Davis v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

5 federal appellate · 60 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 65 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[T]he petitioner must show first that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the petitioner by the Sixth Amendment. A court must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Second, the petitioner must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, which requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the petitioner of a fair trial. Unless a petitioner makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction resulted from a breakdown in the adversarial process that renders the result unreliable. The petitioner must show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the fact finder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt, i.e., the decision reached would have been different absent the errors. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Jackson v. State · Rueda v. State

2. “For many years, Arkansas has allowed collateral attacks upon a final conviction and appeal by means of a postconviction challenge to determine whether a sentence was void because it violated fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitutions or laws of Arkansas or the United States. The present rule for such a challenge is Ark. R. Crim P. 37, which provides the following grounds for a petition: (a) that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or this state; or (b) that the court imposing the sentence was without jurisdiction to do so; or (c) that the sentence was in excess of the maximum sentence authorized by law; or (d) that the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. . . . Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1. The most common ground for postconviction relief is the assertion that the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Hardin

3. “In Lee v. State, 327 Ark. 692 , 942 S.W.2d 231 (1997), we stated simply that “[w]e have decided this issue adversely to Lee’s position on many occasions, and adhere to these previous holdings.” Id. Similarly, in Nooner v. State, 322 Ark. 87 , 907 S.W.2d 677 (1995), we stated that we have discounted this argument on numerous occasions. See Greene v. State, 317 Ark. 350 , 878 S.W.2d 384 (1994). Similarly, on this occasion, we adhere to our previous decisions, and we reject this argument. Therefore, any inference that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this point in the direct appeal is meritless.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Williams v. State