120 November 19, 2025 No. 999
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of the Marriage of
Julio Oscar Larios RAMIREZ,
Petitioner-Appellant,
and
Delia Mata HERNANDEZ,
Respondent-Respondent,
and
Maria C. Leos MATA,
Interested Party.
Washington County Circuit Court
21DR18614; A182212
D. Charles Bailey, Jr., Judge.
Submitted June 6, 2025.
Jeffrey D. Smith filed the brief for appellant.
Sandra P. Naranjo filed the brief for respondent.
Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and
O’Connor, Judge.
O’CONNOR, J.
Portion of supplemental judgment awarding $1,911 in
deposition costs reversed; otherwise affirmed.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 345 Or App 120 (2025) 121
O’CONNOR, J.
In this marital dissolution case, husband appeals
from the trial court’s supplemental judgment awarding fees
and costs to wife. In his first assignment of error, husband
asserts that the trial court erred when it awarded $1,911 in
costs described as “Court Reporter-Deposition.” In his second assignment of error, husband argues that the trial court
erred when it awarded attorney fees, costs, and expenses
to wife based on what husband claims was a post hoc
analysis, which, he asserts, is not permitted. For the reasons explained below, we agree with husband regarding his
first assignment of error and reverse the trial court’s award
of $1,911 in costs of a deposition. We reject defendant’s second assignment of error and affirm the trial court’s award
of remaining fees, and costs.
FACTS
Husband and wife were married in 2012. However,
they did not begin to live together until 2015. Husband and
wife did not have any children together. Wife owned real
property and a daycare business, which she had acquired
before she married husband. Before their marriage, husband and wife verbally agreed that they would keep their
finances separate.
Husband and wife entered into a postnuptial agreement in December 2016.1 The postnuptial agreement stated,
in part, that wife would retain premarital real property, the
daycare business, and certain vehicles.
Husband initiated divorce proceedings in October
2021. During the pendency of this case, husband contested
the validity of the postnuptial agreement on the grounds
that he did not understand what he was signing. The post-nuptial agreement was written in English, which is not
husband’s primary language. But husband testified that he
was able to pass multiple courses in English without the
aid of an interpreter. Husband also testified that he passed
his U.S. citizenship test in English. Husband stated that he
1
The agreement was reflected in a General Judgment of Unlimited Legal
Separation that was filed with the court under a separate case number. The parties refer to it as a postnuptial agreement, and we do the same.
122 Ramirez and Hernandez
had a draft of the postnuptial agreement for approximately
45 days before he signed it. Wife claimed in the trial court
that husband consulted an attorney about the postnuptial
agreement. Husband denied consulting with a lawyer in his
testimony. Husband testified that he consulted two people in
his church about the postnuptial agreement before signing
it.
During the divorce hearing, husband admitted to
falsifying bank statements that he submitted to wife during
discovery and to the court. Husband testified that he knew
that the postnuptial agreement was a legal document, that
no one forced him to sign it, that no one stopped him from
seeking legal advice, no one stopped him from having the
postnuptial agreement translated, and that he had time to
have an attorney review it for him.
The trial court issued a written decision after the
divorce trial. The court concluded that the postnuptial
agreement was enforceable and distributed the marital
assets accordingly. The trial court found that husband had
falsified documents and financial information, gave false or
misleading testimony, and otherwise withheld information.
The trial court also found that wife was not forthcoming and
avoided answering questions from husband or the court.
Wife filed a Statement for Attorney Fees and Costs in
which she sought $45,486.00 in attorney fees and $3,122.95
in “expenses.” As part of the $3,122.95 in expenses, wife
claimed $1,911.00 for “Court Reporter-Deposition.” Husband
disputed wife’s claims for attorney fees on the grounds that
his dispute of the postnuptial agreement was reasonable,
and wife’s settlement offers were unreasonable. The trial
court granted wife’s request for fees in its entirety. In a written order, the court stated that it agreed with and adopted
all reasons wife stated in her request. The court emphasized
that husband should have known that he would not likely
prevail in his challenge to the postnuptial agreement and
thus would not be awarded a share of wife’s premarital real
property. The court also explained that the court and wife’s
counsel had to spend additional time and resources on the
case because of the fraud that husband committed on the
court.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 345 Or App 120 (2025) 123
ANALYSIS
Award of deposition fees. In his first assignment
of error, husband argues that the trial court erred in its
award of $1,911 for court reporter fees to wife because a
court may not award costs for depositions. Wife argues for
the first time on appeal that the claimed expense was a fee
for interpreter services, and the trial court had authority
to award her that amount in costs.2 Whether the trial court
improperly awarded deposition fees in violation of ORCP
68 presents legal question which we review for an error of
law. O’Neal and O’Neal, 158 Or App 431, 433,
974 P2d 785
(1999) (“[W]hether the trial court erred in failing to follow
the procedure of ORCP 68 is a question of law.”); see also
Laack v. Botello,
338 Or App 333, 342,
567 P3d 474, rev den,
374 Or 143 (2025) (explaining that we “ ‘normally review the
amount of an award of costs for abuse of discretion, but, to
the extent the court’s decision is based on its interpretation
of an agreement or statute, we review for error of law’ ”)
(quoting Butler Block, LLC v. AGNI Group, LLC,
240 Or App
548, 552,
250 P3d 924 (2011)).
Oregon Rule of Civil Procedure 68 A(2) governs a
trial court’s award of “costs and disbursements.” The rule
provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he court, acting in its sole
discretion, may allow as costs reasonable expenses incurred
by a party for interpreter services. The expense of taking
depositions shall not be allowed, even though the depositions are used at trial, except as otherwise provided by rule
or statute.” ORCP 68 A(2).
Here, wife’s Statement of Attorney Fees and Costs
identifies $1,911.00 of the $3,122.95 in expenses for “Court
Reporter-Deposition.” There is no evidence in record that
supports wife’s claim that the expense was for an interpreter. Rather, the expense is expressly identified in wife’s
request for fees and costs as a court reporter for a deposition. A trial court “shall not” allow the expense of taking a
deposition as costs under ORCP 68 A(2). Thus, that portion
of the award was in direct conflict with the plain text of the
2
Wife also argues that husband did not preserve the arguments he makes on
appeal. However, a review of the record shows that the arguments he makes on
appeal are preserved in his objection to wife’s Statement of Attorney Fees.
124 Ramirez and Hernandez
rule, and trial court erred in awarding that cost in the supplemental judgment.
Award of attorney’s fees and costs to wife. In his second assignment of error, husband argues that the trial court
improperly based its decision to award attorney’s fees and
costs based on a “post hoc reference to the result actually
obtained[,]” rather than the parties’ “circumstances and
knowledge at the time the settlement was tendered and
rejected.” Callen and Callen, 307 Or App 714, 719,
479 P3d
313 (2020) (internal citation omitted). Husband argues that
his challenge to the postnuptial agreement was not frivolous, even though the trial court ultimately sided with wife.
If the postnuptial agreement was not binding, husband
argues, then wife’s settlement offers were unreasonable.
In response, wife argues that the trial court properly awarded the fees because of husband’s fraud on the
court, which resulted in the waste of resources through
unnecessary litigation. Wife argues that the court properly considered that there was ample opportunity to settle
this case, and that her settlement offers were reasonable.
Wife contends that the trial court determined that husband
should have known that the postnuptial agreement would
have been upheld, but that it also stated that the fees and
costs were awarded based on “blatant fraud on the court
requiring additional time and resources” which is proper
under the factors enumerated in ORS 20.075.
We review a trial court’s award of attorney’s fees,
costs, and expenses for abuse of discretion. Callen, 307 Or
App at 718. “However, the proper exercise of discretion may
be predicated on the trial court’s determinations of questions of law or fact—and those determinations, in turn, may
implicate independent standards of review.”
Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Here, husband’s challenge on
appeal challenged the trial court’s conclusion that he was
not objectively reasonable in pursuing settlement. A trial
court’s conclusion that a party was not objectively reasonable
in pursuing settlement is a legal conclusion that we review
for legal error.
Id. (internal citation omitted). That legal
conclusion, in turn, rests on factual findings. We review a
trial court’s factual findings for any evidence in the record
Nonprecedential Memo Op:
345 Or App 120 (2025) 125
to support them. R. M. v. McNeer,
341 Or App 425, 432,
575
P3d 137 (2025) (internal citation omitted). “When a trial
court does not make express factual findings, we presume
that the facts were decided in a matter consistent with the
trial court’s ultimate conclusion so long as there is evidence
in the record to support those implicit findings.”
Id. (internal
citations omitted).
A trial court may award reasonable attorney fees,
costs, and expenses reasonably incurred in a divorce action
in favor of a party or in favor of a party’s attorney. ORS
107.105(1)(j). ORS 20.075(1) provides a list of factors that
the trial court shall consider in its decision to award fees,
including “[t]he conduct of the parties in the transactions
or occurrences that gave rise to the litigation, including any
conduct of a party that was reckless, willful, malicious, in
bad faith or illegal;” “the objective reasonableness of the
claims and defenses asserted by the parties;” “the objective
reasonableness of the parties and the diligence of the parties and their attorneys during the proceedings;” and “such
other factors as the court may consider appropriate under
the circumstances of the case.” If a court considers a party’s
objective reasonableness in pursuing settlement as a basis
to award attorney fees, it must make that assessment “in
the light of the parties’ circumstances and knowledge at
the time the settlement was tendered and rejected and not
by some post hoc reference to the result actually obtained.”
Callen, 307 Or App at 719 (internal quotation marks and
emphasis omitted).
Here, the trial court adopted wife’s arguments in
its written order to award her attorney’s fees and costs.
The trial court also explained that “the main reasons [for
awarding wife attorney’s fees and costs] are that [husband]
should have known that he would not likely prevail on a
few of the properties due to the post-nuptial agreement and
his blatant fraud on the court required additional time and
resources from [wife’s] counsel.” The trial court had already
concluded in its written order on dissolution that the parties
had entered into “a legally enforceable post-nuptial agreement which was entered by the court” in 2017.
126 Ramirez and Hernandez
The trial court did not err when it concluded that
husband was not objectively reasonable in pursuing settlement negotiations. Husband argues that the trial court
impermissibly employed post hoc reasoning because it was
unclear whether the post-nuptial agreement was enforceable and husband’s decisions to reject wife’s settlement offers
were reasonable given that uncertainty. In Patterson and
Kanaga (Patterson I), 206 Or App 341,
136 P3d 1177 (2006),
we concluded that a trial court erred when it concluded that
a separation agreement unambiguously applied in a dissolution proceeding, and we reversed for the trial court to take
extrinsic evidence on the parties’ intent. Husband relies on
the analysis in Patterson I in support of his argument that it
was objectively reasonable for him to reject wife’s settlement
offers in the hope that extrinsic evidence would persuade
the trial court that the postnuptial agreement was invalid.
If wife could not enforce the agreement, husband argues,
he would have been entitled to significantly more than wife
offered him in settlement.
Our decision in Patterson I turned on our conclusion that the separation agreement was ambiguous because
it could plausibly be interpreted to apply to the dissolution
proceeding or to apply only the parties’ period of separation.
206 Or App at 351. On remand, the trial court considered
extrinsic evidence and concluded that the parties intended
the separation agreement to control the division of their
property at dissolution. Patterson and Kanaga,
242 Or App
452, 463,
255 P3d 634, rev den
351 Or 216 (2011) (Patterson
II). The husband appealed again, and we affirmed.
Here, husband argues that he reasonably litigated
the enforceability of the agreement because he did not understand its terms when he entered into the agreement and the
parties continued to live together for a time. The trial court
found, however, that husband “gave false or misleading testimony and withheld information at times” in addition to
“falsifying documents and financial information.” The trial
court’s findings support its conclusion that husband did, in
fact, understand the agreement when he entered into it and
that he was not truthful when he claimed he did not understand the agreement. That is not impermissible post hoc
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 345 Or App 120 (2025) 127
reasoning of the sort prohibited in Callen. Husband does not
develop a separate argument that terms of the agreement
itself were ambiguous. The trial court did not err when it
relied on husband’s rejection of wife’s settlement offers as
one reason to impose attorney fees and costs.
The court’s order reflects that the court based its
decision on the required statutory factors under ORS 20.075.
The court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded attorney’s fees and costs to wife, other than the expense for depositions discussed above.
Portion of supplemental judgment awarding $1,911
in deposition costs reversed; otherwise affirmed.
