United States v. Walker’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

11 federal appellate · 2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““When a sentence is imposed upon a defendant following a first trial, the Government may not attack it, but the defendant can. If he chooses to do so and succeeds in obtaining a retrial, he suffers no detriment from the sentence imposed after the first trial, and is entitled to no benefit from it. If his second trial results in a conviction, any lawful sentence may be imposed upon him without regard to the sentence passed after the abortive first trial. “In that situation, of course, a heavier sentence ought not to be imposed upon a defendant because he sought vindication of his legal rights and succeeded in obtaining an order for a new trial. Judicial vindictiveness for resort to judicial processes is morally wrong, but the judge who presides at a second trial has the power and the duty to impose any sentence authorized by law, which, in light of all the facts and circumstances then known to him, other than the defendant’s litigiousness, seems most appropriate and just.” Id. at 432 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Stafford

2. ““[T]he import of the [District] Court’s ruling was to condition his Constitutional right to seek correction upon the risk of another sentence, then unforeseeable in nature and extent. Thus, though not so intending, the Court potentially penalized him for asserting the privilege. This the law forbids * * *. [Citing Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 , 78 S.Ct. 221 , 2 L.Ed.2d 184 (1957).] ****** It [the second, harsher sentence] was, in sum, the product of a procedure which could prove either deterring or punitive of an insistence on Constitutional privileges.” 11 346 F.2d at 430-431 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Patton v. State of North Carolina

3. “As the vacatur of the October 31, 1962 sentence — 3 years — is not sustainable, the probationary judgment of June 15, 1964 was ineffective and the order committing Walker for a period of 5 years on October 2, 1964 must be set aside. Walker may be held only to answer for the term computable under the October 31, 1962 judgment as enforced by the revocation order of April 23, 1963.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. McCaffrey v. Blackwell