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← 344 U.S. 206 - Federal Trade Commission v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co.

Federal Trade Commission v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co.’s Empirical Analysis

1952

Citation profile

647
cited by 647 later decisions
26
cited 26 times by the Supreme Court
18
states following
March 2024
most recently cited

303 federal appellate · 24 district · 80 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 647 later decisions (26 by the Supreme Court) — most recently March 2024 · most notably Brown Shoe Co. v. United States (1962), United States v. Adams (1966)

303 federal appellate · 24 district · 80 state decisions — followed in 18 states

175019521960197019801990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Appellate journey

reviewedMinneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. Federal Trade Commission. No.9584 (from Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals)

Relationships

Applies 15 U.S.C. § 13 (§ 2 of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914) · 15 U.S.C. § 14 (§ 3 of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914) · 15 U.S.C. § 45 (§ 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914) · 28 U.S.C. § 2101 · 28 U.S.C. § 452

Relies on Catlin v. United States · Hormel v. Helvering · Cobbledick v. United States · Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co. · Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 647 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[T]he mere fact that a judgment previously entered has been reentered or revised in an immaterial way does not toll the time within which review must be sought. Only when the lower court changes matters of substance, or resolves a genuine ambiguity, in a judgment previously rendered should the period within which an appeal must be taken or a petition for certiorari filed begin to run anew. The test is a practical one. The question is whether the lower court, in its second order, has disturbed or revised legal rights and obligations which, by its prior judgment, had been plainly and properly settled with finality.”
    47 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “I think that no statute, precedent or reason relied on by the Court requires dismissal of this cause. Of course appealability of a judgment depends on its being “final” in the legalistic sense. But there is no more ambiguous word in all the legal lexicon. The Court of Appeals thought its second not its first decree was “final.” Counsel for the Commission evidently believed the second judgment was the “final” one. I am confident many lawyers would have thought the same thing under this Court’s former cases.... But in arguing over “finality” we should not ignore the fact that Congress has declared that this type of proceeding should be reviewable both in the Court of Appeals and here. We frustrate that declaration when review is denied a litigant because of his failure to guess right when confronted in August 1951 with a puzzle, the answer to which no one could know until today.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  3. “the time for appeal may begin to run anew from the date on which the court disposed of the untimely application.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.