Marek v. Goyen’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 9 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Whenever work is done whereby a lien or liens may be claimed under Article 5452 hereof, it shall be the duty of the owner, his agent, trustee, or receiver to retain in his hands during the progress of such work and for thirty (SO) days after the work is completed, s to secure the payment of artisans and mechanics who perform labor or service, and to secure the payment of any other claimants furnishing material, or material and labor, or specially fabricated material for any contractor, subcontractor, agent, or receiver in the performance of such work ten per cent (10%) of the contract price to the owner, his agent, trustee, or receiver of such work, or ten per cent (10%) of the value of same, measured by the proportion that the work done bears to the work to be done, using the contract price or, if none, the reasonable value of the completed work as a basis of computing value. All persons who shall send notices in the time and manner required hy this Act and shall file affidavits claiming a lien not later than thirty (SO) days after the work is completed shall have a lien upon the fund so retained hy the owner, his agent, trustee, or receiver; with preference to artisans and mechanics, who shall share ratably therein to the extent of their claims; with any remaining balance to be shared ratably among all other participating claimants. If the owner, his agent, trustee, or receiver refuses or fails to comply with the provisions of this Article, then all claimants complying wit”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. TEXAS & NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY v. Logwood

2. ““* * * The validity of McAdams’ lien against the property of Housewright, Swayze & Co. depends upon his compliance with the requirements of the statutes enacted in pursuant of the constitution of this state. From the statement, it appears that McAdams did not give written notice of his claim for material furnished to Housewright, Swayze & Co. before they had paid to Berry the amount due him under the contract for building the house, and, by the terms of article 3308, Rev.St., Housewright, Swayze & Co. were not liable to McAdams for the material furnished to the subcontractor. ⅜ sfs ⅜ “Appellee insists that the notice required by the statute is for the benefit of the owner of the property improved, and that actual knowledge by Housewright, Swayze & Co. was a sufficient compliance with the law. The language, ‘but no owner or proprietor shall in any case be required to pay, nor his property be liable for, any money that he may have paid to the contractor before the fixing of the lien or before he has received written notice of the existence of the debt,’ is so explicit that the court cannot construe it to mean something less. The policy of the law is to relieve the owner from demands upon the ground of actual knowledge and constructive notice, because he could rarely defend himself from such claims. Written notice is certain and definite information upon which the owner must act. McAdams did not fix his lien nor give the written notice before payment was made by House-j wright, ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. TEXAS & NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY v. Logwood

3. ““There is uncertainty as to the circumstances under which promissory estoppel is recognized in Texas. Note, 11 T.L.R., p. 248; 16 T.L.R., p. 569; 20 T.L.R., p. 478, and particularly as to the requirements necessary to raise an estoppel to urge the statute of frauds. However, before one can be estopped to set up the statute of frauds as a defense the conduct relied upon to create the estoppel must be characterized as fraudulent. In the absence of fraudulent intent, the one relying on the estoppel must have suffered such substantial detriment as a foreseeable consequence of the conduct that to enforce the statute would result in fraud.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Readmond v. Matsushita Electric Corp. of America