¶1specially concurring:
¶2I agree with the majority’s result, but not its reasoning. I specially concur to clarify the issue regarding the prosecutor’s practice of asking defendant to comment on the veracity of witnesses. The evidence in this case is closely balanced and, thus, warrants review under the plain error doctrine. People v. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d 53, 64 (2003). Here, defendant asserted self-defense and offered witnesses to corroborate his account of the events, making credibility a significant issue. Forensic tests revealed elevated levels of lead, barium, and antimony on the victim’s hands, giving rise to an inference that the victim fired a gun, although the tests were deemed inconclusive. Further, the police determined that a shell casing found near the victim’s body did not come from defendant’s weapon. The medical examiner’s report concerning entrance and exit wounds on the victim could also lend support to defendant’s self-defense claim. Thus, the evidence is closely balanced and is properly reviewed under the plain error doctrine.
¶3In this case, the prosecutor asked defendant several times to comment on the State’s witnesses’ veracity: “So the medical examiner lied when he said that this was an entrance wound?”, “So you can’t think of any reason why he [Kenneth Simmons] would lie about what you did, can you?”, “We expect our enemies to lie on us. It [sic] was your friend, wasn’t he?”, and “Can you think of any reason why she [Doanita Simmons] would lie?” Defendant answered that he did not know what the medical examiner said, that Kenneth and Doanita were his friends and that he did not know of any reason why they would lie.
¶4As I stated in my special concurrence to the previous opinion (People v. Young, 323 Ill. App. 3d 1078-1092 (2001) (Theis, J., specially concurring)), the prosecution’s practice of asking a criminal defendant to comment on the veracity of other witnesses who have testified against him has consistently and repeatedly been condemned by this court because such questions intrude on the jury’s function of determining the credibility of witnesses and serve to demean and ridicule the defendant. People v. Martin, 271 Ill. App. 3d 346, 356 (1995); People v. Morris, 229 Ill. App. 3d 144, 168 (1992); People v. Robinson, 219 Ill. App. 3d 235, 239 (1991); People v. Nwadiei, 207 Ill. App. 3d 869, 876-77 (1990); People v. Matthews, 205 Ill. App. 3d 371, 414-15 (1990); People v. Mitchell, 200 Ill. App. 3d 969, 978 (1990); People v. Foster, 190 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 1029 (1989); People v. Barnes, 182 Ill. App. 3d 75, 85-86 (1989); People v. Hopkins, 107 Ill. App. 3d 422, 426 (1982); People v. Dowd, 101 Ill. App. 3d 830, 844 (1981); People v. Best, 97 Ill. App. 3d 1083, 1086-87 (1981); People v. McGee, 88 Ill. App. 3d 447, 453 (1980); People v. Cohen, 83 Ill. App. 3d 706, 708 (1980); People v. Bost, 80 Ill. App. 3d 933, 946-47 (1980); People v. Moore, 80 Ill. App. 3d 996, 1005 (1980); People v. Hainline, 77 Ill. App. 3d 30, 33 (1979); People v. Robinson, 67 Ill. App. 3d 539, 550-51 (1978); People v. Spates, 62 Ill. App. 3d 890, 893-94 (1978); People v. Riley, 63 Ill. App. 3d 176, 184-85 (1978); People v. Meeks, 11 Ill. App. 3d 973, 979-80 (1973); People v. Hicks, 133 Ill. App. 2d 424, 434 (1971).
¶5While this practice has generally been deemed harmless error where evidence of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming, here, as discussed above, the evidence was closely balanced and the credibility of the witnesses was a crucial factor underlying the jury’s determination of defendant’s guilt or innocence. Further, the State compounded this error by arguing during closing arguments that the jury should find the State’s witnesses, and not defendant, credible, leading to a guilty verdict. He also referred to his questions to defendant as “trick questions” and stated that the State’s witnesses had “no motive to lie.” In light of the State’s numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct, this court’s repeated condemnation of this practice, and the closely balanced evidence in this case, the State’s questioning of defendant with respect to the veracity of adverse witnesses was not harmless error. Accordingly, I concur with the result of the majority in reversing and remanding the judgment of the circuit court.