¶1dissenting:
¶2I agree that defendant’s vehicle was properly stopped because of the apparently expired registration plates. I also agree the officer was not required to immediately walk away from the vehicle when he saw the “T” sticker.
¶3I disagree, however, that defendant was properly convicted of the offense of unlawful use of a weapon (720 ILCS 5/24 — 1(a)(4) (West 2002)). I would reverse that conviction and vacate that sentence.
¶4The evidence is clear that the handgun in question was unloaded, in a snap-closed nylon holster, located in the passenger-side backseat. Section 24 — 1(a)(4) does not apply to weapons that “are unloaded and enclosed in a case, firearm carrying box, shipping box, or other container by a person who has been issued a currently valid Firearm Owner’s Identification Card.” 720 ILCS 5/24 — l(a)(4)(iii) (West 2002). A “holster” is a “case.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 554 (10th ed. 2000). “Enclose” means
“1 a (1): to close in: SURROUND () (2) to fence off (common land) for individual use b: to hold in: CONFINE.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 380 (10th ed. 2000).
¶5“Enclosed” means “held in” or “confined,” such as cattle that are enclosed in a pen. The handgun here was clearly held in or confined in the snap-closed nylon holster, and accordingly there can be no violation of section 24 — 1(a)(4).
¶6The State argues that “By using this holster which left parts of the gun exposed, the defendant failed to bring himself within the exemption,” citing a definition of “case” found in the Wildlife Code (520 ILCS 5/1.2b — 1 (West 2002)):
“ [‘]Case[’] means a container specifically designed for the purpose of housing a gun or bow and arrow device which completely encloses such gun or bow and arrow device by being zipped, snapped, buckled, tied[,] or otherwise fastened with no portion of the gun or bow and arrow device exposed.” (Emphasis added.)
¶7The legislature chose to employ an unusual definition of “enclosed case” in the Wildlife Code. The legislature, however, did not choose to employ that definition in the Criminal Code.
¶8The Criminal Code is broader than the Wildlife Code. The Criminal Code does not just provide an exemption for cases, it provides an exemption for cases, firearm carrying boxes, shipping boxes, and “other container[s].” Even if the words from the Wildlife Code, “no portion of the gun … exposed,” were held to apply to the word “case” in section 24 — 1(a)(4), there is no justification for applying them to the word “container.”
¶9The words, however, should not even be applied to the word “case.” The words are simply not contained in or referred to in section 24 — 1(a)(4). As the majority points out:
“[Cjourts ‘cannot read words into a statute that are not there.’ Chicago Tribune Co. v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 332 Ill. App. 3d 60, 67, 773 N.E.2d 674, 680 (2002). Further, ‘ “[u]nder the doctrine of separation of powers, courts may not legislate, rewrite[,] or extend legislation. If the statute as enacted seems to operate in certain cases unjustly or inappropriately, the appeal must be to the General Assembly, and not to the court.” ’ Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 522, 732 N.E.2d 528, 544 (2000), quoting People v. Garner, 147 Ill. 2d 467, 475-76, 590 N.E.2d 470, 474 (1992).” 345 Ill. App. 3d at 1112.
¶10The proscriptions of a criminal statute must be clearly defined. The statute must provide a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to distinguish between lawful and unlawful conduct so that he or she may act accordingly. People v. Maness, 191 Ill. 2d 478, 483-84, 732 N.E.2d 545, 549 (2000). No one may be required at peril of life, liberty, or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. “ ‘All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.’ ” City of Chicago v. Morales, 177 Ill. 2d 440, 450, 687 N.E.2d 53, 60 (1997), aff’d, 527 U.S. 41, 144 L. Ed. 2d 67, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999), quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453, 83 L. Ed. 888, 890, 59 S. Ct. 618, 619 (1939). “[T]he statute must provide sufficiently definite standards for law enforcement officers and fact finders that its application does not depend merely on their private conceptions.” People v. Hickman, 163 Ill. 2d 250, 256, 644 N.E.2d 1147, 1150 (1994). It is irrelevant that section 24 — 1(a)(4) would make better sense if the words “with no portion of the gun exposed” were read into it.
¶11Apparently the State would concede there was no violation here if the holster had been large enough to completely cover the handgun. What sense does that make? The handgun would have been equally accessible if the holster had been larger. Perhaps the State would concede there was no violation if the handgun were contained in a brown paper bag with the top folded shut. Such a handgun would not have any portion exposed, but the State would probably insist that the bag be “zipped, snapped, buckled, tied[,] or otherwise fastened.” A paper clip?
¶12There is no justification for reading the words of section 24 — 1(a), “enclosed in a case … or other container,” to include the requirement that no portion of the gun be exposed. The unlawful use of a weapon conviction should be reversed.