¶1(concurring in result only):
¶2I respectfully concur in result only. I disagree with the reasoning and analysis of the majority. The reliance by the *91majority on the consent given by Brannon is unnecessary. I do not deal with the issue of consent because the principle of “probable cause” is dispositive. This case presents the quintessential “probable cause” conundrum.
¶3I. WARRANTLESS SEARCH
¶4Generally, a warrantless search is per se unreasonable and violates the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Dupree, 319 S.C. 454, 462 S.E.2d 279 (1995). However, a warrantless search will withstand constitutional scrutiny where the search falls within one of several well recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. Dupree, 319 S.C. at 456, 462 S.E.2d at 281; State v. Bailey, 276 S.C. 32, 274 S.E.2d 913 (1981). These exceptions include: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) “hot pursuit”; (3) stop and frisk; (4) automobile exception; (5) “plain view” doctrine; (6) consent; and (7) abandonment. Dupree, 319 S.C. at 456-57, 462 S.E.2d at 281. The burden of establishing probable cause and the existence of circumstances constituting an exception to the general prohibition against warrantless searches is upon the prosecution. State v. Bultron, 318 S.C. 323, 457 S.E.2d 616 (Ct.App.1995). See also Dupree, 319 S.C. at 456, 462 S.E.2d at 281 (burden is upon State to justify warrantless search).
¶5II. AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION TO WARRANT REQUIREMENT
¶6A warrantless search of a vehicle may be made if (1) there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence of a crime; and (2) there are exigent circumstances arising out of the mobility of the vehicle and its consequently likely disappearance if the search is not executed immediately. This is commonly referred to as the Carroll Doctrine. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149, 45 S.Ct. 280, 283-84, 69 L.Ed. 543, 549 (1925)(holding “the true rule is that if the search and seizure without a warrant are made upon probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid.”).
¶7*92The two bases for the exception are: (1) the ready mobility of automobiles and the potential that evidence may be lost before a warrant is obtained; and (2) the lessened expectation of privacy in motor vehicles which are subject to governmental regulation. State v. Cox, 290 S.C. 489, 351 S.E.2d 570 (1986). When a vehicle is being used on the highways, or if it is readily capable of such use and is found stationary in a place not regularly used for residential purposes-temporary or otherwise-the two justifications for the vehicle exception come into play. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985). First, the vehicle is obviously readily mobile by the turn of an ignition key, if not actually moving. Id.Second, there is a reduced expectation of privacy stemming from its use as a licensed motor vehicle subject to a range of police regulations inapplicable to a fixed dwelling. Id.
¶8A. Probable Cause
¶9Probable cause is defined as a good faith belief that a person is guilty of a crime when this belief rests on such grounds as would induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious person, under the circumstances, to believe likewise. Wortman v. City of Spartanburg, 310 S.C. 1, 425 S.E.2d 18 (1992); State v. Blassingame, 338 S.C. 240, 525 S.E.2d 535 (Ct.App.1999).
¶10The standard for probable cause to conduct a warrantless search is the same as that for a search with a warrant. State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 248 S.E.2d 475 (1978); State v. Bultron, 318 S.C. 323, 457 S.E.2d 616 (Ct.App.1995). “That is, a justifiable determination, based upon the totality of the circumstances and in view of all the evidence available to law enforcement officials at the time of the search, that there exists a practical, nontechnical probability that a crime is being committed or has been committed and incriminating evidence is involved.” Bultron, 318 S.C. at 332, 457 S.E.2d at 621. See also State v. Adams, 291 S.C. 132, 352 S.E.2d 483 (1987)(determination of probable cause depends on totality of circumstances).
¶11In State v. Dupree, 319 S.C. 454, 462 S.E.2d 279 (1995), our Supreme Court discussed probable cause:
*93“In dealing with probable cause ... as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” “And in determining whether the officer acted reasonably ... due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from facts in light of his experience.” Mere suspicions of the officer will not support a finding of probable cause.
... The “experience of a police officer is a factor to be considered in the determination of probable cause, ... but the relevance of the suspect’s conduct should be sufficiently articulable that its import can be understood by the average reasonably prudent person.”
¶12Dupree, 319 S.C. at 458-59, 462 S.E.2d at 282 (citations omitted).
¶13B. Exigent Circumstances
¶14Automobiles, because of their mobility, may be searched without a warrant upon facts not justifying a warrantless search of a residence or office. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970). The opportunity to search an automobile is fleeting since a car is readily movable. Id.An immediate intrusion is necessary because of the nature of an automobile in transit. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982). The mobility of automobiles creates circumstances of such exigency that, as a practical necessity, rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossible. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976). See also 79 C.J.S. Searches and Seizures § 84 (1995)(mobility of vehicle gives rise to exigency justifying search). The ready mobility of the vehicle is one of the principal bases of the automobile exception. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985).
¶15C. Probable Cause Alone is Sufficient Under Automobile Exception
¶16The automobile exception allows law enforcement officials to conduct a search of an automobile based on probable cause *94alone due to the lessened expectation of privacy in motor vehicles traveling on public highways. State v. Cox, 290 S.C. 489, 351 S.E.2d 570 (1986); State v. Bultron, 318 S.C. 323, 457 S.E.2d 616 (Ct.App.1995). See also 68 Am.Jur.2d Searches and Seizures § 268 (2000)(warrantless search of car is valid under Fourth Amendment, so long as search is based on probable cause). The Supreme Court, in State v. Cox, examined the principle of “probable cause” as it relates to the automobile exception:
The [California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985) ] Court makes clear that under the automobile exception, probable cause alone is sufficient to justify a warrantless search. As the Court stated, “the pervasive schemes of regulation, which necessarily lead to reduced expectations of privacy, and the exigencies attendant to ready mobility justify searches [of vehicles] without prior recourse to the authority of a magistrate so long as the overriding standard of probable cause is met.” That is, the inherent mobility of automobiles provides the requisite exigency.
¶17Cox, 290 S.C. at 492, 351 S.E.2d at 571-72 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
¶18Under the automobile exception, if probable cause exists to justify the warrantless search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999); Bultron, 318 S.C. at 332, 457 S.E.2d at 621.
¶19III. AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR
¶20Probable cause to search Brannon’s vehicle existed under the facts of the instant case. On January 15, 1999, Agent Darrell Duncan received information from a reliable confidential informant that Brannon was driving to New Jersey to pick up a quantity of crack cocaine. Duncan had received information from the informant before. All information he previously received from the informant had been reliable. Moreover, Duncan testified the State had obtained a conviction for trafficking based on information provided by the informant.
¶21*95In addition, on January 16,1999, Duncan received an anonymous tip from a woman who identified herself as “Cat.” Cat advised Duncan that Brannon and “Joe Cool” would be driving back to Cherokee County on highway 1-85 at about 9:00 p.m. that night with a quantity of cocaine in the car. She supplied Duncan with vital information: the tag number and a description of the car. Cat stated the drugs were in the trunk of the car, hidden under the carpet. She had observed the men place the drugs there. Officer David Parker knew the vehicle in question from a prior narcotics investigation involving Bran-non. When Agent Duncan ran the tag number, he discovered the car was registered to Brannon.
¶22Based on the information they received, Agent Duncan and Officer Parker set up surveillance on 1-85. Around 8:00 a.m., they observed the vehicle in which Brannon and Mayberry were riding. The vehicle sped up upon passing the unmarked police car. The officers followed the car, which took the first exit in South Carolina and pulled into a Wendy’s parking lot. Brannon and Mayberry quickly jumped out of the vehicle and walked at a fast pace with their heads down toward the Wendy’s restaurant. The men were acting nervous. When the officers asked to speak with them, Brannon and Mayberry continued walking. Due to the suspicious behavior of the pair, and the fact that the officers possessed information that Brannon and Mayberry would possibly try to run, the officers stopped them, placed them in handcuffs, and read them their rights.
¶23The law enforcement officers had probable cause to believe Brannon and Mayberry were transporting drugs in the vehicle pursuant to the tips from the reliable confidential informant and the anonymous informant. Accordingly, the warrantless search of the vehicle was proper under the automobile exception without resort to a “consent” analysis.