Hunt v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

73 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 75 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[I]t is clear that filing an application for leave to appeal, in which is included any and all allegations of error a defendant may have, is not a condition precedent to seeking post conviction relief. Section 645A(c)(l) makes clear that, unlike in the case of direct appeal, a defendant does not waive an allegation of error that could have been raised by way of application for leave to appeal simply by not filing such an application. That section provides: For the purposes of this subtitle, an allegation of error shall be deemed to be waived when a petitioner could have made, but intelligently and knowingly failed to make, such allegation before trial, at trial, on direct appeal {whether or not the petitioner actually took such an appeal), in an application for leave to appeal a conviction based on a guilty plea, in any habeas corpus or coram nobis proceeding actually instituted by said petitioner, in a prior petition under this subtitle, or in any other proceeding actually instituted by said petitioner, unless the failure to make such allegation shall be excused because of special circumstances. The burden of proving the existence of such special circumstances shall be upon the petitioner. Section 645A(c)(2), largely tracking the language of 645A(c)(l), is of similar effect. This difference in treatment of direct appeals and applications for leave to appeal clearly indicates that the Legislature intended that the presumption apply only in the case of direct appeals. To const”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Holmes v. State · State v. Smith

2. ““[T]he Legislature, when it spoke of “waiver’ in subsection (c) of Art. 27, § 645A, was using the term in a narrow sense. It intended that subsection (c), with its ‘intelligent and knowing’ standard, be applicable only in those circumstances where the waiver concept of Johnson v. Zerbst and Fay v. Noia [ 372 U.S. 391 , 83 S.Ct. 822 , 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963) ] was applicable. Other situations are beyond the scope of subsection (c), to be governed by case law or any pertinent statutes or rules. Tactical decisions, when made by an authorized competent attorney, as well as legitimate procedural requirements, will normally bind a criminal defendant.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. State v. Rose

3. “When an allegation of error could have been made by a petitioner before trial, at trial, on direct appeal (whether or not said petitioner actually took such an appeal),... in a prior petition under this subtitle, or in any other proceeding actually instituted by said petitioner, but was not in fact so made, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that said petitioner intelligently and knowingly failed to make such allegation. (Emphasis added).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Conyers v. State