¶1(concurring). We have here another question relating to procedure in bastardy cases, namely, whether or not notice of alibi must be given. In my dissent in People v. Stoeckl, 347 Mich 1, I rejected the theory of epithetical jurisprudence) that we solved anything by calling this action “civil” or “criminal.” I held that in each instance we must (p 12) “look to the purpose to be served by the statute under consideration and equate such purpose against the intendments of the bastardy act.” This case • furnishes another example thereof. I agree that notice of alibi should be given. Not, however, because this action, being held “criminal” for one purpose must be so for another, or because the defendant, having had the “benefit and protection” of certain statutes must comply with others prescribed “not for the benefit of the defendant but for the benefit and protection of the public.” It is impossible thus to classify statutory safeguards and requirements, particularly those relating to trials and procedures in causes criminal in nature, saying this one is for the benefit of the defendant, that one for the benefit of the public. Is not, in truth, the public welfare equally on trial with the prisoner in the dock? Do we not degrade our society as well as him if we deny him due process? What, indeed, is to his benefit that is not to ours, what goes to his protection that *364protects not us ? To me the distinction made is verbal only, not of substance. It is completely unworkable as a matter of practice and can serve only to further confuse a situation already badly muddled.
¶2Notice of alibi should be given, however, because this action is peculiarly susceptible to the evil sought to be cured through the adoption of such statute. The prosecutor puts it in these terms:
“A complaint in a bastardy case must set forth a date on which it is alleged an illegitimate child was conceived. It is incumbent upon the people to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant was present on the date alleged and had sexual intercourse with the complainant on the date in question. … The prosecution should have the right to know such facts, so that it can properly prepare to meet it at the time of trial.”
¶3For the above reasons, I concur in affirmance.