMAN, J.
Petitioner seeks review of an order of the Psychiatric
Security Review Board (PSRB) denying his discharge from
the board’s jurisdiction and continuing petitioner’s commitment to a state hospital designated by the Oregon Health
Authority. In a single assignment of error, petitioner argues
that the board’s determination that his qualifying mental
disorder, when active, renders him a substantial danger
to others is not supported by substantial evidence in the
record. For the following reasons, we affirm.
We review to determine whether substantial
evidence supports the board’s order. ORS 183.482(8)(c).
“Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact
when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” ORS 183.482(8)(c).
A detailed recitation of the facts in this case would
not benefit the bench, the bar, or the public, and we state only
those facts necessary to explain our decision. In 2017, petitioner struck his brother with a sledgehammer. Petitioner
was subsequently diagnosed with personality change due
to a prior traumatic brain injury. Based on that diagnosis,
petitioner was found “Guilty Except for Insanity” of assault
in the second degree in 2018. The trial court found that his
mental disorder rendered him a substantial danger to others and placed him under the board’s jurisdiction for up to
10 years.
In August 2023, the board held a two-year review
hearing pursuant to ORS 161.341(6)(b). Petitioner stipulated that he suffered from a “qualifying mental disorder.”
The board found that petitioner’s qualifying mental disorder, when active, presents a substantial danger to others
and accordingly ordered his continued commitment at the
state hospital.
The board may not release a person from its jurisdiction who has “not recovered from the qualifying mental
disorder, is a substantial danger to others and cannot adequately be controlled if conditionally released on supervision.” ORS 161.346(1)(c). As applicable in petitioner’s case,
“[a] person whose qualifying mental disorder may, with
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 344 Or App 607 (2025) 609
reasonable medical probability, occasionally become active
and when it becomes active will render the person a danger
to others may not be discharged.” ORS 161.351(2). Thus, the
relevant question is whether petitioner’s qualifying mental
disorder, when active, renders him a substantial danger to
others.
On judicial review, we understand petitioner to
argue that the board’s “substantial danger” finding is unsupported by substantial evidence because the board (1) relied
on outdated evidence that does not reflect petitioner’s progress in treatment and (2) undervalued evidence indicating
that petitioner did not commit physical violence during his
hospitalization. We disagree with petitioner’s arguments.
First, we conclude that the board did not rely on
outdated evidence. The board determined that petitioner
poses a “substantial danger” only after “considering all
the evidence admitted on the record,” which comprehensively documents petitioner’s psychiatric history from prior
to the instant offense up until little over a week preceding
the hearing. See ORS 161.346(3) (permitting the board to
consider “the entire psychiatric and criminal history of the
person”). The evidence includes (1) an updated neuropsychological evaluation from April 2023, which notes petitioner’s
inconsistent engagement with treatment intended to mitigate his violent risk; (2) a Short-Term Assessment of Risk
and Treatability (START), dated August 2023, which estimates his violent risk as “moderate”; (3) multiple patient
progress notes recorded within four months of the hearing
that indicate petitioner still must develop symptom management skills and show a “period of stability” in treatment
before discharge; and (4) the testimony of the attending
nurse practitioner, along with her statement that petitioner
“has a qualifying mental disorder, … which when active,
makes him a substantial danger to others” in her August
2023 PSRB Update Note.
To be sure, the attending nurse practitioner acknowledged petitioner’s recent “increased treatment engagement,”
and we are required to “consider evidence that detracts from
PSRB’s finding as well as evidence that supports it in determining whether the supporting evidence is substantial.” See
610 Haskins v. PSRB
Osborn v. PSRB, 171 Or App 248, 252,
15 P3d 80 (2000).
However, the attending nurse practitioner also stated that
petitioner still has “areas for growth” in terms of risk mitigation. Thus, even with the positive trend in petitioner’s
engagement with treatment, a reasonable person could find
that petitioner poses a “substantial danger to others” based
on petitioner’s history of recorded violence and the contemporaneous evidence demonstrating his fluctuating engagement with treatment.1
Second, we understand petitioner to argue that
the board’s “substantial danger to others” finding is not
supported by substantial evidence because petitioner’s violent impulses are directed “almost exclusively” toward his
brother, and he “had not engaged in any ‘substantially dangerous’ behavior” during his hospitalization. Although the
record indicates petitioner presents a violent risk toward his
brother specifically, the attending nurse practitioner testified that his “violent tendencies” are also directed “toward
… family and potentially whoever—it could be a relationship where he would have some kind of form of … a deep
personal connection.” It follows that petitioner’s record of
nonviolence during his hospitalization does not preclude a
“substantial danger” finding because the hospital environment necessarily restricts petitioner’s access to those highrisk connections.
Moreover, the attending nurse practitioner testified
that one of petitioner’s treatment goals is to “reduce or eliminate danger,” and the record includes extensive evidence
that petitioner has not adequately developed his anger management and emotional regulation skillset per treatment
recommendations.
Because the record contains evidence that petitioner failed to satisfactorily engage with treatment
designed to mitigate danger to those identified as potential
targets of his violence, a reasonable person could find that
1
Relatedly, petitioner appears to argue that more recent assessments of petitioner’s current violent risk unfairly rely on a three-year-old formal Violence Risk
Assessment (VRA). However, according to the treatment team, a new VRA is not
warranted until petitioner “attempt[s] to meet” the recommendations of the previous VRA. Here, the record contains evidence that petitioner had not done so at
the time of his hearing.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 344 Or App 607 (2025) 611
his disorder, when active, presents a substantial danger “to
others.” In effect, petitioner’s argument to the contrary asks
us to reweigh the evidence, which we do not do on judicial
review. See McCoin v. PSRB,
310 Or App 534, 535,
484 P3d
1085 (2021) (“[W]e do not make our own findings or reweigh
the evidence[.]”).
Finally, to the extent that petitioner argues that
the board order lacks substantial reason, we disagree.
“Substantial reason exists where the agency has articulated
a rational connection between the facts and the legal conclusion that the agency draws from them.” Rinne v. PSRB,
326 Or App 777, 781,
533 P3d 802 (2023), rev den,
371 Or
825 (2024). Here, the board’s order specifies the applicable
statute under which it held a hearing, lists the evidence it
considered, and cites to the testimony and exhibits that support its findings. See Jenkins v. Board of Parole,
356 Or 186,
208,
335 P3d 828 (2014) (holding substantial reason existed
where agency’s statements left “little doubt as to the facts
on which it relied or the existence of a rational connection
between those facts and its decision pursuant to the statute
and rule under which it acted”). Because the board’s order
“articulated a rational connection between the facts and the
legal conclusion,” it did not lack substantial reason.
Affirmed.
