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← 347 U.S. 89 - Partmar Corp. v. Paramount Pictures Theatres Corp.

Partmar Corp. v. Paramount Pictures Theatres Corp.’s Empirical Analysis

1954

Citation profile

374
cited by 374 later decisions
2
cited 2 times by the Supreme Court
11
states following
July 2010
most recently cited

164 federal appellate · 20 district · 39 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 374 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently July 2010 · most notably Lyons v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. (1955), Uniroyal, Inc. v. Board of Tax Review of the Town of Middlebury (1981)

164 federal appellate · 20 district · 39 state decisions — followed in 11 states

11301954196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Appellate journey

reviewedPartmar Corporation and Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Theatres Corporation and Paramount Pictures, Inc. (from Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals)

Relationships

Applies 15 U.S.C. § 1 (§ 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act) · 15 U.S.C. § 15 (§ 4 of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914) · 15 U.S.C. § 16 (§ 5 of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914)

Relies on Commissioner v. Sunnen · Cromwell v. County of Sac · Stoll v. Gottlieb · United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. · Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 374 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The general principle announced in numerous cases is that a right, question or fact distinctly put in issue, and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, as a ground of recovery, cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies; and even if the second suit is for a different cause of action, the right, question, or fact once so determined must, as between the same parties or their privies, be taken as conclusively established, so long as the judgment in the first suit remains unmodified. This general rule is demanded by the very object for which civil courts have been established, which is to secure the peace and repose of society by the settlement of matters capable of judicial determination. Its enforcement is essential to the maintenance of social order; for the aid of judicial tribunals would not be invoked for the vindication of rights of person and property if, as between parties and their privies, conclusiveness did not attend the judgments of such tribunals in respect of all matters properly put in issue and actually determined by them.”
    6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  2. “We have often held that under the doctrine of res judicata a judgment entered in an action conclusively settles that action as to all matters that were or might have been litigated or adjudged therein. But a prior judgment between the parties has been held to operate as an estoppel in a suit on a cause of action different from that forming the basis for the original suit `only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered.' This latter aspect of res judicata is the doctrine of collateral estoppel by judgment, established as a procedure for carrying out the public policy of avoiding repetitious litigation.”
    5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““ ‘The contention of the government seems to be that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to questions of law; and, in a sense, that is true. It does not apply to unmixed questions of law. Where, for example, a court in deciding a case has enunciated a rule of law, the parties in a subsequent action upon a different demand are not estopped from insisting that the law is otherwise, merely because the parties are the same in both cases. But a fact, question or right distinctly adjudged in the original action cannot be disputed in a subsequent action, even though the determination was reached upon an erroneous view or by an erroneous application of the law.’ Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 569 , 71 S.Ct. 408 , 95 L.Ed. 534 ; Cf. United States v. Stone & Downer Co., 274 U.S. 225, 230 , 47 S.Ct. 616 , 71 L.Ed. 1013 .” 347 U.S. at page 103 , Footnote 9, 74 S.Ct. at page 422 .”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.