State v. Emerson

¶1concurring.

¶2We, like the trial court, find it difficult to believe that the legislature intended to make youths subject to criminal penalties, if they depart from the minimum-security institutions of the Department of Corrections to which committed by the juvenile courts. However, provided the youth is over seventeen years of age at the time of the escape, we are persuaded, for the reasons stated by the majority, that such is the proper construction of La.R.S. 14:110, as amended by Act 450 of 1975.

¶3We do further note that a juvenile so committed is not “sentenced” to the Department of Corrections. State v. Williams, 301 So.2d 327 (La.1974). See La.R.S. 13:1580; La.C.Cr.P. art. 871. We do not read the majority opinion as holding otherwise.

¶4Therefore, an escapee over seventeen detained as a juvenile is not subject to mandatory imprisonment in the penitentiary (as is one who escapes after “having been sentenced to the Department of Corrections”, La.R.S. 14:110 A), but he is instead subject only to imprisonment in the parish jail, and then only at the discretion of the trial court (which may of course suspend a sentence and permit the return of the juvenile to the juvenile facility).1

¶6dissenting.

¶7Defendants Emerson and Duperon were not persons legally confined to the Louisiana Training Institute such that they could *1153have been guilty of violating La.R.S. 14:110 as amended by Act 450 of 1975 effective September 12, 1975. This is so in my view, notwithstanding that amendment to R.S. 14:110 followed this Court’s decision in State v. Williams, 301 So.2d 327 (La.1974). My view is bolstered by the fact that statutes relative to commitment of juveniles at the time these defendants were probably1 “sentenced” to Louisiana Training Institute merely authorized the judge to assign the custody of the child to the institution.

¶8It may be true as the majority states that Act 756 of 1975 in its relevant “confinement” provision became effective before the date of the alleged escape, i. e., December 18, 1975. This only means, however, that a person “sentenced” by a juvenile court judge on or after September 12, 1975, might legally have been “confined.” It does not however mean that these defendants who were only legally committed prior to the effective date of the amendment to R.S. 13:1580 were “confined” by operation of law on September 12, 1975.

¶9Because criminal laws are stricti juris I believe that the trial judge was correct when he found the defendants were not legally confined to the Department of Corrections on December 18, 1975 when they allegedly escaped from Louisiana Training Institute.

¶10Accordingly I dissent.

¶12On Application for Rehearing

¶13A majority of this court adheres to the view that the motion to quash should be overruled because the crime of simple escape, La.R.S. 14:110 A (1) is charged by bills of information.

¶14The applicants additionally point out that the bills incorrectly attempt to label the offense charged as a felony. Since the defendants were not “sentenced” to the Department of Corrections, they are subject only to imprisonment without hard labor for not more than one year.1

¶15With this clarification, our original decree is reinstated. The state is reserved the right to apply for rehearing within the applicable delay, should the state feel that this clarification represents any change in our original ruling.