Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp.’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

468 federal appellate · 125 district · 34 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 1,099 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “this Court has never held that proof of parallel business behavior [by itself] conclusively establishes agreement or, phrased differently, that such behavior itself constitutes a Sherman Act offense.”

   30 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc. · Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc.

2. “* * * These instructions, petitioner argues, were `so superficial and so limited as to deprive petitioner of any of the benefits conferred upon it' by § 5. 78 "We cannot agree. The trial judge instructed in effect, that the Paramount decrees alone could not support a recovery by petitioner; additional evidence was required to relate the presumed Paramount conspiracy to Baltimore and to the claimed damage period. The reasons for this are clear. The Paramount decrees did not rest on findings, nor were the findings based on evidence, of a particular conspiracy concerning restrictions on runs and clearances in Baltimore theatres; yet such a conspiracy is the nub of plaintiff's claim. The Paramount case involved a conspiracy found to exist as of 1945, which was enjoined no later than June 25, 1948; but the conspiracy alleged here involves a claimed damage period running from February 1949 to March 1950. Indeed, the relevancy of Paramount to the instant case is slight. * *”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 259 F. Supp. 35 - State of Michigan v. Morton Salt Company · Richfield Oil Corp. v. Karseal Corp.

3. ““The 1946 decree of the three-judge District Court enjoined the defendants, inter alia, from conspiring with respect to runs and clearances. The decree was stayed by Mr. Justice Reed pending the appeal to this Court. The stay expired, by its own terms, when the Court rendered its decision on May 3, 1948. But this decision, remanding the case to the District Court for further consideration, in no way altered the lower court’s findings as to runs and clearances. [United States v. Paramount Pictures], 334 U.S. 131, 144-148 , 68 S.Ct. 915 , 92 L.Ed. 1260 ; [Id., D.C.], 85 F.Supp. 881, 885, 897 . Hence, the injunctive provisions of the 1946 decree concerning runs and clearances were left intact. Following this Court’s decision, the order on mandate was entered in the District Court on June 25, 1948.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Valuskis v. Loew's Inc.