Chambers’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 54 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(a) A discharge under section 727 ... of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt— (8) unless excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph would impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s dependents, for— (A)(i) an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any program funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution; or (ii) an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship or stipend; or (B) any other educational loan that is a qualified education loan, as defined in section 221(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, incurred by a debtor who is an individual[.]”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In re Oliver · Institute of Imaginal Studies v. Christoff (In re Christoff)

2. “(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt — .... (4) for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny;....”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Rutkowski v. Adas (In re Adas) · Farahani v. Bastanipour (In re Bastanipour)

3. “Although the term “loan” can be construed broadly under various dictionary definitions, [footnote omitted] we look to the common law definition of “loan” as articulated in In re Grand Union Co., 219 F. 353, 356 (2d Cir.1914), and as paraphrased in Renshaw, 222 F.3d at 88 . Under this interpretation, nonpayment of tuition qualifies as a loan “in two classes of cases”: “‘where funds have changed hands,’ or where ‘there is an agreement ... whereby the college extends credit.’ ” [In re] Mehta, 310 F.3d [308] at 314 [(3rd Cir.2002)] (quoting Renshaw, 222 F.3d at 90 ). The agreement to transfer educational services in return for later payment “must be reached prior to or contemporaneous with the transfer” of those educational services. Renshaw, 222 F.3d at 88 . This existence of a separate agreement acknowledging the transfer and delaying the obligation for repayment distinguishes a loan from a mere unpaid debt. As noted by the bankruptcy and district courts, language in another provision of § 523(a) reinforces this interpretation. In § 523(a)(2), a provision designed to prevent the discharge of debts incurred through fraud, Congress excepted from discharge any “extension of credit.” 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(2). This language is not employed in § 523(a)(8). The use of the term “loan” in § 523(a)(8) rather than “extension of credit,” as employed in § 523(a)(2), suggests that a narrower set of circumstances is contemplated in § 523(a)(8) than in § 523(a)(2). Furthermore, although Congress”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Joint Apprenticeship Comm. of United Ass'n Local Union No 307 v. Rezendes (In Re Rezendes)