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345 So. 2d 1252

Docket No. 11519.

Braddy v. Triangle Timber, Inc.

Judy BRADDY v. TRIANGLE TIMBER, INC.

Louisiana Court of Appeal

Decided May 9, 1977.

Louisiana Court of Appeal · decided 1977-05-09

Cited by 10 later decisions — most recently October 1988

10 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“LSA-C.C.P. Art. 2083 provides in part: An appeal may be taken from a final judgment rendered in causes in which appeals are given by law whether rendered after hearing or by default, from an interlocutory judgment which may cause irreparable injury, ... LSA-R.S. 23:1351 provides in part: A. Either party may appeal to the proper appellate court from any judgment rendered in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter ...”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Poullard v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.

Relies on Vidrine v. Argonaut-Southwest Insurance · 157 So. 2d 276 - Naquin v. Coal Operators Casualty Co. · Griffith v. Wyatt Lumber Co.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1977-05-09

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Henry A. Mentz, Jr., Hammond, for appellant.

¶2Charles B. W. Palmer, Amite, for appellee.

¶3Before SARTAIN, COVINGTON and LOTTINGER, JJ.

¶4LOTTINGER, Judge.

¶5

ON MOTION TO DISMISS

¶6This is a workmen's compensation suit. On March 4, 1977, the Trial Court rendered both a preliminary judgment pursuant to LSA-R.S. 23:1316 as well as a judgment on the merits after a trial. On March 9, 1977, defendant was granted a suspensive appeal and filed the requisite bond.

¶7Plaintiff has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal only insofar as it relates to the preliminary judgment contending that it is an interlocutory decree which is not appealable citing Vidrine v. Argonaut-Southwest Insurance Company,166 So.2d 287 (La.App.3rd Cir. 1964); Naquin v. Coal Operators Casualty Co.,157 So.2d 276 (La.App.3rd Cir. 1963); and Griffith v. Wyatt Lumber Co.,193 So. 257 (La.App.2nd Cir. 1939).

¶8In Vidrine, after a preliminary judgment had been rendered, the suit was dismissed as being premature, and thus with the dismissal fell the preliminary judgment. The Court in passing merely noted "that a preliminary judgment rendered in a workmen's compensation suit under the provisions of LSA-R.S. 23:1316 is not a final judgment but is interlocutory in nature."

¶9In Naquin, the Court held that an order setting aside two previously granted preliminary judgments was interlocutory and nonappealable.

¶10Similarly in Griffith the Court held that an order denying a preliminary judgment was interlocutory and nonappealable.

¶11Generally appeals can only be taken from final judgments or "from an interlocutory *1253 judgment which may cause irreparable injury." LSA-C.C.P. art. 2083. Therefore, conceding arguendo that a preliminary judgment pursuant to LSA-R.S. 23:1316 is interlocutory rather than a final judgment, it could only be appealed if it may cause irreparable injury. However, we note that LSA-R.S. 23:1351 in part provides:

"Either party may appeal to the proper appellate court from any judgment rendered as provided in R.S. 23:1035 and in Part IV of this Chapter. …." (emphasis supplied)

¶12The chapter that is referred to is Chapter 10 of Title 23, Labor and Workmen's Compensation. Part IV of Chapter 10 includes LSA-R.S. 23:1316, preliminary judgments. Therefore, the conclusion must be reached that even though generally interlocutory decrees are not appealable, a preliminary judgment pursuant to LSA-R.S. 23:1316, whether interlocutory or not, is appealable. As between a general and a special law, the special law controls. We therefore conclude that there is no merit to plaintiff-appellee's argument that this is not an appealable judgment.

¶13Therefore, for the above and foregoing reasons the motion to dismiss is denied. All costs of this proceeding before this Court are taxed to plaintiff-appellee.

¶14MOTION DENIED.

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