346 Or. App. 72 - State v. Young

72                    December 24, 2025              No. 1115

     This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
      pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
           except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                   STATE OF OREGON

                 STATE OF OREGON,
                  Plaintiff-Respondent,
                            v.
           TYLER DWAYNE HURLOCK YOUNG,
                  Defendant-Appellant.
               Lane County Circuit Court
                  24CR18905; A185191

     Michelle P. Bassi, Judge.
     Submitted November 14, 2025.
  Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Matthew Blythe, Deputy Public Defender,
Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for
appellant.
   Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Interim Deputy Attorney General, and Jonathan N. Schildt,
Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
     Before Lagesen, Chief Judge, and Egan, Judge.
     EGAN, J.
     Orders to pay per diem fees reversed; otherwise affirmed.
Nonprecedential Memo Op:

346 Or App 72

 (2025)                              73

           EGAN, J.
         Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for
unlawful use of a weapon based on his guilty plea, for which
the trial court sentenced him to 36 months of probation with
45 days in jail as a condition. He assigns error to the order
in the judgment that he “shall pay any required per diem
fees” because that requirement to pay per diem fees was not
announced in open court at sentencing. The state concedes
the error. We agree with and accept the state’s concession.
We reverse the order that defendant pay per diem fees and
otherwise affirm.1
         “A criminal defendant has the right to have their
sentence announced in open court. A trial court commits
reversible error if it does not do so, and the result is usually a resentencing.” State v. Priester,

325 Or App 574, 581

530 P3d 118

, rev den,

371 Or 332

 (2023) (internal citations
omitted). A trial court errs in imposing a requirement to pay
a per diem fee in the judgment when that requirement was
not announced at sentencing, and typically the appropriate
remedy is a remand for resentencing. See State v. Barr,

331 Or App 242, 244

545 P3d 772

, rev den,

372 Or 720

 (2024)
(remanding for resentencing when requirement to pay per
diem fees was not announced in open court at sentencing).
However, because the trial court in this case stated on the
record its intent to “waive any fines or fees associated with
this,” we reverse the orders that defendant pay per diem fees
rather than remanding for sentencing. See State v. Sankey,

289 Or App 846

, 847,

409 P3d 73

 (2018) (reversing portions
of judgment requiring the defendant to pay conviction fee
and bench probation fee without remanding for resentencing
when the trial court declared that it would “waive all fees”).
        Orders to pay per diem fees reversed; otherwise
affirmed.




   1
     As authorized by ORS 2.570(2)(b), this matter is determined by a two-judge
panel.