¶1dissenting. I dissent. This court has taken similar appeals to resolve the statutory interpretation of law regarding former-jeopardy claims. See State v. Thompson, 343 Ark. 135, 139, 34 S.W.3d 33, 35 (2000); State v. McMullen, 302 Ark. 252, 253, 789 S.W.2d 715, 716 (1990). Here, no factual issues exist. Appellee Wendi Williams had pled guilty to a federal crime under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1344 (2000). Based on the same conduct underlying the federal crime, the State charged Williams committed theft of property under state law, Ark. Code Ann. § 5-l-144(l)(A)(l) (Repl. 1997), which provides as follows:
When conduct constitutes an offense within the concurrent jurisdiction of this state of the United States or another state or territory thereof, a prosecution in any such other jurisdiction is an affirmative defense to a subsequent prosecution in this state under the following circumstances:
(1) The first prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction as set out in § 5-1-112, and the subsequent prosecution is based on the same conduct unless:
(A) The offense of which the defendant was formerly convicted or acquitted and the offense for which he is subsequently prosecuted each requires proof of a fact not required by the other, and the law defining each of the offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil[. ]
¶2(Emphasis added.)
¶3The sole legal issue to be decided in this appeal is whether the trial court misinterpreted § 5-1-114(1)(A) in deciding that the state theft law is not intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil than the federal bank-fraud statute. It is difficult for me to understand why we decline to reach this legal issue now, because no doubt, this same issue is likely to be raised again until the issue is resolved. As noted above, we have done so in similar appeals in the past, and I know of no good reason not to do so in this case.