Stone v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

118 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 118 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The question of “implied consent” . . . was more closely examined recently in U.S. v. Gonzalez, supra. In Gonzalez, the officer approached an individual outside her home and asked if she would consent to a search of her home. Following a conversation with her daughter, she told the officer she wanted to go inside and get a drink of water. The officer then told her he “wanted to go in” with her, and when she did not bar him from going in, he followed her inside. The Eleventh Circuit held that there was no consent to enter: We have previously noted our hesitancy to find implied consent (i.e. consent by silence) in the Fourth Amendment context, and we agree with our colleagues in the Ninth Circuit that whatever relevance the implied consent doctrine may have in other contexts, it is inappropriate to sanction entry into the home based upon inferred consent.’ [Emphasis added.] Gonzalez then quoted from U.S. v. Shaibu, 920 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1990), to which it had referred above: The government may not show consent to enter from the defendant’s failure to object to the entry. To do so would be to justify entry by consent and consent by entry. ‘This will not do.’ Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. at 17. We must not shift the burden from the government — to show 'unequivocal and specific’ consent — to the defendant, who would have to prove unequivocal and specific objection to a police entry, or be found to have given implied consent. [Emphasis added.]”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Latta v. State

2. “A warrantless entry into a private home is presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984); Scott v. State, 347 Ark. 767 , 67 S.W.3d 567 (2002); Butler v. State, 309 Ark. 211 , 829 S.W.2d 412 (1992). However, the presumption of unreasonableness may be overcome if the law-enforcement officer obtained the consent of the homeowner to conduct a warrantless search. See Holmes v. State, 347 Ark. 530 , 65 S.W.3d 860 (2002) (citing Ark.R.Crim.P. 11.1; Hillard v. State, 321 Ark. 39 , 900 S.W.2d 167 (1995)). This court has established that the State has a heavy burden to prove by clear and positive testimony that a consent to search was freely and voluntarily given. Holmes v. State, supra; Norris v. State, 338 Ark. 397 , 993 S.W.2d 918 (1999); Scroggins v. State, 268 Ark. 261 , 595 S.W.2d 219 (1980). A valid consent to search must be voluntary, and “[v]oluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances.” Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40 (1996) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)). Any consent given must be unequivocal and may not usually be implied. Holmes v. State, supra; Norris v. State, supra (citing U.S. v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819 (11th Cir. 1996)).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Brown

3. “[T]he attenuation must be determined by weighing the seriousness of the police misconduct. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975). This court has... held that an intervening event can be an attenuating circumstance. See, e.g., Brewer v. State, 271 Ark. 810 , 611 S.W.2d 179 (1981) (taint of pretextual arrest attenuated when defendant’s girlfriend told defendant that she had already implicated him in the criminal activity).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Johnson v. State