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← 345 Pa. Super. 374 - Commonwealth v. Doty

345 Pa. Super. 374 - Commonwealth v. Doty’s Empirical Analysis

1985

Citation profile

41
cited by 41 later decisions
4
states following
September 2017
most recently cited

41 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 41 later decisions — most recently September 2017 · most notably 379 Pa. Super. 1 - Commonwealth v. Riffert (1988), 376 Pa. Super. 54 - Commonwealth v. Santiago (1988)

41 state decisions

1601985199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986) · 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986) · 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986)

Relies on Rawlings v. Kentucky · Starnes v. Penrod Drilling Co. · Scott v. United States · Berger v. New York · United States v. Giordano

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 41 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “An application for an order authorizing interceptions of telephone communications must contain, inter alia, the identity of the person, if known, committing the offense under investigation and whose communications are to be intercepted. It must also contain details about particular offenses, the type of communications to be intercepted, and must show that there is probable cause to believe that pertinent communications will be transmitted on the facility under surveillance. 18 Pa.C.S. § 5709(3). The standard for determining whether probable cause existed [for a wiretap or a pen register] is the same as that used to determine cause for search warrants. See: United States v. Talbert, 706 F.2d 464, 467 (4th Cir.1983); United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d 478, 481 (3d Cir.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 , 95 S.Ct. 1338 , 43 L.Ed.2d 432 (1975). The facts contained in the affidavit for a search warrant must be such that an independent, issuing authority, exercising reasonable caution, can conclude that the items sought are connected with criminal activity and that they will be found in the place to be searched. Commonwealth v. Council, 491 Pa. 434, 443 , 421 A.2d 623, 627 (1980); Commonwealth v. Ryan, 300 Pa.Super. 156, 167 , 446 A.2d 277, 283 (1982). Similarly, in an application for a wiretap, the Commonwealth must establish probable cause to believe that (1) a person has or is about to commit one of the offenses enumerated in the statute, (2) that communications relating to that ”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “In order to obtain wiretap authorization: [t]he Attorney General, or ... a deputy attorney general designated in writing by the Attorney General, or the district attorney or ... an assistant district attorney designated in writing by the district attorney of the county wherein the interception is to be made, may make written application to any Superior Court judge for an order authorizing the interception of a wire, electronic or oral communication by the investigative or law enforcement officers or agency having responsibility for an investigation involving suspected criminal activities....”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “Minimization of the interception of communications not subject to seizure is a crucial requirement of a lawful wiretap. Scott v. United States, [ 436 U.S. 128 , 98 S.Ct. 1717 , 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978)], supra; Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 , 87 S.Ct. 1873 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967). Without minimization, surveillance of telephone conversations amounts to a general search and an unreasonable intrusion into a citizen’s privacy. The purpose of minimization is to reduce the scope of an intrusion while at the same time allowing legitimate law enforcement aims to be pursued. An overly restrictive interpretation of the minimization requirement will make it impossible to use a telephone intercept as an effective method for investigating activities of organized crime, such as drug trafficking, gambling, political corruption, etc., which invariably are carried on in secret. See: United States v. Cox, 567 F.2d 930 (10th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 927 , 98 S.Ct. 1496 , 55 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978). This is why minimization must be a question of what is reasonable and practical under the circumstances of each case. Scott v. United States, supra, 436 U.S., at 140 , 98 S.Ct. at 1724 , 56 L.Ed.2d at 179 ; United States v. Armocida, supra, 515 F.2d at 42. The Commonwealth has the burden of proving at a suppression hearing that the manner in which the wiretap was conducted did not impose a greater invasion of privacy than was reasonably necessary under the circumstances. See: United States v. Ar”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.