United States v. Donovan’s Empirical Analysis
348 F.3d 509 · 2003
Citation profile
6 federal appellate ·
Relationships
Applies 26 U.S.C. § 6502 · 26 U.S.C. § 6672
Relies on 23923y Schachner v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ohio · Parrett v. American Ship Building Co. · Kellena Cornist and David Jones v. B.J.T. Auto Sales, Inc. B.J.T. Finance, Inc. James Hadley Bill R. Hatcher Thomas Tepe · United States v. Hodgekins
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 22 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“The taxpayer-proponents agree to the waiver and suspension of any statutory periods of limitations for assessment and collection of the tax liability described in paragraph (1) while the offer is pending, during the time any amount offered remains unpaid, and for one (1) year after the satisfaction of the terms of the offer. The offer shall be deemed pending from the date an authorized official of the Internal Revenue Service accepts taxpayer-proponents’ waiver of the statutory periods of limitation and shall remain pending until an authorized official of the Internal Revenue Service formally, in writing, accepts, rejects or withdraws the offer. If there is an appeal with respect to this offer, the offer shall be deemed pending until the date the Appeals office formally accepts or rejects this offer in writing. If within thirty (30) days of being notified of a right to protest a determination with regard to this offer no protest is filed, the taxpayer-proponents agree to waive the right to a hearing before the Appeals office for this offer in compromise.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“[T]he date of the effective withdrawal of the offer is a different matter from that of the date when the offer is no longer “pending” pursuant to paragraph (m). It may indeed be true, as the district court states, that ‘the withdrawal of an offer in compromise is effective as of the date the taxpayer writes his letter of withdrawal.’ That judgment, however, would be true as a matter of substantive contract law. However, the statute of limitations question turns on when the offer ceases to be ‘pending’ under paragraph (m) of Form 656. The latter con trols when the statute of limitations begins to run again.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“[t]he question of whether the language of an agreement is ambiguous is a question of law. Once the language of a contract has been held to be ambiguous, the interpretation of such language is a question of fact that turns on the intent of the parties.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.