¶1(dissenting).
¶2I dissent.
¶3In the present case, the State claims that certain convictions which the defendant received in the states of Missouri and Minnesota may be considered in determining whether he is an habitual offender under the motor vehicle laws of Iowa. The offenses in question were for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
¶4In determining whether defendant is an “habitual offender,” we must accept the elements which-the legislature has established. To attain that discreditable status, the statutes require the accumulation of a prescribed number of convictions within a six-year period of those offenses listed in section 321.555(1). The sole issue in the present case is whether convictions in another state for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol may be included 'under item b of that section. The district court held they may not; the majority of this court holds they may.
¶5The conviction described in item b is as follows:
Operating a motor vehicle in violation of section 321.281.
¶6Because this obviously has reference to section 321.281 of the motor vehicle laws of this state, I agree with the district court and disagree with the majority opinion.
¶7Even if the elements of the offenses for which defendant was convicted in Missouri and Minnesota were the same as the elements of section 321.281, which is in no way confirmed in the present record, those convictions were not based on violations of section 321.281. They were based upon the violation of statutes of the state in which defendant was charged and convicted for those offenses.
¶8The issue is not whether the legislature could have provided that under-the-influence convictions in other states be considered in determining habitual offender status in Iowa, but whether we should expand the statute where the legislature included only those convictions obtained under the statutes of this state. The language involved in the present case is susceptible of but one meaning. We should accept a proffered interpretation of a statute contrary to its plain meaning only where the contrary meaning is inescapable. Otherwise we should adhere to our expressed preference for interpreting statutes in light of “what the legislature said, rather than what it should or might have said.” Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(13).
¶9Contrary to the view expressed in the majority opinion, I do not find that the broadened interpretation which it adopts is aided in any way by section 321.210. That statute does not relate to determination of habitual offender status, a determination made in judicial proceedings. Section 321.-210 pertains to use of out-of-state convictions for purposes of administrative proceedings before the Department of Transportation. For purposes of the present case, section 321.210 is significant, if at all, as an indication that the legislature was aware that specific directions should be given if out-of-state convictions were to be employed in imposing sanctions under the laws of this state. In the face of such awareness, the legislature worded item b so as to explicitly require conviction for violation of an Iowa statute. I believe that the trial court’s interpretation of the statute was correct and would affirm its decision.
¶10UHLENHOPP, McCORMICK, and MeGIVERIN, JJ., join this dissent.