Schroeder v. Maitinnara

430                 December 3, 2025             No. 1042

   This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
    pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
         except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                 STATE OF OREGON

            Cassandra Louise SCHROEDER,
                 Petitioner-Respondent,
                            v.
                 Ross MAITINNARA,
                 Respondent-Appellant.
            Washington County Circuit Court
                 22DR12736; A184834

  Kelly D. Lemarr, Judge.
  Argued and submitted October 28, 2025.
  George W. Kelly argued the cause and filed the brief for
appellant.
  Laura Graser waived appearance for respondent.
   Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and
Jacquot, Judge.
  TOOKEY, P. J.
  Vacated and remanded.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 

 (2025)           431

        TOOKEY, P. J.
         In this domestic relations case, father appeals a
supplemental judgment awarding mother attorney fees and
costs in the amount of $22,629. On appeal, mother did not
file a responding brief or appear at oral argument. For the
reasons stated below, we vacate and remand the supplemental judgment.
         Trial courts have discretion to award attorney fees
and costs in a proceeding to modify a judgment of dissolution of marriage. ORS 107.135(8). In determining whether
to make an award of attorney fees and the amount, courts
are required to consider the factors set forth in ORS 20.075.
A trial court’s findings “need not be complex or lengthy.”
McCarthy v. Oregon Freeze Dry, Inc., 

, 190, 

 (1998). However, the findings “must describe the
relevant facts and legal criteria for the court’s decision to
award or deny attorney fees in any terms that are sufficiently clear to permit meaningful appellate review.” Id.
at 190-91. Due to the nature of discretionary fee awards,
“sometimes, the absence of an explanation makes it impossible in practice to determine whether the court acted within
its discretion.” Moreau v. Samalin, 

, 

 (2019).
         Here, mother initiated the proceeding to modify the
stipulated judgment of dissolution, but, in awarding fees to
mother, the trial court did not address the ORS 20.075 factors adequately. Instead, the trial court ruled more generally that it was unreasonable for father to refuse “to accept
the recommendations of the stipulated court appointed custody evaluator,” that it was unreasonable for father to withdraw his concession on custody, that he took unreasonable
positions regarding parenting time, and that the “major
impediment to settlement in this matter was … [f]ather’s
fixation on the unfounded sexual abuse allegations.”
         Having reviewed the record, we have difficulty
agreeing with the trial court that it was unreasonable
for father to challenge the custody evaluator’s recommendations. Therefore, we have difficulty concluding the trial
court acted within the permissible bounds of discretion
432                                 Schroeder v. Maitinnara

when it required father to pay all attorney fees and costs
incurred by mother from the time of the custody evaluation.
Nevertheless, we also well understand that trial courts are
usually in a better position than appellate courts to assess
the conduct of the parties. As a result, in this case, in relationship to a more fulsome discussion of the factors set forth
in ORS 20.075, we think that “vacating and remanding to
the trial court is … the appropriate disposition” because
the “discretionary attorney fee award is not susceptible to
meaningful appellate review due to a lack of explanation or
findings.” Moreau, 

.
        Vacated and remanded.