No. 121 February 19, 2026 333
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JOHN MARK BENNETT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Multnomah County Circuit Court
24CN01051; A185031
Monica M. Herranz, Judge.
Submitted November 25, 2025.
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Emily P. Seltzer, Deputy Public Defender,
Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for
appellant.
Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Megan Mizuta, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Joyce, Judge, and
Hellman, Judge.
ORTEGA, P. J.
Affirmed.
334 State v. Bennett
ORTEGA, P. J.
Defendant appeals a judgment finding him in contempt on three counts of violating a Family Abuse Prevention
Act (FAPA) order. In this appeal, he challenges only a single conviction based on willful intimidation, molestation,
or interference with the protected person. He argues that
there was insufficient evidence that he violated the order
or that any violation was willful because, although the evidence showed that he smashed a television, he asserts that
it did not show that he did so in the protected person’s presence or home. Because circumstantial evidence permitted
those inferences, we affirm.
When a defendant argues that there was insufficient
evidence to find that he willfully violated a court order, we
review “to determine whether the record contains evidence
from which a rational trier of fact, drawing all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the state, could find
all elements of contempt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State
v. Northey,
(2025).
The question “is not whether [this court] believe[s] that the
defendant was in contempt, but whether the evidence is sufficient for the trier of fact to so find.” State v. Beleke,
(2017).
Here, the evidence was legally sufficient to show
that defendant willfully intimidated, molested, or interfered with the protected person, C, by smashing a television
inside her apartment. Specifically, the evidence showed that
a FAPA order prohibited defendant from willfully intimidating, molesting, or interfering with C and from willfully being
within 150 feet of C or her residence. Nevertheless, police
encountered defendant on a street near C and her apartment, and defendant admitted that he had damaged the
television, stating that he had done so because it belonged
to him.
Defendant did not have the television with him
when he was apprehended, and police took defendant from
the scene to jail. Although the responding officer was not
able to visit C’s apartment and photograph the television
himself while transporting defendant to jail, he asked C to
Nonprecedential Memo Op:
347 Or App 333
(2026) 335
send him a photo of the damaged television, and she did so
later that day. That evidence permitted a reasonable inference that defendant smashed the television inside C’s apartment in violation of the FAPA order.
Affirmed.
