Fewell v. Pickens’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

41 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 43 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo, as it is for this court to decide what a statute means. Fewell v. Pickens, 346 Ark. 246 , 57 S.W.3d 144 (2001); Hodges v. Huckabee, 338 Ark. 454 , 995 S.W.2d 341 (1999). In this respect, we are not bound by the trial court’s decision; however, in the absence of a showing that the trial court erred, its interpretation will be accepted as correct on appeal. Harris v. City of Little Rock, 344 Ark. 95 , 40 S.W.3d 214 (2001); Norman v. Norman, 342 Ark. 493 , 30 S.W.3d 83 (2000). The first rule in considering the meaning and effect of a statute is to construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. Raley v. Wagner, 346 Ark. 234 , 57 S.W.3d 683 (2001); Dunklin v. Ramsay, 328 Ark. 263 , 944 S.W.2d 76 (1997). When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to rules of statutory construction. Stephens v. Arkansas Sch. for the Blind, 341 Ark. 939 , 20 S.W.3d 397 (2000); Burcham v. City of Van Buren, 330 Ark. 451 , 954 S.W.2d 266 (1997). Where the meaning is not clear, we look to the language of the statute, the subject matter, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be served, the remedy provided, the legislative history, and other appropriate means that shed light on the subject. Stephens, supra (citing State v. McLeod, 318 Ark. 781 , 888 S.W.2d 639 (1994)). Finally, the ultimate rule of statutory construction is to give effect to”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Clayborn v. Bankers Standard Insurance

2. “In their final point on appeal, Fewell and Holdingsco argue that the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear and decide the Commissioner's petition for order of liquidation because the case was on appeal to this court on the issue of the validity of the appointment of the receiver. The Commissioner argues that the trial court did have jurisdiction to hear the liquidation issues because it is a collateral matter not on appeal. [Emphasis ours.] .... On the merits, it appears that the General Assembly anticipated that various orders would be appealed without affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court, as noted in Ark. Code Ann. § 23-68-103 (d), which states: (d) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from an order granting or refusing rehabilitation, liquidation, or conservation, and from every other order in delinquency proceedings having the character of a final order as to the particular portion of the proceedings embraced therein. [Emphasis in original.] In looking at this provision, we believe that the General Assembly anticipated that appeals would arise piecemeal from orders issued by the trial court. As such, we find that the matters here were collateral and that the trial court retained jurisdiction to hear the liquidation petition while the appeal in Fewell I was pending here. Divestiture of jurisdiction in the trial court only occurs when the issue on appeal directly relates to the matter under review by the appellate court. We noted in Vande”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Box v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc.

3. “The rule that an appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction applies only to matters necessarily or directly involved in the matter under review. It does not stay further proceedings with respect to rights not passed on or affected by the judgment or decree from which the appeal is taken. Matters which are independent of, or collateral or supplemental, are left within the jurisdiction and control of the trial court.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Nameloc, Inc. v. Jack, Lyon & Jones, P. A.