Cited by 12 later decisions — most recently August 2017
12 state decisions
Key passage — most relied on by later courts
“a severance should be granted only when there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of a co-defendant or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about a co-defendant's guilt. . . . An appellate court should not reverse a conviction achieved at a joint trial in the absence of a reasonable probability that the defendant would have obtained a more favorable result at a separate trial.”
¶2I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion. Under the particular facts of this case, the act of trying Hughes with Shaw, who was the victim of Hughes’s crime of pointing a firearm, as his co-defendant was inherently prejudicial.
¶3While it is true criminal defendants who are jointly tried are not entitled to separate trials as a matter of right,10 a criminal defendant is entitled to a trial free from bias and confusion. As the majority states, a severance should be granted only when there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of a co-defendant or prevent the jury from, making a reliable judgment about a co-defendant’s guilt. State v. Dennis, 337 S.C. 275, 523 S.E.2d 173 (1999) (emphasis added). Allowing Hughes to be tried with his victim as his co-defendant seriously hampered the jury’s ability to make a *563reliable judgment about Hughes’s guilt for the charge of pointing a firearm. Accordingly, I would hold the PCR court erred by finding counsel was not ineffective for failing to investigate the charges against Hughes and for failing to make a motion to sever Hughes’s trial from his victim/co-defendant’s trial.