Williams v. State’s Empirical Analysis
2002
Citation profile
8 federal appellate · 94 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 102 later decisions — most recently March 2024 · most notably Grillot v. State (2003), Howard v. State (2012)
8 federal appellate · 94 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Estelle v. Williams · Taylor v. Kentucky · Jones v. ABC-TV · Nooner v. State · Ross v. State
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 102 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Restraints are not per se prejudicial, and the defendant must affirmatively demonstrate prejudice. We will not presume prejudice when there is nothing in the record to indicate what impression may have been made on the jurors or where the appellant did not offer any proof of prejudice. Tucker [v. State, 336 Ark. 244 , 983 S.W.2d 956 ]; Hill v. State, 285 Ark. 77 , 685 S.W.2d 495, 496 (1985). Williams has a long criminal past, including a conviction for capital murder, and two convictions for kidnapping and arson. He was on trial for capital murder, aggravated robbery, theft, and escape. Additionally, evidence was offered to show that at the prior trial for capital murder, Williams had taunted the victims and victims’ relatives and had ended up in an altercation with one. This required officers to carry Williams from the courtroom. It would be difficult to imagine a criminal defendant that would better fit the definition of a high-risk defendant. Williams offers no proof of prejudice beyond the general assertion that he could not be tried in restraints, with the exception of one prospective juror during voir dire who was excused for cause. The remainder of the jurors stated that they understood the necessity for the security and that it would not influence their decision as to whether Williams was guilty of these felony charges. The trial court did not abuse its discretion, andWilliams’s right to a fair trial was not violated. The restraint was reasonably necessary to maintain”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Williams v. State“(a) A person commits capital murder if: (1) Acting alone or with one (1) or more other persons: (A) The person commits or attempts to commit: ... (ii) Rape, § 5-14-103 ; ... and ... (B) In the course of and in furtherance of the felony or in immediate flight from the felony, the person or an accomplice causes the death of a person under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life; ... (9)(A) Under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, the person knowingly causes the death of a person fourteen (14) years of age or younger at the time the murder was committed if the defendant was eighteen (18) years of age or older at the time the murder was committed. (B) It is an affirmative defense to any prosecution under this subdivision (a)(9) arising from the failure of the parent, guardian, or person standing in loco parentis to provide specified medical or surgical treatment, that the parent, guardian, or person standing in loco parentis relied solely on spiritual treatment through prayer in accordance with the tenets and practices of an established church or religious denomination of which he or she is a member.”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Torres v. State“[a]ny alternate juror, who has not replaced a regular juror prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, shall be further instructed by the court in addition to the usual instruction regarding discussion of the case and not permitting any one to discuss the case with him or her, to remain at the courthouse during deliberation. During deliberation, should any regular juror die, or upon good cause shown to the court be found unable or disqualified to perform his or her duties, the court may order the juror to be discharged. The court may in its discretion , as an alternative to mistrial, replace such juror with the next alternate. In such event, the court shall instruct the jury to disregard all previous deliberation, and to commence deliberation anew. The trial court in its discretion may seat additional alternates as jurors in this manner as needed.”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Chavez v. State
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.